The D.C. Office of Attorney General (acting through Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq., Jo Anne Robinson, Esq., Charles L. Reischel, Esq., William J. Earl, Esq. and M. Justin Draycott, Esq.) took the position before the D.C. Superior Court in 1996 and again before the D.C. Court of Appeals in 1997 that my belief that Akin Gump's managers (a class of persons that included Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Esq., Robert S. Strauss, Esq., Malcolm Lassman, Esq., Laurence J. Hoffman, Esq., Joel Jankowsky, Esq. and Richard L. Wyatt, Jr., Esq.) engaged in, or approved the commission of, criminal acts, specifically, approving the break-in of my residence in January 1990 and conspiring to solicit confidential mental health information from my treating psychiatrists in violation of the D.C. Mental Health Information Act of 1978 (from 1989 through 1991) -- acts that in their entirety might constitute the crime of racketeering under federal law -- was genuine. Brief of Appellee District of Columbia, Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights, D.C.C.A. no. 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998). Neither Strauss, Jordan, Wyatt, Jankowsky, Race, Lassman, managing partner Hoffman nor any Akin Gump manager disputed the D.C. Attorney General's position or questioned its legal or factual relevance.
I have devoted my blog, My Daily Struggles, to the above litigation: its actors and public policy implications as well as flaws in pleadings filed by the D.C. Office of Attorney General and the opinion issued by the D.C. Court of Appeals. Note that I have never criticized in any way the opinion issued in the above litigation by the D.C. Superior Court. I have remained totally silent as to the action of the Superior Court (and the presiding judge in that proceedings) precisely because I have always recognized that that opinion has no legal meaning. Any long-time reader of my blog with at least average reading comprehension skills would know that. The D.C. Court of Appeals did not review or affirm the opinion of the D.C. Superior Court (1996); by law, the D.C. Court of Appeals reviewed (and affirmed) the earlier final agency action of the D.C. Department of Human Rights (1993).
On January 15, 2010 the U.S. Marshal Service implicitly cautioned me against questioning the validity of the D.C. Court of Appeals' opinion in Freedman, and by extension cautioned that I should not question the validity of the determination of the D.C. Attorney General that an employee of Akin Gump formed a genuine, good faith belief that Akin Gump management has committed a pattern of criminal acts that might constitute the crime of racketeering under federal law.
Is Akin Gump a racketeering influenced organization?
At least one attorney (Pennsylvania Bar ID #41032) who used to be employed at Akin Gump has formed a genuine, good faith belief that Akin Gump is a racketeering influenced organization. That's the opinion of the D.C. Office of Attorney General.
What did the U.S. Marshal say?
The action of the D.C. Court of Appeals in ruling in favor of the D.C. Attorney General should not be questioned. And that's what the U.S. Marshal has implicitly said.