Americans With Disabilities Act: My Continued Unemployability By Reason of Business Necessity

According to the criteria established by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (predecessor of the District of Columbia Office of the Attorney General) I continue to suffer from a psychiatric disorder that, because of an associated risk of violent behavior, may disqualify me from employment under the Americans With Disabilities Act. Cf. Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights, D.C.C.A. no. 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998).

Under the Americans With Disabilities Act a psychiatric disorder may disqualify an individual for employment if the employer can demonstrate that the individual would pose a "direct threat" in the workplace (i.e., a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others) that cannot be eliminated or reduced below the direct threat level through reasonable accommodation. Such a disqualification is job-related and consistent with business necessity.

STATEMENT OF GARY FREEDMAN CONCERNING MENTAL STATUS AFFIRMATION MADE BY THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA OFFICE OF CORPORATION COUNSEL

Under penalty of law, including criminal penalty for false statements under D.C. Code 22-2514, I declare that the following statement truthfully represents my current beliefs, as of January 12, 2014, concerning my employment experience at the Washington, D.C. office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump"), where I was employed from June 13, 1988 to October 29, 1991.

The District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel ("The District") (represented by Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.; Charles L. Reischel, Esq.; M. Justin Draycott, Esq.; Joann Robinson, Esq.; and William J. Earl, Esq.) has affirmed that my allegations concerning my employment experience at Akin Gump reflected genuinely-held beliefs that had been legitimately determined by Akin Gump to be the product of a psychiatric disorder that may render me a "direct threat" in the workplace; the District did not argue that those allegations were self-serving fabrications offered to obtain government benefits or to obtain a disqualification from jury service. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia, Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights, at 5-12, D.C.C.A. no. 96-CV-961.

This statement details the current status of my beliefs that were offered by the District, in pleadings filed on July 25, 1997 with the D.C. Court of Appeals, in support of the determination made by the D.C. Department of Human Rights and Minority Business Development that my former employer, Akin Gump, had genuine concerns about my mental health and stability that justified the firm's determination that I was not suitable for employment by reason of a psychiatric opinion that indicated that I suffered from a "disorder." See Freedman v. D.C. Dept. of Human Rights, D.C.C.A. no. 96-CV-961 at 4 (Memorandum Opinion and Judgment, Sept. 1, 1998) ("the firm . . . learned [upon consulting a practicing psychiatrist] that [Mr. Freedman's] behavior was indicative of a disorder known as 'ideas of reference,' which is sometimes accompanied by violent behavior.').  I submitted said pleadings executed by the District to the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA) in July 1997 in response to the agency's periodic review of my disability claim; SSA determined in 1997 that my disability was continuing based in part on the District’s pleadings.

Said pleadings executed by the District contain a sizable quantum of so-called "after-acquired evidence" that was drawn from documents I prepared for submission to the D.C. Department of Human Rights in support of the unlawful job termination Complaint filed by that agency on February 4, 1992.   Said after-acquired evidence played no role in the employer's termination decision; was never reviewed by the employer's psychiatric consultant (Gertrude R. Ticho, M.D.); and played no role in the agency's final determination.  The agency expressly stated in its Initial Determination dated June 30, 1993 that its no probable cause determination was based solely on ten incidents of harassment I reported to the employer's attorney managers (Dennis M. Race, Esq. and Malcolm Lassman, Esq.) on October 24, 1991. The agency found that the employer's "concern for [the employee] was based on the nature of the ten incidents that [the employee] submitted that he perceived as harassment. The details of these ten incidents are set forth in the Findings of Facts [numbers 4(a) to 4(j)]."

The District's action in proffering a sizable quantum of after-acquired evidence to the reviewing court that played no role in the employer's termination decision or in the agency's final determination was contrary to law.  See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S.Ct. 879, 885 (1995); Motor Vehicle Mfr's. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983), appeal after remand, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Dole, 802 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, New York v. Dole, 480 U.S. 951 (1987); Club 99 v. D.C. Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, 457 A.2d 773, 775 (D.C. 1982); Cooper v. Department of Employment Services, 588 A.2d 1172, 1176 (D.C. 1991).

I continue to believe that beginning in late October 1988 until the date of my job termination, on October 29, 1991, managing attorneys at Akin Gump had clandestine telephone contacts with my sister, during which my sister recounted details of phone conversations between herself and me. I further believe that my sister faxed to firm management documents relating to me, including my grade school report cards and college exam books, among other material. I also believe that the information obtained by the managing attorneys was disseminated throughout the firm without my consent. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 5-6 (after-acquired evidence).  In September 1989 my sister admitted to me at her residence that she spoke with attorney manager Malcolm Lassman about me.  I said to my sister: "I'll show you how smart I am.  I know you are talking to Malcolm Lassman."  My sister said: "You ARE smart!"

I continue to believe that the legal assistant administrator (Maggie Sinnott) invidiously had me typed as a homosexual, and that her interaction with me was, throughout my tenure, guided by that characterization. The administrator would glance and scowl at my genital area when she saw me. Additionally, at a legal assistant Happy Hour held at Stetson's in the Adams-Morgan neighborhood during the summer of 1989, the administrator (Sinnott) introduced me to women only. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 6 (after-acquired evidence). At the said Happy Hour I chatted with a summer intern named Marjorie Levy, daughter of a senior partner at the firm, Charles Levy; I vaguely recall that Marjorie Levy attended Cornell University and that she was writing her autobiography.

I continue to believe that on the second day of my assignment with the firm as an agency-supplied legal assistant, an incident of harassment occurred after I introduced myself to a male employee outside whose office I had been assigned (earlier that day by the legal assistant administrator, Sinnott). A group of employees proceeded to gather in the office adjacent to my assigned work station, and proceeded to engage in a lively and mildly sexually suggestive discussion about the size of the male employee's chest and whether it was hairy or not. The discussion lasted about two minutes. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 6 (agency finding of fact 4(a)).

I continue to believe that while I was walking down a hallway in the firm's offices, in May 1988, one of the firm's associates (Paul Wageman) who was walking toward me, began to hold a pencil next to his genital area and move it up and down in an intentional act of harassment. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 6-7 (agency finding of fact 4(b)). Wageman retained eye contact with me as he walked down the hall rubbing the pencil against his genital area.

I continue to believe that soon after I was hired by the firm as a temporary legal assistant in June 1988, the legal assistant coordinator (John D. Neary) invidiously denied me the legal assistant orientation I had been promised. I was also invidiously denied a box of business cards or personalized note pads, which items had also been promised. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 7 (after-acquired evidence).

I continue to believe that in mid-June 1988 an incident of harassment occurred near my office. On the first morning in a newly-assigned office, I got a cup of coffee in an adjacent kitchen area. At that time, a firm partner (David Hardee) said to me "I smell something sweet in here. Do you smell something sweet in here?" I replied "no." The attorney repeated, "I smell something sweet in here." See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 7 (agency finding of fact 4(c)). I believe that Hardee's use of the word "sweet" was intended to be homosexual innuendo. Hardee, a native of South Carolina, had professional ties to Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., a member of firm management; Jordan served on the Board of Directors of a corporation (RJR Nabisco) that Hardee represented. I cannot recall any other occasion on which Hardee initiated verbal contact with me. Hardee and I occupied nearby offices from mid-June 1988 to mid-March 1989.

I continue to believe that during the three-and-a-half years that I was employed at the firm, I was intentionally shunned by other employees. Three employees whom I asked to lunch initially agreed to dine with me and later changed their minds. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 7 (after-acquired evidence).

I continue to believe that one day during the summer of 1988 I went to the office of another legal assistant (Jesse Raben), who had been coached to harass me. During my conversation with Raben, another employee (the legal assistant coordinator, Neary) walked by and, without saying a word, nodded to Raben. Later, Raben entered the Xerox room where I was making copies and continued the conversation in an affectedly buoyant manner. The next day Raben's earlier buoyant manner was noticeably gone. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 7-8 (after-acquired evidence). On an occasion in November 1989 and again in about March 1990 I asked Raben if he would go to lunch with me; he initially agreed but later backed out.

I continue to believe that on a day in February 1989 a stack of documents on my desk had been tampered with in order to provoke a paranoid response from me. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 8 (after-acquired evidence). This incident may be an example of "gaslighting." Gaslighting is a form of intimidation or psychological abuse in which false information is presented to the victim, making him doubt his own memory and perception. The classic example of gaslighting is to change things in a person's environment without the person's knowledge, and to explain that he "must be imagining things" when he challenges these changes. At that time I worked on a document production task supervised by Constance Brown. The day after the incident I chatted with Brown, who stated spontaneously and not in reference to anything I had said, that she sometimes thought there were "ghosts" in the building who tampered with things; I registered Brown's comments as a prompt that was calculated to trigger paranoid speculation from me about the previous day's incident concerning the out-of-place documents in my office. During my tenure Brown prepared four written performance evaluations that summarized her work experience with me from May 1988 to May 1990, a two-year period; Brown's written evaluations were, without exception, exemplary. Despite her written depictions of me as a superior employee, there is no evidence that Brown supported my request to firm managers for a job promotion in October 1991, which triggered my job termination, or that she disputed the reported statements of coworkers--offered to firm management immediately prior to the decision to terminate—that I was paranoid, hypersensitive to criticism, or that I had a violent temperament.

I continue to believe that in 1989 I was subjected to harassment (throughout the period late March to late October) after I was assigned to share office space with other legal assistants (including Stacey Schaar). During the period late March to mid-April 1989, several legal assistants would meet in the office space for lunch and conversation. Their conversations were often sexual in nature, and featured details, expressed in double-entendres, derived from my personal life. On one occasion, these legal assistants seemed to review the contents of my apartment with detail and accuracy. I noted that these conversations stopped after I spoke to my sister complaining about this type of interaction, in about mid-April 1989. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 8 (after-acquired evidence).

I continue to believe that certain legal assistants made invidious references to my friendship with a male employee (Craig W. Dye) with whom I had previously worked at the law firm of Hogan & Hartson. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 8 (agency finding of fact 4(d)).  At an Akin Gump dinner held in May 1989, another legal assistant (Raben) acknowledged to me that he had heard a rumor that I was homosexual. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 8 (after-acquired evidence). Dye's supervisor at Hogan & Hartson during the period October 1986 to March 1987 was an individual named Sheryl Ferguson, a computer specialist. Ferguson left Hogan in the spring of 1987, and in about mid-year 1989 Dye assumed Ferguson's former supervisory position in that firm's Computer Applications Department. In 1988 Akin Gump hired Ferguson, who by that time worked at ATLIS, a litigation support company, to perform, as a consultant, a study of Akin Gump's litigation support operation. Ferguson completed the consulting task in early 1989, and submitted a lengthy written report in February 1989. The report acknowledged the cooperation of Christine Robertson, Akin Gump's litigation support administrator, as well as several Akin Gump attorneys including John ("Jack") Gallagher and David Callet, senior partners who represented Eastern Airlines (the major client to which I was assigned), as well as an associate named David Tobin, who subsequently left the firm. Ferguson had been my direct supervisor at Hogan & Hartson during the period September 1985 to March 1987. Brown, on her initiative, supplied me with a copy of Ferguson's written technical report, despite the fact that the report was stamped confidential and despite the fact that, according to Akin Gump, I was, as of February 1989, a dispensable temporary employee who had been hired to perform a specific time-limited clerical task for the client Eastern Airlines. I continue to believe that Brown supplied me with a copy of the report knowing that the report was confidential, knowing that Ferguson had been my supervisor at another law firm, and anticipating that I would supply a copy of the report to persons I had worked with at Hogan & Hartson, which would have been an act of gross misconduct on my part. Eastern Airlines filed for bankruptcy protection a few weeks later, on March 9, 1989.

I continue to believe that during the period March 20 through October 23, 1989, I was covertly observed by a computer systems manager (Richard "Dick" Stanke) at the firm. This individual would watch while I engaged in conversations with others and then go into his office and close his door to report to a third party what he observed. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 8-9 (after-acquired evidence). At that time the computer systems manager (Stanke) and I resided in the same apartment building; the resident manager of the building was named Elaine Wranik. At that time Stanke worked in a private office a few feet from the office space occupied by legal assistant Stacey Schaar and me. It was Schaar who said she was afraid of me, see Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 9. Schaar added that the resident manager of the apartment building (where both Stanke and I resided) was also afraid of me. Schaar and Stanke used to chat occasionally.

I continue to believe that during the summer of 1989, some of the telephone conversations of the legal assistants with whom I shared an office were exaggeratedly sexual in nature, an affected behavior that was calculated to harass me. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 9 (after-acquired evidence). On one occasion during the summer of 1989 one of the legal assistants in question (Schaar) had made several photocopies of an article published in The Washington Times that described a homosexual incident involving a male attorney who practiced in the firm's Dallas office, then proceeded to distribute copies of the article to various employees, including me; the legal assistant (Schaar) was later reportedly fired, in May 1990, for gross misconduct.

I continue to believe that I was harassed by intimidating and hostile statements made by one coworker (Schaar) who said to me that she and other employees feared I was homicidal: specifically, Schaar stated to me that she and other employees were afraid that I might buy a gun, bring it to the firm's premises, and carry out a mass homicidal assault. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 9 (after-acquired evidence). Schaar also stated to me: "Even the manager of your apartment building is afraid of you." Schaar's statement concerning the resident manager of my apartment building (Wranik) is contained in a document I prepared in June 1993 (addressed to my then treating psychiatrist, Suzanne M. Pitts, M.D.) and which I later forwarded to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) in January 1996; the cover letter I prepared and sent to DOJ contained a statement that prompted a DOJ referral to the U.S. Secret Service, which agency summoned me for questioning concerning the materials, in February 1996. The investigating Secret Service agent was named Philip C. Leadroot.

I continue to believe that at the firm's 1989 Christmas party, one of the firm's attorneys (Larry Tanenbaum), the alcoholic former husband of the firm's legal assistant administrator (Sinnott), invidiously glanced at my genital area. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 9 (after-acquired evidence). In the summer of 1990, the same attorney glanced at my genital area during an elevator ride, see Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 9, in the period after I asked to lunch a summer intern (Matthew Erskine) whose father was an FBI agent. (Erskine later declined to go to lunch with me).

I continue to believe that in early January 1990 employees or members of the firm burglarized my apartment (whose resident manager was Elaine Wranik). These individuals, I believe, inspected many of the books in my apartment and, armed with a video camera, took a video film of my apartment. I believe that a copy of that video film was sent to my sister, who resided in New Jersey. I believe the unlawful entry into my apartment was done with the knowledge and consent of the firm's management committee. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 9 (after-acquired evidence).

The class of persons about which, according to the District, I formed a genuine belief conspired to, or, in fact, unlawfully entered my residence, in January 1990, see Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 9, includes Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., a close personal friend of former President William Jefferson Clinton (an individual whose law license has been suspended in the state of Arkansas by reason of acts of moral turpitude).

I continue to believe that some time in early spring 1990 harassment occurred after I was assigned, by the litigation support administrator (Robertson), to a work station to perform a specified task (for the client Music Corporation of America “MCA”). Upon sitting down, I looked into the trash basket next to the desk and noticed that it contained a baby food jar. The jar had been wiped clean before being placed in the trash basket. This fact was consistent with the jar having been brought from home by someone for the express purpose of placing it in the trash basket with the intent to harass me. The epithet "baby" is stereotypically anti-Semitic. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 9-10 (agency finding of fact 4(e)). Coincidentally, the client MCA was later purchased by Edgar Bronfman, an individual active in numerous Jewish causes; Bronfman has served as Chairman of the Anti-Defamation League and has headed the World Jewish Congress. Robertson was later found to have made a racially-inappropriate statement about a minority person, and was alleged to have colluded with another supervisor in the discriminatory termination of a black employee. McNeil v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, no. 93-0477 (D.D.C., Nov. 29, 1993).

I continue to believe that on April 13, 1990 I overheard a conversation in which the legal assistant administrator (Sinnott) gave instructions to a legal assistant concerning the bates-stamp numbering of some documents, and that the administrator's repeated use of the word "bates" was a double-entendre: an offensive and intimidating reference to masturbation. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 10 (after-acquired evidence). The incident concerning Sinnott occurred on a Friday, hours before my regularly-scheduled appointment with my then treating psychiatrist, Stanley R. Palombo, M.D.; I interpreted the actions of the administrator (Sinnott) as a prompt that was calculated to encourage me to make paranoid comments about the administrator to my psychiatrist, who would communicate my comments back to firm managers.

I continue to believe that during 1990 my coworkers used words and phrases that I had used during private sessions with my psychiatrist (Dr. Palombo). I inferred that the psychiatrist was discussing my case with firm management. The psychiatrist denied that he had any communication with members of the firm. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 10 (after-acquired evidence).  Dr. Palombo was a clinical professor of psychiatry at The George Washington University Medical Center.  Akin Gump admitted that it consulted another GW clinical professor of psychiatry about me named Gertrude R. Ticho, M.D.  The D.C. Department of Human Rights made a finding of fact that Dr. Ticho, in fact, spoke with attorney manager Dennis M. Race about me, notwithstanding Dr. Ticho's written denial to me that she had any contact with Race.

I continue to believe that some time in 1990 someone had placed a brochure for a secretarial course on my desk with the intent to harass. The brochure was pink in color and featured photographs of women only. On another occasion, someone left a (Levi-Strauss) clothing catalogue on my desk. The front cover of the catalogue depicted a young woman holding a little boy. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 10 (after-acquired evidence). At that time "Levy" and "Strauss" were the names of two senior partners at the firm; their offices were roughly adjacent to each other's. Levy worked in the firm's tax practice group, which also included Hardee. During the summer of 1989, and later that same year during Christmas break, Levy's daughter, Marjorie, a college student, interned at the firm under the supervision of the legal assistant administrator (Sinnott). In early 1990 I had reported to my then treating psychiatrist (Dr. Palombo) that I had had a dream, sexual in nature, that alluded to Marjorie Levy.

I continue to believe that in September or October 1990 my female supervisor (Robertson), who was handing documents to me, pulled the documents back towards herself in such a way that, as I was reaching for them, I touched her breasts, see Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 11 (after-acquired evidence), and that the supervisor's conduct was intentionally sexual in nature. The documents in question concerned trademark litigation involving the client National Football League, a client represented by Tanenbaum. The incident occurred a day or two before I was scheduled to visit my sister and her family in New Jersey. I formed the belief at that time, and continue to believe, that Robertson intended that the transaction serve as an ego-bolstering maneuver, overdetermined in nature and consistent with certain predicate thinking. I believe that the content of the documents Robertson handed to me (relating to the "masculine" sport of football) was insidiously related to her act of having me touch her breast. I believe that Robertson was trying to bolster my sense of masculinity so that I would gain the assurance to make frank comments to my family about my perceptions of coworkers, without fear of reprisal; or, perhaps, take more days off from work than I had originally requested. In terms of predicate thinking I applied the following formula: football = touching female breast = masculinity = absence of castration fears = ability to talk frankly without fear of reprisal or job termination = engage in other risky behavior that might endanger job security (such as taking time off from work). Contrariwise, we have the following formulation: homosexuality = castration fears = job insecurity = fear of job termination = strict adherence to rules (cf. Orthodox Jews) out of fear of being seen and punished = fear of taking risks. Robertson was later found to have made a racially-inappropriate statement about a minority person, and was alleged to have colluded with another supervisor in the discriminatory termination of a black employee. McNeil v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, no. 93-0477 (D.D.C., Nov. 29, 1993). Robertson reportedly told her employees, in the period immediately following my job termination, that she was afraid I might return to the firm’s premises to kill her.

I continue to believe that some time in 1990, while I was riding alone in an elevator with a firm partner (David Eisenstadt), the attorney began to pace back and forth and whistle while glancing at me in an intentionally hostile and intimidating manner. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 11 (agency finding of fact 4(j)). The partner was married to the firm's attorney recruitment administrator, Nina Eisenstein, who worked for hiring partner, Dennis Race, the individual who terminated my employment.

I continue to believe that in March 1991 an (unidentified) coworker invidiously inserted a letter opener, blade first, into a stack of documents located on my desk. The materials were part of a document production task that was supervised by litigation support employee, Lutheria Harrison; the document production task involved a client (LL&E) that was represented by Tanenbaum. I believe the letter opener was intentionally positioned to give the impression of a symbolic stabbing in order to provoke a paranoid response from me. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 11 (after-acquired evidence). Some time during the same week in March 1991 someone had scrawled the phrase "WHITE TRASH" on a piece of paper that had been left on my desk; the piece of paper was a computer printout relating to work for the client LL&E. I believe that the incident was calculated to prompt me to speculate openly that it was a black employee who was harassing me. The litigation support administrator (Robertson) later in 1991 facilitated Harrison's promotion to the legal assistant program, which was supervised by Tanenbaum's former wife, Sinnott; I was terminated in October 1991, despite an exemplary performance record, days after I requested a like promotion and filed a discrimination charge against Robertson: a charge that was dismissed by firm managers as a product of my paranoia.

I continue to believe that some time in April 1991, while I was seated at my desk after returning from lunch, my female supervisor (Robertson) invidiously asked a female employee who was seated nearby, "Are you wet?" I believe that the phrase could be interpreted as alluding to a state of sexual excitation. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 11 (agency finding of fact 4(f)). Robertson was later found to have made a racially-inappropriate statement about a minority person, and was alleged to have colluded with another supervisor in the discriminatory termination of a black employee. McNeil v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, no. 93-0477 (D.D.C., Nov. 29, 1993).

I continue to believe that on another occasion in the summer of 1991, my supervisor (Robertson), invidiously offered me a piece of chocolate, and stated to me "Here, you look like you need some chocolate." I interpreted the phrase "Here, you look like you need some chocolate" as a reference to anal intercourse. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 11 (agency finding of fact 4(g)). Robertson was later found to have made a racially-inappropriate statement about a minority person, and was alleged to have colluded with another supervisor in the discriminatory termination of a black employee. McNeil v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, no. 93-0477 (D.D.C., Nov. 29, 1993).

I continue to believe that in early August 1991, a coworker, Lutheria Harrison, who was positioned in a cubicle adjacent to mine, invidiously emphasized the word "July" while she spoke with a coworker about her July telephone bill. Two days later this seemingly meaningless incident assumed some small measure of significance when I overheard this same employee, who was seated at her desk, state in a markedly audible tone of voice the children's rhyme, "liar, liar, pants on fire." On another occasion a brief time later, I heard the same employee utter the Yiddish phrase, "Oy, veh." I believe the word "July" is a homophone for the phrase "Jew Lie," and I believe that these anecdotes suggest that some of my coworkers may have had an anti-Semitic animus. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 11-12 (agency finding of fact 4(h)). The litigation support administrator (Robertson) later in 1991 facilitated Harrison's promotion to the legal assistant program; I was terminated in October 1991, despite an exemplary performance record, days after I requested a like promotion and filed a discrimination charge against Robertson: a charge that was dismissed by firm managers as a product of my hypersensitivity to trivial goings-on in the workplace.

I continue to believe that on the afternoon of October 2, 1991 a female legal assistant (Katherine Harkness) engaged in acts of overt harassment during my meeting with her in her private office. I was seated in front of the female employee's desk and she was positioned in back of the desk, but leaning over it, supporting her torso with her elbows. As she was reviewing my work for the client Hoechst, she gyrated her hips and rubbed her pelvic region against the desk in a sexual manner suggestive of masturbation while simultaneously expressing her work-related comments in the form of double entendres. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 12 (agency finding of fact 4(i)). The legal assistant (Harkness) was supervised by the legal assistant administrator (Sinnott). The billing partner for this client (Hoechst) was Callet, who had represented Eastern Airlines—the same client I had worked for almost exclusively for two years (1988-1990). Callet is a graduate of The Pennsylvania State University, my college alma mater. On an occasion in mid-June 1988 Callet and I chatted in his office; Callet was curious about my background. I reviewed this incident with an EEOC investigator, Franklin C. Jones, at EEOC Headquarters in November 1991, a few weeks after my job termination. The EEOC investigator said that it was his opinion that this particular incident was prima facie evidence of unlawful harassment under Title VII.

                                                       CERTIFICATION OF GARY FREEDMAN

I, Gary Freedman, certify under penalty of law that the above statements accurately represent my current beliefs about my employment experience at the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld. Consistent with the position of the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel, see Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 5-12, Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C.C.A. no. 96-CV-961, I affirm that the above statements are based on my genuine beliefs and are not a self-serving fabrication.

I understand that this statement, which affirms my continued adherence to a body of beliefs that were previously offered by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals as evidence suggestive of a psychiatric "disorder," might impair my ability to serve on a jury, obtain employment, or impair the exercise of other rights and liberties protected by law.

I certify that I currently take the anti-psychotic medication Geodon and that neither said medication nor the anti-psychotic medications Abilify, Risperdal, or Zyprexa, previously administered at therapeutic doses, has ever modified my beliefs.

___________________________
GARY FREEDMAN
Pennsylvania Attorney ID 41032
January 12, 2014