LL.M. Program -- American University Law School Transcript

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS - Prof. Covey Oliver - Grade B

INTERNATIONAL LAW SEMINAR: LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS - Prof. Claudio Grossman - Grade B

SEMINAR: LEGAL ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL ENTERPRISES - Prof. Seymour J. Rubin - Grade A

COMPARATIVE LAW - Prof. Claudio Grossman - Grade B+

INTERNSHIP - INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION - Grade P

INTERNATIONAL TRADE SEMINAR - Profs. Patrick F.J. Macrory and Jean Anderson - C+

Happy 28th!!

The first movement of Beethoven's piano sonata no. 28, Op. 101, in A major.  Daniel Barenboim performs.

Performance of Creative Persons on the MMPI

The following is an excerpt from Anthony Storr, M.D.'s book about creative persons titled: The Dynamics of Creation, published in 1972.  In one of his books, Dr. Storr quoted with approval the work of my former treating psychiatrist, Stanley R. Palombo, M.D.
_______________________

Some psychological tests, of which the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory is the best known, purport to measure an individual’s tendency toward neurosis and psychosis by means of a questionnaire.  The questions are so framed that the individual's replies indicate whether he possesses depressive, hysterical, paranoid and other neurotic or psychotic traits or not.  It will not surprise any reader who has been patient enough to follow the argument of this book so far to learn that creative persons tested in this way do actually admit to more psychopathological traits than the average population, thus confirming the popular belief that artists are ‘mad’ or at least neurotic.  But, as I showed in the last chapter, they are also different from the general population in possessing greater ego-strength.  In other words, although their psychopathology may put them under greater stress than the average person, they have a superior controlling apparatus, and are thus no more, though perhaps no less, likely to suffer from neurosis and psychosis than anyone else.  These test results confirm our general hypothesis, and, especially for this reason, we must be cautious in interpreting them.  It may be that creative people because they are often so well in touch with what goes on inside themselves, answer such questionnaires with greater insight than the average person and therefore only appear to have more neurotic traits than other people.  The average are often unconscious of their neurotic propensities, tend to be self-satisfied, and often answer questions with less self-doubts than they ought.

Evidence that My SSA Claim Was Just a Litigation Strategy -- 1993

Dear Stell,

What do you think of this idea?

I'll go to the Social Security Administration and file for Social Security disability benefits and state that my former employer determined on the basis of consultations with two mental health professionals, including a psychiatrist, that I am too disturbed to be employable.

The Social Security Administration will then contact the firm and want to know more about this.  Then what do they do?

GF

I assume I wrote this letter in early 1993, after I received Akin Gump's Response to Interrogatories (dated May 22, 1992) in late December 1992.

Hogan & Hartson -- Memo to Computer Applications Department

TO:  Espe Rebollar

FROM:  Gary Freedman

RE:  CHRYAIR Bates Labeling

DATE:  October 7, 1986
___________________________________________________

"Die unzulängliche ist hier Ereignis."

(The ever-unfinished is here completed.)

Chorus Mysticus
Final Scene, Faust, Part II, Goethe

In plain English, the Chrysler bates labeling is all done.

cc: SLF
__________________________

Craig W. Dye had started his employment at Hogan & Hartson on Monday October 6, 1986.  The referenced task of bates-labeling all the Chrysler air bag documents had begun in May 1986; it took 5 months to complete.  There were hundreds of thousands of documents.  The billing partner on Chrysler was James Hourihan, Esq.

Hogan & Hartson -- Job Inquiry -- 1987

March 2, 1987
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apartment 136
Washington, DC  20008

Bob Glen Odle, Esq.
Administrative Partner
Hogan & Hartson
815 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Washington, D  20006

Dear Mr. Odle:

I am eager to be considered for an entry level associate position with the firm of Hogan & Hartson and submit for your consideration a resume together with two recommendations and a writing sample.

I have been employed since September 1985 as a temporary paralegal in the Computer Applications Department under the supervision of Ms. Sheryl Ferguson.  Attorneys with whom I have worked include Ms. Catherine J. Lacroix and, most recently, Ms. Maree Sneed.

Since my primary aim is to acquire experience in the law and not simply pecuniary gain, I am willing to accept a position at a salary considerably below that offered to entry level associates.  Further, should the firm decide to make an offer of employment, I am willing to postpone my employment for a generously-reasonable period until such time that the Computer Applications Department is able to accommodate the loss of my services.

Thank you very much of your consideration.

Sincerely yours,

Gary Freedman

Senator John Warner -- Response

United States Senate

July 8, 1997

Mr. Gary Freedman
3801 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
#136
Washington, D.C.  20008

Dear Mr. Freedman

Thank you for contacting me regarding your request for assistance.  I appreciate hearing from you.

Senatorial courtesy, a long-standing tradition in the United States Senate, dictates that a Senator be given the opportunity to assist the constituents they were elected to represent.  Therefore, as a matter of courtesy, I am forwarding your correspondence to the Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton who represents the District of Columbia.

With kind regards, I am

Sincerely,

John Warner

JW/sb

cc: The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton

Related Letter to Federal Protective Service:
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2010/04/federal-protective-service.html

D.C. Court of Appeals -- Freedman v. D.C. Dept.Human Rights: 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 96-CV-961

GARY FREEDMAN, APPELLANT

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, APPELLEE

Appeal from the Superior Court of the

District of Columbia

(Hon. xxxxx x xxxxxxx, Trial Judge)

(MPA-95-14)

(Argued December 16, 1997               Decided September 1, 1998)

Before TERRY and REID, Associate Judges, and KING, Associate Judge, Retired*

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant claimed that he was the victim of sexual harassment and discrimination by his former employer, a large local law firm (“the firm”), because of his sexual orientation.  After an investigation, the Department of Human Rights (DHR) determined that there was no probable cause to believe that unlawful harassment or discrimination had occurred.  The Superior Court affirmed that determination.  From that ruling appellant brings this appeal; we affirm.

I

In March 1988 appellant began working at the firm, first as a temporary legal assistant, then as a full-time legal assistant, and eventually as a member of the firm’s litigation support staff.   Throughout his tenure with the firm, appellant received generally favorable performance evaluations.
____________________

*  Judge King was an Associate Judge of the court at the time of argument.  His status changed to Associate Judge, Retired, on September 1, 1998

-1-

According to a memorandum prepared by appellant’s supervisor in early 1991, appellant frequently complained of noise and other distractions in the work area normally assigned to litigation staff members.  He also complained that he was often the butt of practical jokes and generally felt harassed.  Responding to these concerns, the firm arranged for him to have a private office in a different location.  After several months, however appellant was forced to give up his private office because his accessing of certain computer databases from that location was interfering with the rest of the work that was done in that area of the firm.  On October 23, 1991, appellant complained to the partner responsible for overseeing legal assistants that he had been the victim of both sexual and religious harassment.  The following day appellant met with this partner and two other attorneys responsible for personnel matters at the firm to discuss his allegations.  At that meeting appellant recounted a litany of events over the previous three years which he believed were examples of sexual harassment and anti-Semitic behavior.  According to a document prepared in response to interrogatories, appellant cited events such as:

An attorney once used the word “sweet” while pouring a cup of coffee from a coffee machine;

While with a group of co-workers one female employee stated, “I bet you have a sexy chest”;

One evening after business hours, an attorney got on the elevator with him and paced back and forth, looking at [him] but saying nothing;

Co-workers in the litigation support group were “trying to make him nervous”;

A female co-worker stood by him swinging her hips so as to provoke him; and

A male co-worker had his eyes fixed to [appellant’s] genital area; and

Once a black employee was heard to use a Yiddish term.

-2-

After the meeting, the firm investigated appellant’s allegations by interviewing appellant’s supervisor and co-workers.

[The D.C. Superior Court's opinion states: "[N]either DHR nor this Court need 'determine whether or not defendant adequately investigated the charges of . . . discrimination before discharging plaintiff.'  Evans v. Bally’s Health and Tennis, 64 FEP Case. 33, 38 (D.Md. 1994).  See also Bradshaw v. Brookdale Hosp. Medical Ctr., 1993 Westlaw 289435 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (even if defendant’s investigation resulted in an inaccurate determination, plaintiff offers no evidence that defendant acted with discriminatory intent). Consistent with the holdings of these cases, the Court concludes that any allegations regarding the adequacy of the firm’s investigation cannot negate the credibility of the respondent’s asserted reasons for the termination."

Note that the D.C. Superior Court cited inapposite case law.  Evans v. Bally's is not even a Title VII case; plaintiff in that case was an alleged harasser whose lawsuit contended that the employer had terminated his employment after inadequately investigating the alleged victim's harassment complaint.  Plaintiff was not an alleged victim of discrimination.

Where there is common knowledge of harassing and discriminatory behavior directed at plaintiff, an employer's investigation that fails to uncover even that common knowledge is evidence of pretext in the termination decision.  See ROBINSON v. JACKSONVILLE SHIPYARDS, 1760 F.Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (where an employer receives adequate actual knowledge of the state of the work environment but, like an ostrich, the company elects to bury its head in the sand rather than learn more about the conditions to which an employee complains, the employer is liable for hostile work environment harassment).

Akin Gump admits that conducting an effective investigation requires careful consideration of the issues and thoughtful planning.  It will be noted that the attorney manager who conducted the investigation of my case (Dennis M. Race) started his career as a labor lawyer, working in the Office of Solicitor of the U.S. Department of Labor.  The firm's managing partner (Laurence J. Hoffman), who executed the Response to Interrogatories filed with DHR on May 22, 1992 also began his career as a labor lawyer, working for the National Labor Relations Board.  Malcolm Lassman, who reported to the management committee on issues relating to paralegals, started out as a labor lawyer.

Even a minimal investigation of my harassment complaint would have disclosed the following facts admitted by the D.C. Corporation Counsel and Akin Gump itself.

1. The D.C. Corporation Counsel admitted that "at a firm dinner in May 1989, another legal assistant [Jesse Raben] acknowledged hearing a rumor that [I] was gay." (R. 329, 341).  Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 8.  Under the common law, publication of false statements that an individual is homosexual constitutes defamation per se.  The D.C. Corporation Counsel admitted that I was a victim of tortious conduct by coworkers and/or supervisors and that it was known among firm personnel at least 2 1/2 years before I lodged a harassment complaint.

2.  DHR found that my job performance evaluations, which rated my work quality as well as professional conduct (and which would have recorded instances of misconduct), were uniformly above-average or outstanding (DHR Finding of Fact 2).  In response to a DHR document request Akin Gump produced only 3 of 9 of the evaluations prepared during my employment.  Was Dennis Race even aware of my exemplary employment history at the time of his Title VII investigation?  On October 30, 1991, the day after my termination, I telephoned Race to obtain approval for an unemployment compensation claim I planned to file.  At that time, Race advised that the quality of my work had deteriorated since I stopped working for Eastern Airlines in 1990.  Yet a memo prepared by my direct supervisor Robertson on October 25, 1991, during Race's Title VII investigation, states: "Gary's work continues to be exemplary."

3. Robertson's memo to Race dated October 25, 1991 prepared after I lodged a harassment complaint against her (and others) was retaliatory since its allegations contradict the employer's own business records.  Why didn't Race investigate the veracity of supervisor Robertson?

4. The D.C. Corporation Counsel admits that in early August 1989 there was a widespread fear that I might become armed and extremely dangerous -- more than two years before I was terminated.  Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 9.   Why didn't the employer investigate this?   (Fears by coworkers that an employee might become violent are a symptom of subtle job harassment known as mobbing.)

5. The record contains a Complaint for Damages filed in U.S. District Court by coworker Pat McNeil, who was supervised by Robertson.  The complaint alleges widespread knowledge that supervisor Robertson was viewed as a racist by black employees.  The McNeil Complaint for Damages establishes complaints by employees about Robertson as of July 1991 -- 3 months before my termination.  Why did Dennis Race not uncover the fact that Robertson was a Title VII problem during his investigation of my complaint in late October 1991, and why didn't Race question Robertson's veracity?

6. As of the filing of Akin Gump's Response to Interrogatories on May 22, 1992 with DHR the employer was aware that the Litigation Support Department was tinged with anti-Semitism. See McNeil Complaint for Damages at paragraph 18: "18. On April 9, 1992, plaintiff {McNeil] was asked to meet with Laurel Digweed from Personnel. Ms. Digweed told plaintiff that she had been advised by Ms. Robertson that plaintiff had called Isabelle Schotz a 'Jewish bitch'   and that the two of them then got into a shoving and fighting match."

7. Akin Gump's attorney managers either knew or should have investigated relevant law showing that there is a phenomenon of subtle job harassment cognizable by the courts.  See, e.g., Eide v. Kelsey-Hayes (Michigan).

A harassment complaint based on “very subtle” behavior by coworkers is legally cognizable, and I directed the Court to the following:

“9/ Appellant's complaint of harassment to the employer concerned very subtle harassment. While an unsophisticated, nonlegal employer might plausibly deem an employee's complaint based on such harassment unbelievable, it is far less convincing that knowledgeable attorney managers of a major law firm would credibly find appellant's harassment complaint "baseless as proof of sexual or religious harassment" [Rec. 138]. In fact, a complaint based on subtle harassment is legally cognizable. At least one court (in a foreign jurisdiction), noting that "sexual harassment based on the creation of an offensive, hostile and intimidating environment . . . can take many forms and is often very subtle," has permitted expert testimony to illuminate for the finder of fact the nature of plaintiff's work environment and the sexual connotations of seemingly trivial events. Eide v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 397 N.W.2d 532, 538 (Mich. App. 1986).”

My recital of harassing incidents could have led to one of three conclusions by Akin Gump’s attorney managers (both Dennis M. Race and managing partner Laurence Hoffman started their careers as labor lawyers): (1) I was simply mistaken but not mentally ill; (2) I was a victim of very subtle harassment (see Eide, above) and not simply mentally ill; (3) I was mentally ill. Akin Gump’s sworn declaration implies that it could have reached only one conclusion: that I was mentally ill and not suitable for employment.

The subtle form of job harassment known as mobbing or bullying to which I may have been subjected has been recognized in the literature since the 1970s. The fact that the D.C. Human Rights Act does not provide a legal remedy for mobbing victims does not vitiate the fact that the very existence of a subtle form of workplace harassment known as mobbing (or the subtle harassment considered by the Court in Eide, above) detracts from Akin Gump's implied assertion that it was compelled to view my allegation of subtle harassment as necessarily the product of mental illness and not something else.

8.  Record evidence shows that employees in the litigation support department were not even aware that Dennis Race had conducted an investigation. See Record at 41: "6.  Dennis Race didn't question anybody in the Department. He never talked to me. If he did an investigation, wouldn't you think that he'd have talked to various ones in the Department? I don't know of anyone in the Department he talked to. Maybe he only talked to selected people Chris Robertson picked, Chris' favorites. [Note that Pat McNeil's conjecture suggests a violation by my supervisor, Chris Robertson, of D.C. Code sec. 1-2525(b), prohibiting the aiding or abetting of retaliation.]"

9.  Akin Gump admitted, and the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found in McNeil, that a transfer from the litigation support department to the paralegal program constituted a promotion.  The employer admits it knew I was transferred from paralegal program to litigation support in March 1990.  Why didn't Race investigate the reason for the discriminatory demotion in March 1990 by legal assistant administrator Maggie Sinnott and litigation support supervisor Robertson (a known racist)?

10.  The D.C. Corporation Counsel admitted that I routinely socialized with coworkers -- controverting supervisor Robertson's allegation to Race that I had difficulty communicating with my peers.  Why didn't Race investigate Robertson's veracity?

• According to Freedman, at a firm dinner in May 1989, another legal assistant acknowledged hearing a rumor that Freedman was gay.  R. 329, 341.  Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 8.

• Additionally, Freedman claims that at a legal assistant happy hour, this administrator introduced him to female employees of the firm, but not to other males.  R. 327, 337.  Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 6.

• Freedman claims that at the firm’s 1989 Christmas party, one of the firm’s attorneys glanced at his genital area.  R. 344.  In the summer of 1990, the same attorney glanced at Freedman’s genital area during an elevator ride.  R. 330, 344.  Brief of Appellee District of Columbia at 9.

11.  Akin Gump probably knew that there were Title VII problems concerning my direct supervisor, Chris Robertson, as of the time of its investigation of my harassment complaint in late October 1991 which should have placed the firm on notice to carefully scrutinize her statements concerning me.

12.  My recital of harassing conduct, adopted as fact by DHR, cited three incidents involving my direct supervisor Robertson.  Why did DHR not question the fact that the employer, in its recital, omitted those three incidents involving Robertson -- indeed, failed to mention anywhere that I had ever complained about Robertson?]

On the basis of those interviews and appellant’s own statements, the firm concluded that appellant was uncomfortable with his co-workers and that he sometimes conducted himself in a manner that was disruptive and even frightening to other employees.  In a response filed with the DHR, a partner with the firm said that after its investigation of appellant’s allegations, the firm consulted with mental health professionals, including a psychiatrist, Dr. Gertrude Ticho. 1/  Without disclosing appellant’s identity to these professionals, representatives of the firm described the behavior that the investigation had revealed and recounted the incidents which appellant believed were examples of harassment .  One psychiatrist identified appellant’s “habit of putting a negative meaning to virtually every event as ‘ideas of reference’ and cautioned that individuals in similar circumstances may become violent.”

On October 29, 1991, the firm told appellant that it had concluded that he could not function in a group setting and that it did not have a position which allowed him to work alone and isolated from other employees.  Accordingly, appellant’s employment with the firm was terminated as of October 31.

II

On February 4, 1992, appellant filed an administrative complaint with DHR, alleging that the firm had “subjected[ed him] to differential treatment in terms and conditions of employment, harass[ed him] and terminat[ed his] employment because of sexual orientation (homosexual).” 2/  Accompanying
______________________

1/  Attached to a pleading appellant filed with the DHR was a handwritten letter from Dr. Ticho indicating that she never met or spoke to the member of the firm who said he had consulted with her.  DHR questioned the authenticity of this letter.

2/  Appellant did not claim, however, he had been fired in retaliation for his complaints of harassment and discrimination.

- 3 -

the complaint were numerous letters, memoranda, charts, and other documents detailing the incidents which he believed were examples of unlawful harassment.

On June 30, 1993, following an investigation pursuant to D.C. Code Section 1-2545 (1992), the Director of DHR sent appellant a ten-page, single-spaced letter in which she concluded that there was no probable cause to believe that he had been the victim of discrimination.  The Director’s findings (here paraphrased) included the following:

That appellant regularly received above-average or outstanding performance evaluations;

That appellant consulted regularly with mental health professionals as early as 1989 and had twenty-eight such consultations during 1991;

That after he complained in October 1991 that he was being harassed, the firm investigated his allegations and at that time learned from his workers that he was uncomfortable with them and that his behavior was sometimes disruptive and frightening;

That the firm consulted with outside mental health professional and learned that appellant’s behavior was indicative of a disorder known as “ideas of reference.” which is sometimes accompanied by violent behavior; and

That the record contained no evidence that appellant ever informed the firm that he was homosexual or that he was being harassed prior to October 23, 1991.

Applying the analysis set forth in Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-253 (1981), the Director determined both that appellant had presented a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination and that the firm in turn had shown a legitimate business reason for its decision to fire him, but that appellant had failed to satisfy his ultimate burden of demonstrating that the proffered reason was

 -4-

pretextual and that he was in fact a victim of unlawful discrimination. 3/  Specifically, the Director stated:

• There is no credible evidence in the record that [the firm] terminated [appellant] because of his sexual orientation or that [appellant] was harassed because of his sexual orientation  [appellant’s] perceptions of activity in his work environment in this matter is so hypersensitive that it triggered [the firms] concern about his mental health as well as concern about his daily interaction with his coworkers.  [The firm’s] actions were based on [appellant’s] own statements along with those of his coworkers and the consultation mental health professionals.

Appellant moved for reconsideration on the ground of new evidence, asserting in addition that the Director’s ruling omitted material facts, misstated material facts, relied on immaterial facts, and applied the law incorrectly to the facts.  On September 24, 1993, the Director noted that, on reconsideration, she must determine whether the previous conclusion “based on the evidence and application of the law followed rationally from the material contested issues of facts . . . [and] whether pertinent facts were either misstated or omitted resulting in a significant alteration of the ‘total mix’ of information made available resulting in a misapplication of law.”  She reiterated the applicable standard of analysis, recounted the findings of facts she had initially made, and reviewed appellant’s claims of new evidence and misstated facts.  The Director determined that there was no new evidence, but only new and unsupported allegations, and that if there were any misstatements of fact, they were immaterial to the outcome of the case.  She concluded that the evidence of record contained nothing to convince her that the initial determination was incorrect.
______________________

3/  See St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (plaintiff claiming discrimination “at all times bears 'the ultimate burden of persuasion‘.” (citations omitted)).

-5-

Appellant then filed in this court a petition for review of DHR’s determination of no probable cause.  This court, however, in an unpublished Memorandum Opinion and Judgment, dismissed his petition for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to the filing of a civil action in the Superior Court.  Freedman v. District of Columbia Department of Human Rights, No. 93-AA-1342 (D.C. January 10, 1995, amended by order filed September 20, 1995).  Accordingly, on October 10, 1995, appellant filed a petition in the Superior Court for review of DHR’s decision.

In an order filed June 11, 1996, the trial court denied appellant’s petition and affirmed DHR’s determination of no probable cause, finding that it was supported by substantial evidence and that appellant had failed to demonstrate the decision was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”  See D.C. Code Section 1-1510 (a)(3)(A) (1992).

III

The standard for review for a DHR determination of no probable cause has been conclusively established.  According to Simpson v. District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, 597 A. 2d 392, 406 (D.C. 1991), the standard is broader than “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”  In this case, however, even if we apply the latter standard, which is more favorable to appellant than the former (as the trial judge recognized), we can find no basis for overturning the finding of no probable cause.  We agree with the assertion in DHR’s brief that that determination should be affirmed “under any reasonable standard.”

Agency action is presumed to be correct, and neither this court nor the trial court may substitute its judgment for that of the agency.  Cohen v. Rental Housing Comm’n, 496 A.2d 603, 605 (D.C. 1985); accord, Rental Housing Comm’n 496 A.2d 603, 605 (D.C. 1985); accord, Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).  A determination of no probable cause, like any other agency decision, should not be disturbed unless the challenging party demonstrates “no rational connection between the facts found and the choice made” by the agency.  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43; Cohen v. Rental Housing Comm’n, 496 A.2d at 605 (challenging party bears the burden of demonstrating error).

-6-

In the present case, DHR’s determination was anything but arbitrary and capricious and certainly reflected reasoned decision-making.  The Director clearly articulated reasoned decision-making.  The Director clearly articulated the facts she relied upon and explained how those facts did not add up to a finding of unlawful conduct on the part of the firm.  Appellant’s argument that it was irrational for DHR to accept the validity of the firm’s proferred explanation for its adverse employment action, given the positive performance evaluations, is without merit.  The firm did not claim that it discharged appellant because he was not doing his job well, but because it was concerned about his mental health and his inability to work with others.  The Director could reasonably conclude, as DHR states in its brief, that the incidents of alleged harassment were “trivial" 
and that his reaction to them “reflected over-sensitivity on his part rather than intolerance on the part of his co-workers.”  There is nothing in the record to persuade us -- and appellant bears that burden of persuasion -- that either the Director’s finding of no probable cause or the trial court’s decision was erroneous.

The judgment is accordingly

                 Affirmed.

FOR THE COURT:

Joy A. Chapper
Acting Clerk of the Court

Copies to:

Honorable xxxxx x xxxxxxx
Clerk, Superior Court

Gary Freedman
3801 Connecticut Ave., NW
Suite 136
Washington, DC  20008

Charles L. Reischel, Esquire
Deputy Corporation Counsel

Rare Praise from Maestro Sidney Rothstein

I am writing to let you know what a great pleasure it was to have Frank Tenaglia as a soloist with the Reading Symphony Orchestra. A mid concert standing ovation is rare, be it indoors, or, as our concert was, outdoors under the stars. The fact that 6500 people jumped to their feet, and we had to play a mid concert encore, is a testament to the impact Mr. Tenaglia's voice and musicianship had on the audience. People still talk to me about his performance. You can be certain we will invite Mr. Tenaglia for a return appearance in the very near future.

--Most cordially, Sidney Rothstein - Music Director Reading and Ridgefield Symphonies

I studied violin under Sidney Rothstein from 1967 to 1969 at The Central High School of Philadelphia.

Office of Human Rights -- Jurisdiction

GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

Rehabilitation Services Administration

December 1, 2004

Gary Freedman
3801 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
#136
Washington, D.C.  20008

RE: Inquiry--Mental Disability Determination

Dear Mr. Freedman:

I am responding to your letter, dated November 18, 2004, requesting information on a District agency than can advise you concerning your allegation of discrimination in employment due to mental disability.

The District of Columbia's Office of Human Rights is the agency empowered to resolve complaints of discrimination in employment.  You may contact them at:

D.C. Office of Human Rights
441 4th Street, N.W. Suite 570N
Washington, D.C.  20001
(202) 727-4559

I hope this information is of assistance to you and may you be successful in your future endeavors.

Sincerely,

Elizabeth B. Parker
Administrator

EBP/cyb

U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Rights Division

Employment Litigation Section
P.O. Box 65968
Washington, D.C.  20035-5968

May 25, 1994

DLP:JSA:JLR:rdw
DJ  170-16-0

Mr. Gary Freedman
3801 Connecticut Ave, N.W.
Apt. 136
Washington, D.C.  20008

Dear Mr. Freedman:

This is in regard to your letter of May 17, 1994, acknowledging receipt of our letters on April 28, 1994 and May 13, 1994.

The Department of Justice has not been given authority to pursue an alleged civil rights violation of the kind described under 42 U.S.C. 1983.  If you wish to pursue this matter under 42 U.S.C. 1983, we can only suggest that you may want to consult with private counsel of your choosing to determine what remedies, if any, may be available to you.

Sincerely,

Deval L. Patrick
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

By:

Jane L. Robinson
Paralegal Specialist
Employment Litigation Section

But see:
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/civilrights/color_of_law

The Siegfried Idyll

Howard Shore’s thoroughly original arrangement of Richard Wagner’s Siegfried Idyll, performed by Lang Lang. Wagner composed the Idyll as a birthday present for his wife Cosima after the birth of their son Siegfried in 1869. It is a highly personal piece of music: its first performance, by a small ensemble in Wagner’s home on Christmas Day 1870, woke Cosima on that morning from her sleep. Later Wagner incorporated music from the Idyll into his opera Siegfried, the third of the four parts of The Ring.

Music is My Religion: A Jew's Thoughts on Christmas

Sunday, December 25, 1870 About this day, my children, I can tell you nothing—nothing about my feelings, nothing about my mood, nothing, nothing, nothing. I shall just tell you, dryly and plainly, what happened. When I woke up I heard a sound, it grew even louder, I could no longer imagine myself in a dream, music was sounding, and what music! After it had died away, R. came in to me with the five children and put into my hands the score of his "Symphonic Birthday Greeting." I was in tears, but so, too, was the whole household; R. had set up his orchestra on the stairs and thus consecrated our Tribschen forever!

The Tribschen Idyll—thus the work is called. — At midday Dr. Sulzer arrived, surely the most important of R.'s friends! After breakfast the orchestra again assembled, and now once again the Idyll was heard in the lower apartment, moving us all profoundly (Countess B. was also there, on my invitation); after it the Lohengrin wedding procession, Beethoven's Septet, and, to end with, once more the work of which I shall never hear enough! — Now at last I understood all R.'s working in secret, also dear Richter's trumpet (he blazed out the Siegfried theme splendidly and had learned the trumpet especially to do it), which had won him many admonishments from me. "Now let me die," I exclaimed to R. "It would be easier to die for me than to live for me," he replied. — In the evening R. reads his Meistersinger to Dr. Sulzer, who did not know it; and I take as much delight in it as if it were something completely new. This makes R. say, "I wanted to read Sulzer Die Ms, and it turned into a dialogue between us two."

Opus 122, No. 8

Brahms wrote the collection of organ preludes, Op. 122, shortly before he died. They were his swan song.

My Little Margie

My little Margie,
I'm always thinking of you, Margie!
I'll tell the whole wide world I love you;
Don't forget your promise to me,
I will bring you a home and ring and everything,

Oh Margie, you've been my inspiration,
Days are never blue
After all is said and done,
There is really only one,
Oh Margie, Margie, it's you!

EEOC -- Declination of Substantial Weight Review

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Washington Field Office

January 5, 2000

Gary Freedman

3801 Connecticut Avenue NW, Apt. 136

Washington, DC  20008-4530

Re:  Gary Freedman vs. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld

       DC Docket No. 92-087-P(N)

Dear Mr. Freedman:

This is in response to your request for a substantial weight review of the above-referenced charge of employment discrimination.  No review of your file was conducted because your charge alleged discrimination on a basis of sexual orientation, which is not covered by any of the statutes enforced by the EEOC.

If you would like to obtain copies of your investigative file, you need to contact the DC Office of Human Rights for their policies on file disclosure.  Their offices are located at One Judiciary Square, 441 4th Street NW, Suite 970N, Washington, DC  20001.  I am sorry that we cannot help you further in this matter.  If you have any questions, I can be reached at the above address and fax number or by phone at (202) 275-7674.

Sincerely,

Laura W. Nawrocki

Acting State & Local Coordinator

[Pertinent portions of attached form:]

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

_______________________

Dismissal and Notice of Rights

EEOC Form 161 (10/96)

[x] Other (briefly state) The EEOC does not have jurisdiction over allegations of sexual orientation discrimination.

-- Notice of Suit Rights --

On behalf of the Commission:

/s/

Tulio L. Diaz, Jr., Director JAN 5 2000

cc: Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld

     c/o Lawrence Hoffman, Managing Partner

     1333 New Hampshire Avenue NW

     Washington, DC  20036

Letter to Kenneth Starr, Esq. -- American University Trustee

August 13, 1997
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC  20008-4530

Kenneth W. Starr, Esq. 
655 15th Street, NW
American University Board of Trustees
Washington, DC  20005

Dear Mr. Starr:

Enclosed, as a courtesy, is a collection of some recent letters pertinent to the concerns of attorney managers of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld that, as of my job termination in October 1991, I posed a possible risk of violence related to a psychiatric disturbance.

Again, I want to assure the American University Board of Trustees that I am keeping federal authorities, including the Federal Protective Service, apprised of facts pertinent to the concerns, affirmed as genuine by the Office of D.C. Corporation Counsel, that I may pose a risk of armed violence including murder.

Sincerely,

Gary Freedman

Telephone Message From U.S. Secret Service

The following is a telephone message pink slip, presumably from 1996, filled out by the front desk person at my apartment building:

To: GARY FREEDMAN #136

Date 2/15  Time: 9:50 AM

From: Phil

of SECRET SERVICE

Phone (202) 435-6883

Telephoned (x)

Please call (x)

Signed: Bev

Telephone Message from U.S. Secret Service

The following is a telephone message pink slip, presumably from 1996, filled out by the front desk person at my apartment building:

To: G Freedman

Date 2/14  Time: 12:20 P.M.

From: Phil

of Secret Service

Phone 435-5100

Telephoned (x)

Please call (x)

SSA Initial Claim -- Letter to RSA

June 1, 1993
3801 Connecticut Ave., NW
#136
Washington, DC  20008

Ms. Fay E. Peterson
District of Columbia
Rehabilitation services Admin.
Disability Determination Division
P.O. Box 37608
Washington, DC  20013

RE: Disability Claim xxx-xx-xxxx

Dear Ms. Peterson:

Enclosed is a copy of a document that I recently prepared and submitted to my psychiatrist.  It is intended to apprise you of my current mental state.

I have formed the belief that my psychiatrist gave a copy of an earlier version of this document to my former employer, itself an apparently delusional belief.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Gary Freedman

My then treating psychiatrist was Suzanne M. Pitts, M.D. at the George Washington University Medical Center.  My long shot guess is that the transmitted document was a revised version of the following:

http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2010/12/significant-moments-origins.html