Tuesday, December 04, 2012

Communication with U.S. District Court Judge Jed S. Rakoff (S.D.N.Y.)




The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff
Columbia University Law School
New York, NY

Dear Judge Rakoff:

The following emails are tangentially related to Tameka Simmons v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, a title VII case in which you rendered a decision.  I have provided a copy of these emails to the Washington Field Office of the FBI as well as the U.S. Marshals Service.

Incidentally, I am a 1971 graduate of The Central High School of Philadelphia (230th class).

Regards,

Gary Freedman
Washington, DC
PA ATTY ID 41032





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To the Federal Bureau of Investigation--Washington Metropolitan Field Office:

There is circumstantial evidence that the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld may have committed perjury in the following case litigated in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (Judge Joyce Hens Green, presiding): McNeil v. Akin, Gump Strauss, Hauer & Feld, Civil Action No. 93-0477 (1993).

Plaintiff McNeil, an African American employee in Akin Gump's Litigation Support Department, was fired for insubordination by Personnel Administrator, Laurel Digweed in April 1992.  Thereafter McNeil filed a suit for damages in U.S. District Court alleging race discrimination under Title VII.  McNeil alleged that her supervisor, Litigation Support Director Christine Robertson was a known racist and that Robertson had colluded in the termination decision with Personnel Administrator Digweed.  Akin Gump denied that Robertson and Digweed colluded in the wrongful termination of McNeil, and the court granted Defendant Akin Gump's motion for summary judgment.  The court found that Robertson's alleged prior racist behavior was irrelevant to the case since Robertson played no role in Plaintiff McNeil's termination.  Defendant Akin Gump was represented by Robert J. Higgins, Esq. (202 420 2272) of Dickstein Shapiro, LLP.  I believe that previously, Akin Gump management partner Dennis M. Race, Esq. (202 887 4028)  handled the case for the firm.

http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2009/11/racism-at-vernon-jordans-law-firm.html

In late October 1991, six months before McNeil was terminated, I had filed a harassment complaint against my supervisor, Litigation Support Director Robertson and others with management attorney Dennis M. Race, Esq., alleging religious and sexual preference harassment under the D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977.  Several days later the firm terminated my employment, later alleging before the D.C. Department of Human Rights that the firm's investigation of my complaint disclosed that I suffered from psychological problems that rendered me unemployable and a direct threat in the workplace.  Akin Gump's Interrogatory Response filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights on May 22, 1992 (in full knowledge of the McNeil termination in April 1992) failed to disclose that I had ever alleged that I had been harassed by Litigation Support Director Robertson.  In effect, Akin Gump failed to disclose that as of late October 1991 it had knowledge that Robertson posed a Title VII problem for the firm.

Moreover, in my own case Akin Gump admitted that Robertson cooperated with Digweed (and Race) in my job termination.  In a termination chart prepared by the firm Akin Gump lists the following three individuals as the decisionmakers in my termination: Robertson, Digweed and Race.  Freedman v. Akin Gump, Hauer & Feld (agency record at 167).

http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2009/12/social-security-administration-initial.html

Additionally, statements contained in Akin Gump’s Response to Interrogatories, filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights on May 22, 1992, directly contradict the firm's production in McNeil v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld.

Akin Gump refers in the Freedman Response to my “transfer” or “transition,” in March 1990, from the firm’s legal assistant program to the firm’s litigation support department:

“In an attempt to find comparable work for the Claimant, a decision was made to transfer him to the Litigation Support Department.” Response to Particulars, Attachment A, page 1. (emphasis added).

“During his transition from a legal assistant position (paralegal) to his work with the litigation support department, Claimant had several discussions with his direct supervisor about problems with interacting with co-workers and occasional outbursts. . . .” Response to Particulars, Attachment A, page 5. (emphasis added).

In McNeil the court found that a transfer from Akin Gump’s litigation support department to the legal assistant program constituted a promotion. McNeil v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, No. 93-0477, footnote 2 at 2 (D.C.D.C., filed Nov. 29, 1993) (“McNeil could have applied for promotions outside of the [litigation support] department to legal secretary or legal assistant, however, she stated that she was not interested in either position. During her tenure, two of her coworkers both black, were promoted to legal assistant positions.”) Thus, according to McNeil, a necessary logical conclusion is that my own reverse transfer from legal assistant to litigation support employee in March 1990 was a demotion.

Akin Gump’s characterization of my demotion as a "transfer” or “transition” directly contradicts Akin Gump's production in McNeil that a "transfer" from the firm's Litigation Support Department to the Legal Assistant program constituted a promotion.

Gary Freedman
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apt. 136
Washington, DC  20008
202 362 7064




















































________________________________________________________

Criminal Division
U.S. Department of Justice



Dear Sir:

The following is my monthly criminal fraud certification per 18 U.S.C.§ 4 for December 2012.  There is circumstantial evidence that I am currently engaged in the commission of a felony against the Government of the United States. There is circumstantial evidence that I have been engaged in a long-term scheme to defraud the Government of the United States of up to about $500,000 in public monies.

I am concerned that the Department of Justice will not investigate this matter because a full investigation might embarrass the law partners of Vernon R. Jordan, Jr., who happens to be a close personal friend of Attorney General Holder.   Further, both the head of the criminal division, Lanny Breuer, and the Attorney General, Eric Holder, are former law partners of xxxxx, Esq. at the law firm of Covington and Burling.  Mr. xxxxx is married to U.S. District Court Judge xxxxx.  Also, Mr. Holder was a colleague of Judge xxxxx's when both served as judges on the D.C. Superior Court.  I believe that both Eric Holder and Judge xxxxx are proteges of Eleanor Holmes Norton, the District of Columbia's representative in Congress.  As a concerned citizen I am specifically concerned about the possibility of an obstruction of justice at the highest levels of the U.S. Department of Justice.

I believe the following statement discharges my duty per 18 U.S.C. § 4 (misprision of felony) to report the commission of a felony perpetrated against the Government of the United States.

I certify under penalty of criminal prosecution for making false statements that the following declaration is true and correct to the best of my knowledge:

1. The U.S. Department of the Treasury made a wire transfer of $1334 to my bank account on December 1, 2012, per my claim of disability granted by the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA): disability claim no. xxxxx.

2. The SSA determined that I became disabled and not suitable for employment by reason of severe mental illness that may be associated with a risk of violent behavior, effective October 29, 1991. As part of my initial claim for benefits in 1993 I provided to SSA evidence that my direct supervisor (Christine Robertson), who reported directly to a senior management attorney (R. Bruce McLean, Esq.) at the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld where I was employed, advised her employees after my termination that she feared I might return to the firm to kill her and arranged to have the firm take protective measures to guard against a possible homicidal assault (agency record at 41).

http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2010/06/social-security-notice-of-award-1993.html

3. The SSA determined that I became disabled effective October 29, 1991 based on the sworn declaration of Laurence J. Hoffman, Esq. and Dennis M. Race, Esq. (202 887 4028) of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, where I was employed until I was diagnosed with mental illness that might be associated with a risk of violence. Akin Gump's mental status determination, according to the sworn declaration, was made in consultation with a practicing psychiatrist (Gertrude R. Ticho, M.D.).  Dr. Ticho (deceased) denied in a letter written on her letterhead in July 1993 and in a taped telephone conversation I had with her in October 1993 that she ever had any communications of the kind alleged by Akin Gump.

http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2009/12/social-security-administration-initial.html

4.  Comprehensive psychological testing performed by The George Washington University Medical Center Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences (Washington, DC) in May 1994 and in March 1996 failed to disclose that I suffer from any mental illness of any kind and, further, failed to disclose the presence of any psychotic thought processes.  In fact, I achieved a perfect score on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test in March 1996 -- a test of psychotic thinking -- which is unusual  even in normal test subjects.  I was not on any medication at the time of testing in 1994 or 1996.

http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2011/08/gw-psych-testing-concern-about-fraud.html

5. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed (1998) a prior agency determination (1993) that found that Akin Gump's sworn declaration was factual and that the employer's mental status determination was genuine and credible, see Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C.C.A. no. 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998), relying in part on the Brief on Appeal filed with the Court on July 25, 1997 by the D.C. Corporation Counsel.

http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2011/12/dc-court-of-appeals-freedman-v-dc.html

6. On January 15, 2010 I was interviewed by Deputy Marshal xxxxx of the U.S. Marshals Service (Washington, DC) who had concerns, based on my prior statements and conduct, that I might pose a continuing and indefinite risk of harm to U.S. District Court Judge xxxxx and the judge's immediate family. It was Judge xxxxx who in 1996 affirmed a prior agency determination that failed to find that Akin Gump's published statements that I might have been homicidal and extremely dangerous, see paragraph 2 above (agency record at 41), as of late October 1991 constituted acts of defamation motivated by a discriminatory animus. Judge xxxxx relied in part on inapposite case law to exonerate the apparent unlawful conduct of the law partners of Vernon Jordan.

http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2011/04/superior-court-decision-freedman-v-dc.html

The USMS imposed continuing and indefinite protective measures limiting my access to a public facility and to a house of worship. The protective measures imposed by the USMS are inconsistent with my employability under the Americans With Disabilities Act, which permits an employer to refuse to employ a disabled person who poses a risk of harm at a place of employment.

http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2010/12/fourth-amendment-touch-my-junk-please.html

7. I believe that to the extent that SSA claim no. xxxxx is based on the sworn declaration of Laurence J. Hoffman, Esq. and Dennis M. Race, Esq. that I became unemployable effective October 29, 1991, that I suffered from severe mental illness and posed a risk of violence as of said date, the claim is based on criminal fraud, a felony under federal law.

http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2011/06/akin-gump-what-was-dc-corporation.html

8. I believe that to the extent that SSA claim no. xxxxx is based on the aforementioned Brief on Appeal filed by the D.C. Corporation Counsel with the D.C. Court of Appeals, the claim is based on criminal fraud, a felony under federal law. I believe that the Brief on Appeal contains several material omissions of fact and law calculated to mislead the Court, misrepresents the agency record and findings, and constitutes a willful fraud by the D.C. Corporation Counsel on the D.C. Court of Appeals.

9. To the extent that Judge xxxxx exonerated the unethical conduct of a psychiatrist in providing an ex parte professional opinion about my mental health and stability to my former employer in violation of the American Psychiatric Association's Goldwater Rule, which prohibits such communications, Judge xxxxx exceeded her judicial power.  A professional opinion offered by a psychiatrist about the mental health and stability of an individual whom she has not seen in private consultation does not meet the criteria established to ensure the reliability of an expert psychiatric opinion and has no more clinical value than a lay opinion and is therefore defamatory.  Further, Judge xxxxx's action in exonerating the unethical conduct of a licensed professional -- conduct that was, in fact, illegal per D.C. Code §2-3305.14(26) as of the filing of the complaint in Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights -- at the behest of her husband's law partner (the late Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq., attorney for the defendant, Akin Gump), carries the appearance of impropriety.

10. I believe that to the extent that SSA claim no. xxxxx is supported by the action of the USMS in concluding that I pose a continuing and indefinite risk of harm to a federal judge (and that judge's immediate family), and in imposing continuing and indefinite restrictions on my access to a public facility and to a house of worship, the claim is based on criminal fraud, a felony under federal law. I believe that the USMS did not form a good faith belief that I pose a risk of harm nor was the interview that Deputy Marshal xxxxx conducted at my residence on January 15, 2010, or my prior conduct or statements that occasioned the interview, a sufficient basis to conclude that I pose a risk of harm. Further, I believe that the USMS interview was the product of a criminal conspiracy between the USMS and other(s) to intimidate me in the free exercise of my constitutionally-protected right to publish facts concerning the likely fraudulent nature of my SSA disability claim and the likely criminal conduct of attorney managers of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld. 18 U.S.C. Section 241 (Conspiracy against Rights).

11. USMS Associate General Counsel Joe xxxxx (202-307-xxxxx) advised me by email on June 7, 2011 that a letter I sent to Judge xxxxx dated August 14, 2000 -- 10 years ago -- triggered the USMS concerns that I might pose a security risk to Judge xxxxx and prompted the USMS to interview me on January 15, 2010. That proposition is so ludicrous that it raises a substantial question about whether the stated reason for the USMS interview was simply pretext for an attempt by the USMS to try to intimidate me: a possible felony per 18 U.S.C. Section 241 (Conspiracy against Rights.)

http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2010/05/psychologist-nancy-shaffer-phd-dc-dept_5489.html

Gary Freedman
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apartment 136
Washington, DC 20008

1 comment:

Gary Freedman said...

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6 Dec 02:02:28 PM
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