The following is a letter dated January 5, 1994 (minus attachments) that I forwarded to the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and copied to the Office of U.S. Attorney (Eric H. Holder, Esq.), the Federal Bureau of Investigation/Washington Field Office, the U.S. Social Security Administration and Charles L. Reischel (D.C. Deputy Corporation Counsel).
January 5, 1994
1. The letter argues that my civil rights were violated under 42 U.S.C. 1983 by the action of my former employer, the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, in filing false and defamatory statements about my mental health and stability with a state agency resulting in the infliction of severe emotional distress. The letter fails to show, however, that Akin Gump's use of a state agency to defame me resulted in the impairment of a federally-protected liberty interest, which is required under Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 47 L.Ed.2d 405, 96 S.Ct. 1155 (1976); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 48 L.Ed.2d 684, 96 S.Ct. 2074 (1976); and Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 33 L.Ed.2d 548, 92 S.Ct. 2701 (1972).
2. The letter establishes that current U.S. Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. was apprised of my employment problems at least as of January 1994. Eric H. Holder, Jr. is a personal friend of senior Akin Gump counsel Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Esq.
3. The letter establishes that I advised federal authorities of serious infirmities in my Social Security disability claim as early as January 1994.
4. The letter establishes that I advised the U.S. Social Security Administration of all material facts adverse to my Social Security disability claim as of early January 1994. My disability claim had been approved in August 1993.
5. The letter establishes that I advised the Office of U.S. Attorney of evidence tending to show that Akin Gump had committed the crime of false statements, a misdemeanor under District of Columbia law. D.C. Code 22-2514 (false statements).
6. I recall that an FBI agent telephoned me in about early February 1994 to inquire about the letter. He asked me what violation of federal law I was alleging. I told the agent that Akin Gump had used the U.S. Postal Service to transmit false and defamatory pleadings. The agent advised me that that was too trivial a matter for the FBI to investigate. The agent did not suggest that I contact the U.S. Postal Inspector.
7. The letter establishes that I advised the Social Security Administration of facts that might lead a psychiatrist to diagnose me with post-traumatic stress disorder, a compensable disability under Social Security rules. Any claim I might make in the future for disability compensation for PTSD is based on longstanding symptoms, long-held beliefs about the nature of my disability, and longstanding statements about the nature of my disability; any future claim I might make for disability benefits for PTSD is not a recent, self-serving fabrication.
2. The letter establishes that current U.S. Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. was apprised of my employment problems at least as of January 1994. Eric H. Holder, Jr. is a personal friend of senior Akin Gump counsel Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Esq.
3. The letter establishes that I advised federal authorities of serious infirmities in my Social Security disability claim as early as January 1994.
4. The letter establishes that I advised the U.S. Social Security Administration of all material facts adverse to my Social Security disability claim as of early January 1994. My disability claim had been approved in August 1993.
5. The letter establishes that I advised the Office of U.S. Attorney of evidence tending to show that Akin Gump had committed the crime of false statements, a misdemeanor under District of Columbia law. D.C. Code 22-2514 (false statements).
6. I recall that an FBI agent telephoned me in about early February 1994 to inquire about the letter. He asked me what violation of federal law I was alleging. I told the agent that Akin Gump had used the U.S. Postal Service to transmit false and defamatory pleadings. The agent advised me that that was too trivial a matter for the FBI to investigate. The agent did not suggest that I contact the U.S. Postal Inspector.
7. The letter establishes that I advised the Social Security Administration of facts that might lead a psychiatrist to diagnose me with post-traumatic stress disorder, a compensable disability under Social Security rules. Any claim I might make in the future for disability compensation for PTSD is based on longstanding symptoms, long-held beliefs about the nature of my disability, and longstanding statements about the nature of my disability; any future claim I might make for disability benefits for PTSD is not a recent, self-serving fabrication.
January 5, 1994
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apt. 136
Washington, DC 20008
Mr. James P. Turner
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights
Civil Rights Division
U.S. Department of Justice
10th & Constitution Avenue, NW
Washington, DC
Dear Mr. Turner:
This letter is intended to communicate my serious concerns regarding the action of my former employer, a private entity, in using the legal processes of a state agency to defame me and to inflict severe emotional distress in violation of my civil rights under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983.
The violation of my civil rights under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 has occurred in the context of the following facts and circumstances:
1. During the period June 13, 1988 through October 29, 1991 I was employed in the capacity of legal assistant (paralegal) at the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld (“Akin Gump”), located at 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, NW, Suite 400, Washington, DC 20036.
On October 24, 1991 I complained to two attorney managers of Akin Gump, Mr. Malcolm Lassman and Mr. Dennis M. Race, that I was a victim of harassment by co-workers, supervisory personnel (including my immediate supervisor. Mrs. Christine Robertson), and attorneys of the firm;. I advised Messrs. Lassman and Race that the harassment focused on my perceived sexual preference (homosexual) and that the harassment appeared to have anti-Semitic overtones.
On October 29 1991 I was terminated by Akin Gump. Mr. Race advised me that he had investigated my allegations of harassment, that he was unable to substantiate my allegations of harassment 1/, and that there appeared to be a lack of fit between me and other firm personnel. Mr. Race also told me
____________________________
1/ On November 29, 1993 the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found, in an unlawful termination matter unrelated to my case, that my supervisor, Mrs. Christine Robertson, exhibited racial animus toward black employees under her supervision. McNeil v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, No. 93-0477 (D.C. D.C., filed Nov. 29, 1993) (memorandum opinion and order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment) (See Exhibit A.) In July 1991, there months before
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that my work was of poor quality. (In fact, all performance evaluations issued during my employment rated my work above-average or outstanding.)
Mr. Race stated that he had conferred with two outside consultants who advised Mr. Race that in a situation such as mine, termination was appropriate. Mr. Race did not identify the names of the consultants or their field of expertise. I had assumed at the time of the termination that the two consultants to which Mr. Race referred were experts in employee relations. Mr.Race indicated in no way whatsoever that he had determined that I suffered from emotional problems that rendered me not suitable for employment.
2. On February 4, 1992 I filed a Complaint [Docket No. 92-087-P(N)] with the District of Columbia Department of Human Rights and Minority Business Development (DOHR), alleging that Akin Gump’s decision to terminate my employment was unlawfully based on the perception that I was homosexual, in violation of the D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended.
3. On December 22, 1992 I received form DOHR via the U.S. Postal Service (certified mail) a copy of Akin Gump’s Response to Interrogatories and Document Request, filed with DOHR in Complaint Docket No. 92-087-P(N), dated May 22, 1992 (See Exhibit B). (I do not know by what means Akin Gump transmitted the pleadings to DOHR, whether by hand delivery or via the U.S. Postal Service.)
__________________
1/ (cont’d)
my termination, Mrs. Robertson called a meeting of the black employees under her supervision, including Mrs. Patricia McNeil, and asked them if they thought she was prejudiced against blacks. She explained that her black male receptionist, Mr. Richard Taylor, had accused her of being prejudiced against blacks and she wanted to know whether they shared that view. All three employees responded in the affirmative and provided her the reasons they felt that way, giving her examples of the way she treated blacks differently than whites. Plaintiff’s Complaint for Damages at 2 (paragraph 12), McNeil, supra (See Exhibit D). Thus, irrespective of the merits of my allegations of harassment, a diligent investigation by Dennis Race in late October 1991 of my complaint of sexual and religious harassment would have disclosed that it was well known to employees within the department supervised by Mrs. Robertson that that supervisor had a disposition to engage in racially discriminatory, and at times racially offensive, behavior. Yet, Mr. Race’s (apparently de minimis) investigation failed to uncover even common knowledge of racially discriminatory conduct by my supervisor--evidence that was material to my complaint of sexual and religious harassment.
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It was by way of Akin Gump’s Response that I learned for the first time, on December 22, 1992, that Akin Gump claimed to have based its termination decision in part on consultations with two mental health professionals, including an unidentified psychiatrist who allegedly advised Akin Gump that I suffered from a severe psychological disorder and was potentially violent.
Akin Gump’s Response also included a memorandum dated October 25, 1991 from my supervisor, Christine Robertson (a person later found by a federal court to exhibit racial animus), to Dennis Race that details purported difficulties that Mrs. Robertson had in her supervision of me and purported difficulties I had with co-workers. The memorandum is replete with factual distortions and defamatory accusations. Certain of Mrs. Robertson’s statements contained in the memorandum dated October 25, 1991 are contradicted by Akin Gump’s business records thus, certain of Mrs. Robertson’s statements were known to be false by Akin Gump’s managers at the time of the termination and at the time Akin Gump included the memorandum in the Response filed with the DOHR (See Exhibit C).
4. At the time of my termination on October 29, 1991 I was a beneficiary of Akin Gump’s Long-Term Disability Income Plan (“Plan”), underwritten by UNUM Life (See Exhibit D). At the termination meeting Mr. Dennis Race did not advise me of my rights under the Plan or provide sufficient facts concerning the emotional and psychological reasons for the termination to alert me to file a [timely] claim. The Plan requires that a claim be filed within 30 days of the onset of disability. It was not until December 22, 1992, upon my receipt of Akin Gump’s Response, that I learned that Akin Gump had purportedly determined that I was unsuitable for employment by reason of psychological disturbance. Even if I had retained insurance coverage by converting to an individual plan under COBRA immediately following the termination on October 29, 1991, the facts provided at the termination meeting were insufficient to alert me to file a timely claim on the basis of psychological disturbance.
Akin Gump’s failure to provide any facts that might alert me to file a timely disability claim allowed Akin Gump to avoid its obligation under an employee benefit plan and had the necessary effect of denying me employee benefit rights. [Cf. Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., Kingsville, Tex., 692 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1982).]
(Akin Gump may have a pattern or practice of a discriminatory denial of employee benefits. In McNeil v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld the aggrieved employee, Mrs. Patricia McNeil, alleged that Akin Gump denied her maternity benefits. Also, Akin Gump’s termination of Mrs. McNeil after 4½ years employment precluded the vesting of her pension under ERISA, an event that would have occurred, but for the termination, upon the fifth anniversary of employment.)
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5. On June 30, 1993 DOHR issued an opinion letter, which I received on July 1, 1993, stating its determination that there was no probable cause to believe that the action of Akin Gump in terminating my employment was discriminatory in violation of the D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended (See Exhibit E). DOHR’s opinion letter identified Gertrude R. Ticho, M.D., as the psychiatrist whom Akin Gump had supposedly consulted and who allegedly advised Akin Gump that I was severely disturbed and potentially violent.
6. On July 2, 1993 I placed a telephone call to Dr. Gertrude Ticho to inquire about her alleged consultation with an Akin Gump manager in the period immediately prior to my termination in October 1991. Dr. Ticho denied having had any such consultation with Akin Gump. Dr. Ticho stated emphatically that she would never make any representations regarding the mental status of an individual she had not seen in personal consultation. I have never had a psychiatric consultation with Dr. Gertrude Ticho.
In a letter to me dated July 4, 1993 Dr. Ticho states that she did not consult with Dennis Race of Akin Gump and that she has never seen me for a psychiatric consultation. I appended a copy of Dr. Ticho’s letter as an attachment to my Application for Reconsideration of DOHR’s No Probable Cause Finding, which I filed with DOHR on July 27, 1993 (See Exhibit D).
(The other mental health resource with which Akin Gump claimed to have consulted, Sheppard Pratt Preferred Resources also denies having conferred with any Akin Gump managers at any time concerning me (See Exhibit D).)
6. In its Determination on Reconsideration, dated September 24, 1993, DOHR reaffirmed its earlier No Probable Cause finding issued on June 30, 1992 (See Exhibit F). DOHR found that Akin Gump’s termination decision was lawfully based on the employer’s determination that I suffered from severe emotional difficulties that rendered me not suitable for employment and potentially violent. DOHR also found that Akin Gump’s allegation that it had conferred with two mental health professionals was competent and persuasive evidence that the consultations had in fact occurred, despite the documentation I submitted to DOHR denying that any such consultations had taken place.
On October 22, 1993 I filed an Appeal of DOHR’s No Probable Cause finding with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, Docket No. 93-AA-1342 (See Exhibit G). The appeal is currently pending.
A few days after October 22, 1993 I spoke again by telephone with Dr. Gertrude Ticho. Dr. Ticho stated that she had had “not the slightest contact” with any Akin Gump managers and affirmed having written the letter to me dated July 4, 1993,
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the authenticity of which had been questioned by DOHR (See Exhibit H).
7. Beginning on October 29, 1991, as a direct result of the malicious conduct of Akin Gump management, I have suffered from psychological symptoms, severe at times. These symptoms have included intense anxiety, irritability, feelings of dread and a constant reliving of the painful experiences I suffered during my employment at Akin Gump. I did not suffer from these specific symptoms prior to the termination on October 29, 199l; the symptoms arose at the time of the termination and, indeed, are a direct consequence of the termination.
During the period immediately prior to October 29, 1991--from May 29, 1991 until October 8, 1991--I consulted weekly with a psychologist, Dr William Dr. Brown, for non-debilitating anxiety (See Exhibit I). As a psychologist, Dr. Brown is precluded from treating clients with severe emotional disorders. Principle 2 (Competence) of the Ethical Principles of Psychologists (Amended June 2, 1989), promulgated by the American Psychological Association (APA), requires that “[p]sychologists recognize the boundaries of their competence and the limitations of their techniques.” A psychologist’s continued treatment of a severely disturbed client would constitute a violation of the aforementioned ethical principle. The APA, which conducted a review of Dr. Brown’s handling of my case, has determined that Dr. Brown’s therapy did not exceed his competence (See Exhibit J).
The finding of the APA that Dr. Brown’s handling of my case did not violate that organization’s ethical principle regarding a psychologist’s competence leads to one inescapable conclusion: that during the period immediately prior to my termination on October 29, 1991--from May 29, 1991 until October 8, 1991--I did not suffer from psychological symptoms of sufficient severity so as to preclude competent non-medical handling by a psychologist. Further, the APA’s disposition of my Complaint against Dr. Brown is consistent with the logical inference that any severe and debilitating symptoms from which I currently suffer are a direct consequence of the malicious actions of Akin Gump management in late October 1991 in terminating my employment and the malicious actions perpetrated by Akin Gump management in connection with the unlawful termination investigation conducted by the District of Columbia Department of Human Rights and Minority Business Development.
On October 27, 1992, about one year after my job termination on October 29, 1991, I commenced weekly psychotherapy with Suzanne M. Pitts, M.D., a psychiatrist at the George Washington University Medical Center. During the session on the morning of December 22, 1992 Dr. Pitts advised me that she discerned improvement in my condition (See Exhibit K). Coincidentally,
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on December 22, 1992 the U.S. Postal Service delivered to me a copy of Akin Gump’s Response to Interrogatories and Document request filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights in connection with that agency’s unlawful termination investigation. As discussed above, Akin Gump’s filing was replete with malicious factual distortions and defamatory accusations. In addition, the pleadings included fabricated--though at the time credible and disturbing--evidence that I had been secretly certified insane and potentially violent by an unidentified psychiatrist! By late January 1993--only weeks after I had read the extremely disturbing falsehoods contained in pleadings filed by Akin Gump--Dr. Pitts determined that it was therapeutically advisable that I undertake twice-weekly consultations and suggested for the first time, on January 19, 1993, that I take medication. On no occasion during the initial weeks of my therapy with Dr. Pitts--from October 27, 1992 through January 12, 1993--did she state that medication was indicated. Quite probably, the marked progress I had made after about eleven weeks of therapy, which Dr. Pitts noted on December 22, 1992, was nullified by the intense emotional distress I experienced following my receipt of Akin Gump’s defamatory pleadings late in the day on December 22, 1992.
There can be no doubt that the malicious conduct of Akin Gump management, at times outrageous, has had a direct and severe effect on my mental state, as it would on any reasonable person.
Based on the record presented herein it appears that attorney managers of my former employer, the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, have conspired to use, and have in fact used, the legal processes of a state agency, the District of Columbia Department of Human Rights and Minority Business Development, to violate my civil rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 by:
(a.) filing fabricated evidence with the DOHR that a psychiatrist had determined that I suffered from a severe psychological disturbance and was potentially violent;
(b.) filing with the DOHR the memorandum dated October 25, 1991 prepared by my former supervisor that contained false, malicious, and defamatory statements in denigration of my mental health and fitness as an employee, and which included statements contradicted by Akin Gump’s business records and therefore known to be false by Akin Gump’s attorney managers; and
(c.) causing the DOHR to have delivered to my residence via the U.S. Postal Service 1/ on December 22, 1992 Akin Gump’s
____________
2/ Akin Gump’s possible use of the U.S. Postal Service to deliver to the DOHR, and/or its causing the DOHR to have
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Response to Interrogatories and Document Request, which contained fabricated and defamatory statements that I had been certified insane and potentially violent by an unidentified psychiatrist and which included the aforementioned memorandum dated October 25, 1991 prepared by my supervisor (an individual later found by a federal court to exhibit racial animus) thereby
(d.) causing me to suffer severe emotional distress that has resulted in a need for intensive psychiatric treatment, with a notable exacerbation of symptoms beginning in late January 1993.
I have submitted a collection of documents pertinent to this matter to the U.S. Social Security Administration, Office of Disability and International Operations, 1500 Woodlawn Drive, Baltimore MD 21241: Social Security Disability Claim No. xxx-xx-xxxx.
Thank you for your attention to this matter,
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
cc: Office of U.S. Attorney [Eric H. Holder, Jr.]
Federal Bureau of Investigation/Washington Field Office
U.S. Social Security Administration
Charles L. Reischel D.C. Corporation Counsel
________________
2/ (cont’d)
1. During the period June 13, 1988 through October 29, 1991 I was employed in the capacity of legal assistant (paralegal) at the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld (“Akin Gump”), located at 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, NW, Suite 400, Washington, DC 20036.
On October 24, 1991 I complained to two attorney managers of Akin Gump, Mr. Malcolm Lassman and Mr. Dennis M. Race, that I was a victim of harassment by co-workers, supervisory personnel (including my immediate supervisor. Mrs. Christine Robertson), and attorneys of the firm;. I advised Messrs. Lassman and Race that the harassment focused on my perceived sexual preference (homosexual) and that the harassment appeared to have anti-Semitic overtones.
On October 29 1991 I was terminated by Akin Gump. Mr. Race advised me that he had investigated my allegations of harassment, that he was unable to substantiate my allegations of harassment 1/, and that there appeared to be a lack of fit between me and other firm personnel. Mr. Race also told me
____________________________
1/ On November 29, 1993 the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found, in an unlawful termination matter unrelated to my case, that my supervisor, Mrs. Christine Robertson, exhibited racial animus toward black employees under her supervision. McNeil v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, No. 93-0477 (D.C. D.C., filed Nov. 29, 1993) (memorandum opinion and order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment) (See Exhibit A.) In July 1991, there months before
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that my work was of poor quality. (In fact, all performance evaluations issued during my employment rated my work above-average or outstanding.)
Mr. Race stated that he had conferred with two outside consultants who advised Mr. Race that in a situation such as mine, termination was appropriate. Mr. Race did not identify the names of the consultants or their field of expertise. I had assumed at the time of the termination that the two consultants to which Mr. Race referred were experts in employee relations. Mr.Race indicated in no way whatsoever that he had determined that I suffered from emotional problems that rendered me not suitable for employment.
2. On February 4, 1992 I filed a Complaint [Docket No. 92-087-P(N)] with the District of Columbia Department of Human Rights and Minority Business Development (DOHR), alleging that Akin Gump’s decision to terminate my employment was unlawfully based on the perception that I was homosexual, in violation of the D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended.
3. On December 22, 1992 I received form DOHR via the U.S. Postal Service (certified mail) a copy of Akin Gump’s Response to Interrogatories and Document Request, filed with DOHR in Complaint Docket No. 92-087-P(N), dated May 22, 1992 (See Exhibit B). (I do not know by what means Akin Gump transmitted the pleadings to DOHR, whether by hand delivery or via the U.S. Postal Service.)
__________________
1/ (cont’d)
my termination, Mrs. Robertson called a meeting of the black employees under her supervision, including Mrs. Patricia McNeil, and asked them if they thought she was prejudiced against blacks. She explained that her black male receptionist, Mr. Richard Taylor, had accused her of being prejudiced against blacks and she wanted to know whether they shared that view. All three employees responded in the affirmative and provided her the reasons they felt that way, giving her examples of the way she treated blacks differently than whites. Plaintiff’s Complaint for Damages at 2 (paragraph 12), McNeil, supra (See Exhibit D). Thus, irrespective of the merits of my allegations of harassment, a diligent investigation by Dennis Race in late October 1991 of my complaint of sexual and religious harassment would have disclosed that it was well known to employees within the department supervised by Mrs. Robertson that that supervisor had a disposition to engage in racially discriminatory, and at times racially offensive, behavior. Yet, Mr. Race’s (apparently de minimis) investigation failed to uncover even common knowledge of racially discriminatory conduct by my supervisor--evidence that was material to my complaint of sexual and religious harassment.
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It was by way of Akin Gump’s Response that I learned for the first time, on December 22, 1992, that Akin Gump claimed to have based its termination decision in part on consultations with two mental health professionals, including an unidentified psychiatrist who allegedly advised Akin Gump that I suffered from a severe psychological disorder and was potentially violent.
Akin Gump’s Response also included a memorandum dated October 25, 1991 from my supervisor, Christine Robertson (a person later found by a federal court to exhibit racial animus), to Dennis Race that details purported difficulties that Mrs. Robertson had in her supervision of me and purported difficulties I had with co-workers. The memorandum is replete with factual distortions and defamatory accusations. Certain of Mrs. Robertson’s statements contained in the memorandum dated October 25, 1991 are contradicted by Akin Gump’s business records thus, certain of Mrs. Robertson’s statements were known to be false by Akin Gump’s managers at the time of the termination and at the time Akin Gump included the memorandum in the Response filed with the DOHR (See Exhibit C).
4. At the time of my termination on October 29, 1991 I was a beneficiary of Akin Gump’s Long-Term Disability Income Plan (“Plan”), underwritten by UNUM Life (See Exhibit D). At the termination meeting Mr. Dennis Race did not advise me of my rights under the Plan or provide sufficient facts concerning the emotional and psychological reasons for the termination to alert me to file a [timely] claim. The Plan requires that a claim be filed within 30 days of the onset of disability. It was not until December 22, 1992, upon my receipt of Akin Gump’s Response, that I learned that Akin Gump had purportedly determined that I was unsuitable for employment by reason of psychological disturbance. Even if I had retained insurance coverage by converting to an individual plan under COBRA immediately following the termination on October 29, 1991, the facts provided at the termination meeting were insufficient to alert me to file a timely claim on the basis of psychological disturbance.
Akin Gump’s failure to provide any facts that might alert me to file a timely disability claim allowed Akin Gump to avoid its obligation under an employee benefit plan and had the necessary effect of denying me employee benefit rights. [Cf. Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., Kingsville, Tex., 692 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1982).]
(Akin Gump may have a pattern or practice of a discriminatory denial of employee benefits. In McNeil v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld the aggrieved employee, Mrs. Patricia McNeil, alleged that Akin Gump denied her maternity benefits. Also, Akin Gump’s termination of Mrs. McNeil after 4½ years employment precluded the vesting of her pension under ERISA, an event that would have occurred, but for the termination, upon the fifth anniversary of employment.)
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5. On June 30, 1993 DOHR issued an opinion letter, which I received on July 1, 1993, stating its determination that there was no probable cause to believe that the action of Akin Gump in terminating my employment was discriminatory in violation of the D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended (See Exhibit E). DOHR’s opinion letter identified Gertrude R. Ticho, M.D., as the psychiatrist whom Akin Gump had supposedly consulted and who allegedly advised Akin Gump that I was severely disturbed and potentially violent.
6. On July 2, 1993 I placed a telephone call to Dr. Gertrude Ticho to inquire about her alleged consultation with an Akin Gump manager in the period immediately prior to my termination in October 1991. Dr. Ticho denied having had any such consultation with Akin Gump. Dr. Ticho stated emphatically that she would never make any representations regarding the mental status of an individual she had not seen in personal consultation. I have never had a psychiatric consultation with Dr. Gertrude Ticho.
In a letter to me dated July 4, 1993 Dr. Ticho states that she did not consult with Dennis Race of Akin Gump and that she has never seen me for a psychiatric consultation. I appended a copy of Dr. Ticho’s letter as an attachment to my Application for Reconsideration of DOHR’s No Probable Cause Finding, which I filed with DOHR on July 27, 1993 (See Exhibit D).
(The other mental health resource with which Akin Gump claimed to have consulted, Sheppard Pratt Preferred Resources also denies having conferred with any Akin Gump managers at any time concerning me (See Exhibit D).)
6. In its Determination on Reconsideration, dated September 24, 1993, DOHR reaffirmed its earlier No Probable Cause finding issued on June 30, 1992 (See Exhibit F). DOHR found that Akin Gump’s termination decision was lawfully based on the employer’s determination that I suffered from severe emotional difficulties that rendered me not suitable for employment and potentially violent. DOHR also found that Akin Gump’s allegation that it had conferred with two mental health professionals was competent and persuasive evidence that the consultations had in fact occurred, despite the documentation I submitted to DOHR denying that any such consultations had taken place.
On October 22, 1993 I filed an Appeal of DOHR’s No Probable Cause finding with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, Docket No. 93-AA-1342 (See Exhibit G). The appeal is currently pending.
A few days after October 22, 1993 I spoke again by telephone with Dr. Gertrude Ticho. Dr. Ticho stated that she had had “not the slightest contact” with any Akin Gump managers and affirmed having written the letter to me dated July 4, 1993,
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the authenticity of which had been questioned by DOHR (See Exhibit H).
7. Beginning on October 29, 1991, as a direct result of the malicious conduct of Akin Gump management, I have suffered from psychological symptoms, severe at times. These symptoms have included intense anxiety, irritability, feelings of dread and a constant reliving of the painful experiences I suffered during my employment at Akin Gump. I did not suffer from these specific symptoms prior to the termination on October 29, 199l; the symptoms arose at the time of the termination and, indeed, are a direct consequence of the termination.
During the period immediately prior to October 29, 1991--from May 29, 1991 until October 8, 1991--I consulted weekly with a psychologist, Dr William Dr. Brown, for non-debilitating anxiety (See Exhibit I). As a psychologist, Dr. Brown is precluded from treating clients with severe emotional disorders. Principle 2 (Competence) of the Ethical Principles of Psychologists (Amended June 2, 1989), promulgated by the American Psychological Association (APA), requires that “[p]sychologists recognize the boundaries of their competence and the limitations of their techniques.” A psychologist’s continued treatment of a severely disturbed client would constitute a violation of the aforementioned ethical principle. The APA, which conducted a review of Dr. Brown’s handling of my case, has determined that Dr. Brown’s therapy did not exceed his competence (See Exhibit J).
The finding of the APA that Dr. Brown’s handling of my case did not violate that organization’s ethical principle regarding a psychologist’s competence leads to one inescapable conclusion: that during the period immediately prior to my termination on October 29, 1991--from May 29, 1991 until October 8, 1991--I did not suffer from psychological symptoms of sufficient severity so as to preclude competent non-medical handling by a psychologist. Further, the APA’s disposition of my Complaint against Dr. Brown is consistent with the logical inference that any severe and debilitating symptoms from which I currently suffer are a direct consequence of the malicious actions of Akin Gump management in late October 1991 in terminating my employment and the malicious actions perpetrated by Akin Gump management in connection with the unlawful termination investigation conducted by the District of Columbia Department of Human Rights and Minority Business Development.
On October 27, 1992, about one year after my job termination on October 29, 1991, I commenced weekly psychotherapy with Suzanne M. Pitts, M.D., a psychiatrist at the George Washington University Medical Center. During the session on the morning of December 22, 1992 Dr. Pitts advised me that she discerned improvement in my condition (See Exhibit K). Coincidentally,
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on December 22, 1992 the U.S. Postal Service delivered to me a copy of Akin Gump’s Response to Interrogatories and Document request filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights in connection with that agency’s unlawful termination investigation. As discussed above, Akin Gump’s filing was replete with malicious factual distortions and defamatory accusations. In addition, the pleadings included fabricated--though at the time credible and disturbing--evidence that I had been secretly certified insane and potentially violent by an unidentified psychiatrist! By late January 1993--only weeks after I had read the extremely disturbing falsehoods contained in pleadings filed by Akin Gump--Dr. Pitts determined that it was therapeutically advisable that I undertake twice-weekly consultations and suggested for the first time, on January 19, 1993, that I take medication. On no occasion during the initial weeks of my therapy with Dr. Pitts--from October 27, 1992 through January 12, 1993--did she state that medication was indicated. Quite probably, the marked progress I had made after about eleven weeks of therapy, which Dr. Pitts noted on December 22, 1992, was nullified by the intense emotional distress I experienced following my receipt of Akin Gump’s defamatory pleadings late in the day on December 22, 1992.
There can be no doubt that the malicious conduct of Akin Gump management, at times outrageous, has had a direct and severe effect on my mental state, as it would on any reasonable person.
Conclusion
Based on the record presented herein it appears that attorney managers of my former employer, the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, have conspired to use, and have in fact used, the legal processes of a state agency, the District of Columbia Department of Human Rights and Minority Business Development, to violate my civil rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 by:
(a.) filing fabricated evidence with the DOHR that a psychiatrist had determined that I suffered from a severe psychological disturbance and was potentially violent;
(b.) filing with the DOHR the memorandum dated October 25, 1991 prepared by my former supervisor that contained false, malicious, and defamatory statements in denigration of my mental health and fitness as an employee, and which included statements contradicted by Akin Gump’s business records and therefore known to be false by Akin Gump’s attorney managers; and
(c.) causing the DOHR to have delivered to my residence via the U.S. Postal Service 1/ on December 22, 1992 Akin Gump’s
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2/ Akin Gump’s possible use of the U.S. Postal Service to deliver to the DOHR, and/or its causing the DOHR to have
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Response to Interrogatories and Document Request, which contained fabricated and defamatory statements that I had been certified insane and potentially violent by an unidentified psychiatrist and which included the aforementioned memorandum dated October 25, 1991 prepared by my supervisor (an individual later found by a federal court to exhibit racial animus) thereby
(d.) causing me to suffer severe emotional distress that has resulted in a need for intensive psychiatric treatment, with a notable exacerbation of symptoms beginning in late January 1993.
I have submitted a collection of documents pertinent to this matter to the U.S. Social Security Administration, Office of Disability and International Operations, 1500 Woodlawn Drive, Baltimore MD 21241: Social Security Disability Claim No. xxx-xx-xxxx.
Thank you for your attention to this matter,
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
cc: Office of U.S. Attorney [Eric H. Holder, Jr.]
Federal Bureau of Investigation/Washington Field Office
U.S. Social Security Administration
Charles L. Reischel D.C. Corporation Counsel
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2/ (cont’d)
the U.S. Postal Service deliver to me, perjured and defamatory pleadings may subject Akin Gump’s attorney managers to the jurisdiction of federal criminal law by reason of said managers' use of the U.S. Postal Service to further a conspiracy to (1) obstruct an investigation of a state agency, (2) abuse the process of a state agency, (3) promote Akin Gump’s discriminatory employment practices, (4) defame, and (5) inflict emotional distress.
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