I had sent Kirkland & Ellis one of my "attention-grabbing" job inquiries. Apparently, the firm interpreted the letter as sincere and not inappropriate.
In August 1994 pursuant to the newly-reenacted independent counsel law, Kenneth Starr, Esq. was appointed by a three-judge panel to continue the Whitewater investigation. Starr took the job part-time and remained active with his law firm, Kirkland & Ellis, as this was permitted by statute and was also the norm with previous independent counsel investigations.
Kirkland & Ellis
Partnerships Including Professional Corporations
655 Fifteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, .C. 20005
202 879-5000
October 23, 1998
Mr. Gary Freedman
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apartment 136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Dear Mr. Freedman:
Thank you very much for your letter expressing an interest in associating with our firm.
We appreciate your letter of August 12, 1998, however, it is difficult for our Recruiting Committee to determine your qualifications without benefit of your resume and academic credentials. Please feel free to forward a resume and official transcript at your earliest convenience for our consideration.
Thank you again for your interest in our firm, and we wish you well in your efforts to secure a challenging legal position.
Sincerely,
Dusti L. Johnson
Attorney Recruiting Manager
DLJ: lrd
******************
August 12, 1998
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Thomas D. Yannucci, Esq.
Managing Partner
Kirkland & Ellis
Suite 1200
655 15th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20005
Dear Mr. Yannucci:
I am an attorney licensed to practice in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and qualify for consideration for an associate position at Kirkland & Ellis. Preliminary to forwarding a copy of my resume to you I believe I have a legal duty to advise you of the following facts regarding concerns about my potential for armed violence or homicide, intent to purchase firearms to commit a felony, and the illegal transport of a deadly weapon: concerns placed in controversy and affirmed, by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel, as relating to genuine fears about my criminal intent.
The Government of the District of Columbia has affirmed that my former employer, the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump") terminated my employment in October 1991 on the basis of genuine concerns about my mental health and stability, including the potential for violence. The employer's termination decision was made following an ex parte consultation with a psychiatrist who did not examine me personally. Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order, June 10, 1996) (name of state court judge redacted at the implicit direction of the Justice Department). As of the filing of the complaint in the said proceedings, in October 1995, and at all times thereafter, it was unlawful under the laws of the District of Columbia for a psychiatrist to offer a professional psychiatric opinion about an individual without benefit of personal examination as is strongly recommended by the American Psychiatric Association's Principles of Medical Ethics. The D.C. Code in its latest revision makes it unlawful for a physician to "[fail] to conform to standards of acceptable conduct and prevailing practice within a health profession." See D.C. Code 2-3305.14(26). This provision was added to the District of Columbia Health Occupations Revision Act by D.C. Law 10-247, enacted on March 23, 1995.
The District of Columbia Superior Court did not find that the action of my Akin Gump supervisor in stating to employees that she feared that I might have had plans to kill her and the action of the supervisor in arranging to have her office secured against such a homicidal assault, see record on appeal at 41, was invidiously motivated.
The District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.) expressly affirmed to the D.C. Superior Court in pleadings filed in the above-referenced proceedings, relying on legally-irrelevant "after-acquired" evidence, see McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S.Ct. 879, 885 (1995), that my coworkers had formed genuine fears (i.e., not motivated by discriminatory animus) that I might have been armed and dangerous and poised to carry out a homicidal assault on the firm's premises. See Brief of Respondent in Opposition to Petition for Review of no Probable Cause Determination by Department of Human Rights at 6, Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (citing record on appeal at 276). The District implicitly asserted that my coworkers' concerns about my potential for armed violence were relevant to the employer's decision to terminate my employment.
I stand by the "Statement of Gary Freedman to the Office of U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Regarding Intent to Commit Crime of Violence as Determined by the Law Firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld," ("Statement to the U.S. Attorney") dated April 24, 1995, and made under penalty of criminal sanctions (D.C. Code 22-2514).
I want to advise, additionally, that representations made by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (M. Justin Draycott, Esq.) to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in December 1997, in the currently pending appeal of the above-referenced litigation, that my coworkers had genuine fears about my potential for armed violence or homicide conflict with the prior Statement to the U.S. Attorney, and that said conflict may give rise to the appearance that representations that I made in the Statement to the U.S. Attorney were unreliable, knowingly false, or perjured.
Additionally, the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel stands by speculation made by the District of Columbia Department of Human Rights that a document I submitted to the agency may have been inauthentic (i.e., forged or fabricated), see record on appeal at 8; presumably, according to the agency, I submitted the possibly inauthentic document in order to deny forensic psychiatric evidence filed by Akin Gump with the agency: forensic psychiatric evidence relating to my mental health (specifically relating to the psychiatric symptom "ideas of reference") and stability (specifically relating to my potential for violence).
In the early evening of Thursday August 6, 1998 two special agents of the U.S. Capitol Police arrived at my home, frisked me for weapons, sought my consent to search my home, and interrogated me in a combatively aggressive manner about an incident that had allegedly occurred earlier in the day. The agents advised me that they had obtained information from individuals employed by the District of Columbia that earlier in the day I had gotten into a violent argument at a mental health clinic operated by the District of Columbia, and that I had threatened to commit a brutally heinous crime involving the use of firearms against unidentified third parties, a threat that would constitute a prosecutable offense. I met the next day with one of the agents at U.S. Capitol Police headquarters at which time he advised me that he had confirmed that, in fact, I had not been at the clinic the previous day, that the incident as reported to the U.S. Capitol Police by individuals employed by the Government of the District of Columbia (Mental Health Services Administration) was based on totally erroneous information.
Robert Chapman, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, is familiar with this matter, and will respond to any questions you may have. The telephone number of the U.S. Attorney's Office is (202) 514 7566.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
Enclosure: "Authorization for Disclosure" -- Gertrude R. Ticho, M.D.
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