U.S. Capitol Police Investigation -- U.S. Attorney -- 1998

On the evening of August 6, 1998 two Special Agents of the US Capitol Police (Threat Investigation Unit) forcibly entered my home, after frisking me for weapons, and proceeded to interrogate me about an allegation made by a DC employee that, earlier in the day, at the height of an enraged argument, I had threatened to kill two federal officers at point-blank range, execution style in the Capitol rotunda. Later investigation by Agent Steven Horan disclosed that said allegation was mistakenly based on a letter I had written to my psychiatrist (Stephen Quint, MD) and copied to a DC agency that factually summarized Mr. Race's violence-risk determination [an act of defamation]; my supervisor's homicide-risk determination [an act of defamation]; as well as the DC Corporation Counsel's determination that my coworkers had formed a reasonable apprehension that I might commit an armed, mass homicide [an act of defamation]. Though I was exonerated of making unlawful threats, Officer Horan photo ID'd me to all federal officers assigned to the U.S. Capitol Building as a protective measure.

http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2009/11/did-i-mislead-federal-law-enforcement.html

On August 7, 1998 Agent Horan advised me that the federal government (unbeknownst to me) had previously placed my name on a national registry of potential terrorists because of a letter I had written in 1996 to a local psychiatric facility (The Meyer Clinic), inquiring into out-patient services. Said letter elaborated Mr. Race's violence-risk determination [an act of defamation] as well as my supervisor's homicide-risk determination [an act of defamation].

On the afternoon of August 7, 1998 two Special Agents of the U.S. Secret Service placed me under house arrest because of concerns I might pose a risk of harm to President Clinton. The two Secret Service agents were part of a team of six federal special agents who had been assigned to interrogate me and secure my person, over a two-day period (August 6-7, 1998). Federal law enforcement concerns were aroused by a letter I had written and sent to a DC agency that discussed the federal civil rights implications of the DC Corporation Counsel's handling of 96-CV-961. I had sent an identical letter to U.S. Senator Arlen Specter (R.-PA.) on Capitol Hill, who responded with a cordial and personalized reply. Senator Specter, a former prosecutor, saw absolutely nothing threatening about the letter I had written, much less did he see the need to assign six federal special agents to interrogate me and secure my person.

August 8, 1998
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008-4530

Robert Chapman, Esq.
Assistant U.S. Attorney
for the District of Columbia
555 Fourth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001

Dear Mr. Chapman:

This will advise the Office of U.S. Attorney that I am cooperating fully with an investigation instituted by the United States Capitol Police, Protective Intelligence Division, Threat Assessment Section. You may obtain details of the investigation from Stephan J. Horan, Special Agent, at (202) 224-1495.

To summarize details of my case: The Government of the District of Columbia has affirmed that my former employer, the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump") terminated my employment in October 1991 on the basis of genuine concerns about my mental health and stability, including the potential for violence. The employer's termination decision was made following an ex parte consultation with a psychiatrist who did not examine me personally. Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order, June 10, 1996) (name of state court judge redacted at the implicit direction of the Justice Department). As of the filing of the complaint in the said proceedings, in October 1995, and at all times thereafter, it was unlawful under the laws of the District of Columbia for a psychiatrist to offer a professional psychiatric opinion about an individual without benefit of personal examination as is strongly recommended by the American Psychiatric Association's Principles of Medical Ethics. The D.C. Code in its latest revision makes it unlawful for a physician to "[fail] to conform to standards of acceptable conduct and prevailing practice within a health profession." See D.C. Code 2-3305.14(26). This provision was added to the District of Columbia Health Occupations Revision Act by D.C. Law 10-247, enacted on March 23, 1995.

The District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.) expressly affirmed to the D.C. Superior Court in pleadings filed in the above-referenced proceedings, relying on legally-irrelevant "after-acquired" evidence, see McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S.Ct. 879, 885 (1995), that my coworkers had formed genuine fears (i.e., not motivated by discriminatory animus) that I might have been armed and dangerous and poised to carry out a homicidal assault on the firm's premises. See Brief of Respondent in Opposition to Petition for Review of no Probable Cause Determination by Department of Human Rights at 6, Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (citing record on appeal at 276). The District implicitly asserted that my coworkers' concerns about my potential for armed violence were relevant to the employer's decision to terminate my employment.

I stand by the "Statement of Gary Freedman to the Office of U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Regarding Intent to Commit Crime of Violence as Determined by the Law Firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld," ("Statement to the U.S. Attorney") dated April 24, 1995, and made under penalty of criminal sanctions (D.C. Code 22-2514).

I recognize, however, that representations made by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (M. Justin Draycott, Esq.) to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in December 1997, in the currently pending appeal of the above-referenced litigation, that my coworkers had genuine fears about my potential for armed violence or homicide conflict with the Statement to the U.S. Attorney, and that said conflict may give rise to the appearance that representations that I made in the Statement to the U.S. Attorney were unreliable, knowingly false, or perjured.

Additionally, the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel stands by speculation made by the District of Columbia Department of Human Rights that a document I submitted to the agency may have been inauthentic (i.e., forged or fabricated), see record on appeal at 8; presumably, according to the agency, I submitted the document in order to deny forensic psychiatric evidence filed by Akin Gump with the agency, that I suffered from a psychiatric symptom associated with a risk of violence.

I enclose a draft version of a letter that I will be submitting to prospective employers in connection future employment inquiries, consistent with my legal duty to advise of any facts that might affect an employer's tort liability. Dennis M. Race, Esq., an Akin Gump attorney manager, expressly represents that I posed a negligence liability (violence risk) at that firm, see record on appeal at 148.

You may discuss this matter with Mr. Race at (202) 887-4028.

Sincerely,

Gary Freedman