U.S. Department of Justice -- Request for Court Intervention

January 14, 1995
3801 Connecticut Ave., NW
#136
Washington, DC  20008

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington Field Office
1900 Half Street, SW
Washington, DC  20324-1600

Re: Freedman v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld

Dear Sir:

Further to my letter to you dated January 12, 1995 that forwarded a copy of the D.C. Court of Appeals Memorandum Opinion and Judgment, filed January 10, 1995, I want to state that I believe that the Opinion is erroneous as a mater of law and that the Judgment has the effect of unreasonably perpetuating an undue burden on the federal interest.  Accordingly, I respectfully request that the Federal Bureau of Investigation consider inquiring of the Office of U.S. Attorney whether the U.S. Attorney might file a motion to intervene in District of Columbia Court of Appeals No. 93-AA-1342, Gary Freeman v. District of Columbia Department of Human Rights, for the purpose of filing a petition for rehearing per D.C.App. Rule 40.  A petition for rehearing must be filed, if at all, within 14 days after the filing of a judgment (or as modified by order of the Court), which in this case is January 10, 1995.

I believe that the above-referenced Opinion is erroneous as a matter of law for the following reason: an agency’s particularized findings of fact are as a matter of law and logic necessarily subsumed in the agency’s ultimate conclusion, regardless of how general and nonspecific the ultimate conclusion.

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals denies that the agency’s no probable cause finding was an adjudication of my mental competence.  Admittedly, the clear language of the agency’s ultimate conclusion, quoted by the Court, “there there is no probable cause to believe that discrimination has occurred in this matter” fully disposes of my discrimination Complaint.  The agency’s general and nonspecific conclusion neither expressly adjudicates my mental competence nor does it refer in any manner to my mental competence.

Yet, the agency’s ultimate conclusion dismissing the Complaint necessarily incorporates, as a matter of law, the express and particularized findings by the District of Columbia Department of Human Rights, including Finding of Fact No. 6 that my former employer determined in consultation with a psychiatrist that I suffered from a mental disorder that rendered me potentially violent: “Respondent also sought outside professional guidance because of the emotional and psychological nature of Complainant’s allegations and his coworkers responses.  Respondent contacted an unnamed counselor from its Employee Assistance Program and an outside psychiatrist.  Both agreed that Complainant should seek counseling.  Dr. Gertrude Ticho [M.D.] identified Complainant’s behavior, putting a negative meaning to virtually every event as “ideas of reference” and cautioned that individuals in similar circumstances may become violent. . . .”  Department of Human Rights Initial Determination, dated June 30, 1993, page 7.

The agency’s final action dismissing my discrimination complaint, though stated in language that does not refer to any factual basis for the dismissal, incorporates as a mater of law each of the agency’s particularized seven Findings of Fact, including the above-quoted Finding of Fact No. 6 that sets forth the agency’s conclusions regarding my purportedly pathological mental state and potential for violence.  I believe, therefore, that the agency’s action functions as a de facto adjudication of my mental health and the adjudicative nature of the agency’s action confers “contested case” status to this matter, and, hence, jurisdiction in the D.C. Court of Appeals.

Further, the Judgment has the effect of unreasonably perpetuating an undue burden on the federal interest.  The agency’s determination that I suffer from severe mental disorder that renders me potentially violent has and will continue to pose a concern to federal law enforcement agencies.  On December 15, 1994 I underwent an informal interrogation by the U.S. Secret Service so that that agency might resolve concerns regarding my potential for violence, concerns raised by the determination by the D.C. Department of Human Rights that I am potentially violent.  How many man hours have been spent--and how many man hours will be spent--by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Secret Service to investigate a chimera created by a state agency?

It is unconscionable that two federal law enforcement agencies, the U.S. Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation are and will continue to he held hostage by an unreliable--indeed, factually insupportable determination by an apparently incompetent and possibly corrupt state official.

I therefore respectfully propose that the Office of U.S. Attorney intervene in the above-referenced appeal for the purpose of filing a petition for rehearing of District of Columbia Court of Appeals No. 93-AA-1342, Freedman v. District of Columbia Department of Human Rights.

Sincerely,

Gary Freedman