1 a representation of an existing fact;
2 its materiality;
3 its falsity;
4 the speaker's knowledge of its falsity;
5 the speaker's intent that it shall be acted upon by the plaintiff;
6 plaintiff's ignorance of its falsity;
7 plaintiff's reliance on the truth of the representation;
8 plaintiff's right to rely upon it; and
9 consequent damages suffered by plaintiff.
In April 1993 I filed for disability benefits from the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA) by reason of severe mental illness, which according to my former employer, the D.C. law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, rendered me unfit for employment by reason of business necessity effective October 29, 1991. The firm alleged in a sworn statement dated May 22, 1992 filed under penalty of criminal sanctions with the D.C. Department of Human Rights that I posed a tort risk to the firm, a statement that I submitted to the SSA in support of my disability claim. I do not know the precise facts upon which the SSA relied to determine that I became unemployable on October 29, 1991 nor the facts upon which the SSA has determined that I have been continuously unemployable and eligible for benefits to the present date.
I have not misrepresented any material facts about myself or my beliefs upon which treating psychiatrists, since September 1992, have diagnosed me with severe (psychotic) mental illness including bipolar disorder (Napoleon Cuenco, MD, Daniel Tsao, MD, Suzanne M. Pitts); paranoid schizophrenia (Dimitrios Georgopoulos, MD, Albert H. Taub, Betsy Jane Cooper, MD) and delusional (paranoid) disorder (Albert H. Taub, MD, Rhoda Ruttenberg, MD, Henry C. Barbot, MD, Didi Bailey, MD, Jeremy Carpenter, MD, Umar Rahman, MD). I did not misrepresent any material facts about my beliefs in the harassment complaint I lodged at Akin Gump in October 1991, upon which a psychiatrist advised Akin Gump that I suffered from a "disorder" known as "ideas of reference" that might dispose me to commit an act of violence.
My beliefs, upon which my treating psychiatrists have diagnosed severe (psychotic) mental illness, are genuine and long-held. See U.S. v. Francisco Martin Duran, United States Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, 96 F.3d 1495 (Oct. 8, 1996 ). Duran pleaded not guilty to the charge of attempting to assassinate the President of the United States and mounted an insanity defense, claiming that he was trying to save the world by destroying an alien "mist", connected by an umbilical cord to an alien in the Colorado mountains. Duran's insanity defense failed based on expert prosecution testimony that Duran's purported belief, or "delusion," was not genuine and long-held.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals decided in an opinion issued on September 1, 1998 that the reasons my former employer, Akin Gump, submitted to the D.C. Department of Human Rights in support of its decision to terminate my employment, effective October 29, 1991, were genuine and worthy of credence. Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights, D.C.C.A. no. 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998) (the Court implicitly affirmed that I had a disturbed mental state during the entire period March 1988 to October 29, 1991, cf. Duran, in other words, that my belief that I was a victim of harassment, which was the product of a psychiatric "disorder," was long-held and genuine).
Akin Gump had advised the D.C. Department Human Rights that following its investigation of a complaint of job harassment I had lodged against my direct supervisor, coworkers, and attorneys, the firm had determined, in consultation with a practicing psychiatrist, Gertrude R. Ticho, M.D., that my beliefs were the product of a psychiatric "disorder" (ideas of reference) that might dispose me to commit an act of violence. (Akin Gump apparently disputed, or failed to affirm, the determination of the D.C. Department of Human Rights that I had ever lodged a complaint against my direct supervisor.)
I continue to believe that I was a victim of job harassment at Akin Gump; arguably--by reason of my beliefs about Akin Gump alone--I remain unemployable per the Americans With Disabilities Act by reason of business necessity.
But there is more. On January 15, 2010 the U.S. Marshal determined that I pose a risk of harm to one of its protectees (and that protectee's family), and barred me from visiting my local synagogue as well as the U.S. District Court without prior (discretionary) approval by the U.S. Marshal.
At oral argument before the D.C. Court of Appeals on December 16, 1997 assistant D.C. Corporation Counsel M. Justin Draycott, Esq. stated to the Court that I "admitted" that my "coworkers were afraid" of me, affirming record evidence I had proffered to the D.C. Department of Human Rights that my former direct supervisor advised her employees on about October 29, 1991 that I might have had plans to return to the firm's premises after my termination to kill her: requiring the supervisor (and unnamed others) to take protective measures against a feared homicidal assault.
Akin Gump did not dispute pleadings filed by the D.C. Office of Corporation Counsel with the D.C. Court of Appeals that among the facts material to the firm's termination decision were the following:
1. I admitted (according to the Corporation Counsel) that a coworker, speaking for herself and others, in August 1989, was afraid that I might be armed and extremely dangerous;
2. I believed that I was a victim of frequent harassing acts by firm personnel (as an agency-supplied employee and later) throughout my tenure, from March 1988 to late October 1991, including the act of "gaslighting" and the spreading of false and malicious rumors;
3. I believed the law firm of Akin Gump violated the D.C. Mental Health Information Act by soliciting and obtaining confidential mental health information about me from a treating psychiatrist;
4. I believed that the law firm of Akin Gump may have committed a criminal act in gaining access to my apartment in January 1990, inspecting the premises, and videotaping the premises and its contents: that this possible criminal act was likely approved by the firm's management committee, which included Robert S. Strauss, Esq., Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Esq. Richard Wyatt, Esq. Laurence J. Hoffman, Esq. (managing partner), Malcolm Lassman, Esq., Joel Jankowski, Esq. and others; and
5. I believed that the law firm of Akin Gump shared confidential personal information about me, some of it obtained unlawfully, with firm personnel who thereafter used the information to harass me, thereby intentionally inflicting severe emotional distress.
My current treating psychiatrists do not believe that I pose a risk of harm to myself or others. However, comprehensive psychological testing performed by the George Washington University Medical Center Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences in May 1994 (William Fabian, Ph.D.) disclosed that I have a (deeply ingrained) tendency to decompensate under stress (such as, presumably, the stresses of the workplace) and that I have poor coping skills. There is no evidence that I currently have the ability to cope with workplace stresses. In fact, my present circumstances suggest I do not. I am totally socially isolated; I speak by telephone to my sister, my only sibling, about once a week; the U.S. Marshal believes that my writings evidence anger of an intensity that merits law enforcement scrutiny as well as the imposition of protective measures; at my psychiatric consultations I speak of imaginary friends, criminal conspiracies involving high level government officials, nationally-prominent lawyers, and the U.S. Marshal Service. On June 17, 2010 my psychiatrist Abbas Jama, MD, observed that I am obsessively preoccupied with the past, which he considers pathological.
I believe that my SSA claim is fraudulent, that I do not suffer from psychotic mental illness, and that my beliefs about my environment are accurate. However, I accept the determinations made by my treating psychiatrists since 1992 that I suffer from severe mental illness; I accept the determination made by the U.S. Marshal that I pose a risk of harm to others and that I am therefore unemployable by reason of business necessity per the Americans With Disabilities Act; I accept the fact that my beliefs that I am employable and that my claim for disability benefits is fraudulent are symptoms of severe (psychotic) mental illness; I accept the fact that my belief that I do not suffer from psychotic mental illness is itself a symptom of psychotic mental illness, namely, my inability to appreciate, or have insight 1/ into, the nature and severity of my disorder. I have disclosed to the U.S. Marshal, a representative of the U.S. Department of Justice, that I believe my continued receipt of disability benefits paid by the SSA is fraudulent and amounts to the commission of a felony.
I have not withheld or misrepresented any material facts about the illness diagnosed by my psychiatrists from either the U.S. Social Security Administration or the U.S. Department of Justice. I have diligently provided facts adverse to my disability claim to the U.S. Social Security Administration, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Office of U.S. Attorney (District of Columbia).
I affirm under penalty of law that the above statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
June 27, 2010
1/ See initial assessment, Napoleon Cuenco, MD, George Washington University Department of Psychiatry, September 24, 1992, which stated that my insight into my disorder was "poor."