Monday, March 21, 2011

Akin Gump: Response filed with Department of Human Rights

The following letter is pages 511-524 in the record on appeal in Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights, D.C.C.A. no. 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998).  I had received Akin Gump's Response on December 23, 1992.  The following letter discusses irregularities in the Response and Document Production.

My detailed critique of factual errors in a retaliatory memo dated October 25, 1991 written by my direct supervisor is important.   As it turned out, the D.C. Court of Appeals in its Opinion and Judgment relied heavily on the memo, failed to recognize its retaliatory nature (describing the memo as having been written in early 1991 instead of October 25, 1991, the day after I had lodged a harassment complaint against my supervisor) and accepted the memo's factual assertions as true.  For the Court, the memo was crucial in its determination that the employer had valid business reasons to terminate me rather than recognizing that the memo was retaliatory and evidence of the employer's pretext.

Further, I was diagnosed with bi-polar disorder in September 1992 by the George Washington University Medical Center Department of Psychiatry.  According to GW I exhibited the mood-congruent psychotic features of loose associations and flight of ideas.  I was not on medication when I wrote the following letter and yet the letter does not seem to exhibit disordered thought processes.

December 28, 1992
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apartment 136
Washington, DC 20008

Mr. Donald M Stocks
Case Investigations
Government of the District of Columbia
Department of the District of Columbia
     Department of Human Rights and Minority
Business Development
2000 14th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20009

          RE: Docket No.: 92-087-P(N)
                GARY FREEDMAN v. AKIN, GUMP, HAUER & FELD

Dear Mr. Stocks:

This will respectfully advise that I am in receipt of the Respondent’s Response to the OHR’s Interrogatories (“Response”) and Request for Documents in the above-referenced complaint, and that I am in the process of preparing a written Reply to be submitted to the OHR no later than 5:00 p.m. on January 8, 1993.

I would like to direct your immediate attention, however, to certain selected irregularities in the Response and Document Production that may constitute a willful attempt on the part of the Respondent to obstruct the investigation. The Response contains several willful misstatements of material facts in apparent violation of D.C. Code Sec. 1-2528 (Resisting the Office or Commission) and D.C. Code Sec. 1-2529 (Falsifying documents and testimony) 1/.   Also the Respondent’s Document Production is manifestly incomplete, in possible violation of D.C. Code Sec. 1-2528(b) (Resisting the Office or Commission) and, further, contains a document of questionable authenticity, in possible violation of D.C. Code Sec. 1-2529 (Falsifying documents and testimony).

I would also like to request that discovery in this investigation be expanded to encompass the production of additional documents that may be in the Respondent’s custody that are materially related to Respondent’s assertion that its decision to terminate my employment was based on reasonable concerns that I suffered from a serious mental disorder and was potentially violent (or violent), and not based on the perception that I was homosexual.
___________________
1/ Any willfully false statements in the Response would also violate the Respondent’s certification, executed by Laurence J. Hoffman on May 22, 1992 and appended to the Response, and would constitute a violation by Mr. Hoffman of the D.C. Code of Professional Responsibility.  Laurence Hoffman, a member of the D.C. bar, is an attorney manager of the Respondent and has been designated as the Respondent’s representative in this matter.

A. WILLFULLY FALSE STATEMENTS IN THE RESPONSE

Attachment E of the Response (Memorandum dated October 25, 1991 from Chris Robertson to Dennis Race RE: Gary Freedman) contains several misstatements of material facts of which the Respondent’s attorney managers, including Laurence Hoffman, have either actual or constructive knowledge. My supervisor, Chris Robertson, states that at one point (ostensibly in the months immediately prior to my relocation to the terrace level on April 8, 1991) she had arranged to assign me to a private office on the ninth floor upon my complaint of harassment. On no occasion prior to mid-August 1991, after I had already been assigned to office space on the terrace level, did I complain to Chris Robertson or any supervisor or attorney manager of harassment by co-workers. (See Attachment A, attached herewith). At no time after March 17, 1989 and before mid-August 1991 did I ever occupy a private office anywhere on the Respondent’s premises. (See Attachment A, attached herewith). Prior to April 8, 1991, when I was relocated to the terrace level, I was assigned to a large, group office on the 9th floor, which I had occupied continuously since late October 1989.

The Respondent prepares and distributes, at frequent intervals, telephone directories listing each employee’s telephone number and office assignment. If I had in fact been assigned to an “office on the 9th floor by [myself]” for “a few months,” as alleged by Chris Robertson, that office assignment would be reflected in the telephone directories, which are part of the Respondent’s business records. Review of the said telephone directories will reveal that I was not assigned to a private office on the 9th floor in the period immediately prior to my assignment to the terrace level on April 8, 1991, as alleged by Chris Robertson.

The Respondent also prepares and distributes, at frequent intervals, office floor plans, indicating the office assignment of each employee. If I had in fact been assigned an office on the 9th floor by myself for a few months, as alleged by Chris Robertson, that office assignment would be reflected on the said floor plans, which are part of the Respondent’s business records. Again, review of the said floor plans will reveal that I was not assigned to a private office on the 9th floor in the period immediately prior to my assignment to the terrace level on April 8, 1991, as alleged by Chris Robertson.

Chris Robertson further alleges in the subject memorandum that my accessing of Litigation Support databases from the 9th floor slowed down the 9th floor computer network. During the period of about mid-year 1990 until about late April 1991, after my assignment to the terrace level I was not engaged in tasks that would have necessitated my access of Litigation Support databases. And during the stated period I in fact did not access Litigation Support databases. The tasks on which I was engaged during the stated period included work on the firm’s litigation docket, Quality Control (“QC”), and off-line document coding.

I was not engaged in either on-line coding or on-line QC on any Litigation Support projects during the stated period, which would have necessitated my accessing Litigation Support databases. Any use I made of the computer during the stated period would have been limited to accessing WordPerfect on the 9th floor computer network or accessing “LMS” on the 9th floor computer network to enter my hours worked for billing and accounting purposes. Moreover, during the period I was assigned to office space on the 9th floor, specifically in the period after about mid-year 1990, I had no physical access to the databases of on-going Litigation Support projects. My access to these databases was locked. In about late April 1991, when I resumed on-line coding, which required access to Litigation support databases, my computer terminal had to be reconfigured to allow me access. Further, in about late April 1991, after my assignment to the terrace level, Chris Robertson had to arrange with Renee Lloyd, a litigation support employee, to have me retrained on the use of the relevant computer program; so much time had elapsed since I had last been engaged in on-line coding that I had forgotten how to use the program.

The tasks on which I was assigned during the period immediately prior to April 8, 1991 (the period during which Chris Robertson alleges that I was accessing litigation support databases) are recorded in the LMS computerized attorney time records, which are part of the Respondent’s business records. Review of said records will disclose that during the period immediately prior to April 8, 1991, I was not engaged in tasks that would have involved my accessing Litigation Support databases, as alleged by Chris Robertson.

Thus, certain of the allegations made by Chris Robertson in the subject memorandum are contrary to the Respondent’s own business records. The Respondent therefore has either actual knowledge or, as custodian of its own business records, constructive knowledge that certain of the representations made by Chris Robertson in the Memorandum dated October 25, 1991 are false.

Respondent's inclusion of the said memorandum as Attachment E to its Response to Interrogatories, and its reliance on said memorandum in the Response, constitutes the Respondent’s adoption of the intentionally false statements of Chris Robertson and, further, constitute the Respondent’s representation that the intentionally false statements are true, contrary to the Respondent’s Certification. The Respondent’s actions therefore violate D.C. Code Sec. 1-2528 (Resisting the Office or Commission) and D.C. Code Sec. 1-2529 (Falsifying documents and testimony).

Further, the Respondent’s refusal to engage in mediation of my Complaint, despite its knowledge that the termination of my employment was based in part on false statements made by my supervisor, may itself constitute a violation of D.C. Code Sec. 1-2528 (Resisting the Office or Commission). As the foregoing discussion amply shows, the Respondent cannot possibly have a good faith belief that the basis of its decision to terminate is sound since the Respondent’s own business records contradict the assertions of my supervisor.

I want to emphasize that Dennis Race did not show me the subject memorandum prior to my termination. The first time I became apprised of the memorandum’s existence was upon my receipt of the Response on December 23, 1992.

B. IRREGULARITIES IN RESPONDENT’S DOCUMENT PRODUCTION

(1).  Request for all Complainant’s Performance Evaluations

In the Request for Documents, Respondent was requested to produce “all Complainant’s performance evaluations.”  Respondent failed to produce certain of the requested documents (See Attachment G of Response).

The following list enumerates all performance evaluations that were prepared by the Respondent, and indicates the production status.

1.  Year-end Performance Evaluation, 1988, prepared by Constance Brown (not dated)--RESPONDENT FAILED TO PRODUCE

2.  Mid-year Performance Evaluation, 1989, prepared by Kathleen Winslow, dated 5/17/89--RESPONDENT FAILED TO PRODUCE

3.  Mid-year Performance Evaluation, 1989, prepared by John Potter, Esq., dated 5/14/89--RESPONDENT FAILED TO PRODUCE

4.  Mid-year Performance Evaluation, 1989, prepared by Constance Brown, dated 5/19/89--RESPONDENT FAILED TO PRODUCE

5.  Year-end Performance Evaluation, 1989, prepared by Constance Brown, dated 11/6/89--RESPONDENT FAILED TO PRODUCE

6.  Mid-year Performance Evaluation, 1990, prepared by Chris Robertson and Constance Brown, dated 6/11/90--PRODUCED

7.  Year-end Performance Evaluation, 1990, prepared by Chris Robertson, dated 11/20/90--RESPONDENT FAILED TO PRODUCE

8.  Mid-year Performance Evaluation, 1991  prepared by Chris Robertson, dated May 1991--PRODUCED

9.  Year-end Performance Evaluation, 1991, prepared by Chris Robertson, dated 10/24/91--PRODUCED

As the above listing indicates, Respondent has produced only three of the requested Performance Evaluations; nine such documents were prepared.  Respondent's possible willful failure to comply with the request for all Performance Evaluations may constitute a violation of D.C. Code Sec. 1-2528(b) (Resisting the Office or Commission).

Further, the Performance Evaluation dated 10/24/91, immediately prior to my termination on 10/29/91, is of suspect authenticity and, at the very least, is invalid according to Respondent’s own written policy.  Chris Robertson never discussed this Performance Evaluation with me.  Nor was I provided a copy of the Performance Evaluation prior to my termination.  The first time I became apprised of its existence was upon my receipt of the Response on December 23, 1992.  Chris Robertson’s failure to discuss this Performance Evaluation with me is contrary to the Respondent’s written policy as set forth on page 2 of the evaluation form:  “EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION:  Please show this evaluation to the employee you supervise and indicate on the last page whether this has been done.  If the employee disagrees with your evaluation or has additional information believed to be pertinent, you should include those comments in the section captioned ‘EMPLOYEE’S COMMENTS.’”  Page 6 of Respondent’s evaluation form expressly directs the supervisor to provide a written justification if for any reason the supervisor has not discussed the evaluation with the employee.  Not only was the Performance Evaluation dated 10/24/91 not discussed with me prior to my termination, but the supervisor did not state a written justification for her failure to discuss the evaluation.  In the case of each of the eight Performance Evaluations prepared prior to the one in question I was given a copy of the evaluation at about the time it was prepared.

The manifestly false written statements contained in the Memorandum dated October 25, 1991 from Chris Robertson to Dennis Race RE: Gary Freedman (Attachment E of the Response), discussed above, seriously undermine the credibility of Chris Robertson’s written statement that the subject Performance Evaluation was prepared on 10/24/91.  The possibility that Chris Robertson prepared the subject Performance Evaluation after my termination, and dated it retroactively, cannot be ruled out.  The filing of a bogus Performance Evaluation in response to OHR’s Request for Documents would violate D.C. Code Sec. 1-2528 (Resisting the Office or Commission) and D.C. Code Sec. 1-2529 (Falsifying documents and testimony).

(Moreover, assuming the Performance Evaluation dated 10/24/91 is authentic, Chris Robertson’s failure to indicate on the form her reasons for not discussing the evaluation with me is contrary to Respondent’s written policy and is therefore a per se unlawful discriminatory practice.)

(2.)  Termination Chart

The Respondent was requested to prepare a Termination Chart reflecting all terminations by Respondent and the reasons for the termination for the period January 1, 1990 to December 31, 1991.

The Termination Chart prepared by the Respondent is appended as Attachment H to the Response.

The Termination Chart may contain at least one material omission.  I believe, based on a conversation I overheard between legal assistants Christine Lambert and J. Robert Tansey while employed by the Respondent, that a legal assistant named Stacey Schaar was involuntarily terminated in about May 1990.  Her name and details concerning her possible termination are omitted in the Termination Chart.  If Stacey Schaar was in fact involuntarily terminated by the Respondent, in about May 1990, the Respondent’s possible willful failure to include details concerning the termination would constitute a violation of D.C. Code Sec. 1-2528 (Resisting the Office of Commission) and D.C. Code Sec. 1-2529 (Falsifying documents and testimony).

C.  COMPLAINANT’S REQUEST FOR EXPANDED DISCOVERY

The Respondent asserts that a material issue in its determination to terminate my employment was its concerns regarding my mental status and not my sexual preference.  The Respondent states that based on consultations with mental health professionals and discussions with employees, the Respondent concluded that my allegations of harassment were based on “ideas of reference,” that I was “paranoid,” and that I might become violent (or that my behavior was violent).

Documents relating to the Respondent’s assertion that it had formed the belief that I was mentally disturbed and potentially violent (or violent) are therefore material to my Complaint.

Such documents would include the following:

1.  Any documents (letters, memoranda, handwritten notes, etc) relating to contacts between the Respondent and the two mental health professionals that the Respondent consulted prior to my termination, in addition to any documents relating to any contacts with other mental health professionals during my employment.  The Response refers to “representations” that the Respondent sought from two mental health professionals, but does not indicate where the representations received were written or oral.

2. Handwritten notes made by Dennis Race contemporaneously with the meeting on October 24, 1991, called by Mr. Race, at which I was directed, on the initiative of Messrs. Race and Lassman, to relate instances of harassment.

3.  Any handwritten notes made by Dennis Race contemporaneously with the investigation he conducted on his initiative, and not at my request, during the period October 24, 1991 to October 29, 1991, immediately prior to my termination.

4.  Any handwritten notes or other documents relating to Dennis Race’s deliberations with my supervisor and other members of Respondent’s Management Committee that led to Respondent’s decision to terminate.

5.  Any other documents in the Respondent’s custody that are material to the Respondent’s determination that I suffered from a serious mental disturbance and was potentially violent (or violent) so as to justify a lawful termination.

Also, in view of the Respondent’s assertion that it was concerned that I appeared to suffer from a serious mental disturbance and that Respondent feared that I might become violent (or that my behavior was violent), it is plausible that the Respondent contacted my sister, Mrs. Estelle Jacobson, immediately prior to my termination, or at other rimes during my employment.  (It is the Respondent’s policy to retain as part of its personnel records the telephone number and address of an individual, designated by each employee, to be contacted in the event of an emergency.  At two points during my employment I supplied the Respondent’s personnel department with my sister’s name, address, and telephone number.)  Documents relating to possible contacts between the Respondent and my sister are material to the Respondent’s assertion that it had formed the reasonable belief that I suffered from a serious mental disturbance, which necessitated my termination.  According to the facts as asserted in the Response, the Respondent’s managers, as attorneys, would have been aware that their failure to contact a close relative of a potentially violent (or violent) employee, whose violent propensities were thought to have been the product of a serious mental disturbance, might be deemed negligent.

Thus, discovery should be expanded to include:

6.  Any documents (handwritten notes, letters, memoranda, fax transmissions, etc) that relate to or memorialize any contacts between the Respondent and Mrs. Estelle Jacobson during the time period October 1, 1991 to October 29, 1991.  Whether any contacts actually occurred can be determined by examination of the Respondent’s long-distance telephone charges for the month of October 1991. (My sister lives in New Jersey).
__________________________________________________

This letter does not constitute the Complainant’s Reply to the Respondent’s Response to Interrogatories and Document Request, which will be submitted to the OHR by 5:00 p.m. on January 8, 1993.  This letter is intended to direct your immediate attention to irregularities in the Respondent’s Document Production and to possible statutory violations committed by the Respondent in the filing of its Response.

Further, I would also like to direct your immediate attention to the fact that certain of the Respondent’s actions in connection with my termination raise the issue of the possible commission of a felony.  Though these specific actions do not fall within the immediate purview of the OHR, they indicate the Respondent’s flagrant disregard for the law and, therefore, raise a serious question regarding the character of the Respondent’s attorney managers and the veracity of the representations made by the Respondent in its Response.

The Response states that the Respondent, specifically, Dennis Race, obtained representations regarding my mental status from a practicing psychiatrist and from the Respondent’s Employee Assistance Program (Sheppard Pratt Employee Assistance Programs).

During the course of my employment with the Respondent I consulted with various mental health professionals in private practice, including a number of psychiatrists and two psychologists.  Any disclosure of confidential mental health information to the Respondent by any of the mental health professionals with whom I consulted would be in violation of the District of Columbia Mental Health Information Act, D.C. Code Sec. 6-2002 (Disclosures prohibited; exceptions) and would subject the offending mental health professional to criminal prosecution for the commission of a misdemeanor  Further, an agreement between the Respondent and any mental health professional with whom I consulted by which the mental health professional would provide a representation regarding my mental status to the Respondent would constitute a conspiracy to violate the District of Columbia Mental Health Information Act and would subject the offending mental health professional and certain of the Respondent’s attorney managers to criminal prosecution of a felony.

On three occasions during my employment with the Respondent I consulted with mental health counselors at the Sheppard Pratt Employee Assistance Programs.  Any disclosure of confidential mental health information to the Respondent by a mental health counselor employed by the Sheppard Pratt Employee Assistance Programs would be in violation of the District of Columbia Mental Health Information Act, D.C. Code Sec. 6-2002 (Disclosures prohibited; exceptions) and would subject the offending mental health counselor and the mental health facility by which she is employed to criminal prosecution for the commission of a misdemeanor.  Further, an agreement between the Respondent  and any mental health counselor employed by Sheppard Pratt Employee Assistance Programs with whom I consulted by which the mental heath professional would provide a representation regarding my mental status to the Respondent, and which relied on confidential mental health information contained in its files, would constitute a conspiracy to violate the District of Columbia Mental Health Information Act and would subject the offending metal health counselor and certain of the Respondent’s attorney managers to criminal prosecution for the commission of a felony.

The possible commission of serious criminal offenses by the Respondent has a material bearing on the character and judgment of the Respondent’s attorney managers, and raises a serious question as to the good faith of the Respondent’s decision to terminate my employment and the veracity of statements contained in the Respondent’s Response.

Thank you very much for your attention to this matter.  If the need arises, you can reach me at (202) 362-7064 or leave messages at (202) 363-3800

Sincerely,

[s]

Gary Freedman

ATTACHMENT A
COMPLAINANT’S OFFICE ASSIGNMENTS

1.  March 3, 1988 - Mid-June 1988:  Various offices on second floor (while employed as an agency-supplied temporary).  I was assigned to various private offices on the second floor on the initiative of my supervisor, legal assistant administrator, Maggie Sinnott,.  I was kept isolated from other employees who worked on the project on which I was working.  On my second day on the job, for example, March 4, 1988, Maggie Sinnott, on her initiative, and not at my request, reassigned me from a conference room, “2 Wyatt,” which I had shared with other temporary employees, to a secretary’s work station.

2.  Mid-June 1988 - March 17, 1989: private office on the fifth floor.  I was assigned to private office on initiative of my supervisor.  I did not request to be isolated.

3.  March 20, 1989 - Late October 1989: Open, common area on 6th floor shared with two agency-supplied temporary employees [Gwen Lesh, Esq. and Stacey Schaar].  Legal assistant coordinator, J.D. Neary, advised me on about March 19, 1989 that the 6th floor office assignment was temporary and that I would be permanently assigned to the terrace level with other legal assistants [assigned to Eastern Airlines litigation] when that space became available to the firm in about May 1989.  I was never assigned to the terrace level with other legal assistants as had been promised, which perpetuated my isolation.

4.  Late October 1989 - April 5, 1991:  Large, group office on 9th floor shared with other legal assistants.  In March 1990 I was reassigned from the legal assistant program to the Litigation Support group, but kept my office assignment on the 9th floor.  In about March 1990, when the Litigation Support group moved from the 12th floor to the terrace level, I requested of my supervisor that she allow me to remain on the 9th floor.  She permitted me to remain on the 9th floor, explaining that there was no room for me on the terrace level.  On no occasion while working on the 9th floor did I request of my supervisor that I be relocated to a private office.  I never occupied a private office on the 9th floor.  During the period mid-year 1990 to April 5, 1991 I did not access Litigation Support data bases from the ninth floor.  The tasks to which I was assigned did not require such access.  The Respondent’s computerized attorney time records (“LMS” reports), in the custody of the Respondent, verify that during the subject time period I was assigned to work on the firm’s docket and other work, such as Quality Control, that did not require access of databases.  During this time period any use of the firm’s computer network was limited to WordPerfect.

5.  April 8, 1991 - mid-August 1991: Terrace Level.  In mid-August 1991 I requested of my supervisor that she allow me to be moved to a private office and complained of the noise situation in the terrace level, and discussed certain harassing incidents that I had experienced while working on the 9th floor.  This was the only occasion during my employment that I requested of any supervisory employee that I be permitted to move to a private office.  (On this occasion, I also requested of my supervisor for the first and only time that she consider having me reassigned to the legal assistant group;  my supervisor did not get back to me regarding this request, and I concluded that it would be pointless to ask anyone other than Earl Segal, the partner in charge of the legal assistant program, for such a reassignment.)  She acknowledged that noise was a problem in the terrace level, but that she felt there was nothing she could do about the noise.  She said she even considered having all the employees’ private telephones removed to cut down on employees’ excessive use of telephones for nonbusiness purposes.  The meeting with my supervisor on this occasion in mid-August 1991 was called by her in response to a complaint by a fellow employee, Gregory Courtney, that I had told him to “shut up” earlier that morning.  I denied the accusation and explained that I had told Greg Courtney, who was having a loud conversation with another employee, Richard Taylor, to “hold it down.”  At that time I had just commenced work on the Hoechst project, which required a quietwork environment.  I did not interpret the meeting with my supervisor as a reprimand, nor was I advised that it was intended as such.  If anything, my supervisor seemed to find the incident amusing, and confided in me her difficulties in trying to control her other employees’ behavior (including their overuse of the telephone for personal telephone conversations) and her difficulties in hiring conscientious employees such as me.  (Also, this was the only interaction with a supervisor that even remotely resembled a reprimand.)  On no occasion did I ever tell another employee to “shut up;” on two occasions I politely asked a co-worker, Melissa Whitney, to turn down her radio, which she listened to without earphones.  It was Gregory Courtney’s intentional misrepresentation to my supervisor, which my supervisor communicated to me, that prompted my request on this occasion in mid-August 1991 to be moved or, in the alternative, to be reassigned to the legal assistant group.  The incident confirmed my suspicion that my co-workers on the terrace level had a propensity to act in an irrational and malicious manner.

6.  Mid-August 1991 - October 29, 1991:  Private area in large room on 4th floor.  Moved to 4th floor area with supervisor’s permission to work on the Hoechst chemical analysis project, a task that required mental concentration and a quiet atmosphere.  Upon commencing the project I inquired of another legal assistant, Katherine Harkness, with whom I worked on the project, whether she thought the firm’s library would be a suitable place to work.  She stated that she had tried working in the library but that even the library was too noisy for the mental concentration required by the Hoechst project.  In  about mid-October 1991 my supervisor advised me that she had decided to relocate my permanent desk assignment on the terrace level to another location within the terrace level because of the noise situation in the terrace.  The decision to move me was taken on my supervisor’s initiative.  Within the last few months of my employment, from mid-August 1991 until October 29, 1991, I had virtually no interaction with other coworkers in the terrace level.

7.  October 23, 1991:  I met with Earl Segal on my initiative to request that my work space be reassigned from the terrace level or, in the alternative, that I be reassigned to the legal assistant program.  The meeting was prompted by the fact that my special assignment on the Hoechst project was nearing completion (I was working on the last batch of documents at the time), which meant that I would have to return to my permanent station on the terrace level from my temporary station on the 4th floor.

I, Gary Freedman, having read the above letter and Attachment A appended to this letter to Donald M. Stocks, dated December 28, 1992, state that the statements herein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

[s] Gary Freedman
____________
Signature

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28th day of December, 1992.

Leslie A. Pilon
____________
Notary Signature

My Commission Expires: [Notary stamp illegible.]

5 comments:

Gary Freedman said...

Are you getting the impression that there's something about Stacey Schaar that Akin Gump doesn't want people to know?

1. I lodged a harassment complaint about Stacey Schaar to Dennis Race and Malcolm Lassman on 10/24/91. I specifically recall Lassman say: "But she's not here anymore." Akin Gump in its Response omitted my complaint about her.

2. Stacey Schaar's name and details about her termination were omitted in the Termination Chart filed with the agency.

Gary Freedman said...

Performance Evaluations: Did Akin Gump withhold them from the agency or had the firm simply lost them?

If the firm lost the evaluations, it had no knowledge of my employment history.

What about that fact as it pertains to the termination decision?

Gary Freedman said...

Do you know that I wasn't deposed as a witness in McNeil v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld?

I wonder why? I wonder why, indeed!

By the way, Robert Higgins, Esq. at Dickstein Shapiro was Akin Gump's lawyer in McNeil.

Gary Freedman said...

"16. The incident leading up to plaintiff’s [McNeil's] discharge commenced on April 7, 1992. Plaintiff was called in by Ms. Robertson and told that a coworker had complained that plaintiff was abusing the personal phone call privileges by taking too many personal calls and that she talked so loudly on these calls that she disrupted the work of other employees. Plaintiff denied engaging in such conduct and urged Ms. Robertson to check with other employees if she had any doubt about who was telling the truth on the matter. Plaintiff asked who it was who complained, and Ms. Robertson identified a white coworker by the name of Isabelle Schotz."

McNeil v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, Complaint (D.D.C. 1993).

So, months earlier, in mid-August 1991, Chris Robertson had acknowledged to me that:

1.) Employees (other than me) were excessively noisy in the terrace level.

2.) Employees (other than me) were making excessive personal telephone calls from their work stations.

3.) Robertson had considered removing all the personal telephones in the litigation support suite.

What did Robertson and Bruce McLean do about the problem? Nothing! They were ineffective managers, which is what the D.C. Court of Appeals found in In re: Michael X. Morrell (disbarment proceedings.) This is precisely the type of environment that promotes and sustains workplace mobbing: ineffective management.

http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2009/12/michael-x-morrell.html

Gary Freedman said...

Akin Gump: A Culture of Intentional Deception?

http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2011/02/akin-gump-culture-of-intentional.html