Dr. Mack investigated the phenonmenon of alien abductions. He interviewed about 200 people who claimed that they had been abducted by extraterrestrial aliens, and concluded that their beliefs could not be explained by any psychiatric disorder. He concluded that the "experiencers," as he called them, were describing actual experiences. Dr. Mack found that there was a uniformity in the actions and characteristics that the experiencers attributed to the alien abductors, which lent credence to the experiencers' reports.
Question: Let us say that in the days before my job termination, Dennis Race, Esq. had spoken with Dr. John Mack at Harvard. Let's say that Dennis Race described me to Dr. Mack. Let's say that Dr. Mack stated to Dennis Race that the qualities I possessed were consistent with the qualities that "experiencers" attributed to extraterrestrial aliens. Dennis Race concluded in good faith, relying on the credentials of Dr. Mack, that I might be an alien, that (as a non-human) I did not enjoy any rights under the law and that Dennis Race formed a good-faith belief that he might lawfully terminate me.
Could the DC Court of Appeals conclude the following about my job termination?
"There is no probable cause to believe that Petitioner's job termination violated the D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977. The employer consulted a psychiatrist who identified Petitioner's qualities as alien-like, and the employer concluded it was lawful to terminate Mr. Freedman. The Department of Human Rights (DHR) did not find that Petitioner was an extraterrestrial alien. Rather, DHR concluded that the law firm was not motivated by a discriminatory animus based on petitioner’s sexual orientation, but rather by concerns raised by a psychiatrist, and this constituted a legitimate business reason for his termination. The Department of Human Rights found that a competent, practicing psychiatrist advised the employer that Mr. Freedman possessed qualities that are consistent with those attributed to aliens, and that the employer, on that basis, made a good-faith, nondiscriminatory determination that Petitioner did not enjoy the rights of a human being. It is not the role of this Court to weight the evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Moreover, neither DHR nor this Court need “determine whether or not defendant adequately investigated the charges of . . . discrimination’ before discharging plaintiff.” Evans v. Bally’s Health and Tennis, 64 FEP Case. 33, 38 (D.Md. 1994). See also Bradshaw v. Brookdale Hosp. Medical Ctr., 1993 Westlaw 289435 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (even if defendant’s investigation resulted in an inaccurate determination, plaintiff offers no evidence that defendant acted with discriminatory intent)."
What's wrong with that court determination?