What did Attorney General Eric Holder Know and When Did He Know It? -- 1995

The following is the text of a legally operative declaration I forwarded to the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, Eric H. Holder, Jr., in April 1995.  Notwithstanding my sworn statement that I never owned a gun or attempted to purchase one (see below), the D.C. Office of Attorney General (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.), affirmed to the D.C. Superior Court in 1996 and later to the D.C. Court of Appeals in 1997, in responsive pleadings it filed in my unlawful job termination lawsuit, that in August 1989 an Akin Gump coworker, speaking for herself and other employees, had formed a genuine and credible fear that I might have been armed and extremely dangerous.  (I was terminated by Akin Gump more than two years later, effective October 29, 1991.)  See Brief of Appellee District Of Columbia, Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights, D.C.C.A. no. 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998).

The U.S. Attorney did not investigate the apparent inconsistency between my sworn statement of April 1995 (see below) and court pleadings filed by the District in 1996 and 1997.

Eric H. Holder, Jr. is the current Attorney General of the United States, prior to which he was a partner at the Washington, D.C. office of the law firm of Covington & Burling.  The late Charles F.C. Ruff, who served as D.C. Attorney General in the 1990s, was on leave from his private practice at Covington & Burling.  Attorney General Holder is a friend of senior Akin Gump partner Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Esq.


What was my motivation in writing the following declaration?  I was investigated by the Washington Field Office of the U.S. Secret Service (Philip C. Leadroot, S.A., now retired) during the period December 1994 to February 1995.  I met with S.A. Leadroot at least twice.  When I told S.A. Leadroot about the fears at Akin Gump that I might have been armed and extremely dangerous, he casually and  insistently dismissed my concerns.  I found S.A. Leadroot's behavior peculiar and disturbing.  I believe that statements by coworkers that I might have been armed and extremely dangerous merited investigation by the U.S. Secret Service.  The following writing attempts to prove that the statements of my former direct supervisor that she feared for her life were not casual off-hand comments, but, on their face, substantial concerns; and that those concerns needed to be investigated.


At the time of the above-referenced U.S. Secret Service investigation the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the parent organization of the Secret Service, was headed by Secretary Robert E. Rubin, a longtime close personal friend of Akin Gump founder, Robert S. Strauss.  Reportedly it was Strauss who persuaded President Clinton to nominate Rubin to the post.  After my job termination Akin Gump partner Dennis M. Race cautioned me against making any written statements that might "embarrass" the firm.  In the late 1990s, senior Akin Gump partner Vernon E. Jordan reportedly tried to buy the silence of a White House intern who had evidence that might lead to the impeachment of President Clinton.

April 24, 1995

3801 Connecticut Ave., NW

#136

Washington, DC  20008-4530

Eric H. Holder, Jr.

U.S. Attorney for the

District of Columbia

Washington, DC  20001

RE: Freedman v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld

Dear Mr. Holder:

Enclosed for your information is a declaration captioned: Statement of Gary Freedman Regarding Intent to Commit Crime of Violence as Determined by the Law Firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld.

I welcome an investigation by the Office of U.S. Attorney into the veracity of the statements contained in the enclosed declaration;  I understand that any false statements contained in the document will subject me to possible criminal prosecution.

I am sure that Messrs. Laurence J. Hoffman, Dennis M. Race, and R. Bruce McLean, and other attorneys and staff of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld will cooperate fully in any investigation of issues pertinent to the enclosed declaration.

Sincerely,

Gary Freedman

cc: Federal Bureau of Investigation

U.S. Secret Service

STATEMENT OF GARY FREEDMAN REGARDING INTENT TO COMMIT CRIME OF VIOLENCE AS DETERMINED BY THE LAW FIRM OF AKIN, GUMP, STRAUSS, HAUER & FELD

WHEREAS I was employed as a legal assistant ("paralegal") in the Washington office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump" or "firm"), located at 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Suite 400, Washington, D.C. 20036, until October 29, 1991, on which date my employment was involuntarily terminated; and

WHEREAS a former co-worker in the firm's litigation Support Department ("Department"), Patricia McNeil, advised me in a telephone conversation on the evening of July 1, 1993 that in the period shortly after my job termination, on October 29, 1991, my former direct supervisor, Christine Robertson (":Robertson"), held a meeting of her employees to advise that I had been terminated, and the supervisor stated that she had arranged with an unidentified employee(s) to have the lock to the Department's office suite changed because of the supervisor's feat that I might return to the office with a dangerous or deadly weapon to kill the supervisor or other employees in retaliation for my job termination; and

WHEREAS Robertson was a senior supervisory employee of Akin Gump who reported directly to R. Bruce McLean, a partner and member of the firm's Management Committee; and

WHEREAS I believe Robertson routinely attended management meetings that were uniformly held on Thursday of each week that were also attended by the firm's managing partner, Laurence J. Hoffman ("Hoffman"), other management partners, and other senior supervisory employees; and

WHEREAS in the days immediately prior to my job termination, Robertson had several oral and written communications with the partner who terminated my employment, Dennis M. Race ("Race"), regarding the issue of my continued employment with the firm.  See Akin Gump Response to Interrogatories and Document Request, Response to Particulars (Attachment A), at page 3; and Attachment D; and

WHEREAS Race conferred with members of Akin Gump's Management Committee prior to the firm's decision to terminate my employment.  See Akin Gump Response to Interrogatories and Document Request, Response to Particulars (Attachment A), at page 3; and

WHEREAS Robertson's action in securing the office suite that housed her office was motivated by her fear that I might possess or acquire a firearm or other dangerous or deadly weapon and unlawfully enter the said office suite with the intent to commit a crime of violence as defined by D.C. Code Section 22-3201(f); and

WHEREAS the fears that motivated Robertson's action in securing the office suite were not vague or generalized; rather, Robertson stated with specificity to employees under her supervision her fear as to my purported intent to gain unlawful entry to the Department's office suite in order to commit a crime of violence; and

WHEREAS Robertson's action in securing the office suite was done with the cooperation and assistance of other employees possibly including one or more supervisory employees (such as Personnel Administrator Laurel Digweed or Services Manager Stella Edmondson); and

WHEREAS Robertson's action in securing the office suite was not a hasty impulse but involved deliberation, planning, consultation and coordination with other employees, and involved at least a minimal financial expenditure; and

WHEREAS Robertson's action in securing the office suite carried the unequivocal presumption that she had the specific fear I might commit the crime of unlawful entry (a misdemeanor under D.C. Code Section 22-3102) or burglary (a felony under D.C. Code Section 22-1801); and

WHEREAS Robertson's action in securing the office suite and advising her employees that I might be armed and dangerous was knowingly malicious; knowingly unsupported by my past conduct as an employee (as memorialized in the firm's personnel records), reputation in the firm, and Robertson's prior personal dealings with me; and part of a long-standing pattern and practice of harassing and discriminatory conduct in violation of my rights under the D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977 ("the Act"); and

WHEREAS I advised the D.C. Department of Human Rights ("DHR") of Robertson's malicious and discriminatory action in (1) telling employees that I might be armed and dangerous and (2) advising employees that the lock to the employees' office therefore had to be changed in order to protect against the possibility that I might return to the office to commit a crime of violence.  See Complainant's Application for Reconsideration of a No Probable Cause Finding (filed July 27, 1993), at Attachment A, paragraph 7; and

WHEREAS the DHR determined that I was not harassed and was not subjected to unlawful discrimination in violation of the Act; that my belief that I was subjected to harassment and discrimination was the product of a paranoid mental disturbance that rendered me potentially violent and an imminent threat to persons in my environment; and

WHEREAS the determination by the DHR that my belief that I was subjected to disparate treatment under the Act was solely the product of a severe paranoid mental disturbance carries the necessary presumption that my continued and unwavering belief that I was subjected to disparate treatment under the Act is per se evidence that I continue to suffer from a severe paranoid mental disturbance that renders me potentially violent and an imminent threat to persons in my environment; and

WHEREAS the determination by the DHR that I suffer from a severe paranoid mental disturbance that renders me potentially violent and an imminent threat to persons in my environment contributes to the appearance or presumption that  the action of Robertson in securing the office suite was justifiable and that Robertson's fear that I might be armed and dangerous was reasonable; and

WHEREAS sworn statements filed with the DHR in Freedman v. Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld, Docket No. 92-087-P(N), by Hoffman and Race that my conduct in the firm was at times violent and that the firm had determined in consultation with a psychiatrist that I was paranoid and potentially violent contributes to the appearance or presumption that the action of Robertson in securing the office suite was justifiable and that Robertson's fear that I might be armed and dangerous was reasonable; and

WHEREAS Robertson's position as a senior supervisory employee who had routine and frequent contact with one or more members of the firm's Management Committee, including Hoffman and McLean, contributes to the appearance or presumption that the action of Robertson in securing the office suite was made with the constructive knowledge of the firm's Management Committee; or with the actual prior approval or subsequent ratification of one or more members of the firm's Management Committee; and

WHEREAS statements made by Robertson that I might be armed and dangerous, which I reported in writing to the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), may have been a material factor in the decision by the FBI to forward said writing to the U.S. Secret Service for possible investigation; and

WHEREAS statements made by Robertson that I might be armed and dangerous, which statements were communicated to the U.S. Secret Service by the FBI, may have been a material factor in the decision by the U.S. Secret Service to conduct an investigation into my potential for harm to that agency's protectees,

NOW, THEREFORE, I HEREBY STATE UNDER PENALTY OF LAW, D.C. CODE SECTION 22-2514, PROVIDING FOR CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR MAKING FALSE STATEMENTS:

I do not now nor have I ever owned, purchased, or otherwise acquired a pistol, firearm or other dangerous or deadly weapon as defined by D.C. Code Section 22-3202(a) in the District of Columbia or in any jurisdiction;

I have never attempted to purchase or acquire any dangerous or deadly weapon nor have I ever used or handled such a weapon at any time in my life;

I have never committed, attempted, or threatened to commit a crime of violence as defined by D.C. Code Section 22-3201(f) in the District of Columbia or in any jurisdiction;

At no time during my employment at Akin Gump did I act in any manner that would lead a reasonable person to believe that I might be armed or that I might attempt to acquire a dangerous or deadly weapon; and

At no time during my employment at Akin Gump did I act in any manner that would lead a reasonable person to believe that I might commit a crime of violence or any violent act.

/s/
_____________________
Gary Freedman

4-24-95
_____________________
Date

I, Gary Freedman, hereby reaffirm the above statement this 26th day of July 2010 under penalties for making false statements under the applicable laws of the District of Columbia and the United States.  I hereby reaffirm that the statements contained therein have been true and correct during the entire period April 24, 1995 to the present date.