I was terminated from my job as a paralegal by the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld in late October 1991.
I was harmed emotionally by the action of Akin Gump in filing false sworn statements about my mental health and stability with the D.C. Department of Human Rights on May 22, 1992, and causing the D.C. Corporation Counsel, the D.C. Superior Court and the D.C. Court of Appeals to affirm false allegations of fact about my mental health and stability.
There is no statute of limitations on the emotional consequences of an offense. I suffered a legal wrong, namely, the intentional infliction of emotional distress as a proximate result of the criminal act of false sworn statements, committed by Akin Gump in 1992, and I continue to struggle with the emotional consequences of that injury.
I was harmed emotionally by the action of Akin Gump in filing false sworn statements about my mental health and stability with the D.C. Department of Human Rights on May 22, 1992, and causing the D.C. Corporation Counsel, the D.C. Superior Court and the D.C. Court of Appeals to affirm false allegations of fact about my mental health and stability.
There is no statute of limitations on the emotional consequences of an offense. I suffered a legal wrong, namely, the intentional infliction of emotional distress as a proximate result of the criminal act of false sworn statements, committed by Akin Gump in 1992, and I continue to struggle with the emotional consequences of that injury.
I am an emotionally sensitive person. In fact, the D.C. Department of Human Rights made a specific finding of fact that I am hypersensitive. Perhaps a less sensitive person would not have reacted as I have to my job termination and its aftermath. But people who are disposed to dismiss my emotional devastation should be mindful of the eggshell skull rule that applies in both the civil and criminal law. Admittedly, I have suffered an unusually high level of emotional injury. But Akin Gump, under the law, is compelled to take me as it found me: an extremely emotionally sensitive and vulnerable person.
This rule holds one liable for all consequences resulting from his or her tortious (usually negligent) activities leading to an injury to another person, even if the victim suffers an unusually high level of damage (e.g., due to a pre-existing vulnerability or medical condition). The term implies that if a person had a skull as delicate as the shell of an egg, and a tortfeasor who was unaware of the condition injured that person's head, causing the skull unexpectedly to break, the defendant would be held liable for all damages resulting from the wrongful contact, even if
such damages were not reasonably foreseeable, or
the tortfeasor did not intend to cause such a severe injury.
In criminal law, the general maxim is that the defendant must "take their victims as they find them," a quotation from the judgment of Lord Justice Lawton in R v. Blaue (1975), in which the defendant was held responsible for killing his victim, despite his contention that her refusal of a blood transfusion constituted novus actus interveniens.
The doctrine is applied in all areas of torts -- intentional torts, negligence, and strict liability cases - as well as in criminal law. There is no requirement of physical contact with the victim - if a trespasser's wrongful presence on the victim's property so terrifies the victim that he has a fatal heart attack, the trespasser will be liable for the damages stemming from his original tort. The foundation for this rule is based primarily on policy grounds. The courts do not want the accused to rely on the victim's own vulnerability to avoid liability.
The thin skull rule is not to be confused with the related crumbling skull rule in which the plaintiff suffers from a detrimental position (from a prior injury, for instance) pre-existent to the occurrence of the present tort. In the "crumbling skull" rule, the prior condition is only to be considered with respect to distinguishing it from any new injury arising from the present tort - as a means of apportioning damages in such a way that the defendant would not be liable for placing the plaintiff in a better position than they were in prior to the present tort.
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