Thursday, June 23, 2011

Did Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. Engage in an Obstruction of Justice?

By letter dated January 5, 1994 I advised U.S. Attorney Eric H. Holder, Jr. that I was a Social Security claimant and that there were substantial questions about the veracity of statements upon which my disability claim was based.  The following letter further details infirmities in the evidence upon which my disability claim was based.  Thus, U.S. Attorney Holder was on notice that my Social Security Disability claim might have been based on criminal fraud under Title 42, Ch. 7, Subchapter VIII, § 1011. Penalties for defrauding the U.S. Social Security Administration.

October 17, 1994
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apt. 136
Washington, DC 20008

Mr. Eric H. Holder, Jr.
U.S. Attorney for the
     District of Columbia
555 4th Street, NW
Judiciary Center Building
Washington, DC 20001

          RE: Freedman v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld

Dear Mr. Holder:

Enclosed with respect to the above-referenced matter is a tape recording containing two telephone conversations relating to the possible filing by attorney managers of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump") of wilfully false sworn statements, a felony under D.C. Code Section 22-2513 (False swearing) and D.C. Code Section 22-2514 (False statements).

1. Telephone conversation on July 2, 1993 between me and Ilana Baptiste, an employee of the Washington office of Sheppard Pratt Preferred Resources, Akin Gump's former Employee Assistance Program provider. Ilana Baptiste states, upon reviewing my case file, that she is unable to substantiate any contacts between Sheppard Pratt and any Akin Gump managers, as alleged by Akin Gump in its Response to Interrogatories and Document Request ("Response"), dated May 22, 1992, filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights. Ilana Baptiste also states that she is aware of my previous discussions concerning this matter with Judy Peres, a Sheppard Pratt counselor, in January 1993. Ilana Baptiste reports her recollection that Judy Peres made a private statement in January 1993, at the time I relayed Akin Gump's allegation concerning Sheppard Pratt: "Judy said [to me in private], 'nothing like that was ever done.'"

With respect to the evidentiary weight of Ilana Baptiste's statements, keep in mind that the statements of Ilana Baptiste are the spontaneous declarations of a low-level employee made in response to my unanticipated inquiry, and not the statements of a Sheppard Pratt supervisor following a deliberate assessment of possible legal exposure. I direct your specific attention to Ilana Baptiste's statement regarding Akin Gump's allegation of a contact with Sheppard Pratt concerning my mental status: "That just sounds so fabricated."

(The telephone call was inadvertently terminated; no portion of the telephone conversation has been intentionally omitted).

2. Telephone conversation between me and Gertrude R. Ticho, M.D. on July 2, 1993. Dr. Ticho denies having had any contacts with Akin Gump managers of the nature alleged by Akin Gump in the Response. Dr. Ticho expressly states that she does not make any representations regarding the mental state of an individual she has not seen in private consultation. (A transcript of the telephone conversation is enclosed).

I have previously forwarded to your office a tape recording of a telephone conversation I had with Dr. Ticho in late October 1993 in which Dr Ticho denies having had any contacts with any Akin Gump managers. This completes the transmittal to your office of all evidence in my possession relating to the possible violation by Akin Gump managers of D.C. Code Section 22-2513 (False swearing) and/or D.C. Code Section 22-2514 (False statements) 1/.

Also enclosed for your information is a copy of a letter dated September 26, 1994 to the Hon. Annice M. Wagner, Chief Judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, regarding this matter. I believe that it would be inappropriate for me to have any further ex parte communications with the Court. The Court advised me at oral argument, on October 13, 1994, that it will not consider any nonrecord evidence relating to this issue.  Regardless of the Court's final disposition of Freedman v. District of Columbia Department of Human Rights, there is, nonetheless, a body of documentary evidence not part of the record on appeal strongly indicating that Akin Gump's attorney managers filed false sworn statements with the D.C. Department of Human Rights, a felony under D.C. Code Sections 22-2513 and 22-2514. Further, Akin Gump's failure to disavow possible false sworn statements that it filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights, and upon which the D.C. Court of Appeals must necessarily rely in its disposition of my Petition for Review, may constitute a fraud by the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Thank you very much.

Sincerely,

Gary Freedman

cc: Charles L. Reischel [Deputy D.C. Corporation Counsel, deceased]
__________________

1/ Akin Gump's Response includes a sworn Certification, executed by Laurence J. Hoffman, thereby satisfying the requirement of D.C. Code Section 22-2514(a) that the subscriber acknowledge liability to punishment for making false statements.

1 comment:

Gary Freedman said...

D.C. Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 3.3 - Candor to Tribunal

(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:

(1) Make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer, unless correction would require disclosure of information that is prohibited by Rule 1.6;

(2) Counsel or assist a client to engage in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good-faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning, or application of the law;

(3) Fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction not disclosed by opposing counsel and known to the lawyer to be dispositive of a question at issue and directly adverse to the position of the client; or

(4) Offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false, except as provided in paragraph (b). A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.

(b) When the witness who intends to give evidence that the lawyer knows to be false is the lawyer's client and is the accused in a criminal case, the lawyer shall first make a good-faith effort to dissuade the client from presenting the false evidence; if the lawyer is unable to dissuade the client, the lawyer shall seek leave of the tribunal to withdraw. If the lawyer is unable to dissuade the client or to withdraw without seriously harming the client, the lawyer may put the client on the stand to testify in a narrative fashion, but the lawyer shall not examine the client in such manner as to elicit testimony which the lawyer knows to be false, and shall not argue the probative value of the client's testimony in closing argument.

(c) The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding.

(d) A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that a fraud has been perpetrated upon the tribunal shall promptly take reasonable remedial measures, including disclosure to the tribunal to the extent disclosure is permitted by Rule 1.6(d).