Thursday, March 31, 2011
Wednesday, March 30, 2011
Akin Gump: Sheppard Pratt Employee Assistance Program
The following are pages 504-506 of the record on appeal in Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C.C.A. no. 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998) (minus attachments):
January 11, 1993
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apartment 136
Washington, DC 20008
Mr. Donald M. Stocks
Government of the District
Of Columbia
Department of Human Rights and
Minority Business Development
2000 14th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20009
RE: Docket No.: 90-087-P(N)
Gary Freedman v. Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld
Dear Mr. Stocks:
Enclosed for your information is a copy of a registered letter mailed to Sheppard Pratt Preferred Resources concerning the above-referenced Complaint.
I will forward any information I obtain from Sheppard Pratt.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
January 11, 1993
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apartment 136
Washington, DC 20008
Judy Peres, L.C.S.W.
Sheppard Pratt Preferred Resources
2033 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036
Dear Ms. Peres:
I am a former employee of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, located at 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, Suite 400, Washington, DC 20036.
During my employment, which ended October 29, 1991, Sheppard Pratt Preferred Resources was the firm’s designated Employee Assistance Program. On two occasions in September 1989 I consulted with a Sheppard Pratt mental health counselor, Ms. Kathleen Kelly; on one occasion in November 1990 I consulted with you.
This letter will serve as formal written notice, per the client access provision of The District of Columbia Mental Health Information Act, D.C. Code Sec. 6-2041, that I wish to inspect and duplicate the record of mental health information concerning my consultations, which is maintained by Sheppard Pratt.
Also, a sworn pleading, dated May 22, 1992, filed with The District of Columbia Office of Human Rights and Minority Business Development by my former employer, states that some time during the period October 24-October 29, 1991, Mr. Dennis Race, an attorney manager of Akin Gump, requested from, and was in fact provided by, Sheppard Pratt Preferred Resources a representation regarding my mental status. Per the disclosure provision of The District of Columbia Mental Health Information Act, D.C. Code Sec. 6-2004, the record of mental health information maintained by Sheppard Pratt will include (1) the date of the disclosure to my employer, (2) the name of the recipient of the mental health information, and (3) a description of the contents of the disclosure.
I will be contacting you in the near future to arrange a mutually convenient time for me to inspect and duplicate Sheppard Pratt’s record of mental health information, which will by law include a record of the representation regarding my mental status that was provided to my employer.
For your information I am enclosing herewith a copy of the relevant sections of The District of Columbia Mental Health Information Act (Sections 6-2041 and 6-2004) and a copy of the portion of the pleading filed by Akin Gump with The Office of Human Rights stating that my employer sought from, and was provided by, Sheppard Pratt a representation regarding my mental status in late October 1991.
Thank you for your assistance. I may be reached at (202) 362-7064; you may leave messages at (202) 363-3800.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
Enclosures
cc: Donald M. Stocks
January 11, 1993
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apartment 136
Washington, DC 20008
Mr. Donald M. Stocks
Government of the District
Of Columbia
Department of Human Rights and
Minority Business Development
2000 14th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20009
RE: Docket No.: 90-087-P(N)
Gary Freedman v. Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld
Dear Mr. Stocks:
Enclosed for your information is a copy of a registered letter mailed to Sheppard Pratt Preferred Resources concerning the above-referenced Complaint.
I will forward any information I obtain from Sheppard Pratt.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
January 11, 1993
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apartment 136
Washington, DC 20008
Judy Peres, L.C.S.W.
Sheppard Pratt Preferred Resources
2033 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036
Dear Ms. Peres:
I am a former employee of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, located at 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, Suite 400, Washington, DC 20036.
During my employment, which ended October 29, 1991, Sheppard Pratt Preferred Resources was the firm’s designated Employee Assistance Program. On two occasions in September 1989 I consulted with a Sheppard Pratt mental health counselor, Ms. Kathleen Kelly; on one occasion in November 1990 I consulted with you.
This letter will serve as formal written notice, per the client access provision of The District of Columbia Mental Health Information Act, D.C. Code Sec. 6-2041, that I wish to inspect and duplicate the record of mental health information concerning my consultations, which is maintained by Sheppard Pratt.
Also, a sworn pleading, dated May 22, 1992, filed with The District of Columbia Office of Human Rights and Minority Business Development by my former employer, states that some time during the period October 24-October 29, 1991, Mr. Dennis Race, an attorney manager of Akin Gump, requested from, and was in fact provided by, Sheppard Pratt Preferred Resources a representation regarding my mental status. Per the disclosure provision of The District of Columbia Mental Health Information Act, D.C. Code Sec. 6-2004, the record of mental health information maintained by Sheppard Pratt will include (1) the date of the disclosure to my employer, (2) the name of the recipient of the mental health information, and (3) a description of the contents of the disclosure.
I will be contacting you in the near future to arrange a mutually convenient time for me to inspect and duplicate Sheppard Pratt’s record of mental health information, which will by law include a record of the representation regarding my mental status that was provided to my employer.
For your information I am enclosing herewith a copy of the relevant sections of The District of Columbia Mental Health Information Act (Sections 6-2041 and 6-2004) and a copy of the portion of the pleading filed by Akin Gump with The Office of Human Rights stating that my employer sought from, and was provided by, Sheppard Pratt a representation regarding my mental status in late October 1991.
Thank you for your assistance. I may be reached at (202) 362-7064; you may leave messages at (202) 363-3800.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
Enclosures
cc: Donald M. Stocks
Tuesday, March 29, 2011
Akin Gump: Intentional Interference with an Economic Relationship
The following are pages 494-497 of the record on appeal in Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights, D.C.C.A. no.6-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998):
March 22, 1993
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apt. 136
Washington, DC 20008
Mr. Donald M. Stocks
Case Investigations
Government of the District of
Columbia
Department of Human Rights and Minority
Business Development
2000 14th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20009
RE: DOCKET NO.: 92-087-P(N)
Gary Freedman v. Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld
Dear Mr. Stocks:
Enclosed are materials for your general information, in connection with the above-referenced matter, regarding the common law tort, intentional interference with an economic relationship: (1) Petrocelli, W. and Repa, B.K. Sexual Harassment on the Job, at 8/16-8/17 (Nolo Press: 1992); (2) Sack, S.M., The Employee Rights Handbook (Facts on File: 1991); (3) and a copy of the cover page of the Akin, Gump "Long Term Disability [Income] Plan."
The actions of various employees of the Respondent, particularly my supervisor, Chris Robertson, in providing knowingly false information to management regarding my conduct while an employee arguably constitute the tort of intentional interference with an economic relationship. (Although I was technically an at-will employee, there are grounds to impute the existence of an implied contract relationship between me and the Respondent. The District of Colombia recognizes language in personnel manuals as establishing an implied contract.)
While this tort falls outside the purview of the Complaint, I wanted to draw your attention to the fact that the specific actions of my supervisor and other employees of the Respondent are deemed by the courts sufficiently egregious so as to be remediable. Also, the Respondent's continued refusal to mediate the Complaint and its apparent failure to take appropriate action against employees whose conduct constitutes prima facie evidence of the commission of a tort indicates the Respondent's lack of good faith.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
[enclosures omitted.]
1. On October 23-24, 1991 Akin Gump management was placed on notice that Litigation Support manager Chris Robertson may have harassed me in violation of the D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977. The firm had actual or constructive knowledge that information about me contained in a memo dated October 25, 1991 from Robertson to Dennis Race, Esq. was false and defamatory.
2. My employment was terminated by Akin Gump effective October 29, 1991 by Dennis Race, Esq.; Chris Robertson; and Personnel Administrator Laurel Digweed.
2. In early April 1992 Personnel Administrator Laurel Digweed (in consultation with managing partner Laurence J. Hoffman) terminated the employment of litigation support employee Pat McNeil, a black woman supervised by Robertson.
3. On May 22, 1992 Akin Gump (Race and managing partner Laurence J. Hoffman) filed the firm's Response with the D.C. Department of Human Rights in Freedman v. Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld. Akin Gump's Response failed to disclose that I had lodged a harassment complaint against Robertson, my direct supervisor, in October 1991.
4. In 1993 Pat McNeil filed a Title VII lawsuit against Akin Gump alleging that Digweed colluded with Robertson (a known racist) in her unlawful job termination. Akin Gump denied that Robertson colluded with Digweed in terminating McNeil, and the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted a summary judgment in favor of Akin Gump. It is clear that Akin Gump concealed its knowledge of Robertson's tortious and allegedly unlawful conduct in relation to me, in October 1991.
March 22, 1993
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apt. 136
Washington, DC 20008
Mr. Donald M. Stocks
Case Investigations
Government of the District of
Columbia
Department of Human Rights and Minority
Business Development
2000 14th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20009
RE: DOCKET NO.: 92-087-P(N)
Gary Freedman v. Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld
Dear Mr. Stocks:
Enclosed are materials for your general information, in connection with the above-referenced matter, regarding the common law tort, intentional interference with an economic relationship: (1) Petrocelli, W. and Repa, B.K. Sexual Harassment on the Job, at 8/16-8/17 (Nolo Press: 1992); (2) Sack, S.M., The Employee Rights Handbook (Facts on File: 1991); (3) and a copy of the cover page of the Akin, Gump "Long Term Disability [Income] Plan."
The actions of various employees of the Respondent, particularly my supervisor, Chris Robertson, in providing knowingly false information to management regarding my conduct while an employee arguably constitute the tort of intentional interference with an economic relationship. (Although I was technically an at-will employee, there are grounds to impute the existence of an implied contract relationship between me and the Respondent. The District of Colombia recognizes language in personnel manuals as establishing an implied contract.)
While this tort falls outside the purview of the Complaint, I wanted to draw your attention to the fact that the specific actions of my supervisor and other employees of the Respondent are deemed by the courts sufficiently egregious so as to be remediable. Also, the Respondent's continued refusal to mediate the Complaint and its apparent failure to take appropriate action against employees whose conduct constitutes prima facie evidence of the commission of a tort indicates the Respondent's lack of good faith.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
[enclosures omitted.]
1. On October 23-24, 1991 Akin Gump management was placed on notice that Litigation Support manager Chris Robertson may have harassed me in violation of the D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977. The firm had actual or constructive knowledge that information about me contained in a memo dated October 25, 1991 from Robertson to Dennis Race, Esq. was false and defamatory.
2. My employment was terminated by Akin Gump effective October 29, 1991 by Dennis Race, Esq.; Chris Robertson; and Personnel Administrator Laurel Digweed.
2. In early April 1992 Personnel Administrator Laurel Digweed (in consultation with managing partner Laurence J. Hoffman) terminated the employment of litigation support employee Pat McNeil, a black woman supervised by Robertson.
3. On May 22, 1992 Akin Gump (Race and managing partner Laurence J. Hoffman) filed the firm's Response with the D.C. Department of Human Rights in Freedman v. Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld. Akin Gump's Response failed to disclose that I had lodged a harassment complaint against Robertson, my direct supervisor, in October 1991.
4. In 1993 Pat McNeil filed a Title VII lawsuit against Akin Gump alleging that Digweed colluded with Robertson (a known racist) in her unlawful job termination. Akin Gump denied that Robertson colluded with Digweed in terminating McNeil, and the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted a summary judgment in favor of Akin Gump. It is clear that Akin Gump concealed its knowledge of Robertson's tortious and allegedly unlawful conduct in relation to me, in October 1991.
Akin Gump: Long Term Disability Income Plan
The following are pages 492-493 of the record on appeal in Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights, D.C.C.A. no. 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998):
March 23, 1993
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apt. 136
Washington, DC 20008
Mr. Donald M. Stocks
Government of the District of Columbia
Dept. of Human Rights & Minority
Business Development
2000 14th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20009
RE: Docket No.: 92-087 P(N)
Gary Freedman v. Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld
Dear Mr. Stocks:
Enclosed is a copy of a letter that I have forwarded to the U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Labor Management Standards in connection with the above-referenced matter.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
March 23, 1993
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apt. 136
Washington, DC 20008
Assistant Secretary
Office of Labor Management Standards
U.S. Department of Labor
1730 K Street, NW
Washington, DC
Dear Sir:
I am seeking your opinion regarding the propriety under ERISA of the following actions taken by my former employer, the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, located at 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, NW, Suite 400, Washington, DC 20036.
On October 29, 1991 I was terminated for cause after my employer determined, in consultation with two mental health professionals, including a psychiatrist, that I suffered from a serious mental illness that rendered my continued presence in the firm untenable. I was employed in the capacity of legal assistant (paralegal). My performance evaluations for the entire period of my employment, which lasted from June 13, 1988 until October 29, 1991, were exemplary; no written or oral reprimands were ever issued.
During my employment I was a beneficiary of the firm’s Long Term Disability Income Plan, underwritten by UNUM Life Insurance Company of America. A copy of the Plan is enclosed. My former employer’s action in terminating my employment prevented me from obtaining benefits under the Plan. The mental illness cited by my employer as justification for the termination would otherwise have rendered me eligible for benefits under the Plan. At the time of my termination I was not advised of my rights under the Plan.
On February 4, 1992 I filed a Complaint with the District of Columbia Department of Human Rights (“DOHR”) alleging that the termination was discriminatory in violation of the District of Columbia Human Rights Act of 1977. A copy of the Complaint is enclosed together with a copy of my former employer’s Response. DOHR’s investigation of the Complaint is pending.
Was my former employer’s action in terminating my employment on the basis that I suffered from a debilitating mental illness, precluding my eligibility for benefits under the employer’s Long Term Disability Income Plan, lawful under ERISA?
I appreciate your assistance in this matter.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
Obviously, I don’t know anything about ERISA.
March 23, 1993
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apt. 136
Washington, DC 20008
Mr. Donald M. Stocks
Government of the District of Columbia
Dept. of Human Rights & Minority
Business Development
2000 14th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20009
RE: Docket No.: 92-087 P(N)
Gary Freedman v. Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld
Dear Mr. Stocks:
Enclosed is a copy of a letter that I have forwarded to the U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Labor Management Standards in connection with the above-referenced matter.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
March 23, 1993
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apt. 136
Washington, DC 20008
Assistant Secretary
Office of Labor Management Standards
U.S. Department of Labor
1730 K Street, NW
Washington, DC
Dear Sir:
I am seeking your opinion regarding the propriety under ERISA of the following actions taken by my former employer, the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, located at 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, NW, Suite 400, Washington, DC 20036.
On October 29, 1991 I was terminated for cause after my employer determined, in consultation with two mental health professionals, including a psychiatrist, that I suffered from a serious mental illness that rendered my continued presence in the firm untenable. I was employed in the capacity of legal assistant (paralegal). My performance evaluations for the entire period of my employment, which lasted from June 13, 1988 until October 29, 1991, were exemplary; no written or oral reprimands were ever issued.
During my employment I was a beneficiary of the firm’s Long Term Disability Income Plan, underwritten by UNUM Life Insurance Company of America. A copy of the Plan is enclosed. My former employer’s action in terminating my employment prevented me from obtaining benefits under the Plan. The mental illness cited by my employer as justification for the termination would otherwise have rendered me eligible for benefits under the Plan. At the time of my termination I was not advised of my rights under the Plan.
On February 4, 1992 I filed a Complaint with the District of Columbia Department of Human Rights (“DOHR”) alleging that the termination was discriminatory in violation of the District of Columbia Human Rights Act of 1977. A copy of the Complaint is enclosed together with a copy of my former employer’s Response. DOHR’s investigation of the Complaint is pending.
Was my former employer’s action in terminating my employment on the basis that I suffered from a debilitating mental illness, precluding my eligibility for benefits under the employer’s Long Term Disability Income Plan, lawful under ERISA?
I appreciate your assistance in this matter.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
Obviously, I don’t know anything about ERISA.
Akin Gump: Long Term Disability Income Plan
The following are pages 490-491 in the record on appeal in Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights, D.C.C.A. no. 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998):
April 1, 1993
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008
Mr. Donald M. Stocks
Govt. of the District of Columbia
Dept. of Human Rights and Minority
Business Development
2000 14th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20009
RE: Docket No.: 90-087-P(N)
Gary Freedman v. Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld
Dear Mr. Stocks:
Enclosed is a copy of a letter I recently received from the U.S. Department of Labor in connection with the above referenced matter.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
[stamped APR - 5 REC’D]
U.S. Department of Labor
Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration
Washington District Office
1730 K Street N.W., Suite 556
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 254-7013 Fax: (202) 254-3378
March 26, 1993
Gary Freedman
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apt. 136
Washington, DC 20008
Re: Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld Long Term Disability Income Plan (“Plan”)
Dear Mr. Freedman
This office has received your letter in reference to the Plan. Inquiries of this nature are being handled by our Division of Technical Assistance and Inquiries, a special unit which provides benefit assistance. Therefore, we have forwarded a copy of your letter to that division for appropriate response. For future reference, their address is:
Division of Technical Assistance/Inquiries
Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration
U.S. Department of Labor
200 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Room N-5658
Washington, D.C. 20210
You will hear directly from them in the future.
Sincerely,
/s/
R.C. Marshall
District Supervisor
April 1, 1993
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008
Mr. Donald M. Stocks
Govt. of the District of Columbia
Dept. of Human Rights and Minority
Business Development
2000 14th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20009
RE: Docket No.: 90-087-P(N)
Gary Freedman v. Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld
Dear Mr. Stocks:
Enclosed is a copy of a letter I recently received from the U.S. Department of Labor in connection with the above referenced matter.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
[stamped APR - 5 REC’D]
U.S. Department of Labor
Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration
Washington District Office
1730 K Street N.W., Suite 556
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 254-7013 Fax: (202) 254-3378
March 26, 1993
Gary Freedman
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apt. 136
Washington, DC 20008
Re: Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld Long Term Disability Income Plan (“Plan”)
Dear Mr. Freedman
This office has received your letter in reference to the Plan. Inquiries of this nature are being handled by our Division of Technical Assistance and Inquiries, a special unit which provides benefit assistance. Therefore, we have forwarded a copy of your letter to that division for appropriate response. For future reference, their address is:
Division of Technical Assistance/Inquiries
Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration
U.S. Department of Labor
200 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Room N-5658
Washington, D.C. 20210
You will hear directly from them in the future.
Sincerely,
/s/
R.C. Marshall
District Supervisor
Akin Gump: Long Term Disability Income Plan
The following are pages 486-487 in the record on appeal in Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights, D.C.C.A. no. 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998). I obviously don't know anything about ERISA.
May 7, 1993
3801 Connecticut Ave., NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008
Mr. Donald M. Stocks
Government of the District of Columbia
Dept. Human Rights and Minority
Business Development
2000 14th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20009
RE: Docket No. 92-087-P(N)
Gary Freedman v. Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld
Dear Mr. Stocks:
I enclose the attached letter for your information. I suspect that Akin Gump's action in terminating my employment constitutes more than simply an arguable ERISA violation; my rights under COBRA are really immaterial in my case, as the letter indicates.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
[stamped "RECEIVED MAY 10 1993 DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND MINORITY BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT"]
May 6, 1993
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008
Division of Technical
Assistance/Inquiries
Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration
U.S. Department of Labor
200 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Room N-5658
Washington, DC 20210
Re: Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld Long Term Disability Income Plan ("Plan")
Dear Sir:
I have been advised that the Division of Technical Assistance/Inquiries is reviewing my query regarding the Plan.
In order to assist you in your review, I would like to provide additional facts and documents.
At the time of my termination on October 29, 1991, I was not advised of my conversion privileges under the Plan. The only information and documentation I received upon termination concerned (1) conversion of the firm's group life insurance with Prudential, (2) election of continued medical coverage with Northwestern National, and (3) election of continued employee assistance program coverage.
Enclosed are all the documents my employer provided at the termination meeting on October 29, 1991.
Further, on October 29, 1991 my employer did not state as justification for the termination the fact that it had determined in consultation with two mental health professionals, including a psychiatrist, that I was paranoid and potentially violent. I was apprised of this only upon my receipt on December 23, 1991 of the firm's Response to my Complaint alleging an unlawful termination filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights. Therefore, it was 14 months after termination that I was apprised that my employer had considered me disabled. The plan requires a written notice of claim within 30 days of the date the disability starts. Even if I had converted to an individual contract, the information provided by my employer at the time of the termination would have been inadequate to alert me to file a claim under the Plan.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
May 7, 1993
3801 Connecticut Ave., NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008
Mr. Donald M. Stocks
Government of the District of Columbia
Dept. Human Rights and Minority
Business Development
2000 14th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20009
RE: Docket No. 92-087-P(N)
Gary Freedman v. Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld
Dear Mr. Stocks:
I enclose the attached letter for your information. I suspect that Akin Gump's action in terminating my employment constitutes more than simply an arguable ERISA violation; my rights under COBRA are really immaterial in my case, as the letter indicates.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
[stamped "RECEIVED MAY 10 1993 DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND MINORITY BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT"]
May 6, 1993
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008
Division of Technical
Assistance/Inquiries
Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration
U.S. Department of Labor
200 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Room N-5658
Washington, DC 20210
Re: Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld Long Term Disability Income Plan ("Plan")
Dear Sir:
I have been advised that the Division of Technical Assistance/Inquiries is reviewing my query regarding the Plan.
In order to assist you in your review, I would like to provide additional facts and documents.
At the time of my termination on October 29, 1991, I was not advised of my conversion privileges under the Plan. The only information and documentation I received upon termination concerned (1) conversion of the firm's group life insurance with Prudential, (2) election of continued medical coverage with Northwestern National, and (3) election of continued employee assistance program coverage.
Enclosed are all the documents my employer provided at the termination meeting on October 29, 1991.
Further, on October 29, 1991 my employer did not state as justification for the termination the fact that it had determined in consultation with two mental health professionals, including a psychiatrist, that I was paranoid and potentially violent. I was apprised of this only upon my receipt on December 23, 1991 of the firm's Response to my Complaint alleging an unlawful termination filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights. Therefore, it was 14 months after termination that I was apprised that my employer had considered me disabled. The plan requires a written notice of claim within 30 days of the date the disability starts. Even if I had converted to an individual contract, the information provided by my employer at the time of the termination would have been inadequate to alert me to file a claim under the Plan.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
Monday, March 28, 2011
Akin Gump: Employment Discrimination
The following document is pages 350-353 of the record on appeal in Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C.C.A. no. 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998).
RESPONDENT’S DISCRIMINATORY REFUSAL TO OFFER COMPLAINANT WORK CONSISTENT WITH COMPLAINANT’S ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL CREDENTIALS
1. Complainant is licensed to practice law. He is a member of the bar of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and was awarded the degree of J.D. by Temple University School of Law. Complainant also holds the degree of LL.M. in International Legal Studies from The Washington College of Law, The American University. The field of International Law is a major practice area of the Respondent. Complainant is not a member of the D.C. bar.
2. During the period of Complainant’s employment with the Respondent, he was employed in a position far below his educational level and professional experience, notwithstanding the Respondent’s knowledge of Complainant’s qualifications. In March 1990, Complainant was reassigned by the Respondent to a position that required even less advanced skills than those required by the position for which he was originally hired, despite Complainant’s consistently exemplary performance evaluations.
3. During the period of Complainant’s employment with the Respondent he did not request in any manner that he be considered for an associate position or law clerk position. Upon being hired in June 1988 Complainant was cautioned by the Respondent’s then Legal Assistant Administrator, Margarita C. Babb, that he should not view his position as legal assistant as a stepping stone to an associate position. The Legal Assistant Administrator’s warning carried the implied threat of disciplinary action for failure to comply. Indeed, only four working days after Complainant requested of Earl Segal, the partner in charge of the Legal Assistant Program, that Complainant be considered for reassignment to the Legal Assistant program on October 23, 1991, Complainant was advised that the Respondent had decided to terminate his employment. The Complainant was involuntarily terminated on October 29, 1991 by the Chairman of the Respondent’s Hiring Committee, Dennis Race, without cause.
4. During a discussion with the then Legal Assistant Administrator, Margarita C. Babb, in June 1988, prior to being hired as a legal assistant, Complainant was advised that when the largely menial document coding assignment for the client Eastern Airlines was completed, Complainant would be assigned to the Legal Assistant group. In March 1990, however, as the quantity of work on Eastern diminished, Complainant was assigned to the Litigation Support Group to continue the menial task of document coding for other clients rather than being assigned to substantive tasks in the Legal Assistant group.
5. Although Complainant billed most of his hours to document production tasks for Eastern Airlines during the period June 1988 until about mid-year 1990, the actions of the legal assistant administrative staff were consistent with the promise made by Margarita Babb in June 1988 that Complainant would be assigned to substantive tasks upon the completion of his assignment for the client Eastern Airlines.
Complainant was routinely invited to attend, and did attend, legal assistant staff meetings. The legal assistant administrative staff arranged for Complainant to attend Westlaw and Lexis training both on-site and off-site on a number of occasions. Complainant was invited to attend, and did attend, legal assistant seminars including a series of weekly writing seminars for legal assistants in February 1989 conducted by one of the Respondent’s associates, Gary Rubin; a cite checking seminar for legal assistants held in about early 1989 conducted by one of Respondent’s associates, Michael J. Mueller; and a legislative seminar held in about early 1989 conducted by one of Respondent’s partners, Edward S. Knight (?). Also, Complainant was given personalized Westlaw and Lexis access cards for use in computer searches of legal databases; the granting of such access cards is not consistent with the work of a document coder
6. At the time Complainant was hired as a full time legal assistant in August 1989, Complainant was given, on about July 31, 1989, a legal assistant orientation by legal assistant administrator, Maggie Sinnott. Maggie Sinnott asked the Complainant about his availability for travel and advised Complainant that he would be given a firm credit card. Maggie Sinnott’s actions at the time of the legal assistant orientation were inconsistent with Respondent's assertion that Complainant was hired to work as a document coder on Eastern Airlines or that he would be assigned to the Litigation Support Group upon the completion of his assignment on Eastern Airlines. The Legal Assistant Administrator’s actions at the time Complainant was hired full-time in August 1989 were consistent with the understanding that Complainant was being hired to perform substantive legal assistant assignments that would commence once the temporary assignment on Eastern Airlines ended.
7. Despite Respondent’s assertion that Complainant was hired for the express purpose of working on a document production assignment for Eastern Airlines, Complainant was occasionally requested, by the Legal Assistant administrative staff, to interrupt his work on Eastern to perform assignments typically performed by other legal assistants and not by document coders. In late March 1989, for example, Complainant was requested to interrupt his work on Eastern to prepare a digest of a deposition transcript for attorney John Potter. On July 28, 1989, Complainant was requested to cite check a brief for attorney Merrill Spiegel. During the summer of 1990--after Complainant had been reassigned to the Litigation Support Group--the legal assistant administrator, Maggie Sinnott, who was at that time no longer the Complainant’s supervisor, requested that Complainant digest deposition transcripts. In mid-August 1991, the Complainant’s supervisor, Chris Robertson, on her initiative, arranged to have Complainant work on the Hoechst chemical analysis project, a task on which only other legal assistants--not litigation support employees--were assigned.
8. During the entire period of Complainant’s employment with the Respondent, Complainant was harassed, on the basis of perceived sexual orientation, by staff persons, associates, and partners of the Respondent. As a result of the harassment, Complainant formed the belief that his employment with the Respondent was in jeopardy, which, combined with the warning of the Legal Assistant Administrator, militated against his inquiring as to a position as associate or law clerk.
9. Jan Fraser-Smith, an agency-supplied temporary employee, who began her assignment with the Respondent at about the same time as the Complainant, in March 1988, and who worked as a document coder on the same project as the Complainant, was later hired by the Respondent as a law clerk. Though the Complainant is qualified to work as a law clerk, he was never offered such a position. The harassment that Complainant suffered during his employment, which carried the implied threat of termination, precluded Complainant from requesting a more substantive position with the Respondent.
10. In March 1990, when Complainant was advised that he was to be reassigned from the legal assistant group to the Litigation Support Group, his newly-assigned supervisor, Chris Robertson, told Complainant that once he was assigned to the Litigation Support Group, a supervisory position was “a distinct possibility.” In fact, Complainant was not assigned to a supervisory position in Litigation Support, nor was he routinely given substantive assignments in litigation support.
11. During a meeting between Complainant and his supervisor, Chris Robertson, during the week of about August 12, 1991, Complainant requested that he be reassigned to the legal assistant program so that he might have the opportunity to perform more substantive tasks. Complainant was never advised by Chris Robertson that she had followed up on Complainant’s request.
12. On October 23, 1991, in a meeting between Complainant and Earl L. Segal, the partner in charge of the Legal Assistant Program, Complainant again requested that the firm consider reassigning Complainant to the Legal Assistant Program, implicitly stating a desire to be provided an opportunity to perform more substantive assignments. Four working days later, on October 29, 1991, Complainant was advised that the Respondent had decided to terminate him.
13. Some time in 1990, Brain Burns, a legal assistant who had been employed by the Respondent since about 1985, was granted a position as associate. Brian Burns is a member of the D.C. bar. Complainant believes that Brian Burns is not a homosexual. During his employment with the Respondent as a legal assistant, Brian Burns was consistently granted substantive assignments that eased his transition from legal assistant to practicing attorney. In effect, Brian Burns’ position with the Respondent was an “associate-track” legal assistant position. Complainant’s educational level and professional experience also qualified him for an associate-track legal assistant position with the Respondent; a like position was never offered to Complainant. The harassment that Complainant suffered during his employment, which carried the implied threat of termination, precluded Complainant from requesting an associate-track legal assistant position.
14. In a letter dated February 7, 1985, before Complainant’s employment with the Respondent, Complainant submitted a resume to the Respondent’s Hiring Committee requesting consideration for an associate position. The Respondent’s Hiring Committee advised the Complainant by letter dated February 4, 1985 that, regrettably, it had to deny Complainant’s request for an interview despite his excellent credentials because of the limited number of openings then available.
15. Brian Burns is employed as an associate in the Respondent’s tax group. During Complainant’s employment with Respondent the tax group was headed by a partner named David Hardee, who has since withdrawn from the partnership. During my tenure with the Respondent I experienced a number of harassing interactions with David Hardee, arguably evidencing an anti-homosexual bias by David Hardee.
16. Some time during the summer of 1989, The Washington Times reported on an alleged homosexual incident involving an attorney in the Respondent’s Dallas office. Complainant does not know the outcome of the incident, specifically, how the Respondent’s management dealt with the attorney involved, or how the handling of the matter reflected management’s attitudes and policies regarding attorneys suspected of homosexual activities.
17. Some time in the first half of 1990, while riding alone in an elevator with a partner of the Respondent, David Eisenstadt, Mr. Eisenstadt proceeded to pace back and forth and whistle, all the while glancing at me. I experienced David Eisenstadt’s behavior as offensive and intimidating. David Eisenstadt is the husband of the Respondent’s attorney recruitment administrator, Nina Eisenstein. Around noon on October 29, 1991, after having been advised of my termination, shortly after I got off the elevator in the lobby area to leave the building, Nina Eisenstein gazed at my genital area.
[Lilliam Machado, Esq. was employed as an Akin Gump paralegal and later hired as an associate. I believe that Sanford Ring, Esq. was employed as an Akin Gump paralegal and later hired as an associate. Glenda Creasy Walden was employed as an Akin Gump paralegal; I believe she may have been later hired as an associate. F. Robert Wheeler, Esq. was hired as an agency-supplied temporary to perform a clerical task for the client Eastern Airlines; he was later granted an associate position. Mr. Wheeler had practiced law previously.]
RESPONDENT’S DISCRIMINATORY REFUSAL TO OFFER COMPLAINANT WORK CONSISTENT WITH COMPLAINANT’S ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL CREDENTIALS
1. Complainant is licensed to practice law. He is a member of the bar of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and was awarded the degree of J.D. by Temple University School of Law. Complainant also holds the degree of LL.M. in International Legal Studies from The Washington College of Law, The American University. The field of International Law is a major practice area of the Respondent. Complainant is not a member of the D.C. bar.
2. During the period of Complainant’s employment with the Respondent, he was employed in a position far below his educational level and professional experience, notwithstanding the Respondent’s knowledge of Complainant’s qualifications. In March 1990, Complainant was reassigned by the Respondent to a position that required even less advanced skills than those required by the position for which he was originally hired, despite Complainant’s consistently exemplary performance evaluations.
3. During the period of Complainant’s employment with the Respondent he did not request in any manner that he be considered for an associate position or law clerk position. Upon being hired in June 1988 Complainant was cautioned by the Respondent’s then Legal Assistant Administrator, Margarita C. Babb, that he should not view his position as legal assistant as a stepping stone to an associate position. The Legal Assistant Administrator’s warning carried the implied threat of disciplinary action for failure to comply. Indeed, only four working days after Complainant requested of Earl Segal, the partner in charge of the Legal Assistant Program, that Complainant be considered for reassignment to the Legal Assistant program on October 23, 1991, Complainant was advised that the Respondent had decided to terminate his employment. The Complainant was involuntarily terminated on October 29, 1991 by the Chairman of the Respondent’s Hiring Committee, Dennis Race, without cause.
4. During a discussion with the then Legal Assistant Administrator, Margarita C. Babb, in June 1988, prior to being hired as a legal assistant, Complainant was advised that when the largely menial document coding assignment for the client Eastern Airlines was completed, Complainant would be assigned to the Legal Assistant group. In March 1990, however, as the quantity of work on Eastern diminished, Complainant was assigned to the Litigation Support Group to continue the menial task of document coding for other clients rather than being assigned to substantive tasks in the Legal Assistant group.
5. Although Complainant billed most of his hours to document production tasks for Eastern Airlines during the period June 1988 until about mid-year 1990, the actions of the legal assistant administrative staff were consistent with the promise made by Margarita Babb in June 1988 that Complainant would be assigned to substantive tasks upon the completion of his assignment for the client Eastern Airlines.
Complainant was routinely invited to attend, and did attend, legal assistant staff meetings. The legal assistant administrative staff arranged for Complainant to attend Westlaw and Lexis training both on-site and off-site on a number of occasions. Complainant was invited to attend, and did attend, legal assistant seminars including a series of weekly writing seminars for legal assistants in February 1989 conducted by one of the Respondent’s associates, Gary Rubin; a cite checking seminar for legal assistants held in about early 1989 conducted by one of Respondent’s associates, Michael J. Mueller; and a legislative seminar held in about early 1989 conducted by one of Respondent’s partners, Edward S. Knight (?). Also, Complainant was given personalized Westlaw and Lexis access cards for use in computer searches of legal databases; the granting of such access cards is not consistent with the work of a document coder
6. At the time Complainant was hired as a full time legal assistant in August 1989, Complainant was given, on about July 31, 1989, a legal assistant orientation by legal assistant administrator, Maggie Sinnott. Maggie Sinnott asked the Complainant about his availability for travel and advised Complainant that he would be given a firm credit card. Maggie Sinnott’s actions at the time of the legal assistant orientation were inconsistent with Respondent's assertion that Complainant was hired to work as a document coder on Eastern Airlines or that he would be assigned to the Litigation Support Group upon the completion of his assignment on Eastern Airlines. The Legal Assistant Administrator’s actions at the time Complainant was hired full-time in August 1989 were consistent with the understanding that Complainant was being hired to perform substantive legal assistant assignments that would commence once the temporary assignment on Eastern Airlines ended.
7. Despite Respondent’s assertion that Complainant was hired for the express purpose of working on a document production assignment for Eastern Airlines, Complainant was occasionally requested, by the Legal Assistant administrative staff, to interrupt his work on Eastern to perform assignments typically performed by other legal assistants and not by document coders. In late March 1989, for example, Complainant was requested to interrupt his work on Eastern to prepare a digest of a deposition transcript for attorney John Potter. On July 28, 1989, Complainant was requested to cite check a brief for attorney Merrill Spiegel. During the summer of 1990--after Complainant had been reassigned to the Litigation Support Group--the legal assistant administrator, Maggie Sinnott, who was at that time no longer the Complainant’s supervisor, requested that Complainant digest deposition transcripts. In mid-August 1991, the Complainant’s supervisor, Chris Robertson, on her initiative, arranged to have Complainant work on the Hoechst chemical analysis project, a task on which only other legal assistants--not litigation support employees--were assigned.
8. During the entire period of Complainant’s employment with the Respondent, Complainant was harassed, on the basis of perceived sexual orientation, by staff persons, associates, and partners of the Respondent. As a result of the harassment, Complainant formed the belief that his employment with the Respondent was in jeopardy, which, combined with the warning of the Legal Assistant Administrator, militated against his inquiring as to a position as associate or law clerk.
9. Jan Fraser-Smith, an agency-supplied temporary employee, who began her assignment with the Respondent at about the same time as the Complainant, in March 1988, and who worked as a document coder on the same project as the Complainant, was later hired by the Respondent as a law clerk. Though the Complainant is qualified to work as a law clerk, he was never offered such a position. The harassment that Complainant suffered during his employment, which carried the implied threat of termination, precluded Complainant from requesting a more substantive position with the Respondent.
10. In March 1990, when Complainant was advised that he was to be reassigned from the legal assistant group to the Litigation Support Group, his newly-assigned supervisor, Chris Robertson, told Complainant that once he was assigned to the Litigation Support Group, a supervisory position was “a distinct possibility.” In fact, Complainant was not assigned to a supervisory position in Litigation Support, nor was he routinely given substantive assignments in litigation support.
11. During a meeting between Complainant and his supervisor, Chris Robertson, during the week of about August 12, 1991, Complainant requested that he be reassigned to the legal assistant program so that he might have the opportunity to perform more substantive tasks. Complainant was never advised by Chris Robertson that she had followed up on Complainant’s request.
12. On October 23, 1991, in a meeting between Complainant and Earl L. Segal, the partner in charge of the Legal Assistant Program, Complainant again requested that the firm consider reassigning Complainant to the Legal Assistant Program, implicitly stating a desire to be provided an opportunity to perform more substantive assignments. Four working days later, on October 29, 1991, Complainant was advised that the Respondent had decided to terminate him.
13. Some time in 1990, Brain Burns, a legal assistant who had been employed by the Respondent since about 1985, was granted a position as associate. Brian Burns is a member of the D.C. bar. Complainant believes that Brian Burns is not a homosexual. During his employment with the Respondent as a legal assistant, Brian Burns was consistently granted substantive assignments that eased his transition from legal assistant to practicing attorney. In effect, Brian Burns’ position with the Respondent was an “associate-track” legal assistant position. Complainant’s educational level and professional experience also qualified him for an associate-track legal assistant position with the Respondent; a like position was never offered to Complainant. The harassment that Complainant suffered during his employment, which carried the implied threat of termination, precluded Complainant from requesting an associate-track legal assistant position.
14. In a letter dated February 7, 1985, before Complainant’s employment with the Respondent, Complainant submitted a resume to the Respondent’s Hiring Committee requesting consideration for an associate position. The Respondent’s Hiring Committee advised the Complainant by letter dated February 4, 1985 that, regrettably, it had to deny Complainant’s request for an interview despite his excellent credentials because of the limited number of openings then available.
15. Brian Burns is employed as an associate in the Respondent’s tax group. During Complainant’s employment with Respondent the tax group was headed by a partner named David Hardee, who has since withdrawn from the partnership. During my tenure with the Respondent I experienced a number of harassing interactions with David Hardee, arguably evidencing an anti-homosexual bias by David Hardee.
16. Some time during the summer of 1989, The Washington Times reported on an alleged homosexual incident involving an attorney in the Respondent’s Dallas office. Complainant does not know the outcome of the incident, specifically, how the Respondent’s management dealt with the attorney involved, or how the handling of the matter reflected management’s attitudes and policies regarding attorneys suspected of homosexual activities.
17. Some time in the first half of 1990, while riding alone in an elevator with a partner of the Respondent, David Eisenstadt, Mr. Eisenstadt proceeded to pace back and forth and whistle, all the while glancing at me. I experienced David Eisenstadt’s behavior as offensive and intimidating. David Eisenstadt is the husband of the Respondent’s attorney recruitment administrator, Nina Eisenstein. Around noon on October 29, 1991, after having been advised of my termination, shortly after I got off the elevator in the lobby area to leave the building, Nina Eisenstein gazed at my genital area.
[Lilliam Machado, Esq. was employed as an Akin Gump paralegal and later hired as an associate. I believe that Sanford Ring, Esq. was employed as an Akin Gump paralegal and later hired as an associate. Glenda Creasy Walden was employed as an Akin Gump paralegal; I believe she may have been later hired as an associate. F. Robert Wheeler, Esq. was hired as an agency-supplied temporary to perform a clerical task for the client Eastern Airlines; he was later granted an associate position. Mr. Wheeler had practiced law previously.]
Patterson Belknap Partner on Seinfeld: They Did Their Own Investigation!
Former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani appeared in 1993 in an episode of Seinfeld: The Nonfat Yogurt. In 1977 Rudy Giuliani joined the New York law firm of Patterson Belknap Webb and Tyler. Coincidentally, Philip Forlenza of Patterson Belknap represented defendant Akin Gump in a $4 billion lawsuit arising out of Akin Gump's hedge fund representation. For the Chapter -- The Coincidences Never Cease: Jerry Seinfeld appeared in TV commercials for American Express back in the 1990s. Akin Gump senior counsel Vernon E. Jordan, Jr. serves on the board of directors of American Express.
Incidentally, Patterson Belknap prides itself on independence of thought. Patterson Belknap is a magnet for independent thinkers. The firm was founded by attorneys who believed they could create a more congenial atmosphere on their own, away from the lockstep anonymity of larger firms. Patterson Belknap carefully manages growth and purposefully operates with a single office in New York City.
In the Seinfeld episode The Nonfat Yogurt Jerry, Elaine and George eat at a non-fat frozen yogurt shop in which Kramer has invested. The yogurt is delicious, and they (along with Newman) indulge, as it is "non-fat." When Kramer notices that Jerry and Elaine have gained weight, they become suspicious of the yogurt's contents. Elaine decides to send the yogurt to a laboratory for testing. The Seinfeld crew embarks on their own investigation!
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nlOJLNX5_YM
From the Final Scene:
Giuliani (appearing in a televised press conference): My campaign staff has received some very disturbing information regarding the fat content in yogurt that's being sold throughout the city. I pledge to you now, that if I'm elected mayor, as my first order of business I'll appoint a special task force to investigate this matter. I promise you, my fellow New Yorkers, that Mayor Giuliani will do everything possible to cleanse this city of this falsified non-fat yogurt.
(in the yogurt store)
Jerry: The old yogurt was so much better. Oh, this is terrible.
George: Phew!
Elaine: Oh, it stinks.
Kramer: Mine, too. I got one more day.
Jerry: I can't eat this.
Newman: Hey, Jerry. Thanks a lot. I hope you're happy.
Jerry: It had fat in it, it's not good for you.
Newman: I don't care. It was good. I was enjoying it. Had to interfere. Couldn't leave well enough alone. Well, I will get even with you for this. You can count on it.
Elaine: Hey, you guys, listen to this. Listen to this. (reading from a newspaper report:) "Apparently some blood spilled into Mr. Giuliani's test tube causing his cholesterol count to be 150 points higher than was initially reported. Ironically, the mishap by bringing the non-fat yogurt scandal to the attention of the public, probably clinched the election for the Republican. It was the one issue which seemed to electrify the voters and swept Giuliani into office."
Jerry: So, in effect, the yogurt won him the election.
Elaine: I wonder what actually happened in that lab.
Kramer: Yeah, me, too.
Newman: I can't eat this.
Boy: Thanks for ruining my daddy's business, you fat *beep*!
Incidentally, Patterson Belknap prides itself on independence of thought. Patterson Belknap is a magnet for independent thinkers. The firm was founded by attorneys who believed they could create a more congenial atmosphere on their own, away from the lockstep anonymity of larger firms. Patterson Belknap carefully manages growth and purposefully operates with a single office in New York City.
In the Seinfeld episode The Nonfat Yogurt Jerry, Elaine and George eat at a non-fat frozen yogurt shop in which Kramer has invested. The yogurt is delicious, and they (along with Newman) indulge, as it is "non-fat." When Kramer notices that Jerry and Elaine have gained weight, they become suspicious of the yogurt's contents. Elaine decides to send the yogurt to a laboratory for testing. The Seinfeld crew embarks on their own investigation!
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nlOJLNX5_YM
From the Final Scene:
Giuliani (appearing in a televised press conference): My campaign staff has received some very disturbing information regarding the fat content in yogurt that's being sold throughout the city. I pledge to you now, that if I'm elected mayor, as my first order of business I'll appoint a special task force to investigate this matter. I promise you, my fellow New Yorkers, that Mayor Giuliani will do everything possible to cleanse this city of this falsified non-fat yogurt.
(in the yogurt store)
Jerry: The old yogurt was so much better. Oh, this is terrible.
George: Phew!
Elaine: Oh, it stinks.
Kramer: Mine, too. I got one more day.
Jerry: I can't eat this.
Newman: Hey, Jerry. Thanks a lot. I hope you're happy.
Jerry: It had fat in it, it's not good for you.
Newman: I don't care. It was good. I was enjoying it. Had to interfere. Couldn't leave well enough alone. Well, I will get even with you for this. You can count on it.
Elaine: Hey, you guys, listen to this. Listen to this. (reading from a newspaper report:) "Apparently some blood spilled into Mr. Giuliani's test tube causing his cholesterol count to be 150 points higher than was initially reported. Ironically, the mishap by bringing the non-fat yogurt scandal to the attention of the public, probably clinched the election for the Republican. It was the one issue which seemed to electrify the voters and swept Giuliani into office."
Jerry: So, in effect, the yogurt won him the election.
Elaine: I wonder what actually happened in that lab.
Kramer: Yeah, me, too.
Newman: I can't eat this.
Boy: Thanks for ruining my daddy's business, you fat *beep*!
Blog: Interest in the Writings of a Psychotic
Verizon Internet Services (96.239.41.228) 
Brooklyn, New York, United States, 1 returning visitFriday, March 25, 2011
Akin Gump: The Great Deception
The following site presents a negative picture of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld:
http://z4.invisionfree.com/The_Great_Deception/index.php?showtopic=547
http://z4.invisionfree.com/The_Great_Deception/index.php?showtopic=547
Franklin Institute Alumna: Cecelia Segawa Seigle
Cecilia Segawa Seigle is Professor Emerita of Japanese Studies in the Department of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies of the University of Pennsylvania. She is the author of the Yoshiwara—The Glittering World of Japanese Courtesans (University of Hawaii Press, 1993), and Kôjo Shinanomiya no nichijô seikatsu ("The Everyday Life of Imperial Princess Shinanomiya," under her Japanese name, Yoshiko Segawa), (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2001). She has published a number of books of modern and contemporary Japanese literature. Her essays, book reviews, biographical essays and monographs have appeared in various academic journals. She has been a research fellow of the Historiographical Institute of the University of Tokyo for the last four years, and is writing a book on the Ôoku, the women's quarters at Edo Castle, 1600-1868.
I worked with Cecelia Segawa Seigle at The Franklin Institute in Philadelphia in the early 1970s. She translated and abstracted Japanese-language technical literature. We both worked in the Science Information Services Department headed by Bernard E. Epstein. I remember that on one occasion, I believe it was in about 1972, I asked Dr. Seigle to write the Japanese character for hippopotamus. I still remember that in Japanese hippopotamus is the word "kaba." Her husband was a dental surgeon.
I wonder if Dr. Seigle knows Claire Hirshfield, Ph.D. Dr. Hirshfield is a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania and is Professor Emerita of History at The Pennsylvania State University where I earned my B.A. in 1975. Dr. Hirshfield taught two courses I took: Modern European History and The History of Modern Southeast Asia. Dr. Hirshfield is an Asia scholar and has studied in Japan.
I worked with Cecelia Segawa Seigle at The Franklin Institute in Philadelphia in the early 1970s. She translated and abstracted Japanese-language technical literature. We both worked in the Science Information Services Department headed by Bernard E. Epstein. I remember that on one occasion, I believe it was in about 1972, I asked Dr. Seigle to write the Japanese character for hippopotamus. I still remember that in Japanese hippopotamus is the word "kaba." Her husband was a dental surgeon.
I wonder if Dr. Seigle knows Claire Hirshfield, Ph.D. Dr. Hirshfield is a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania and is Professor Emerita of History at The Pennsylvania State University where I earned my B.A. in 1975. Dr. Hirshfield taught two courses I took: Modern European History and The History of Modern Southeast Asia. Dr. Hirshfield is an Asia scholar and has studied in Japan.
Significant Moments: The Individualist and the Mob
Albert Rothenberg, M.D. first described or discovered a process he termed "homospatial thinking," which consists of actively conceiving two or more discrete entities occupying the same space, a conception leading to the articulation of new identities. Homospatial thinking has a salient role in the creative process in the following wide variety of fields: literature, the visual arts, music, science, and mathematics. This cognitive factor, along with "Janusian thinking," clarifies the nature of creative thinking as a highly adaptive and primarily nonregressive form of functioning.
There is a section of my book Significant Moments whose manifest content quotes Hermann Hesse's novel, Demian. An interlinear presence is the metaphor of viruses and contagion. A type of virus, the retrovirus, alters the host cell's genetic makeup when it infects a cell. The virus causes diseases, such as AIDS and cancer; but it's ability to change the cell's genome enables it to be used for genetic engineering, to insert beneficial genes into the cell. The retrovirus is neither all good nor all bad. It exists Beyond Good and Evil.
"Well, I think," he went on, "one can give this story about Cain quite a different interpretation. Most of the things we're taught I'm sure are quite right and true, but one can view all of them from quite a different angle than the teachers do—and most of the time they then make better sense. For instance, one can't be quite satisfied with this Cain and the mark on his forehead, with the way it's explained to us. Don't you agree? It's perfectly possible for someone to kill his brother with a stone and to panic and repent. But that he's awarded a special decoration for his cowardice, a mark that protects him and puts the fear of God into all the others, that's quite odd, isn't it?""Of course," I said with interest: the idea began to fascinate me. "But what
other way of interpreting the story is there?"
He slapped me on the shoulder.
"It's quite simple! The first element of the story, its actual beginning, was the mark. Here was a man with something in his face that frightened the others. They didn't dare lay hands on him; he impressed them, he and his children.
We can guess—no, we can be quite certain—that it was not a mark on his forehead like a postmark—life is hardly ever as clear and straightforward as that.
It is much more likely that he struck people as faintly sinister, perhaps a little more intellect and boldness in his look than people were used to. This man was powerful: you would approach him only with awe. He had a 'sign.' You could explain this any way you wished. And people always want what is agreeable to them and puts them in the right. They were afraid of Cain's children: they bore a 'sign.' So they did not interpret the sign for what it was—a mark of distinction—but as its opposite. They said: 'Those fellows with the sign, they're a strange lot'—and indeed they were. People with courage and character always seem sinister to the rest. It was a scandal that a breed of fearless and sinister people ran about freely, so they attached a nickname and myth to these people to get even with them, to make up for the many times they had felt afraid—do you get it?"
"Yes—that is—in that case Cain wouldn't have been evil at all? And the whole story in the Bible is actually not authentic?"
"Yes and no. Such age-old stories are always true but they aren't always properly recorded and aren't always given correct interpretations. In short, I mean Cain was a fine fellow and this story was pinned upon him only because people were afraid . . .
Hermann Hesse, Demian.
. . . afraid he might . . .
Henry James, The Beast in the Jungle.
. . . infect them with the same . . .
Kevin Trent Bergeson, Greyhound Bus Trip Forces Salt Lake Man to Confront Existential Void.
. . . unorthodox . . .
Peter Radetsky, The Invisible Invaders: The Story of the Emerging Age of Viruses.
. . . outlook on life . . ."
Kevin Trent Bergeson, Greyhound Bus Trip Forces Salt Lake Man to Confront Existential Void.
The story was simply a rumor, something that people gab about, and it was true in so far as Cain and his children really bore a kind of a mark and were different from most people."
I was astounded.
"And do you believe that the business about killing his brother isn't true either?" I asked, entranced.
"Oh, that's certainly true. The strong man slew a weaker one. It's doubtful whether it was really his brother. But it isn't important. Ultimately all men are brothers. So, a strong man slew a weaker one: perhaps it was a truly valiant act, perhaps it wasn't. At any rate, all the other weaker ones were afraid of him from then on, they complained bitterly and if you asked them: 'Why don't you turn around and slay him, too?' they did not reply 'Because we're cowards,' but rather 'You can't, he has a sign. God has marked him.' The fraud must have originated some way like that. . . ."
Hermann Hesse, Demian.
____________________________________
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2011/03/akin-gump-groupthink-and-independent.html
There is a section of my book Significant Moments whose manifest content quotes Hermann Hesse's novel, Demian. An interlinear presence is the metaphor of viruses and contagion. A type of virus, the retrovirus, alters the host cell's genetic makeup when it infects a cell. The virus causes diseases, such as AIDS and cancer; but it's ability to change the cell's genome enables it to be used for genetic engineering, to insert beneficial genes into the cell. The retrovirus is neither all good nor all bad. It exists Beyond Good and Evil.
"Well, I think," he went on, "one can give this story about Cain quite a different interpretation. Most of the things we're taught I'm sure are quite right and true, but one can view all of them from quite a different angle than the teachers do—and most of the time they then make better sense. For instance, one can't be quite satisfied with this Cain and the mark on his forehead, with the way it's explained to us. Don't you agree? It's perfectly possible for someone to kill his brother with a stone and to panic and repent. But that he's awarded a special decoration for his cowardice, a mark that protects him and puts the fear of God into all the others, that's quite odd, isn't it?""Of course," I said with interest: the idea began to fascinate me. "But what
other way of interpreting the story is there?"
He slapped me on the shoulder.
"It's quite simple! The first element of the story, its actual beginning, was the mark. Here was a man with something in his face that frightened the others. They didn't dare lay hands on him; he impressed them, he and his children.
We can guess—no, we can be quite certain—that it was not a mark on his forehead like a postmark—life is hardly ever as clear and straightforward as that.
It is much more likely that he struck people as faintly sinister, perhaps a little more intellect and boldness in his look than people were used to. This man was powerful: you would approach him only with awe. He had a 'sign.' You could explain this any way you wished. And people always want what is agreeable to them and puts them in the right. They were afraid of Cain's children: they bore a 'sign.' So they did not interpret the sign for what it was—a mark of distinction—but as its opposite. They said: 'Those fellows with the sign, they're a strange lot'—and indeed they were. People with courage and character always seem sinister to the rest. It was a scandal that a breed of fearless and sinister people ran about freely, so they attached a nickname and myth to these people to get even with them, to make up for the many times they had felt afraid—do you get it?"
"Yes—that is—in that case Cain wouldn't have been evil at all? And the whole story in the Bible is actually not authentic?"
"Yes and no. Such age-old stories are always true but they aren't always properly recorded and aren't always given correct interpretations. In short, I mean Cain was a fine fellow and this story was pinned upon him only because people were afraid . . .
Hermann Hesse, Demian.
. . . afraid he might . . .
Henry James, The Beast in the Jungle.
. . . infect them with the same . . .
Kevin Trent Bergeson, Greyhound Bus Trip Forces Salt Lake Man to Confront Existential Void.
. . . unorthodox . . .
Peter Radetsky, The Invisible Invaders: The Story of the Emerging Age of Viruses.
. . . outlook on life . . ."
Kevin Trent Bergeson, Greyhound Bus Trip Forces Salt Lake Man to Confront Existential Void.
The story was simply a rumor, something that people gab about, and it was true in so far as Cain and his children really bore a kind of a mark and were different from most people."
I was astounded.
"And do you believe that the business about killing his brother isn't true either?" I asked, entranced.
"Oh, that's certainly true. The strong man slew a weaker one. It's doubtful whether it was really his brother. But it isn't important. Ultimately all men are brothers. So, a strong man slew a weaker one: perhaps it was a truly valiant act, perhaps it wasn't. At any rate, all the other weaker ones were afraid of him from then on, they complained bitterly and if you asked them: 'Why don't you turn around and slay him, too?' they did not reply 'Because we're cowards,' but rather 'You can't, he has a sign. God has marked him.' The fraud must have originated some way like that. . . ."
Hermann Hesse, Demian.
____________________________________
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2011/03/akin-gump-groupthink-and-independent.html
Thursday, March 24, 2011
Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights -- Docket
Complaint filed by Department of Human Rights
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2010/06/akin-gump-unlawful-termination.html
Akin Gump First Response to Interrogatories
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2009/12/social-security-administration-initial.html
Complainant's Reply
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2010/02/akin-gump-my-side-of-story.html
Akin Gump Second Response to Interrogatories
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2009/12/akin-gump-no-contemporaneous.html
Department of Human Rights Initial Determination
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2010/02/dc-department-of-human-rights-initial.html
Complainant's Petition for Reconsideration
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2010/02/akin-gump-application-for.html
Department of Human Rights Determination on Reconsideration (Final Agency Action)
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2010/02/akin-gump-final-agency-action.html
D.C. Court of Appeals Memorandum Opinion and Judgment (with links to Appellant's pleadings)
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2011/09/freedman-v-dhr-dc-court-of-appeals-no_20.html
D.C. Superior Court -- Petitioner's Petition for Review
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2011/07/dc-superior-court-petition-for-review.html
D.C. Superior Court -- Petitioner's Reply Memorandum
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2011/04/freedman-v-dc-dept-human-rights-reply.html
D.C. Superior Court -- Opinion and Order
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2011/04/superior-court-decision-freedman-v-dc.html
Appellant's Brief on Appeal (D.C. Court of Appeals)
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2009/11/freedman-v-dc-dept-mental-health-akin_27.html
District of Columbia Brief on Appeal
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2011/03/dc-reply-brief-freedman-v-dc-dept-human.html
Appellant's Reply Brief on Appeal
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2009/11/freedman-v-dc-dept-mental-health-akin.html
D.C. Court of Appeals Memorandum Opinion and Judgment
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2011/12/dc-court-of-appeals-freedman-v-dc.html
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2010/06/akin-gump-unlawful-termination.html
Akin Gump First Response to Interrogatories
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2009/12/social-security-administration-initial.html
Complainant's Reply
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2010/02/akin-gump-my-side-of-story.html
Akin Gump Second Response to Interrogatories
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2009/12/akin-gump-no-contemporaneous.html
Department of Human Rights Initial Determination
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2010/02/dc-department-of-human-rights-initial.html
Complainant's Petition for Reconsideration
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2010/02/akin-gump-application-for.html
Department of Human Rights Determination on Reconsideration (Final Agency Action)
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2010/02/akin-gump-final-agency-action.html
D.C. Court of Appeals Memorandum Opinion and Judgment (with links to Appellant's pleadings)
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2011/09/freedman-v-dhr-dc-court-of-appeals-no_20.html
D.C. Superior Court -- Petitioner's Petition for Review
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2011/07/dc-superior-court-petition-for-review.html
D.C. Superior Court -- Petitioner's Reply Memorandum
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2011/04/freedman-v-dc-dept-human-rights-reply.html
D.C. Superior Court -- Opinion and Order
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2011/04/superior-court-decision-freedman-v-dc.html
Appellant's Brief on Appeal (D.C. Court of Appeals)
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2009/11/freedman-v-dc-dept-mental-health-akin_27.html
District of Columbia Brief on Appeal
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2011/03/dc-reply-brief-freedman-v-dc-dept-human.html
Appellant's Reply Brief on Appeal
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2009/11/freedman-v-dc-dept-mental-health-akin.html
D.C. Court of Appeals Memorandum Opinion and Judgment
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2011/12/dc-court-of-appeals-freedman-v-dc.html
Akin Gump: Groupthink and the Independent-Minded, Creative Individual
According to the psychologist Raymond Cattell persons at a lower level of ego strength tend to place a premium on group adherence. They tend to be group-oriented, affiliative, a joiner and follower dependent. While persons at a high level of ego strength tend to be more self-reliant, resourceful, individualistic, and self-sufficient.
The independent-minded, creative person tends to be a non-joiner; such a person typically fears contamination by group members. According to Heinz Hartmann, a "fear of contamination" can be a feature of ego strength. The group-oriented individual may view a person at a higher level of ego strength as a threat to group cohesion. Creative individuals, many of whom have a precarious sense of identity, may be wary of groups; they may fear that identification with group members will threaten their precarious sense of identity. The independent-minded individual may feel threatened by the conventionalized, conformist mentality of many groups.
MacKinnon's research supports the premise that more creative individuals tend to be more independent-minded and possess a higher level of ego strength than the less creative. Donald W. MacKinnon, "Personality and the Realization of Creative Potential." American Psychologist 20: 273-81, 1965.
MacKinnon gathered personality data on architects. The data clustered into three personality types: (I) the artist (creative), (II) neurotic (conflicted; artiste manque), and (III) the average (adapted). (Architects were chosen because they combine art with science, business, even psychology). His research found significant differences among the three groups.
Group I scored highest, in MacKinnon's analysis, on aggression, autonomy (independence), psychological complexity and richness, and ego strength (will); their goal was found to be "some inner artistic standard of excellence."
Group II scored intermediate on independence, close to (I) on richness, and highest on anxiety; their goal was "efficient execution."
Group III scored highest on abasement, affiliation, and deference (socialization); their goal was to meet the standard of the group.
The following characteristics of independent-minded, creative persons are adverse to group membership, and the values of abasement, affiliation and deference:
* He is more observant and perceptive, and he puts a high value on independent "true-to-himself" perception. He perceives things the way other people do but also the way others do not.
* He is more independent in his judgments, and his self-directed behavior is determined by his own set of values and ethical standards.
* He balks at group standards, pressures to conform and external controls. He asserts his independence without being hostile or aggressive, and he speaks his mind without being domineering. If need be, he is flexible enough to simulate the prevailing norms of cultural and organizational behavior.
* He dislikes policing himself and others; he does not like to be bossed around. He can readily entertain impulses and ideas that are commonly considered taboo; he has a spirit of adventure.
* He is highly individualistic and non-conventional in a constructive manner. Psychologist Donald W. MacKinnon puts it this way: "Although independent in thought and action, the creative person does not make a show of his independence; he does not do the off-beat thing narcissistically, that is, to call attention to himself. ... He is not a deliberate nonconformist but a genuinely independent and autonomous person."
* He is less anxious and possesses greater stability.
* His complex personality is, simultaneously, more primitive and more cultured, more destructive and more constructive, crazier and saner. He has a greater appreciation and acceptance of the nonrational elements in himself and others.
* He is willing to entertain and express personal impulses, and pays more attention to his "inner voices." He likes to see himself as being different from others, and he has greater self-acceptance.
* He searches for philosophical meanings and theoretical constructs and tends to prefer working with ideas, in contradistinction to the less creative who prefer to deal with the practical and concrete.
* He has a greater need for variety and is almost insatiable for intellectual ordering and comprehension. Intellectual independence is antithetical to the conventionalized morality of highly-cohesive groups.
* He regards authority as arbitrary, contingent on continued and demonstrable superiority. When evaluating communications, he separates source from content, judges and reaches conclusions based on the information itself, rather than whether the information source was an "authority" or an "expert." Authority in groups is often embodied in group leaders or the peer pressure of group members. The independent-minded individual will resist accepting authority based solely on the status of group leaders or the majoritarian thinking of group members.
The independent-minded person at a high level of ego strength will be able to maintain autonomy even under "extreme pressure" to conform to groupthink. See Kramer, P.D., Should You Leave? A Psychiatrist Explores Intimacy and Autonomy--and the Nature of Advice at 154 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997).
Kernberg has made the following observations about the difficulties faced by independent-minded, creative persons in some groups. Kernberg, O. Ideology, Conflict and Leadership in Groups and Organizations at 5, 84-85 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).
-- Psychological autonomy, the ability to retain his individuality even under extreme pressure, places the independent-minded individual at risk of aggression in groups that have regressed to a state of pre-autonomous superego functioning, i.e., groups in which a regressed, conformist ideology prevails.
-- An individual's creative potential places him at risk of envy and attack by narcissistically-disturbed supervisors in the workplace. Narcissistic supervisors will attempt to block or sabotage the promotion of honest and talented staff, who threaten them.
-- The affect underlying the group aggression that the creative person may experience is envy--envy of his thinking, his individuality, and his rationality.
The peer relations of independent-minded persons who are considered "outsiders" tend to become crudely sexualized and debased in regressed groups. The affect underlying the sexualization and debasement is jealousy. See Sullivan, H.S. The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry at 348-48 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1953) (discussing situations in which an innocent victim of jealousy serves as an absolutely fantasied figure for a group of persons).
Groupthink
The conventionalized thinking that may come to prevail in groups has been termed "groupthink."
Groupthink is a type of thought within a deeply cohesive in-group whose members try to minimize conflict and reach consensus without critically testing, analyzing, and evaluating ideas. It is a second potential negative consequence of group cohesion.
Irving Janis studied a number of 'disasters' in American foreign policy, such as failure to anticipate the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (1941); the Bay of Pigs fiasco (1961) when the US administration sought to overthrow Fidel Castro; and the prosecution of the Vietnam War (1964–67) by President Lyndon Johnson. He concluded that in each of these cases, the decisions were made largely due to the cohesive nature of the committees which made them. Moreover, that cohesiveness prevented contradictory views from being expressed and subsequently evaluated. As defined by Janis, “A mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action”.
Individual creativity, uniqueness, and independent thinking are lost in the pursuit of group cohesiveness, as are the advantages of reasonable balance in choice and thought that might normally be obtained by making decisions as a group. During groupthink, members of the group avoid promoting viewpoints outside the comfort zone of consensus thinking. A variety of motives for this may exist such as a desire to avoid being seen as foolish, or a desire to avoid embarrassing or angering other members of the group. Groupthink may cause groups to make hasty, irrational decisions, where individual doubts are set aside, for fear of upsetting the group’s balance. The term is frequently used pejoratively, in hindsight. Additionally, it is difficult to assess the quality of decision making in terms of outcomes all the time, but one can almost always evaluate the quality of the decision-making process.
William H. Whyte coined the term in 1952, in Fortune Magazine:
Groupthink being a coinage — and, admittedly, a loaded one — a working definition is in order. We are not talking about mere instinctive conformity — it is, after all, a perennial failing of mankind. What we are talking about is a rationalized conformity — an open, articulate philosophy which holds that group values are not only expedient but right and good as well.
Irving Janis, who did extensive work on the subject, defined it as:
A mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.
Causes of groupthink
Highly cohesive groups are much more likely to engage in groupthink, because their cohesiveness often correlates with unspoken understanding and the ability to work together with minimal explanations (e.g., techspeak or telegraphic speech). Vandana Shiva refers to a lack of diversity in worldview as a "monoculture of the mind" while James Surowiecki warns against loss of the "cognitive diversity" that comes from having team members whose educational and occupational backgrounds differ. The closer group members are in outlook, the less likely they are to raise questions that might break their cohesion.
Although Janis sees group cohesion as the most important antecedent to groupthink, he states that it will not invariably lead to groupthink: 'It is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition'. According to Janis, group cohesion will only lead to groupthink if one of the following two antecedent conditions is present:
-- Structural faults in the organization: insulation of the group, lack of tradition of impartial leadership, lack of norms requiring methodological procedures, homogeneity of members' social background and ideology.
-- Provocative situational context: high stress from external threats, recent failures, excessive difficulties on the decision-making task, moral dilemmas.
Social psychologist Clark McCauley's three conditions under which groupthink occurs:
-- Directive leadership.
-- Homogeneity of members' social background and ideology.
-- Isolation of the group from outside sources of information and analysis.
Symptoms of groupthink
To make groupthink testable, Irving Janis devised eight symptoms indicative of groupthink:
-- Illusions of invulnerability creating excessive optimism and encouraging risk taking.
-- Rationalizing warnings that might challenge the group's assumptions.
-- Unquestioned belief in the morality of the group, causing members to ignore the consequences of their actions.
-- Stereotyping those who are opposed to the group as weak, evil, biased, spiteful, stupid, or impotent (Note that the feminization of Jews--the view of Jews as impotent castrates--can be a feature of anti-Semitism). (Compare the phenomenon of workplace mobbing.)
-- Direct pressure to conform placed on any member who questions the group, couched in terms of "disloyalty".
-- Self-censorship of ideas that deviate from the apparent group consensus.
-- Illusions of unanimity among group members, silence is viewed as agreement.
-- Mind guards — self-appointed members who shield the group from dissenting information.
Groupthink, resulting from the symptoms listed above, results in defective decision-making. That is, consensus-driven decisions are the result of the following practices of groupthinking:
-- Incomplete survey of alternatives
-- Incomplete survey of objectives
-- Failure to examine risks of preferred choice
-- Failure to reevaluate previously rejected alternatives
-- Poor information search
-- Selection bias in collecting information
-- Failure to work out contingency plans.
Janis argued that groupthink was responsible for the Bay of Pigs 'fiasco' and other major examples of faulty decision-making. The UK bank Northern Rock, before its nationalization, is thought to be a recent major example of groupthink. In such real-world examples, a number of the above groupthink symptoms were displayed.
Groupthink and de-individuation
Cults are also studied by sociologists in regard to groupthink and its deindividuation effects. The textbook definition describes deindividuation as the loss of self-awareness and evaluation apprehension, which occurs in group situations that foster anonymity and draw attention away from the individual.
Preventing groupthink
According to Irving Janis, decision making groups are not necessarily destined to groupthink. He devised seven ways of preventing groupthink:
-- Leaders should assign each member the role of “critical evaluator”. This allows each member to freely air objections and doubts.
-- Higher-ups should not express an opinion when assigning a task to a group.
-- The organization should set up several independent groups, working on the same problem.
-- All effective alternatives should be examined.
-- Each member should discuss the group's ideas with trusted people outside of the group.
-- The group should invite outside experts into meetings. Group members should be allowed to discuss with and question the outside experts.
-- At least one group member should be assigned the role of Devil's advocate. This should be a different person for each meeting.
By following these guidelines, groupthink can be avoided. After the Bay of Pigs invasion fiasco, President John F. Kennedy sought to avoid groupthink during the Cuban Missile Crisis. During meetings, he invited outside experts to share their viewpoints, and allowed group members to question them carefully. He also encouraged group members to discuss possible solutions with trusted members within their separate departments, and he even divided the group up into various sub-groups, to partially break the group cohesion. Kennedy was deliberately absent from the meetings, so as to avoid pressing his own opinion.
Recent developments and critiques
In 2001, Ahlfinger and Esser described the difficulties of testing Janis' antecedants, specifically those related to government groups, stating in abstract:
Two hypotheses derived from groupthink theory were tested in a laboratory study which included measures of the full range of symptoms of groupthink, symptoms of a poor decision process, and decision quality. The hypothesis that groups whose leaders promoted their own preferred solutions would be more likely to fall victim to groupthink than groups with nonpromotional leaders received partial support. Groups with promotional leaders produced more symptoms of groupthink, discussed fewer facts, and reached a decision more quickly than groups with nonpromotional leaders. The hypothesis that groups composed of members who were predisposed to conform would be more likely to fall victim to groupthink than groups whose members were not predisposed to conform received no support. It is suggested that groupthink research is hampered by measurement problems.
After ending their study, they stated that better methods of testing Janis' symptoms were needed.
In a broad 2005 survey of post-Janis research Robert S. Baron contends that the connection between certain antecedents Janis believed necessary have not been demonstrated, and that groupthink is more ubiquitous and its symptoms are "far more widespread" than Janis envisioned. Baron' premise is "that Janis’s probing and insightful analysis of historical decision-making was correct about the symptoms of groupthink and their relationship to such outcomes as the suppression of dissent, polarization of attitude and poor decision quality and yet wrong about the antecedent conditions he specified...not only are these conditions not necessary to provoke the symptoms of groupthink, but that they often will not even amplify such symptoms given the high likelihood that such symptoms will develop in the complete absence of intense cohesion, crisis, group insulation, etc." As an alternative to Janis' model, Baron presents a "strong ubiquity" model for Groupthink:
" . . . the ubiquity model represents more a revision of Janis’s model than a repudiation. The social identification variable modifies Janis’s emphasis on intense-high status group cohesion as an antecedent condition for groupthink. Similarly, low self efficacy amplifies Janis’s prior consideration of this factor. The one major shift is that the ubiquity model assumes that when combined, social identification, salient norms and low self efficacy are both necessary and sufficient to evoke “groupthink reactions.” Such reactions include Janis’s array of defective decision processes as well as suppressed dissent, selective focus on shared viewpoints, polarization of attitude and action and heightened confidence in such polarized views. Note that such elevated confidence will often evoke the feelings of in-group moral superiority and invulnerability alluded to by Janis."
Baron says in conclusion that the pervasiveness of “groupthink phenomena” has been underestimated by prior theoretical accounts.
The independent-minded, creative person tends to be a non-joiner; such a person typically fears contamination by group members. According to Heinz Hartmann, a "fear of contamination" can be a feature of ego strength. The group-oriented individual may view a person at a higher level of ego strength as a threat to group cohesion. Creative individuals, many of whom have a precarious sense of identity, may be wary of groups; they may fear that identification with group members will threaten their precarious sense of identity. The independent-minded individual may feel threatened by the conventionalized, conformist mentality of many groups.
MacKinnon's research supports the premise that more creative individuals tend to be more independent-minded and possess a higher level of ego strength than the less creative. Donald W. MacKinnon, "Personality and the Realization of Creative Potential." American Psychologist 20: 273-81, 1965.
MacKinnon gathered personality data on architects. The data clustered into three personality types: (I) the artist (creative), (II) neurotic (conflicted; artiste manque), and (III) the average (adapted). (Architects were chosen because they combine art with science, business, even psychology). His research found significant differences among the three groups.
Group I scored highest, in MacKinnon's analysis, on aggression, autonomy (independence), psychological complexity and richness, and ego strength (will); their goal was found to be "some inner artistic standard of excellence."
Group II scored intermediate on independence, close to (I) on richness, and highest on anxiety; their goal was "efficient execution."
Group III scored highest on abasement, affiliation, and deference (socialization); their goal was to meet the standard of the group.
The following characteristics of independent-minded, creative persons are adverse to group membership, and the values of abasement, affiliation and deference:
* He is more observant and perceptive, and he puts a high value on independent "true-to-himself" perception. He perceives things the way other people do but also the way others do not.
* He is more independent in his judgments, and his self-directed behavior is determined by his own set of values and ethical standards.
* He balks at group standards, pressures to conform and external controls. He asserts his independence without being hostile or aggressive, and he speaks his mind without being domineering. If need be, he is flexible enough to simulate the prevailing norms of cultural and organizational behavior.
* He dislikes policing himself and others; he does not like to be bossed around. He can readily entertain impulses and ideas that are commonly considered taboo; he has a spirit of adventure.
* He is highly individualistic and non-conventional in a constructive manner. Psychologist Donald W. MacKinnon puts it this way: "Although independent in thought and action, the creative person does not make a show of his independence; he does not do the off-beat thing narcissistically, that is, to call attention to himself. ... He is not a deliberate nonconformist but a genuinely independent and autonomous person."
* He is less anxious and possesses greater stability.
* His complex personality is, simultaneously, more primitive and more cultured, more destructive and more constructive, crazier and saner. He has a greater appreciation and acceptance of the nonrational elements in himself and others.
* He is willing to entertain and express personal impulses, and pays more attention to his "inner voices." He likes to see himself as being different from others, and he has greater self-acceptance.
* He searches for philosophical meanings and theoretical constructs and tends to prefer working with ideas, in contradistinction to the less creative who prefer to deal with the practical and concrete.
* He has a greater need for variety and is almost insatiable for intellectual ordering and comprehension. Intellectual independence is antithetical to the conventionalized morality of highly-cohesive groups.
* He regards authority as arbitrary, contingent on continued and demonstrable superiority. When evaluating communications, he separates source from content, judges and reaches conclusions based on the information itself, rather than whether the information source was an "authority" or an "expert." Authority in groups is often embodied in group leaders or the peer pressure of group members. The independent-minded individual will resist accepting authority based solely on the status of group leaders or the majoritarian thinking of group members.
The independent-minded person at a high level of ego strength will be able to maintain autonomy even under "extreme pressure" to conform to groupthink. See Kramer, P.D., Should You Leave? A Psychiatrist Explores Intimacy and Autonomy--and the Nature of Advice at 154 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997).
Kernberg has made the following observations about the difficulties faced by independent-minded, creative persons in some groups. Kernberg, O. Ideology, Conflict and Leadership in Groups and Organizations at 5, 84-85 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).
-- Psychological autonomy, the ability to retain his individuality even under extreme pressure, places the independent-minded individual at risk of aggression in groups that have regressed to a state of pre-autonomous superego functioning, i.e., groups in which a regressed, conformist ideology prevails.
-- An individual's creative potential places him at risk of envy and attack by narcissistically-disturbed supervisors in the workplace. Narcissistic supervisors will attempt to block or sabotage the promotion of honest and talented staff, who threaten them.
-- The affect underlying the group aggression that the creative person may experience is envy--envy of his thinking, his individuality, and his rationality.
The peer relations of independent-minded persons who are considered "outsiders" tend to become crudely sexualized and debased in regressed groups. The affect underlying the sexualization and debasement is jealousy. See Sullivan, H.S. The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry at 348-48 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1953) (discussing situations in which an innocent victim of jealousy serves as an absolutely fantasied figure for a group of persons).
Groupthink
The conventionalized thinking that may come to prevail in groups has been termed "groupthink."
Groupthink is a type of thought within a deeply cohesive in-group whose members try to minimize conflict and reach consensus without critically testing, analyzing, and evaluating ideas. It is a second potential negative consequence of group cohesion.
Irving Janis studied a number of 'disasters' in American foreign policy, such as failure to anticipate the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (1941); the Bay of Pigs fiasco (1961) when the US administration sought to overthrow Fidel Castro; and the prosecution of the Vietnam War (1964–67) by President Lyndon Johnson. He concluded that in each of these cases, the decisions were made largely due to the cohesive nature of the committees which made them. Moreover, that cohesiveness prevented contradictory views from being expressed and subsequently evaluated. As defined by Janis, “A mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action”.
Individual creativity, uniqueness, and independent thinking are lost in the pursuit of group cohesiveness, as are the advantages of reasonable balance in choice and thought that might normally be obtained by making decisions as a group. During groupthink, members of the group avoid promoting viewpoints outside the comfort zone of consensus thinking. A variety of motives for this may exist such as a desire to avoid being seen as foolish, or a desire to avoid embarrassing or angering other members of the group. Groupthink may cause groups to make hasty, irrational decisions, where individual doubts are set aside, for fear of upsetting the group’s balance. The term is frequently used pejoratively, in hindsight. Additionally, it is difficult to assess the quality of decision making in terms of outcomes all the time, but one can almost always evaluate the quality of the decision-making process.
William H. Whyte coined the term in 1952, in Fortune Magazine:
Groupthink being a coinage — and, admittedly, a loaded one — a working definition is in order. We are not talking about mere instinctive conformity — it is, after all, a perennial failing of mankind. What we are talking about is a rationalized conformity — an open, articulate philosophy which holds that group values are not only expedient but right and good as well.
Irving Janis, who did extensive work on the subject, defined it as:
A mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.
Causes of groupthink
Highly cohesive groups are much more likely to engage in groupthink, because their cohesiveness often correlates with unspoken understanding and the ability to work together with minimal explanations (e.g., techspeak or telegraphic speech). Vandana Shiva refers to a lack of diversity in worldview as a "monoculture of the mind" while James Surowiecki warns against loss of the "cognitive diversity" that comes from having team members whose educational and occupational backgrounds differ. The closer group members are in outlook, the less likely they are to raise questions that might break their cohesion.
Although Janis sees group cohesion as the most important antecedent to groupthink, he states that it will not invariably lead to groupthink: 'It is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition'. According to Janis, group cohesion will only lead to groupthink if one of the following two antecedent conditions is present:
-- Structural faults in the organization: insulation of the group, lack of tradition of impartial leadership, lack of norms requiring methodological procedures, homogeneity of members' social background and ideology.
-- Provocative situational context: high stress from external threats, recent failures, excessive difficulties on the decision-making task, moral dilemmas.
Social psychologist Clark McCauley's three conditions under which groupthink occurs:
-- Directive leadership.
-- Homogeneity of members' social background and ideology.
-- Isolation of the group from outside sources of information and analysis.
Symptoms of groupthink
To make groupthink testable, Irving Janis devised eight symptoms indicative of groupthink:
-- Illusions of invulnerability creating excessive optimism and encouraging risk taking.
-- Rationalizing warnings that might challenge the group's assumptions.
-- Unquestioned belief in the morality of the group, causing members to ignore the consequences of their actions.
-- Stereotyping those who are opposed to the group as weak, evil, biased, spiteful, stupid, or impotent (Note that the feminization of Jews--the view of Jews as impotent castrates--can be a feature of anti-Semitism). (Compare the phenomenon of workplace mobbing.)
-- Direct pressure to conform placed on any member who questions the group, couched in terms of "disloyalty".
-- Self-censorship of ideas that deviate from the apparent group consensus.
-- Illusions of unanimity among group members, silence is viewed as agreement.
-- Mind guards — self-appointed members who shield the group from dissenting information.
Groupthink, resulting from the symptoms listed above, results in defective decision-making. That is, consensus-driven decisions are the result of the following practices of groupthinking:
-- Incomplete survey of alternatives
-- Incomplete survey of objectives
-- Failure to examine risks of preferred choice
-- Failure to reevaluate previously rejected alternatives
-- Poor information search
-- Selection bias in collecting information
-- Failure to work out contingency plans.
Janis argued that groupthink was responsible for the Bay of Pigs 'fiasco' and other major examples of faulty decision-making. The UK bank Northern Rock, before its nationalization, is thought to be a recent major example of groupthink. In such real-world examples, a number of the above groupthink symptoms were displayed.
Groupthink and de-individuation
Cults are also studied by sociologists in regard to groupthink and its deindividuation effects. The textbook definition describes deindividuation as the loss of self-awareness and evaluation apprehension, which occurs in group situations that foster anonymity and draw attention away from the individual.
Preventing groupthink
According to Irving Janis, decision making groups are not necessarily destined to groupthink. He devised seven ways of preventing groupthink:
-- Leaders should assign each member the role of “critical evaluator”. This allows each member to freely air objections and doubts.
-- Higher-ups should not express an opinion when assigning a task to a group.
-- The organization should set up several independent groups, working on the same problem.
-- All effective alternatives should be examined.
-- Each member should discuss the group's ideas with trusted people outside of the group.
-- The group should invite outside experts into meetings. Group members should be allowed to discuss with and question the outside experts.
-- At least one group member should be assigned the role of Devil's advocate. This should be a different person for each meeting.
By following these guidelines, groupthink can be avoided. After the Bay of Pigs invasion fiasco, President John F. Kennedy sought to avoid groupthink during the Cuban Missile Crisis. During meetings, he invited outside experts to share their viewpoints, and allowed group members to question them carefully. He also encouraged group members to discuss possible solutions with trusted members within their separate departments, and he even divided the group up into various sub-groups, to partially break the group cohesion. Kennedy was deliberately absent from the meetings, so as to avoid pressing his own opinion.
Recent developments and critiques
In 2001, Ahlfinger and Esser described the difficulties of testing Janis' antecedants, specifically those related to government groups, stating in abstract:
Two hypotheses derived from groupthink theory were tested in a laboratory study which included measures of the full range of symptoms of groupthink, symptoms of a poor decision process, and decision quality. The hypothesis that groups whose leaders promoted their own preferred solutions would be more likely to fall victim to groupthink than groups with nonpromotional leaders received partial support. Groups with promotional leaders produced more symptoms of groupthink, discussed fewer facts, and reached a decision more quickly than groups with nonpromotional leaders. The hypothesis that groups composed of members who were predisposed to conform would be more likely to fall victim to groupthink than groups whose members were not predisposed to conform received no support. It is suggested that groupthink research is hampered by measurement problems.
After ending their study, they stated that better methods of testing Janis' symptoms were needed.
In a broad 2005 survey of post-Janis research Robert S. Baron contends that the connection between certain antecedents Janis believed necessary have not been demonstrated, and that groupthink is more ubiquitous and its symptoms are "far more widespread" than Janis envisioned. Baron' premise is "that Janis’s probing and insightful analysis of historical decision-making was correct about the symptoms of groupthink and their relationship to such outcomes as the suppression of dissent, polarization of attitude and poor decision quality and yet wrong about the antecedent conditions he specified...not only are these conditions not necessary to provoke the symptoms of groupthink, but that they often will not even amplify such symptoms given the high likelihood that such symptoms will develop in the complete absence of intense cohesion, crisis, group insulation, etc." As an alternative to Janis' model, Baron presents a "strong ubiquity" model for Groupthink:
" . . . the ubiquity model represents more a revision of Janis’s model than a repudiation. The social identification variable modifies Janis’s emphasis on intense-high status group cohesion as an antecedent condition for groupthink. Similarly, low self efficacy amplifies Janis’s prior consideration of this factor. The one major shift is that the ubiquity model assumes that when combined, social identification, salient norms and low self efficacy are both necessary and sufficient to evoke “groupthink reactions.” Such reactions include Janis’s array of defective decision processes as well as suppressed dissent, selective focus on shared viewpoints, polarization of attitude and action and heightened confidence in such polarized views. Note that such elevated confidence will often evoke the feelings of in-group moral superiority and invulnerability alluded to by Janis."
Baron says in conclusion that the pervasiveness of “groupthink phenomena” has been underestimated by prior theoretical accounts.
Wednesday, March 23, 2011
Akin Gump Idea of Reference: Twenty-Two Years Later!
I worked as a paralegal at the law firm of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld from March 3, 1988 to October 29, 1991. The firm fired me days after I lodged a harassment complaint against my supervisor and coworkers. The firm later told the District of Columbia Department of Human Rights, which was investigating my termination, that I was not suitable for employment because I suffered from mental illness that rendered me potentially violent. According to the firm, my harassment complaint was actually evidence of a "disorder," ideas of reference, that caused me to attribute a negative meaning to trivial events.
Be that as it may.
In my Reply to Akin Gump's pleadings filed with the Department of Human Rights I stated that Akin Gump had discriminated against me by, among other things, making employment promises that it never acted on.
The firm had hired me as a full-time legal assistant during the summer of 1989, then later demoted me to a position in the litigation support department in March 1990, without cause:
"At the time Complainant was hired as a full-time legal assistant on August 1, 1989 (See Attachment B), Complainant was given, on about July 31, 1989, a legal assistant orientation by Legal Assistant Administrator, Maggie Sinnott. Ms. Sinnott asked the Complainant about his availability for travel and advised Complainant that Respondent would issue him a firm credit card. Ms. Sinnott's actions at the time of Complainant’s legal assistant orientation were inconsistent with Respondent’s assertion that Complainant was hired to work as a document coder on Eastern Airlines or that he would be assigned to the Litigation Support group upon the completion of his assignment for the client Eastern Airlines."
Just today, after 22 years, I succumbed to the irresistible impulse to attach a negative meaning to Maggie Sinnott's promise to issue me a firm credit card. Odd, that a psychotic -- and make no mistake, I am a severely disturbed individual -- would have an idea of reference decades after the instigating event.
It so happens that in July 1989, just prior to the firm's granting me full-time status, The Washington Times reported that a male attorney in the firm's Dallas office had had a homosexual tryst with a male prostitute. The incident caused a hubbub at the firm; managing partner Larry Hoffman even went so far as to issue a memo to all personnel stating that the incident was still under investigation and employees should not jump to conclusions.
What's interesting is that the male attorney in the firm's Dallas office had used his Akin Gump credit card to pay for the sexual liaison. I now believe, as of 4:30 PM, Wednesday March 23, 2011, that Maggie Sinnott's offer of a firm credit card at my legal assistant orientation was a cynical reference to the Dallas incident.
Make no mistake, I am a truly demented individual!
Be that as it may.
In my Reply to Akin Gump's pleadings filed with the Department of Human Rights I stated that Akin Gump had discriminated against me by, among other things, making employment promises that it never acted on.
The firm had hired me as a full-time legal assistant during the summer of 1989, then later demoted me to a position in the litigation support department in March 1990, without cause:
"At the time Complainant was hired as a full-time legal assistant on August 1, 1989 (See Attachment B), Complainant was given, on about July 31, 1989, a legal assistant orientation by Legal Assistant Administrator, Maggie Sinnott. Ms. Sinnott asked the Complainant about his availability for travel and advised Complainant that Respondent would issue him a firm credit card. Ms. Sinnott's actions at the time of Complainant’s legal assistant orientation were inconsistent with Respondent’s assertion that Complainant was hired to work as a document coder on Eastern Airlines or that he would be assigned to the Litigation Support group upon the completion of his assignment for the client Eastern Airlines."
Just today, after 22 years, I succumbed to the irresistible impulse to attach a negative meaning to Maggie Sinnott's promise to issue me a firm credit card. Odd, that a psychotic -- and make no mistake, I am a severely disturbed individual -- would have an idea of reference decades after the instigating event.
It so happens that in July 1989, just prior to the firm's granting me full-time status, The Washington Times reported that a male attorney in the firm's Dallas office had had a homosexual tryst with a male prostitute. The incident caused a hubbub at the firm; managing partner Larry Hoffman even went so far as to issue a memo to all personnel stating that the incident was still under investigation and employees should not jump to conclusions.
What's interesting is that the male attorney in the firm's Dallas office had used his Akin Gump credit card to pay for the sexual liaison. I now believe, as of 4:30 PM, Wednesday March 23, 2011, that Maggie Sinnott's offer of a firm credit card at my legal assistant orientation was a cynical reference to the Dallas incident.
Make no mistake, I am a truly demented individual!
Freedman, Simmons and Economic Factors
Tameka Simmons, an African-American lawyer, was employed as an associate in the New York office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld. Her employment was terminated by the firm in 2009. Akin Gump alleges that the employment decision was based solely on economic concerns. In December 2010 Simmons filed a lawsuit against Akin Gump, alleging that the firm's termination decision was unlawfully based on race.
The racial discrimination suit by Tameka Simmons claims the firm cited pretextual economic reasons for her 2009 layoff. Simmons says she was the only female black associate in Akin Gump’s New York office at the time of her layoff, even though the firm said there were four black female lawyers there.
In an odd way, Akin Gump's termination decision in Simmons parallels -- or is the polar opposite of -- my job termination by Akin Gump in October 1991.
I was employed at Akin Gump as a paralegal from March 3, 1988 until my termination on October 29, 1991. In late October 1991 I lodged a harassment complaint against my supervisor and coworkers. I told Akin Gump's attorney managers that I believed I was being harassed on the basis of perceived sexual orientation and the fact that I was Jewish. Within a week I was terminated. I was told that my work was of poor quality, that there was a "lack of fit" between me and firm personnel, and that the firm could not accommodate my request for a private office.
On February 4, 1992 I filed an unlawful job termination complaint with the D.C. Department of Human Rights alleging that I was harassed and terminated because of my perceived sexual orientation (homosexual). In its Response (May 22, 1992) the firm claimed that its investigation of my harassment complaint disclosed that my behavior was disruptive, bizarre, and frightening to coworkers. The firm also alleged that it had consulted a psychiatrist (who did not examine me personally) who advised the firm that my harassment Complaint was the product of the "disorder" ideas of reference, and that I might become violent. The firm alleged that my presence at the firm posed a tort risk for the employer. Additionally, Akin Gump's Response stated that my work performance was good -- implicitly retracting its position on the day of the termination (October 29, 1991) that my work quality was poor.
What's interesting is that 1991 was a bad year for the economy. On Friday April 5, 1991 Malcolm Lassman called a meeting of the firm's paralegals to address rumors rampant in the firm that Akin Gump had plans to lay off paralegals. Lassman acknowledged that the firm was experiencing the effects of the weak economy; he said some clients were late in paying their bills. But Lassman assured the paralegals that the firm had no plans to lay off paralegals. Lassman added that as a general rule, with respect to all employee groups, the firm used layoffs as a last resort to deal with economic pressures.
I was terminated six months later. I've always suspected that economic considerations played a role in my termination. For one thing, I was hired as a paralegal at a salary competitive with other paralegals. In March 1990 Akin Gump demoted me (without cause) to the litigation support group from the paralegal group. Upon my transfer to litigation support, I was automatically overpaid for the job I was doing. Second the economy was in bad shape in 1991 and remained so well into 1992. In November 1991 I qualified for unemployment benefits. In 1992 Congress passed an extension of benefits to address the weak hiring picture and I qualified for extended benefits (an additional 26 weeks).
I've often wondered whether my job termination for cause was really a layoff of convenience. Perhaps the firm thought, well, we'd like to get rid of him anyway because of the cost savings -- and since he lodged a harassment complaint we can craft a legally-viable excuse to fire him out of that complaint.
I wonder what my case says about Akin Gump's possible use of economic pretext to conceal an unlawful, racially-motivated termination in Simmons.
The racial discrimination suit by Tameka Simmons claims the firm cited pretextual economic reasons for her 2009 layoff. Simmons says she was the only female black associate in Akin Gump’s New York office at the time of her layoff, even though the firm said there were four black female lawyers there.
In an odd way, Akin Gump's termination decision in Simmons parallels -- or is the polar opposite of -- my job termination by Akin Gump in October 1991.
I was employed at Akin Gump as a paralegal from March 3, 1988 until my termination on October 29, 1991. In late October 1991 I lodged a harassment complaint against my supervisor and coworkers. I told Akin Gump's attorney managers that I believed I was being harassed on the basis of perceived sexual orientation and the fact that I was Jewish. Within a week I was terminated. I was told that my work was of poor quality, that there was a "lack of fit" between me and firm personnel, and that the firm could not accommodate my request for a private office.
On February 4, 1992 I filed an unlawful job termination complaint with the D.C. Department of Human Rights alleging that I was harassed and terminated because of my perceived sexual orientation (homosexual). In its Response (May 22, 1992) the firm claimed that its investigation of my harassment complaint disclosed that my behavior was disruptive, bizarre, and frightening to coworkers. The firm also alleged that it had consulted a psychiatrist (who did not examine me personally) who advised the firm that my harassment Complaint was the product of the "disorder" ideas of reference, and that I might become violent. The firm alleged that my presence at the firm posed a tort risk for the employer. Additionally, Akin Gump's Response stated that my work performance was good -- implicitly retracting its position on the day of the termination (October 29, 1991) that my work quality was poor.
What's interesting is that 1991 was a bad year for the economy. On Friday April 5, 1991 Malcolm Lassman called a meeting of the firm's paralegals to address rumors rampant in the firm that Akin Gump had plans to lay off paralegals. Lassman acknowledged that the firm was experiencing the effects of the weak economy; he said some clients were late in paying their bills. But Lassman assured the paralegals that the firm had no plans to lay off paralegals. Lassman added that as a general rule, with respect to all employee groups, the firm used layoffs as a last resort to deal with economic pressures.
I was terminated six months later. I've always suspected that economic considerations played a role in my termination. For one thing, I was hired as a paralegal at a salary competitive with other paralegals. In March 1990 Akin Gump demoted me (without cause) to the litigation support group from the paralegal group. Upon my transfer to litigation support, I was automatically overpaid for the job I was doing. Second the economy was in bad shape in 1991 and remained so well into 1992. In November 1991 I qualified for unemployment benefits. In 1992 Congress passed an extension of benefits to address the weak hiring picture and I qualified for extended benefits (an additional 26 weeks).
I've often wondered whether my job termination for cause was really a layoff of convenience. Perhaps the firm thought, well, we'd like to get rid of him anyway because of the cost savings -- and since he lodged a harassment complaint we can craft a legally-viable excuse to fire him out of that complaint.
I wonder what my case says about Akin Gump's possible use of economic pretext to conceal an unlawful, racially-motivated termination in Simmons.
The Potentially Violent Employee: Employer's Legal Duty
I worked as a paralegal at the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld from March 3, 1988 to October 29, 1991. In late October 1991, I lodged a harassment complaint against my supervisor and coworkers. As part of its investigation into my complaint Akin Gump consulted a psychiatrist who had not examined me personally. The psychiatrist reportedly advised the employer that my harassment complaint was a symptom of the "disorder" ideas of reference, which caused me to attach a negative meaning to trivial events. The psychiatrist further reportedly advised the employer I was potentially violent. My supervisor and some coworkers told Akin Gump's managers that my behavior was frightening, disruptive and bizarre, or so Akin Gump claimed. The employer terminated my employment on the grounds that my mental illness rendered me a tort risk to the firm. The Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) had not yet become law as of the date of my job termination.
Would Akin Gump's investigation and resulting violence risk assessment -- and the firm's ultimate decision to terminate -- pass muster under the ADA as currently interpreted? Probably not.
http://www.ohioemployerlawblog.com/2011/01/unstable-employees-direct-threats-and.html
The ADA contains a specific exception for employees with mental disabilities who pose a “direct threat.” The statute defines “direct threat” as “a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation.” The ADA’s regulations require that the determination that an individual poses a direct threat must be “based on an individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job.” Employers must base this assessment on either “a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge” or “on the best available objective evidence.” In making this determination, employers should rely on the following four factors:
A few additional practical points to consider:
-- The firm should have obtained written statements from firm personnel documenting with specificity the facts of any threatening, intimidating or violent behavior I had engaged in.
-- The firm should have terminated me at the end of the work day, not at noon.
-- The firm should not have allowed me to go home to get a suitcase so I could transport my belongings from the firm's premises.
-- Perhaps the firm should have contacted the police.
-- Perhaps the firm should have arranged for a security escort to accompany me home.
-- Perhaps the firm should have spoken to my sister
-- When I filed for unemployment benefits in November 1991, the unemployment office required certain documentation about my employment -- documentation in the custody of the firm's Personnel Director, Laurel Digweed. I telephoned Laurel Digweed about the matter and she requested that I stop by her office (in about mid-November 1991) to get the documentation I needed. Laurel Digweed, who was one of the three decisionmakers who approved my job termination based on a concern I might become violent allowed me to return to the firm's premises for the limited purpose of retrieving required documentation. Perhaps Laurel Digweed should have mailed me the documentation, obviating my need to visit the firm a few weeks after my termination.
(Interestingly, I specifically recall my visit to the firm in about mid-November 1991 to see Laurel Digweed because I had an idea of reference during my meeting with her. She needed to sign something and looked for a pen. She said: "I can't find a black pen. I want to sign this with a black pen." I thought her statement could be interpreted as a reference to racism, a possible attempt to prompt me to complain about racism or antisemitism at the firm. What's interesting is that at that point in time I did not know that my supervisor had been accused of racism. I only learned that in 1993 when a black coworker, Pat McNeil, telephoned me in March or April 1993 in connection with her Title VII lawsuit against Akn Gump.)
Would Akin Gump's investigation and resulting violence risk assessment -- and the firm's ultimate decision to terminate -- pass muster under the ADA as currently interpreted? Probably not.
http://www.ohioemployerlawblog.com/2011/01/unstable-employees-direct-threats-and.html
The ADA contains a specific exception for employees with mental disabilities who pose a “direct threat.” The statute defines “direct threat” as “a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation.” The ADA’s regulations require that the determination that an individual poses a direct threat must be “based on an individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job.” Employers must base this assessment on either “a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge” or “on the best available objective evidence.” In making this determination, employers should rely on the following four factors:
- The duration of the risk;
- The nature and severity of the potential harm;
- The likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and
- The imminence of the potential harm.
A few additional practical points to consider:
- Prior to the termination, obtain written statements from co-workers, supervisors, and managers documenting all threatening behavior.
- The severity of threat is proportional to the duration of the risk. In other words, the more real the risk the less amount of time you have to allow it in your workplace.
- Some employers are opposed to security escorts of terminated employees. The termination of an employee who poses a direct threat for violence is the exception.
- Consider carrying out the termination as late in the work day, and work week, as possible. This timing will create an artificial cooling-off period and help limit the risk that the employee returns to do harm.
- Put the local police department on notice. Also consider a private security detail for a period of time until you are reasonably certain the employee is not going to return to cause harm.
-- The firm should have obtained written statements from firm personnel documenting with specificity the facts of any threatening, intimidating or violent behavior I had engaged in.
-- The firm should have terminated me at the end of the work day, not at noon.
-- The firm should not have allowed me to go home to get a suitcase so I could transport my belongings from the firm's premises.
-- Perhaps the firm should have contacted the police.
-- Perhaps the firm should have arranged for a security escort to accompany me home.
-- Perhaps the firm should have spoken to my sister
-- When I filed for unemployment benefits in November 1991, the unemployment office required certain documentation about my employment -- documentation in the custody of the firm's Personnel Director, Laurel Digweed. I telephoned Laurel Digweed about the matter and she requested that I stop by her office (in about mid-November 1991) to get the documentation I needed. Laurel Digweed, who was one of the three decisionmakers who approved my job termination based on a concern I might become violent allowed me to return to the firm's premises for the limited purpose of retrieving required documentation. Perhaps Laurel Digweed should have mailed me the documentation, obviating my need to visit the firm a few weeks after my termination.
(Interestingly, I specifically recall my visit to the firm in about mid-November 1991 to see Laurel Digweed because I had an idea of reference during my meeting with her. She needed to sign something and looked for a pen. She said: "I can't find a black pen. I want to sign this with a black pen." I thought her statement could be interpreted as a reference to racism, a possible attempt to prompt me to complain about racism or antisemitism at the firm. What's interesting is that at that point in time I did not know that my supervisor had been accused of racism. I only learned that in 1993 when a black coworker, Pat McNeil, telephoned me in March or April 1993 in connection with her Title VII lawsuit against Akn Gump.)
Tuesday, March 22, 2011
Racism at Vernon Jordan's Law Firm: Akin Gump's Answer in Simmons
The following links to Akin Gump's Answer filed on December 27, 2010 in Simmons v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, a lawsuit brought by a former Akin Gump associate alleging race discrimination in employment, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York.
http://www.nylj.com/nylawyer/adgifs/decisions/123010answer.pdf
http://www.nylj.com/nylawyer/adgifs/decisions/123010answer.pdf
Covington & Burling: Interest in the Writings of a Psychotic
Covington & Burling (216.200.93.134) Washington, District Of Columbia, United States, 0 returning visits