Pennsylvania Bar: Office of Disciplinary Counsel -- 2000

The following is the text of a statement I forwarded to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Edwin R. Frownfelter, Esq.) in the year 2000..  The Justice Department would probably ask:  What was my motivation in writing the statement?  I wanted the Pennsylvania Bar to take action that would affect my attorney license in that state, which would allow me to claim that the D.C. Office of Corporation Counsel had violated my civil rights under federal law.  As I've said before, my actions have had one aim: to prove that my civil rights were violated by the D.C. Corporation Counsel in averring to the D.C. Court of Appeals that my former employer, the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, had determined, in consultation with a psychiatrist who did not examine me personally, that I suffered from severe mental illness that rendered me potentially violent.  Mr. Frownfelter of the Pennsylvania Office of Disciplinary Counsel sent me a cordial letter concerning this matter back in the year 2000.  I cannot now locate it.  I wonder if Mr. Frownfelter had any communications with Akin Gump?

Statement Concerning the Resumption of Active Status

1. I affirm that I have been continuously disabled since October 29, 1991 by reason of psychiatric illness as determined by the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA), and receive monthly benefits paid by the SSA (claim no. xxx xx xxxx).

2. I affirm that the SSA determined that I became disabled effective October 29, 1991 based on sworn interrogatory responses (dated May 22, 1992) relating to my mental health and stability as of said date made by attorney managers of my former employer, the Washington, D.C. office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld (Akin Gump), and filed by said attorney managers, Laurence J. Hoffman, Esq. and Dennis M. Race, Esq., both members of the District of Columbia Bar, with the D.C. Department of Human Rights, pursuant to a complaint for job reinstatement issued by that agency on February 4, 1992. See Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, District of Columbia Court of Appeals No. 96-CV-961 (final order, Sept. 1, 1998).

3. I affirm that Akin Gump attorney managers Hoffman and Race averred in said interrogatory responses filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights pursuant to the above-referenced complaint that they had determined, in consultation with a psychiatrist, Gertrude R. Ticho, M.D., that my behavior as an employee was consistent with a psychiatric "disorder" that might be associated with a risk of violent conduct. See Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights at 4, D.C.C.A. No. 96-CV-961. Said attorney mangers also affirmed to the D.C. Department of Human Rights that my conduct during my tenure was in fact violent.

4. I affirm that the D.C. Department of Human Rights, by order dated September 24, 1993, found that there was no probable cause to believe that Akin Gump's termination decision was unlawful under the D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977, and specifically found that Akin Gump's concerns about my mental health and stability (including the potential for violence) were genuine.

5. I affirm that the D.C. Office of Corporation Counsel (M. Justin Draycott, Esq.), in the appeal of the above-referenced agency order, urged the D.C. Court of Appeals, at oral argument on December 16, 1997, to accept as fact that my coworkers had formed genuine fears that I was possibly armed and dangerous during my tenure at the firm (June 13, 1988 to October 29, 1991), and implicitly urged the court, as a matter of law, to accept that my coworkers' genuine fears that I was armed and dangerous were material to Akin Gump's decision to terminate my employment. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 9 (citing record on appeal at 276), Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights, D.C.C.A. No. 96-CV-961.

6. I affirm that my current treating psychiatrist, Albert H. Taub, M.D., a physician licensed to practice in the District of Columbia, and an employee of the government of the District of Columbia (Commission on Mental Health Services), advised the D.C. Board of Medicine (James R. Granger) in writing, by letter dated February 22, 1999, that as of said date I suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, a psychotic mental illness of long-standing duration. Dr. Taub's written medical opinion, submitted by him to an agency of the District of Columbia (Board of Medicine), was made subject to the penalties of the D.C. Code relating to unsworn falsification to authorities.

7. I affirm that I donot now nor have I ever taken anti-psychotic medication.

8. I affirm that I did not receive a response to my written inquiry to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Edwin R. Frownfelter, Esq.), dated March 13, 2000, concerning my intent to resume active status.

The above statements are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S.A. Section 4904 (relating to unsworn falsification to authorities).


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Gary Freedman, Pa. Atty. ID # 41032


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