U.S. Capitol Police -- Letter No. 2

August 8, 1998
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008-4530

Scott L. Nelson, Esq.
Miller, Cassidy, Larocca & Lewin
2555 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037-1353
(202) 293-6400

Dear Mr. Nelson:

I am an attorney licensed to practice in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and am interested in consideration for employment with your firm in the capacity of associate. Preliminary to forwarding a copy of my resume to you I believe I have a legal duty to advise you of the following facts regarding concerns about my potential for armed violence, homicide, arms procurement, and the illegal transport of weapons: concerns that have been placed in controversy and affirmed as genuine by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel.

The Government of the District of Columbia has affirmed that my former employer, the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump") terminated my employment in October 1991 on the basis of genuine concerns about my mental health and stability, including the potential for violence. The employer's termination decision was made following an ex parte consultation with a psychiatrist who did not examine me personally. Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order, June 10, 1996). As of the filing of the complaint in the said proceedings, in October 1995, and at all times thereafter, it was unlawful under the laws of the District of Columbia for a psychiatrist to offer a professional psychiatric opinion about an individual without benefit of personal examination as is strongly recommended by the American Psychiatric Association's Principles of Medical Ethics. The D.C. Code in its latest revision makes it unlawful for a physician to "[fail] to conform to standards of acceptable conduct and prevailing practice within a health profession." See D.C. Code 2-3305.14(26). This provision was added to the District of Columbia Health Occupations Revision Act by D.C. Law 10-247, enacted on March 23, 1995.

The District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.) expressly affirmed to the D.C. Superior Court in pleadings filed in the above-referenced proceedings, relying on legally-irrelevant "after-acquired" evidence, see McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S.Ct. 879, 885 (1995), that my coworkers had formed genuine fears (i.e., not motivated by discriminatory animus) that I might have been armed and dangerous and poised to carry out a homicidal assault on the firm's premises. See Brief of Respondent in Opposition to Petition for Review of no Probable Cause Determination by Department of Human Rights at 6, Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (citing record on appeal at 276). The District implicitly asserted that my coworkers' concerns about my potential for armed violence were relevant to the employer's decision to terminate my employment.

I stand by the "Statement of Gary Freedman to the Office of U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Regarding Intent to Commit Crime of Violence as Determined by the Law Firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld," ("Statement to the U.S. Attorney") dated April 24, 1995, and made under penalty of criminal sanctions (D.C. Code 22-2514).

I want to advise, additionally, that representations made by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (M. Justin Draycott, Esq.) to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in December 1997, in the currently pending appeal of the above-referenced litigation, that my coworkers had genuine fears about my potential for armed violence or homicide conflict with the prior Statement to the U.S. Attorney, and that said conflict may give rise to the appearance that representations that I made in the Statement to the U.S. Attorney were unreliable, knowingly false, or perjured.

Additionally, the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel stands by speculation made by the District of Columbia Department of Human Rights that a document I submitted to the agency may have been inauthentic (i.e., forged or fabricated), see record on appeal at 8; presumably, according to the agency, I submitted the document in order to deny forensic psychiatric evidence filed by Akin Gump with the agency, that I suffered from a psychiatric symptom associated with a risk of violence.

Robert Chapman, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, is familiar with this matter, and will respond to any questions you may have. The telephone number of the U.S. Attorney's Office is (202) 514 7566.

Sincerely,

Gary Freedman

[I have no idea why I designated this letter "USCAP2"]