The Man Who Knows Too Much

I worked with Craig W. Dye at the law firm of Hogan & Hartson (now Hogan Lovells) from early October 1986 until late February 1988.  In early March 1988 I started a new job at the D.C. law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld.  Craig Dye and I got together occasionally on a social basis until early February 1992.  I spoke by telephone with him for the last time on July 14, 1993 (Bastille Day).

I believe that Craig Dye has information relating to crimes committed by Akin Gump and that he should provide the FBI with the information he has.

-- I believe that Craig started communicating with Earl Segal and/or Malcolm Lassman in late October 1988, after I provided him (together with Daniel D. Cutler and Michael J. Wilson) a copy of my self analysis The Caliban Complex: An Attempt at Self-Analysis.

-- In July 1987, while Craig and I were coworkers at Hogan & Hartson, I wrote a one-page, humorous creative piece about a suspected Communist who tried to obtain employment with the FBI in the 1950s.  I believe that Craig probably provided Akin Gump a copy of that piece in late October 1988 and that the piece aroused the interest of Akin Gump founder, Bob Strauss, who was employed as an FBI agent after he graduated law school in 1941.  Bob Strauss was assigned to surveillance of suspected Communists during World War II as an FBI Special Agent.

-- I believe that Craig had routine and frequent communications with Earl Segal and Malcolm Lassman throughout my employment at Akin Gump, until October 29, 1991 and at times thereafter.

-- I believe that Craig has knowledge that Akin Gump solicited my treating psychiatrists to violate the D.C. Mental Health Information Act by requesting and obtaining confidential mental health  information about me.  

-- I believe that Craig knows the true reasons for my job termination by Akin Gump on October 29, 1991, and knows that the reasons for the termination are inconsistent with my becoming unemployable by reason of severe mental illness.  I therefore believe that Craig has information that Akin Gump has defrauded the U.S. Social Security Administration, which constitutes a felony by Akin Gump and the misprision of a felony by Craig.

-- I believe that Craig knows the true reasons for my job termination by Akin Gump on October 29, 1991, and knows that the reasons for the termination are inconsistent with those made in sworn statements by Dennis M. Race and Laurence J. Hoffman, two Akin Gump attorney managers, to the D.C. Department of Human Rights, and that Laurence J. Hoffman and Dennis M. Race are guilty of making false sworn statements to a District of Columbia agency -- in violation of District law and their professional responsibilities as attorneys.

-- I believe that Craig knows that Earl Segal and/or Malcolm Lassman had routine and frequent communications with my sister, Mrs. Estelle F. Jacobson since late October 1988.

-- I believe that Craig knows the true reason why Akin Gump's management placed me under surveillance beginning in late October 1988.

-- On a Saturday morning in early March 1991 I telephoned Craig at home. We talked for about a half hour. I formed the belief that Craig recorded that telephone conversation and thereafter provided Akin Gump a copy of the tape.  I believe that the tape of that telephone call was played for Bob Strauss.

-- I believe that Craig knows that Akin Gump management had arranged with Elaine Wranik, the manager of my apartment building until 1992, to inspect my apartment routinely and report her findings back to Akin Gump.

-- I believe that Craig knows the true nature of the relationship between Earl Segal and my late brother-in-law, Edward A. Jacobson (1947-1996), and its possible pecuniary nature.

Both Segal and my brother-in-law are from Philadelphia, Jewish, born in June 1947, and worked in the real estate field.  Segal was a real estate partner at Akin Gump.  My brother-in-law had a second mortgage business, Meredith Financial Services.  Both Segal and I graduated Penn State.

-- I believe that Craig Dye has information that could lead to the criminal prosecution of Akin Gump's attorney managers for the crimes of fraud and racketeering, and that his nondisclosure of facts pertinent to various crimes committed by Akin Gump may itself constitute a prosecutable offence.

I have no legally-cognizable evidence that any crimes have been committed by anyone.  My beliefs appear to be consistent with the determination of the D.C. Department of Human Rights that I suffer from a disorder "ideas of reference" that causes me to attach a negative meaning to trivial events: a conclusion affirmed by Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights, D.C.C.A. no. 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998).

The District of Columbia Attorney General affirmed before the D.C. Superior Court (1996) and the D.C. Court of Appeals (1997)  that I formed a genuine, good-faith belief that Akin Gump has violated several criminal statutes of the District of Columbia  (and that those crimes in their entirety may constitute the crime of racketeering under federal law).