In August 1998 my then treating psychiatrist Albert H. Taub, M.D. (D.C. Department of Mental Health) recommended that I take the anti-psychotic medication Zyprexa. I refused to take the medication unless Dr. Taub signed the following informed consent statement that I prepared. Dr. Taub refused to sign the statement, whereupon I filed a complaint with the D.C. Board of Medicine against Dr. Taub. In response to the complaint instituted by the D.C. Medical Board Dr. Taub explained, in a letter to the Medical Board dated February 22, 1999, his refusal to sign what he termed my "manifesto," and stated that I suffered from severe mental illness of longstanding duration, which he diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenia. In Dr. Taub's opinion, therefore, the following statement is the product of a person with the disabling psychotic mental illness, paranoid schizophrenia.
August 17, 1998 (revised 8/22/98)
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Albert H. Taub, M.D.
Attending Physician
Community Mental Health Center (North)
Washington, DC 20007
RE: Patient no. 230923 -- Social Security Disability Claim no. xxx xx xxxx
Dear Dr. Taub:
I have reviewed your recommendation that I take the drug "Xyprexa." I have learned that the medication is a neuroleptic (anti-psychotic) that is frequently (though not exclusively) prescribed for schizophrenia or any severe mental illness in which disturbed thought processes are prominent.
In order to preserve my legal rights, I believe I must ask you to prepare and sign a statement that includes the following points, so that, in the event I take the medication, no incorrect inferences will be drawn at some later time concerning the specific indications that prompted your prescription. The following points delimit the purpose of the prescription to exclude facts or issues relating to litigation in which I am currently involved, and related matters.
You may want to review this matter with the D.C. Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles L. Reischel, Esq.) prior to preparing the statement. The telephone number of the Corporation Counsel's Office at 441 Fourth Street, NW (One Judiciary Square), 20001, is (202) 727-6252.
Statement of Albert H. Taub, M.D., Made in Contemplation of Medical Prescription
1. Mr. Freedman's belief that he was subjected to unlawful employment discrimination by employees and managers of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump"), where Mr. Freedman was employed from June 13, 1988 to October 29, 1991, is a rational belief, or opinion, and is not the product of a mental disturbance.
2. Mr. Freedman's belief that his job termination by Akin Gump, effective October 29, 1991, was unlawful under the D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977 is a rational belief, or opinion, and is not the product of a mental disturbance.
3. Mr. Freedman's belief that he was subjected to a hostile, intimidating, or offensive work environment during the entirety of his tenure at Akin Gump (1988-1991) is a rational belief, or opinion, and is not the product of a mental disturbance.
4. Mr. Freedman's belief that attorney managers of Akin Gump, including managing partner Laurence J. Hoffman, Esq. and hiring partner Dennis M. Race, Esq. (among others) conspired to defame him, and did in fact defame him, specifically with regard to the issues of Mr. Freedman's mental health, stability (potential for violence), employment history at Akin Gump, and suitability for employment is a rational belief, or opinion, and is not the product of a mental disturbance.
5. Mr. Freedman's belief that his sister Mrs. Estelle Jacobson had clandestine communications with Akin Gump attorney manager Malcolm Lassman, Esq., dating as far back as the year 1989, is a rational belief, or opinion, that is based on statements made by Mrs. Jacobson to Mr. Freedman in about September 1989 and is not the product of a mental disturbance.
6. Mr. Freedman's belief that the resident manager of his apartment building (3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Washington, DC), Elayne Wranik (now deceased), unlawfully permitted persons associated with Akin Gump, in January 1990, to gain access to Mr. Freedman's apartment, inspect the apartment's contents, and videotape the apartment is a rational belief, or opinion, that is based in part on statements made by Elayne Wranik to Mr. Freedman during the week of about November 4, 1991, and is not the product of a mental disturbance.
7. Mr. Freedman's belief that his sister, Mrs. Estelle Jacobson, continued to communicate clandestinely with persons associated with Akin Gump in the period after Mr. Freedman's job termination, effective October 29, 1991, is a rational belief, or opinion, based on statements made by Mrs. Jacobson to Mr. Freedman, and is not the product of a mental disturbance.
8. Mr. Freedman's belief that the psychiatric treatment provided to him by psychiatry residents at the George Washington University Medical Center ("GW"), during the period September 1, 1992 through June 30, 1996, may have fallen below acceptable medical standards (in that medical doctors misdiagnosed his illness, misprescribed medication, and failed to take any meaningful or appropriate action to assure the continuation of his treatment upon his termination by GW), is a rational belief, or opinion, and is not the product of a mental disturbance.
9. Mr. Freedman's averral that employees of the District of Columbia provided erroneous or false information to federal law enforcement authorities that led to the action of federal law enforcement authorities (U.S. Capitol Police) on August 6, 1998 in visiting Mr. Freedman's home, frisking him for weapons, and subjecting him to interrogation with respect to an allegation that Mr. Freedman had threatened (to employees of the District of Columbia) to commit a crime of violence (a threat that would constitute a felony under Federal law), is a rational statement of fact and is not the product of a mental disturbance. Further, Mr. Freedman's belief that the above-described action of employees of the District of Columbia (in providing erroneous or false information about him to Federal law enforcement authorities), may itself constitute a prosecutable offense committed by employees of the District of Columbia is a rational belief, or opinion, and is not the product of a mental disturbance.
10. Mr. Freedman's belief that the action of Stephen D. Quint, M.D. (D.C. Mental Health Services Administration) in delaying for six weeks following June 18, 1998 the assignment of Mr. Freedman to a therapist despite Mr. Freedman's diagnosis (paranoid schizophrenia); and the action of Dr. Quint in assigning Mr. Freedman to a psychology student rather than to a psychiatry resident (despite the availability of a psychiatry resident at the "P Street Clinic") are actions that may be inconsistent with sound medical practice, constitute a rational belief, or opinion, and is not the product of a mental disturbance.
11. Mr. Freedman's action in writing a letter to Dr. Quint, which letter is dated July 27, 1998, that highlights the failure of the D.C. Mental Health Services Administration to take actions in regard to Mr. Freedman's case that may be consistent with sound medical practice, was--despite the reasonable concerns of Federal law enforcement officers--not the product of a serious mental disturbance. The D.C. Mental Health Services Administration acknowledges that despite Dr. Quint's receipt of the letter (on about July 28, 1998), Dr. Quint proceeded to assign (on about July 30, 1998) Mr. Freedman to a psychology student (Lisa Osborne) rather than to a psychiatry resident, notwithstanding the availability of a psychiatry resident at the P Street Clinic.
12. The D.C. Mental Health Services Administration acknowledges that Mr. Freedman underwent comprehensive psychological testing in May 1994 performed by GW and that the testing failed to disclose any psychotic thought processes, any impairment in ego strength, or any diagnosable mental illness according to DSM-III criteria. The D.C. Mental Health Services Administration further acknowledges that the U.S. Social Security Administration determined that Mr. Freedman became disabled and not suitable for employment effective October 29, 1991, the date of his job termination by Akin Gump.
13. The D.C. Mental Health Services Administration acknowledges that as part of GW's psychiatric assessment of Mr. Freedman in September 1992, Mr. Freedman had a consultation with one of his former treating psychiatrists, Stanley R. Palombo, M.D., a psychiatrist in private practice (telephone no. 202 362-6004), who determined that as of October 2, 1992, Mr. Freedman was fully employable without restriction. Again, the D.C. Mental Health Services Administration acknowledges that the U.S. Social Security Administration determined that Mr. Freedman became disabled and not suitable for employment effective October 29, 1991, the date of his job termination by Akin Gump.
14. The D.C. Mental Health Services Administration acknowledges that Mr. Freedman's treating psychiatrists at the George Washington University Medical Center, where he underwent out-patient psychiatric treatment from 1992 to 1996, determined that Mr. Freedman did not pose a risk of violence or pose a risk of harm to any person.
15. The D.C. Mental Health Services Administration does not represent that Mr. Freedman was subjected to unlawful job harassment during his tenure at Akin Gump. However, Mr. Freedman's obsessive preoccupation with his employment experience at Akin Gump is consistent with the psychological sequelae that are known to result from victimization in a hostile, offensive, or intimidating work environment.
16. It is the opinion of the D.C. Mental Health Services Administration that the content of Mr. Freedman's beliefs or opinions described above is not the product of a mental disturbance or the psychiatric symptom "ideas of reference," notwithstanding the position of the D.C. Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles L. Reischel, Esq.) taken on behalf of the D.C. Department of Human Rights in an appeal currently pending before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C.C.A. no. 96-CV-961.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
cc: Stephan J. Horan, S.A. [U.S. Capital Police]
August 17, 1998 (revised 8/22/98 and 3/5/99)
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Albert H. Taub, M.D.
Attending Physician
Community Mental Health Center (North)
Washington, DC 20007
RE: Patient no. 230923 -- Social Security Disability Claim no. xxx xx xxxx
Dear Dr. Taub:
I have reviewed your recommendation that I take the drug "Xyprexa." I have learned that the medication is a neuroleptic (anti-psychotic) that is frequently (though not exclusively) prescribed for schizophrenia or any severe mental illness in which disturbed thought processes are prominent.
In order to preserve my legal rights, I believe I must ask you to prepare and sign a statement that includes the following points, so that, in the event I take the medication, no incorrect inferences will be drawn at some later time concerning the specific indications that prompted your prescription. The following points delimit the purpose of the prescription to exclude facts or issues relating to litigation in which I am currently involved, and related matters.
You may want to review this matter with the D.C. Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles L. Reischel, Esq.) prior to preparing the statement. The telephone number of the Corporation Counsel's Office at 441 Fourth Street, NW (One Judiciary Square), 20001, is (202) 727-6252.
Statement of Albert H. Taub, M.D., Made in Contemplation of Medical Prescription
I, Albert H. Taub, M.D., a physician licensed to practice in the District of Columbia, make the following statement in contemplation of prescribing anti-psychotic medication to my patient, Gary Freedman, D.C. Mental Heath Services Administration patient no. 230923. Pursuant to the psychiatric nomenclature promulgated by the American Psychiatric Association (DSM-IV), a psychiatrist may offer a professional opinion as to whether a patient's belief is bizarre or non-bizarre, based solely on the face of the patient's belief and without reference to extrinsic evidence.
1. Mr. Freedman's belief that he was subjected to unlawful employment discrimination by employees and managers of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump"), where Mr. Freedman was employed from June 13, 1988 to October 29, 1991, is a non-bizarre belief. I can offer no opinion as to whether the belief is the product of a mental disturbance, and the belief is not material to my recommendation that Mr. Freedman take anti-psychotic medication.
2. Mr. Freedman's belief that his job termination by Akin Gump, effective October 29, 1991, was unlawful under the D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977 is a non-bizarre belief. I can offer no opinion as to whether the belief is the product of a mental disturbance, and the belief is not material to my recommendation that Mr. Freedman take anti-psychotic medication.
3. Mr. Freedman's belief that he was subjected to a hostile, intimidating, or offensive work environment during the entirety of his tenure at Akin Gump (1988-1991) is a non-bizarre belief. I can offer no opinion as to whether the belief is the product of a mental disturbance, and the belief is not material to my recommendation that Mr. Freedman take anti-psychotic medication.
4. Mr. Freedman's belief that attorney managers of Akin Gump, including managing partner Laurence J. Hoffman, Esq. and hiring partner Dennis M. Race, Esq. (among others) conspired to defame him, and did in fact defame him, specifically with regard to the issues of Mr. Freedman's mental health, stability (potential for violence), employment history at Akin Gump, and suitability for employment is a non-bizarre belief. I can offer no opinion as to whether the belief is the product of a mental disturbance, and the belief is not material to my recommendation that Mr. Freedman take anti-psychotic medication.
5. Mr. Freedman's belief that his sister Mrs. Estelle Jacobson had clandestine communications with Akin Gump attorney manager Malcolm Lassman, Esq., dating as far back as the year 1989, is a non-bizarre belief, or opinion, that is based on statements made by Mrs. Jacobson to Mr. Freedman in about September 1989. I can offer no opinion as to whether the belief is the product of a mental disturbance, and the belief is not material to my recommendation that Mr. Freedman take anti-psychotic medication.
6. Mr. Freedman's belief that the resident manager of his apartment building (3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Washington, DC), Elayne Wranik (now deceased), unlawfully permitted persons associated with Akin Gump, in January 1990, to gain access to Mr. Freedman's apartment, inspect the apartment's contents, and videotape the apartment is a non-bizarre belief, or opinion, that is based in part on statements made by Elayne Wranik to Mr. Freedman during the week of about November 4, 1991. I can offer no opinion as to whether the belief is the product of a mental disturbance, and the belief is not material to my recommendation that Mr. Freedman take anti-psychotic medication.
7. Mr. Freedman's belief that his sister, Mrs. Estelle Jacobson, continued to communicate clandestinely with persons associated with Akin Gump in the period after Mr. Freedman's job termination, effective October 29, 1991, is a non-bizarre belief, based on statements made by Mrs. Jacobson to Mr. Freedman. I can offer no opinion as to whether the belief is the product of a mental disturbance, and the belief is not material to my recommendation that Mr. Freedman take anti-psychotic medication.
8. Mr. Freedman's belief that the psychiatric treatment provided to him by psychiatry residents at the George Washington University Medical Center ("GW"), during the period September 1, 1992 through June 30, 1996, may have fallen below acceptable medical standards (in that medical doctors misdiagnosed his illness, misprescribed medication, and failed to take any meaningful or appropriate action to assure the continuation of his treatment upon his termination by GW), is a non-bizarre belief. I can offer no opinion as to whether the belief is the product of a mental disturbance, and the belief is not material to my recommendation that Mr. Freedman take anti-psychotic medication.
9. Mr. Freedman's averral that employees of the District of Columbia provided erroneous or false information to federal law enforcement authorities that led to the action of federal law enforcement authorities (U.S. Capitol Police) on August 6, 1998 in visiting Mr. Freedman's home, frisking him for weapons, and subjecting him to interrogation with respect to an allegation that Mr. Freedman had threatened (to employees of the District of Columbia) to commit a crime of violence (a threat that would constitute a felony under Federal law), is a rational statement of facts about which I have personal knowledge and is not the product of a mental disturbance. Further, Mr. Freedman's belief that the above-described action of employees of the District of Columbia (in providing erroneous or false information about him to Federal law enforcement authorities), may itself constitute a prosecutable offense committed by employees of the District of Columbia is a non-bizarre belief. I can offer no opinion as to whether the belief is the product of a mental disturbance, and the belief is not material to my recommendation that Mr. Freedman take anti-psychotic medication.
10. Mr. Freedman's belief that the action of Stephen D. Quint, M.D. (D.C. Mental Health Services Administration) in delaying for six weeks following June 18, 1998 the assignment of Mr. Freedman to a therapist despite Mr. Freedman's diagnosis (paranoid schizophrenia); and the action of Dr. Quint in assigning Mr. Freedman to a psychology student rather than to a psychiatry resident (despite the availability of a psychiatry resident at the "P Street Clinic") are actions that may be inconsistent with sound medical practice, constitute a non-bizarre belief. I can offer no opinion as to whether the belief is the product of a mental disturbance, and the belief is not material to my recommendation that Mr. Freedman take anti-psychotic medication.
11. Mr. Freedman's action in writing a letter to Dr. Quint, which letter is dated July 27, 1998, that highlights the failure of the D.C. Mental Health Services Administration to take actions in regard to Mr. Freedman's case that may be consistent with sound medical practice, was--despite the reasonable concerns of Federal law enforcement officers--not the product of a serious mental disturbance. The D.C. Mental Health Services Administration acknowledges that despite Dr. Quint's receipt of the letter (on about July 28, 1998), Dr. Quint proceeded to assign (on about July 30, 1998) Mr. Freedman to a psychology student (Lisa Osborne) for once per month counseling sessions rather than to a psychiatry resident, notwithstanding the availability of a psychiatry resident at the P Street Clinic. Dr. Quint's actions speak for themselves. 12. I affirm that Mr. Freedman underwent comprehensive psychological testing in May 1994 performed by GW and that the testing failed to disclose any psychotic thought processes, any impairment in ego strength, or any diagnosable mental illness according to DSM-III criteria. I further affirm that the U.S. Social Security Administration determined that Mr. Freedman became disabled and not suitable for employment effective October 29, 1991, the date of his job termination by Akin Gump.
13. I accept as factual and truthful Mr. Freedman's statement that as part of GW's psychiatric assessment of Mr. Freedman in September 1992, Mr. Freedman had a consultation with one of his former treating psychiatrists, Stanley R. Palombo, M.D., a psychiatrist in private practice (telephone no. 202 362-6004), who determined that as of October 2, 1992, Mr. Freedman was fully employable without restriction. Again, I affirm that the U.S. Social Security Administration determined that Mr. Freedman became disabled and not suitable for employment effective October 29, 1991, the date of his job termination by Akin Gump.
14. I affirm that Mr. Freedman's treating psychiatrists at the George Washington University Medical Center, where he underwent out-patient psychiatric treatment from 1992 to 1996, determined that Mr. Freedman did not pose a risk of violence or pose a risk of harm to any person, notwithstanding threat assessment inquiries made by the U.S. Secret Service (Philip C. Leadroot, S.A.) to treating psychiatrist Dimitrios Georgopoulos, M.D. on two occasions, in early 1995 and early 1996. GW's clinical assessments of Mr. Freedman's condition are fully documented in the contemporaneous chart of his treatment maintained by GW; the chart speaks for itself. Reported concerns about Mr. Freedman's risk of violence, voiced by any source, that arose prior to his admission to the P Street Clinic are not material to my current medical recommendations.
15. I do not represent that Mr. Freedman was subjected to unlawful job harassment during his tenure at Akin Gump. However, Mr. Freedman's obsessive preoccupation with his employment experience at Akin Gump is consistent with the psychological sequelae that are known to result from victimization in a hostile, offensive, or intimidating work environment.
16. Mr. Freedman's belief that one or more of his treating psychiatrists (including Stanley R. Palombo, M.D.) unlawfully divulged confidential mental health information concerning Mr. Freedman's psychiatric treatment to attorney managers of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld is a belief that, although not confirmed in fact, was deemed reasonable by one of Mr. Freedman's coworkers at the said firm (Patricia A. McNeill). It is my professional opinion that Mr. Freedman's belief is therefore not idiosyncratic and not bizarre. Indeed, Mr. Freedman's belief is one that is so common among employed psychiatry patients that, in my professional judgment, it is generally prudent to exclude such beliefs from diagnostic and medical decisionmaking. I can offer no opinion as to whether the belief is the product of a mental disturbance, and the belief is not material to my recommendation that Mr. Freedman take anti-psychotic medication, notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Freedman's belief was determined by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles L. Reischel, Esq.) to be material to establishing that Mr. Freedman's employer had genuine concerns about Mr. Freedman's mental health and stability. See Freedman v. D.C. Dept. of Human Rights, D.C.C.A. no. 96-CV-961.
17. I affirm that Mr. Freedman's treating psychiatrist at the P Street Clinic (during the period November 1996 to June 18, 1998), Dr. Singh, advised Mr. Freedman on January 19, 1998 that it was the opinion of Dr. Singh as well as attending physician Stephen D. Quint, M.D. that Mr. Freedman did not suffer from any mental disorder for which medication was indicated. See Letter dated January 24, 1998 from Gary Freedman to Dr. Singh.
18. I affirm that Mr. Freedman's action in providing information to the District of Columbia Board of Medicine concerning my professional conduct, which resulted in the action of the Board on January 6, 1999 in issuing a complaint against me (no. 98-839), was a good faith action; that the decision of the Board to issue a complaint was based on the sound discretion of the Board that Mr. Freedman's referral presented substantial and credible information about possible professional misconduct that merited further investigation.
19. I affirm that I consult with Mr. Freedman one time per month at the express request of the U.S. Secret Service. The U.S. Secret Service requested in August 1998 that the P Street Clinic arrange to have Mr. Freedman meet with a psychiatrist no less than once per month, notwithstanding the fact that it is the policy of the P Street Clinic that patients consult an attending psychiatrist no more than once every three months. I affirm that my once per month consultations do not exceed thirty minutes in duration, and that my professional fees are billed to Maryland Medicare Part B Medical Insurance - Outpatient Facility Claims. I further affirm that I am aware that the above-described psychiatric consultation arrangement has the necessary effect of shifting the burden of psychiatric fees from the U.S. Secret Service to the U.S. Social Security Administration (Maryland Medicare); the U.S. Secret Service employs its own psychiatric consultants who might just as well assess Mr. Freedman on a monthly basis, and who, in fact, as psychiatrists trained in forensics, are more qualified to conduct a violence risk assessment than I am.
20. It is my professional judgment that the content of Mr. Freedman's beliefs or opinions described above are non-bizarre. I can offer no opinion as to whether the above-described beliefs are the product of a mental disturbance, notwithstanding the determination made by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Freedman v. D.C. Dept. of Human Rights, docket no. 96-CV-961, that there was no probable cause to believe that Mr. Freedman's employer, the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, was motivated to terminate Mr. Freedman's employment effective October 29, 1991 for any reasons other than genuine concerns about Mr. Freedman's mental health and stability (including the potential for violence).
Facts pertinent to the litigation of Mr. Freedman's job termination (see Freedman v. D.C. Dept. of Human Rights, D.C.C.A. no. 96-CV-961) are not material to my recommendation that Mr. Freedman take anti-psychotic medication, notwithstanding the fact that the U.S. Social Security Administration determined that Mr. Freedman became not suitable for employment and eligible for disability benefits as of October 29, 1991, the date of the termination; notwithstanding the fact that the disability determination made by the SSA was based partly on facts concerning Mr. Freedman's mental health and stability averred under oath by Dennis M. Race, Esq. and Laurence J. Hoffman, Esq., both members of the said firm; and notwithstanding the fact that the SSA has determined that Mr. Freedman has been continuously disabled and eligible for benefits since the date of his job termination, effective October 29, 1991, by reason of psychiatric illness.
It is my professional opinion that Mr. Freedman's current mental condition is not inconsistent with his continued eligibility for Social Security disability benefits, notwithstanding all of the statements I have made herein. I am not aware of any facts about Mr. Freedman's current condition that are inconsistent with his continued eligibility for disability benefits paid by the SSA.
(notary's signature and stamp) ______________________________
Albert H. Taub, M.D.
Partial transcript of telephone conversation with former Akin Gump co-worker Patricia McNeil on the evening of July 1, 1993 concerning nonconsentual communications between Akin Gump attorney managers and my treating psychiatrists.
I have provided the D.C. Corporation Counsel (Charles L. Reischel, Esq.; telephone: (202) 727-6252) a copy of the tape of the conversation.
The following is evidence that the belief described in paragraph 16 of the "Statement of Albert H. Taub, M.D." is not idiosyncratic: one criterion for determining whether a belief constitutes rational opinion or paranoia.
________________________________________________________
McNeil: Well, the psychiatrists that you were seeing . . . do you know if they ever talked to your psychiatrists?
Freedman: They wouldn't admit to talking to them.
McNeil: Well, what about your, have you talked to your psychiatrist? Do you have confidence in your psychiatrist? Are you still seeing the same. . .?
Freedman: I'm seeing a different. . . I'm seeing a psychiatrist right now, somebody at GW.
McNeil: Oh, 'cause I was getting ready to say, I would change psychiatrists, 'cause you never know when he may, ah, violated your confidentiality, violated your rights.
Freedman: Hm-hm.
McNeil: Well, the psychiatrists that you were seeing when you were at Akin Gump, did he or she ever admit to talking to Akin Gump about you?
Freedman: No, they wouldn't admit it. I thought they were though. I had that feeling.
McNeil: You have that feeling that they may talk to them.
Freedman: Yea. But they wouldn't admit it, 'cause it's illegal to do that.
McNeil: Right, it is illegal.
Freedman: So, they're not going to admit it.
McNeil: That is something!
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