If nothing else at least we can be assured Elena Kagan has a sense of humor. During today’s hearings Sen. Lindsey Graham asked Kagan, in relation to a question about the Christmas Day Bomber, “where were you on Christmas day?” Responded Kagan, to a deserved round of applause: “You know, like all Jews, I was probably at a Chinese restaurant.” Point Kagan.
I can top that. I didn't just spend Christmas Day at a Chinese restaurant. I spend every day at a "Chinese Restaurant." My life is a "Chinese Restaurant!"
Let me explain. I am referring to a segment from the Seinfeld episode, The Chinese Restaurant. The Chinese Restaurant revolves around protagonist Jerry and his friends Elaine Benes and George Costanza waiting for a table at a Chinese restaurant, on their way to see Plan 9 from Outer Space. Unable to get a table, they loiter and talk, while George tries to use the phone that is constantly being used by another customer and Jerry sees a woman he recognizes. At one point in the episode, Mr. Cohen, a regular, gets a table right away despite the fact that Jerry and company have been waiting for some time.
Mr. Cohen (enters): Hey, what stinks in here?
Bruce (laughing): Mr. Cohen! Haven't seen you for a couple of weeks.
Mr. Cohen: Well, I've been looking for a better place.
(Bruce laughs)
Bruce: Better place... Want a table?
Mr. Cohen: No, just bring me a plate and I'll eat here.
Bruce (laughing): Give him a plate and you eat here... Come on, I give you a table.
Jerry: Excuse me... we've been waiting here. Now, I KNOW we were ahead of that guy, he just came in.
Bruce: Oh no, Mr. Cohen always here.
Elaine: He's always here? What does that mean? What does that mean?
Bruce: Oh, Mr. Cohen, very nice man. He live on Park Avenue.
Elaine: Where am I? Is this a dream? What in God's name is going on here?!
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-4hTIFc4mbI
My world is an upside-down affair of inexplicable events, odd coincidences, and incredible explanations that seem to have no basis in reason or common sense. Yes, where am I?
Wednesday, June 30, 2010
Is Akin Gump a Racketeering Influenced Organization? What Did the U.S. Marshal Say?
The D.C. Office of Attorney General (acting through Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq., Jo Anne Robinson, Esq., Charles L. Reischel, Esq., William J. Earl, Esq. and M. Justin Draycott, Esq.) took the position before the D.C. Superior Court in 1996 and again before the D.C. Court of Appeals in 1997 that my belief that Akin Gump's managers (a class of persons that included Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Esq., Robert S. Strauss, Esq., Malcolm Lassman, Esq., Laurence J. Hoffman, Esq., Joel Jankowsky, Esq. and Richard L. Wyatt, Jr., Esq.) engaged in, or approved the commission of, criminal acts, specifically, approving the break-in of my residence in January 1990 and conspiring to solicit confidential mental health information from my treating psychiatrists in violation of the D.C. Mental Health Information Act of 1978 (from 1989 through 1991) -- acts that in their entirety might constitute the crime of racketeering under federal law -- was genuine. Brief of Appellee District of Columbia, Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights, D.C.C.A. no. 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998). Neither Strauss, Jordan, Wyatt, Jankowsky, Race, Lassman, managing partner Hoffman nor any Akin Gump manager disputed the D.C. Attorney General's position or questioned its legal or factual relevance.
I have devoted my blog, My Daily Struggles, to the above litigation: its actors and public policy implications as well as flaws in pleadings filed by the D.C. Office of Attorney General and the opinion issued by the D.C. Court of Appeals. Note that I have never criticized in any way the opinion issued in the above litigation by the D.C. Superior Court. I have remained totally silent as to the action of the Superior Court (and the presiding judge in that proceedings) precisely because I have always recognized that that opinion has no legal meaning. Any long-time reader of my blog with at least average reading comprehension skills would know that. The D.C. Court of Appeals did not review or affirm the opinion of the D.C. Superior Court (1996); by law, the D.C. Court of Appeals reviewed (and affirmed) the earlier final agency action of the D.C. Department of Human Rights (1993).
On January 15, 2010 the U.S. Marshal Service implicitly cautioned me against questioning the validity of the D.C. Court of Appeals' opinion in Freedman, and by extension cautioned that I should not question the validity of the determination of the D.C. Attorney General that an employee of Akin Gump formed a genuine, good faith belief that Akin Gump management has committed a pattern of criminal acts that might constitute the crime of racketeering under federal law.
Is Akin Gump a racketeering influenced organization?
At least one attorney (Pennsylvania Bar ID #41032) who used to be employed at Akin Gump has formed a genuine, good faith belief that Akin Gump is a racketeering influenced organization. That's the opinion of the D.C. Office of Attorney General.
What did the U.S. Marshal say?
The action of the D.C. Court of Appeals in ruling in favor of the D.C. Attorney General should not be questioned. And that's what the U.S. Marshal has implicitly said.
I have devoted my blog, My Daily Struggles, to the above litigation: its actors and public policy implications as well as flaws in pleadings filed by the D.C. Office of Attorney General and the opinion issued by the D.C. Court of Appeals. Note that I have never criticized in any way the opinion issued in the above litigation by the D.C. Superior Court. I have remained totally silent as to the action of the Superior Court (and the presiding judge in that proceedings) precisely because I have always recognized that that opinion has no legal meaning. Any long-time reader of my blog with at least average reading comprehension skills would know that. The D.C. Court of Appeals did not review or affirm the opinion of the D.C. Superior Court (1996); by law, the D.C. Court of Appeals reviewed (and affirmed) the earlier final agency action of the D.C. Department of Human Rights (1993).
On January 15, 2010 the U.S. Marshal Service implicitly cautioned me against questioning the validity of the D.C. Court of Appeals' opinion in Freedman, and by extension cautioned that I should not question the validity of the determination of the D.C. Attorney General that an employee of Akin Gump formed a genuine, good faith belief that Akin Gump management has committed a pattern of criminal acts that might constitute the crime of racketeering under federal law.
Is Akin Gump a racketeering influenced organization?
At least one attorney (Pennsylvania Bar ID #41032) who used to be employed at Akin Gump has formed a genuine, good faith belief that Akin Gump is a racketeering influenced organization. That's the opinion of the D.C. Office of Attorney General.
What did the U.S. Marshal say?
The action of the D.C. Court of Appeals in ruling in favor of the D.C. Attorney General should not be questioned. And that's what the U.S. Marshal has implicitly said.
Disturbance at the Cleveland Park Neighborhood Library -- August 12, 2005
The following is a message addressed to now-retired Cleveland Park Neighborhood Branch Librarian, Brian P. Brown. The message was apparently written on about Friday August 12, 2005. I posted the message to an email account on which I used to record my thoughts about Brian, who used to be my imaginary friend. The email account was on netscape.com: username -- lettheworldseewh (Let The World See What I Have Seen).
BRIAN--
Hey, buddy. I've skipped CPK today. I decided to spend the day at AU. I get unlimited computer time over here. They have a huge bank of computers. It's pretty crowded over here, though. A lot of students. I think the boys and girls are nearing the end of the summer semester. Typically, the library gets pretty crowded at the end of the semester, coming up on final exams.
What are you doing this weekend? It's a three-day holiday. Monday is Vernon Jordan's birthday [August 15]. It's also Napoleon's birthday. But Vernon Jordan is taller and a more colorful person. I thought you and I could head up to Martha's Vineyard this weekend and spend some time with Vernon and his family and friends. As Vernon Jordan likes to say: "It's legal in Massachusetts."
I'm still ruminating about that incident in the library on Saturday, with the nut-job who wouldn't stop arguing. Did you actually hear what she was saying? "You young people with your cell phones. You all have cell phones. You think you're God Almighty with those cell phones of yours. I hear the language you’re using. I can hear you using the "F" word. You think I can’t hear you? You all think you're God Almighty with those cell phones of yours." Like middle-aged people don't use cell phones. Well, actually, people of all ages use cell phones, but it's only young people who think they're God Almighty with their cell phones, I guess.
I can't stop thinking how reasonable you were with her. The fact that she was given two warnings, by Charles and you: two chances to correct her behavior. The fact that you put her on notice that you had called the cops, thereby giving her a chance to take advantage of the 5-minutes it takes for the cops to arrive. She was able to leave without ever having to deal with the police.
Of course, you could argue that I admitted that I was a mental patient who was not taking his meds. But I’ll tell you this. If that nut-job on Saturday isn’t under psychiatric care, she should be! Her behavior spoke for itself.
I just can’t help thinking that you intentionally wanted to humiliate me. You wanted to rub my nose in the dirt, so to speak. I never thought that way before. The entire time since April 2004 when the incident happened, I just thought, “Well, Brian just did what he was duty-bound to do.” But I no longer think that. There were measured, graduated steps you could have taken, including talking to me personally and invoking a six-month ban on your own – to be backed up with a threat of police intervention if I didn’t comply. After thirteen years of seeing my behavior in the library, you must have known that I’m a reasonable, courteous person.
You were a history major, right? Last night I couldn’t get out of my mind the image of 1918. How the allies were absolutely determined to humiliate Germany, to drag her through the mud. The allies took a mere armistice (November 11, 1918) and on their own they transformed that armistice into a de facto unconditional surrender. The allies then proceeded to ram an onerous peace treaty down Germany’s throat. Basically, the allies strong-armed Germany. You know what that lead to. And didn’t that turn into a dream come true!
So much for my paranoia.
Do you follow that TV show, “Big Brother,” on CBS? Three of the contestants who were voted out of the house, Eric, Michael, and Kaysar were given a chance to get back in the house. America voted on which contestant would be allowed to return. Turns out Kaysar won. I voted for Eric. (I signed up for e-mail messages about the show from CBS). Eric was a nut-case. That’s why I voted for him. I didn’t actually like Eric better than the other two. The way I see it, nut-cases wreak havoc in libraries, but they make for good TV. I figured Eric would stir up the house.
And, by the way, I have another grievance about you. You treat me like a nonperson in the library. You never say hello. Listen, buddy, I think I’ve paid my debt to society – and more so. I stayed away from the library for an entire year, not just the six months that you imposed.
What gets me is the fact that you have your little buddies, patrons who you allow to go back to your office to chat it up with you. Like John Conner – is that his name? The guy who you let sleep in the library? You let him go back to your office. Then there’s your baseball buddy. You know who I mean? The middle-aged guy who obsesses about baseball? You invited him back to your office a few days ago.
You’ve never invited me back to your office. You never even say hello. I’m p.o.’d, buddy.
Then again, what do we have to talk about? We have about as much in common as Clarence Thomas and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
Check you out later, Brian. Call me if you and the little lady want to take a trip up to Martha’s Vineyard this weekend. Ciao.
BRIAN--
Hey, buddy. I've skipped CPK today. I decided to spend the day at AU. I get unlimited computer time over here. They have a huge bank of computers. It's pretty crowded over here, though. A lot of students. I think the boys and girls are nearing the end of the summer semester. Typically, the library gets pretty crowded at the end of the semester, coming up on final exams.
What are you doing this weekend? It's a three-day holiday. Monday is Vernon Jordan's birthday [August 15]. It's also Napoleon's birthday. But Vernon Jordan is taller and a more colorful person. I thought you and I could head up to Martha's Vineyard this weekend and spend some time with Vernon and his family and friends. As Vernon Jordan likes to say: "It's legal in Massachusetts."
I'm still ruminating about that incident in the library on Saturday, with the nut-job who wouldn't stop arguing. Did you actually hear what she was saying? "You young people with your cell phones. You all have cell phones. You think you're God Almighty with those cell phones of yours. I hear the language you’re using. I can hear you using the "F" word. You think I can’t hear you? You all think you're God Almighty with those cell phones of yours." Like middle-aged people don't use cell phones. Well, actually, people of all ages use cell phones, but it's only young people who think they're God Almighty with their cell phones, I guess.
I can't stop thinking how reasonable you were with her. The fact that she was given two warnings, by Charles and you: two chances to correct her behavior. The fact that you put her on notice that you had called the cops, thereby giving her a chance to take advantage of the 5-minutes it takes for the cops to arrive. She was able to leave without ever having to deal with the police.
Of course, you could argue that I admitted that I was a mental patient who was not taking his meds. But I’ll tell you this. If that nut-job on Saturday isn’t under psychiatric care, she should be! Her behavior spoke for itself.
I just can’t help thinking that you intentionally wanted to humiliate me. You wanted to rub my nose in the dirt, so to speak. I never thought that way before. The entire time since April 2004 when the incident happened, I just thought, “Well, Brian just did what he was duty-bound to do.” But I no longer think that. There were measured, graduated steps you could have taken, including talking to me personally and invoking a six-month ban on your own – to be backed up with a threat of police intervention if I didn’t comply. After thirteen years of seeing my behavior in the library, you must have known that I’m a reasonable, courteous person.
You were a history major, right? Last night I couldn’t get out of my mind the image of 1918. How the allies were absolutely determined to humiliate Germany, to drag her through the mud. The allies took a mere armistice (November 11, 1918) and on their own they transformed that armistice into a de facto unconditional surrender. The allies then proceeded to ram an onerous peace treaty down Germany’s throat. Basically, the allies strong-armed Germany. You know what that lead to. And didn’t that turn into a dream come true!
So much for my paranoia.
Do you follow that TV show, “Big Brother,” on CBS? Three of the contestants who were voted out of the house, Eric, Michael, and Kaysar were given a chance to get back in the house. America voted on which contestant would be allowed to return. Turns out Kaysar won. I voted for Eric. (I signed up for e-mail messages about the show from CBS). Eric was a nut-case. That’s why I voted for him. I didn’t actually like Eric better than the other two. The way I see it, nut-cases wreak havoc in libraries, but they make for good TV. I figured Eric would stir up the house.
And, by the way, I have another grievance about you. You treat me like a nonperson in the library. You never say hello. Listen, buddy, I think I’ve paid my debt to society – and more so. I stayed away from the library for an entire year, not just the six months that you imposed.
What gets me is the fact that you have your little buddies, patrons who you allow to go back to your office to chat it up with you. Like John Conner – is that his name? The guy who you let sleep in the library? You let him go back to your office. Then there’s your baseball buddy. You know who I mean? The middle-aged guy who obsesses about baseball? You invited him back to your office a few days ago.
You’ve never invited me back to your office. You never even say hello. I’m p.o.’d, buddy.
Then again, what do we have to talk about? We have about as much in common as Clarence Thomas and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
Check you out later, Brian. Call me if you and the little lady want to take a trip up to Martha’s Vineyard this weekend. Ciao.
On Doing You Own Investigation: President of Central High School
The following is a letter I sent in 1997 to Dr. Sheldon Pavel, the President of my high school alma mater, The Central High School of Philadelphia. Note that I copied the letter to the U.S. Attorney in Philadelphia, Michael Stiles; the letter is one of several letters I copied to the Philadelphia U.S. Attorney that mentioned gun violence and homicide. Mr. Stiles did not refer the matter to the FBI. What precisely did the U.S. Marshal find disturbing in my letters, posted on this blog, that triggered its interview of me at my residence on Friday January 15, 2010? My paranoid suspicion is that the U.S. Marshal was engaged in an act of intimidation, and did not have bona fide law enforcement concerns about me.
July 7, 1997
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Sheldon S. Pavel, Ph.D.
President
Central High School
Ogontz and Olney Avenues
Philadelphia, PA 19141
RE: Weapons Possession - Intent to Inflict Grievous Bodily Harm/Possible Intent to Commit Murder - D.C. Corporation Counsel Affirmation - Possible Concealment of State and/or Federal Weapons Law Violations
Dear Dr. Pavel:
During the period March 1988 to October 1991 I was employed as a legal assistant in the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump"). Attorney managers at Akin Gump terminated my employment effective October 29, 1991 upon determining, in consultation with a psychiatrist, that a complaint of harassment I had lodged against several co-workers was attributable to a psychiatric symptom ("ideas of reference") prominent in the psychotic disorders and typically associated with a risk of violent behavior. See Freedman v. D.C. Dept. of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order issued June 10, 1996) (name of state court judge redacted at the implicit direction of the Justice Department). In the period immediately after my job termination senior Akin Gump managers determined that it was advisable to secure the office of my direct supervisor against a possible homicidal assault, which it was feared I might commit.
In pleadings filed in the District of Columbia Superior Court, the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.) affirmed that Akin Gump personnel had geniune concerns that I might have had plans to procure firearms for an unlawful purpose and possessed the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm or commit murder. Mr. Ruff currently serves as chief White House Counsel to President Clinton (telephone no.: 202 456 1414).
I have been under investigation by the U.S. Secret Service as a potential security risk to President Clinton, and was interrogated at the Washington Field Office by Special Agent Philip C. Leadroot (202 435-5100) as recently as February 1996, about 16 months ago. Questioning by Mr. Leadroot centered on the issue of presidential assassination.
I am a 1971 graduate of Central High School (230th class). There is a remote possibility that Akin Gump's attorney managers may have contacted two of my teachers at Central, Sylvan Boni, Ph.D. and Ethel B. Fisher, to obtain background information about me in connection with my employment.
Dr. Boni was a French teacher at Central; I was enrolled in his class in academic year 1969-1970. I believe he is now retired.
Mrs. Fisher was a science teacher at Central; I believe that a planned involuntary transfer of Mrs. Fisher from Central at the end of the 1969-1970 academic year prompted her decision to resign from the school system. I was enrolled in her Chemistry class in academic year 1969-1970. Mrs. Fisher had been employed as a chemist at the Naval Experimental Research Station (Philadelphia Navy Yard) during World War II (where one of her coworkers was the late Isaac Asimov).
If either Dr. Boni or Mrs. Fisher has communicated with Akin Gump about me these individuals may possess information pertinent to a criminal investigation conducted by the U.S. Secret Service during the period December 1994-February 1995 relating to the security of the President of the United States.
I request that, if at all feasible, you contact Dr. Boni and Mrs. Fisher to counsel these individuals to disclose to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (David M. Bowie, Supervisory Special Agent, Washington Field Office, 202 252 7801) the content of any communications they may have had with any Akin Gump attorneys regarding me. Attorneys who may have directed inquiries to Dr. Boni or Mrs. Fisher include Earl L. Segal, Malcolm Lassman, or Laurence J. Hoffman (managing partner), among others.
Enclosed are some additional documents that provide background to the matters discussed in this letter.
Be advised: President Clinton's own lawyer, chief White House Counsel Charles F.C. Ruff, is talking real guns, real bullets, real brain tissue.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
cc: Michael R. Stiles, Esq. (Office of U.S. Attorney, Philadelphia)
July 7, 1997
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Sheldon S. Pavel, Ph.D.
President
Central High School
Ogontz and Olney Avenues
Philadelphia, PA 19141
RE: Weapons Possession - Intent to Inflict Grievous Bodily Harm/Possible Intent to Commit Murder - D.C. Corporation Counsel Affirmation - Possible Concealment of State and/or Federal Weapons Law Violations
Dear Dr. Pavel:
During the period March 1988 to October 1991 I was employed as a legal assistant in the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump"). Attorney managers at Akin Gump terminated my employment effective October 29, 1991 upon determining, in consultation with a psychiatrist, that a complaint of harassment I had lodged against several co-workers was attributable to a psychiatric symptom ("ideas of reference") prominent in the psychotic disorders and typically associated with a risk of violent behavior. See Freedman v. D.C. Dept. of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order issued June 10, 1996) (name of state court judge redacted at the implicit direction of the Justice Department). In the period immediately after my job termination senior Akin Gump managers determined that it was advisable to secure the office of my direct supervisor against a possible homicidal assault, which it was feared I might commit.
In pleadings filed in the District of Columbia Superior Court, the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.) affirmed that Akin Gump personnel had geniune concerns that I might have had plans to procure firearms for an unlawful purpose and possessed the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm or commit murder. Mr. Ruff currently serves as chief White House Counsel to President Clinton (telephone no.: 202 456 1414).
I have been under investigation by the U.S. Secret Service as a potential security risk to President Clinton, and was interrogated at the Washington Field Office by Special Agent Philip C. Leadroot (202 435-5100) as recently as February 1996, about 16 months ago. Questioning by Mr. Leadroot centered on the issue of presidential assassination.
I am a 1971 graduate of Central High School (230th class). There is a remote possibility that Akin Gump's attorney managers may have contacted two of my teachers at Central, Sylvan Boni, Ph.D. and Ethel B. Fisher, to obtain background information about me in connection with my employment.
Dr. Boni was a French teacher at Central; I was enrolled in his class in academic year 1969-1970. I believe he is now retired.
Mrs. Fisher was a science teacher at Central; I believe that a planned involuntary transfer of Mrs. Fisher from Central at the end of the 1969-1970 academic year prompted her decision to resign from the school system. I was enrolled in her Chemistry class in academic year 1969-1970. Mrs. Fisher had been employed as a chemist at the Naval Experimental Research Station (Philadelphia Navy Yard) during World War II (where one of her coworkers was the late Isaac Asimov).
If either Dr. Boni or Mrs. Fisher has communicated with Akin Gump about me these individuals may possess information pertinent to a criminal investigation conducted by the U.S. Secret Service during the period December 1994-February 1995 relating to the security of the President of the United States.
I request that, if at all feasible, you contact Dr. Boni and Mrs. Fisher to counsel these individuals to disclose to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (David M. Bowie, Supervisory Special Agent, Washington Field Office, 202 252 7801) the content of any communications they may have had with any Akin Gump attorneys regarding me. Attorneys who may have directed inquiries to Dr. Boni or Mrs. Fisher include Earl L. Segal, Malcolm Lassman, or Laurence J. Hoffman (managing partner), among others.
Enclosed are some additional documents that provide background to the matters discussed in this letter.
Be advised: President Clinton's own lawyer, chief White House Counsel Charles F.C. Ruff, is talking real guns, real bullets, real brain tissue.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
cc: Michael R. Stiles, Esq. (Office of U.S. Attorney, Philadelphia)
The U.S. Marshal Says I'm an Angry Young Man!
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Tuesday, June 29, 2010
The Unanswered Question
The Unanswered Question is a work by American composer Charles Ives.
The full title Ives originally gave the piece was "A Contemplation of a Serious Matter" or "The Unanswered Perennial Question". His biographer Jan Swafford called it "a kind of collage in three distinct layers, roughly coordinated." The three layers involve the scoring for a string quartet, woodwind quartet, and solo trumpet. Each layer has its own tempo and key. Ives himself described the work as a "cosmic landscape" in which the strings represent "the Silences of the Druids—who Know, See and Hear Nothing." The trumpet then asks "The Perennial Question of Existence" and the woodwinds seek "The Invisible Answer", but abandon it in frustration, so that ultimately the question is answered only by the "Silences".
October 28, 1991
Our Friends: Thank you very much, doctor. You've been very helpful in explaining his mental state. While we have you on the line, we have one more question. One last question. If we fire him, will he get on with his life, or will he turn himself into a one-man Warren Commission, spending the next 20 years trying to right his perceived wrongs?
Doctor: The doctor searches for The Invisible Answer, but abandons it in frustration, so that ultimately the question is answered only by the Silences.
The full title Ives originally gave the piece was "A Contemplation of a Serious Matter" or "The Unanswered Perennial Question". His biographer Jan Swafford called it "a kind of collage in three distinct layers, roughly coordinated." The three layers involve the scoring for a string quartet, woodwind quartet, and solo trumpet. Each layer has its own tempo and key. Ives himself described the work as a "cosmic landscape" in which the strings represent "the Silences of the Druids—who Know, See and Hear Nothing." The trumpet then asks "The Perennial Question of Existence" and the woodwinds seek "The Invisible Answer", but abandon it in frustration, so that ultimately the question is answered only by the "Silences".
October 28, 1991
Our Friends: Thank you very much, doctor. You've been very helpful in explaining his mental state. While we have you on the line, we have one more question. One last question. If we fire him, will he get on with his life, or will he turn himself into a one-man Warren Commission, spending the next 20 years trying to right his perceived wrongs?
Doctor: The doctor searches for The Invisible Answer, but abandons it in frustration, so that ultimately the question is answered only by the Silences.
Significant Moments: Workplace Mobbing and Holocaust Survivors
I began writing "Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations" in 1940, about a year after I had been set free and moved to the United States. From the moment I arrived in this country, within weeks after liberation, I spoke of the camps to everybody willing to listen, and many more unwilling to do so. Painful as this was because of what it brought back to mind, I did it because I was so full of the experience that it would not be contained. I did it also because I was anxious to force on the awareness of as many people as possible what was going on in Nazi Germany, and out of a feeling of obligation to those who still suffered in the camps. But I met with little success. At that time, nothing was known in the U.S. about the camps, and my story was met with utter disbelief.
Bruno Bettelheim, The Ultimate Limit.
National Socialist Germany seems to have been something new in human affairs. Its roots were old, and the soil was old, but it was a mutant.
Herman Wouk, War and Remembrance.
A plague!
Thomas Mann, Death in Venice.
The Third Reich erupted into history as a surprise. It lasted a mere dozen years. It is gone. Historians, social scientists, political analysts, still stammer and grope in the mountainous ruins of the unprecedented facts about human nature and society that it left behind. Ordinary people prefer to forget it: a nasty twelve-year episode in Europe's decline, best swept under the rug.
Herman Wouk, War and Remembrance.
Before the U.S. was drawn into the war, people did not wish to believe that Germany could do such horrendous things. I was accused of being carried away by my hatred of the Nazis, of engaging in paranoid distortions. I was warned not to spread such lies. I was taken to task for opposite reasons at the same time: that I painted the SS much too black; and that I gave them much too much credit for being intelligent enough to devise and systematically execute such a diabolic system, when everybody knew that they were but stupid madmen. Such reactions only convinced me more of the need to make people aware of the reality of the camps, of what went on in them and the nefarious purposes they served. My hope was that publishing a paper, written as objectively as possible to forestall the accusation that I distorted facts out of personal hatred, might make people listen to what I had to tell. That was my conscious reason for writing "Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations," which I finished in 1942.
Unfortunately, for well over a year, this paper was rejected by one after another of the psychiatric and psychoanalytic journals to which I sent it, thinking that these were most likely to be willing to print it. The reasons for rejection varied. Some editors objected because I had not kept written records while in the camps, implicitly revealing that they had not believed a word of what I had written about conditions in the camps. Others refused it because the data were not verifiable, or because the findings could not be replicated. A few came right out and said that both what I claimed were facts and my conclusions were most improbable exaggerations. Some added--probably correctly, as judged by my experience when I tried talking about these matters to professional people—that the article would be too unacceptable to their audiences.
Bruno Bettelheim, The Ultimate Limit.
Certainly it was awkward that I was obliged to publish the results of my inquiries without there being any possibility of other specialists testing and checking them, particularly as those results were of a surprising and by no means gratifying character.
Sigmund Freud, Dora: An Analysis of a Case of Hysteria.
_________________________________________
Primo Levi recorded in his book The Drowned and the Saved the following admonishment that an SS guard enjoyed giving to prisoners at a Nazi concentration camp:
"However this war may end, we have won the war against you; none of you will be left to bear witness, but even if someone were to survive, the world will not believe him. There will be perhaps suspicions, discussions, research by historians, but there will be no certainties, because we will destroy the evidence together with you. And even if some proof should remain and some of you survive, people will say the events you describe are too monstrous to be believed: they will say that they are exaggerations of Allied propaganda and will believe us, who will deny everything, and not you. We will be the ones to dictate the history of the camps."
Be that as it may.
Workplace mobbing is a subtle form of job harassment or bullying that can be considered as a 'virus' or a 'cancer' that spreads throughout the workplace via gossip, rumor and unfounded accusations. It is a deliberate attempt to force a person out of their workplace by humiliation, general harassment, emotional abuse and/or terror. Mobbing can be described as being “ganged up on". Mobbing is executed by a leader (who can be a manager, a co-worker, or a subordinate). The leader then rallies others into a systematic and frequent “mob-like” behaviour toward the victim.
The victim of workplace mobbing is likely to be victimized twice: first in the workplace and later. When the victim of mobbing describes his experiences his report, based as it is on subtle harassing acts, will probably be dismissed as a product of paranoia or hypersensitivity. The world will not believe the report of a mobbing victim. There will be perhaps suspicions and discussions but there will be no certainties. People will say the events the mobbing victim describes are too trivial to have any meaning: they will say that they are exaggerations. Those in a position to investigate will believe the mobbers, who will deny everything, and not the victim. The mobbers will be the ones to dictate the narrative of the workplace.
Bruno Bettelheim, The Ultimate Limit.
National Socialist Germany seems to have been something new in human affairs. Its roots were old, and the soil was old, but it was a mutant.
Herman Wouk, War and Remembrance.
A plague!
Thomas Mann, Death in Venice.
The Third Reich erupted into history as a surprise. It lasted a mere dozen years. It is gone. Historians, social scientists, political analysts, still stammer and grope in the mountainous ruins of the unprecedented facts about human nature and society that it left behind. Ordinary people prefer to forget it: a nasty twelve-year episode in Europe's decline, best swept under the rug.
Herman Wouk, War and Remembrance.
Before the U.S. was drawn into the war, people did not wish to believe that Germany could do such horrendous things. I was accused of being carried away by my hatred of the Nazis, of engaging in paranoid distortions. I was warned not to spread such lies. I was taken to task for opposite reasons at the same time: that I painted the SS much too black; and that I gave them much too much credit for being intelligent enough to devise and systematically execute such a diabolic system, when everybody knew that they were but stupid madmen. Such reactions only convinced me more of the need to make people aware of the reality of the camps, of what went on in them and the nefarious purposes they served. My hope was that publishing a paper, written as objectively as possible to forestall the accusation that I distorted facts out of personal hatred, might make people listen to what I had to tell. That was my conscious reason for writing "Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations," which I finished in 1942.
Unfortunately, for well over a year, this paper was rejected by one after another of the psychiatric and psychoanalytic journals to which I sent it, thinking that these were most likely to be willing to print it. The reasons for rejection varied. Some editors objected because I had not kept written records while in the camps, implicitly revealing that they had not believed a word of what I had written about conditions in the camps. Others refused it because the data were not verifiable, or because the findings could not be replicated. A few came right out and said that both what I claimed were facts and my conclusions were most improbable exaggerations. Some added--probably correctly, as judged by my experience when I tried talking about these matters to professional people—that the article would be too unacceptable to their audiences.
Bruno Bettelheim, The Ultimate Limit.
Certainly it was awkward that I was obliged to publish the results of my inquiries without there being any possibility of other specialists testing and checking them, particularly as those results were of a surprising and by no means gratifying character.
Sigmund Freud, Dora: An Analysis of a Case of Hysteria.
_________________________________________
Primo Levi recorded in his book The Drowned and the Saved the following admonishment that an SS guard enjoyed giving to prisoners at a Nazi concentration camp:
"However this war may end, we have won the war against you; none of you will be left to bear witness, but even if someone were to survive, the world will not believe him. There will be perhaps suspicions, discussions, research by historians, but there will be no certainties, because we will destroy the evidence together with you. And even if some proof should remain and some of you survive, people will say the events you describe are too monstrous to be believed: they will say that they are exaggerations of Allied propaganda and will believe us, who will deny everything, and not you. We will be the ones to dictate the history of the camps."
Be that as it may.
Workplace mobbing is a subtle form of job harassment or bullying that can be considered as a 'virus' or a 'cancer' that spreads throughout the workplace via gossip, rumor and unfounded accusations. It is a deliberate attempt to force a person out of their workplace by humiliation, general harassment, emotional abuse and/or terror. Mobbing can be described as being “ganged up on". Mobbing is executed by a leader (who can be a manager, a co-worker, or a subordinate). The leader then rallies others into a systematic and frequent “mob-like” behaviour toward the victim.
The victim of workplace mobbing is likely to be victimized twice: first in the workplace and later. When the victim of mobbing describes his experiences his report, based as it is on subtle harassing acts, will probably be dismissed as a product of paranoia or hypersensitivity. The world will not believe the report of a mobbing victim. There will be perhaps suspicions and discussions but there will be no certainties. People will say the events the mobbing victim describes are too trivial to have any meaning: they will say that they are exaggerations. Those in a position to investigate will believe the mobbers, who will deny everything, and not the victim. The mobbers will be the ones to dictate the narrative of the workplace.
Akin Gump: Did Joel Jankowsky Approve the Commission of a Felony? What Did the U.S. Marshal Say?
Joel Jankowsky is one of three senior executive partners of Akin Gump and as such serves ex officio as a member of all the firm's committees. Jankowsky represents numerous clients on a variety of public policy matters, with an emphasis on entertainment, telecommunications and technology-related issues.
Prior to joining Akin Gump in 1977, Jankowsky was legislative assistant to the Honorable Carl Albert, speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, from 1972 to 1977. Jankowsky served as a captain in the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General Corps from 1968 to 1972.
Jankowsky received his B.B.A. in 1965 and his J.D. in 1968 from the University of Oklahoma. He is a member of the bars of Oklahoma and the District of Columbia and is admitted to practice before the U.S. Court of Military Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court.
The D.C. Office of the Attorney General (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.) determined in 1996 that I had formed a genuine, good faith belief that in January 1990, Akin Gump attorneys may have committed a criminal act in gaining unlawful access to my apartment, inspecting the apartment, and videotaping the apartment's contents. The D.C. Office of the Attorney General affirmed that I formed a genuine, good-faith belief that the break-in was committed with the prior approval of the firm's Executive Committee, which included Joel Jankowsky. It may be that Joel Jankowsky approved the commission of a felony in January 1990. Brief of Appellee District of Columbia, Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights, D.C.C.A. no. 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998). On January 15, 2010 the U.S. Marshal Service implicitly advised me that I should not question the validity of the Court's opinion in Freedman, and by extension that I should not question the validity of the determination of the D.C. Attorney General that an employee of Akin Gump formed a genuine, good faith belief that Joel Jankowsky or other Akin Gump Executive Committee partners may have approved the commission of a felony.
Interestingly, Joel Jankowsky worked closely with former Akin Gump partner Edward S. Knight, Esq. who, during my tenure at the firm, was a member of the firm's Legislative Practice Group. Mr. Knight served as General Counsel of the U.S. Department of the Treasury during the Clinton Administration, in the 1990s.
What did Joel Jankowsky know and when did he know it?
Jankowsky received his B.B.A. in 1965 and his J.D. in 1968 from the University of Oklahoma. He is a member of the bars of Oklahoma and the District of Columbia and is admitted to practice before the U.S. Court of Military Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court.
The D.C. Office of the Attorney General (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.) determined in 1996 that I had formed a genuine, good faith belief that in January 1990, Akin Gump attorneys may have committed a criminal act in gaining unlawful access to my apartment, inspecting the apartment, and videotaping the apartment's contents. The D.C. Office of the Attorney General affirmed that I formed a genuine, good-faith belief that the break-in was committed with the prior approval of the firm's Executive Committee, which included Joel Jankowsky. It may be that Joel Jankowsky approved the commission of a felony in January 1990. Brief of Appellee District of Columbia, Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights, D.C.C.A. no. 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998). On January 15, 2010 the U.S. Marshal Service implicitly advised me that I should not question the validity of the Court's opinion in Freedman, and by extension that I should not question the validity of the determination of the D.C. Attorney General that an employee of Akin Gump formed a genuine, good faith belief that Joel Jankowsky or other Akin Gump Executive Committee partners may have approved the commission of a felony.
Interestingly, Joel Jankowsky worked closely with former Akin Gump partner Edward S. Knight, Esq. who, during my tenure at the firm, was a member of the firm's Legislative Practice Group. Mr. Knight served as General Counsel of the U.S. Department of the Treasury during the Clinton Administration, in the 1990s.
What did Joel Jankowsky know and when did he know it?
Akin Gump: Connecting the Dots
Michael X. Morrell was disbarred in Fall 1996 for violations of the District of Columbia Code of Professional Responsibility, including “dishonest, deceitful or fraudulent conduct,” “illegal acts involving moral turpitude,” and “misappropriation of client funds.” For the factual underpinnings of these violations, see In re Morrell, 684 A.2d 361, 362-65 (D.C. 1996).
Michael Morrell practiced law at the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld while I worked there.
I recall reading in a newspaper report in the year 1996 that the D.C. Court of Appeals, in its disbarment opinion concerning Michael Morrell, chastised Akin Gump for its lax management practices. I found that to be an interesting observation. While I worked at the firm, whenever a mental health professional asked me why I thought I was a victim of job harassment, I always attributed my problems to "weak management." I recall telling William D. Brown, Ph.D. in 1991 that I thought the firm was run "like a candy store."
Be that as it may.
In the book MOBBING: Emotional Abuse in the American Workplace, the authors say that mobbing is typically found in work environments that have poorly organized production and/or working methods and
incapable or inattentive management and that mobbing victims are usually "exceptional individuals who demonstrated intelligence, competence, creativity, integrity, accomplishment and dedication".
Michael Morrell practiced law at the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld while I worked there.
I recall reading in a newspaper report in the year 1996 that the D.C. Court of Appeals, in its disbarment opinion concerning Michael Morrell, chastised Akin Gump for its lax management practices. I found that to be an interesting observation. While I worked at the firm, whenever a mental health professional asked me why I thought I was a victim of job harassment, I always attributed my problems to "weak management." I recall telling William D. Brown, Ph.D. in 1991 that I thought the firm was run "like a candy store."
Be that as it may.
In the book MOBBING: Emotional Abuse in the American Workplace, the authors say that mobbing is typically found in work environments that have poorly organized production and/or working methods and
incapable or inattentive management and that mobbing victims are usually "exceptional individuals who demonstrated intelligence, competence, creativity, integrity, accomplishment and dedication".
So there's an interesting connection between In re Morrell (1996) and Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights (1998). There is a direct link between Akin Gump's lax management that the D.C. Court of Appeals noted in Morrell and the case of mobbing behavior that I presented to the D.C. Court of Appeals in Freedman. Unfortunately, the Court got it right in Morrell and got it wrong in Freedman (if I may be permitted to criticize a court's opinion). I suppose it never dawned on the Court that it was dealing with interconnecting pieces in one big jigsaw puzzle -- the Wild and Wacky World of Akin Gump!
Monday, June 28, 2010
Sunday, June 27, 2010
Effects of Workplace Mobbing: Lasting Debilitation
My last treating psychiatrist Abbas Jama, M.D. recommended that I give up my preoccupation with the past. He said I should let go of my anger with my last employment experience at the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, where I worked for three-and-a-half years as a paralegal.
Yes, I am preoccupied with my past employment problems. But is my reaction an abnormal response or a typical response to severe mobbing by coworkers? The literature indicates that in cases of "third-degree" mobbing the victim may be unable to reenter the workforce and may suffer serious, long-lasting mental or physical disability. It may be that I suffer the effects of "third degree" mobbing.
People ask: Why do you write a blog? My answer? If I had a psychiatrist who was expert in treating my specific problems maybe I could talk to him about what I feel. But that's the problem: finding a psychiatry resident from St. Elizabeths who is expert in treating my specific problems.
Victims of workplace mobbing frequently suffer from: adjustment disorders, somatic symptoms (eg, headaches or irritable bowel syndrome), Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), major depression.
In mobbing targets with PTSD, Heinz Leymann notes that the “mental effects were fully comparable with PTSD from war or prison camp experiences."
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2007/07/mementos-of-past-pains-and-pleasures.html
Some patients may develop alcoholism or other substance abuse disorders. Family relationships routinely suffer. Some targets may even develop brief psychotic episodes, generally with paranoid symptoms. Leymann estimated that 15% of suicides in Sweden could be directly attributed to workplace mobbing. A worker's perception that he is a victim of mobbing is not necessarily evidence of paranoia; mobbing itself can lead to paranoia and psychotic episodes.
http://www.innovations-training.com/0804CP_Article4.pdf
Degrees of mobbing:
First degree: Victim manages to resist, escapes at an early stage, or is fully rehabilitated in the original workplace or elsewhere. Second degree: Victim cannot resist or escape immediately and suffers temporary or prolonged mental and/or physical disability and has difficulty reentering the workforce. Third degree: Victim is unable to reenter the workforce and suffers serious, long-lasting mental or physical disability.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobbing
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2007/07/mementos-of-past-pains-and-pleasures.html
Some patients may develop alcoholism or other substance abuse disorders. Family relationships routinely suffer. Some targets may even develop brief psychotic episodes, generally with paranoid symptoms. Leymann estimated that 15% of suicides in Sweden could be directly attributed to workplace mobbing. A worker's perception that he is a victim of mobbing is not necessarily evidence of paranoia; mobbing itself can lead to paranoia and psychotic episodes.
http://www.innovations-training.com/0804CP_Article4.pdf
Degrees of mobbing:
First degree: Victim manages to resist, escapes at an early stage, or is fully rehabilitated in the original workplace or elsewhere. Second degree: Victim cannot resist or escape immediately and suffers temporary or prolonged mental and/or physical disability and has difficulty reentering the workforce. Third degree: Victim is unable to reenter the workforce and suffers serious, long-lasting mental or physical disability.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobbing
Am I Guilty of Fraud?
Common law fraud has nine elements:
1 a representation of an existing fact;
2 its materiality;
3 its falsity;
4 the speaker's knowledge of its falsity;
5 the speaker's intent that it shall be acted upon by the plaintiff;
6 plaintiff's ignorance of its falsity;
7 plaintiff's reliance on the truth of the representation;
8 plaintiff's right to rely upon it; and
9 consequent damages suffered by plaintiff.
In April 1993 I filed for disability benefits from the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA) by reason of severe mental illness, which according to my former employer, the D.C. law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, rendered me unfit for employment by reason of business necessity effective October 29, 1991. The firm alleged in a sworn statement dated May 22, 1992 filed under penalty of criminal sanctions with the D.C. Department of Human Rights that I posed a tort risk to the firm, a statement that I submitted to the SSA in support of my disability claim. I do not know the precise facts upon which the SSA relied to determine that I became unemployable on October 29, 1991 nor the facts upon which the SSA has determined that I have been continuously unemployable and eligible for benefits to the present date.
I have not misrepresented any material facts about myself or my beliefs upon which treating psychiatrists, since September 1992, have diagnosed me with severe (psychotic) mental illness including bipolar disorder (Napoleon Cuenco, MD, Daniel Tsao, MD, Suzanne M. Pitts); paranoid schizophrenia (Dimitrios Georgopoulos, MD, Albert H. Taub, Betsy Jane Cooper, MD) and delusional (paranoid) disorder (Albert H. Taub, MD, Rhoda Ruttenberg, MD, Henry C. Barbot, MD, Didi Bailey, MD, Jeremy Carpenter, MD, Umar Rahman, MD). I did not misrepresent any material facts about my beliefs in the harassment complaint I lodged at Akin Gump in October 1991, upon which a psychiatrist advised Akin Gump that I suffered from a "disorder" known as "ideas of reference" that might dispose me to commit an act of violence.
My beliefs, upon which my treating psychiatrists have diagnosed severe (psychotic) mental illness, are genuine and long-held. See U.S. v. Francisco Martin Duran, United States Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, 96 F.3d 1495 (Oct. 8, 1996 ). Duran pleaded not guilty to the charge of attempting to assassinate the President of the United States and mounted an insanity defense, claiming that he was trying to save the world by destroying an alien "mist", connected by an umbilical cord to an alien in the Colorado mountains. Duran's insanity defense failed based on expert prosecution testimony that Duran's purported belief, or "delusion," was not genuine and long-held.
http://cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/F3/96/1495/504003/
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals decided in an opinion issued on September 1, 1998 that the reasons my former employer, Akin Gump, submitted to the D.C. Department of Human Rights in support of its decision to terminate my employment, effective October 29, 1991, were genuine and worthy of credence. Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights, D.C.C.A. no. 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998) (the Court implicitly affirmed that I had a disturbed mental state during the entire period March 1988 to October 29, 1991, cf. Duran, in other words, that my belief that I was a victim of harassment, which was the product of a psychiatric "disorder," was long-held and genuine).
Akin Gump had advised the D.C. Department Human Rights that following its investigation of a complaint of job harassment I had lodged against my direct supervisor, coworkers, and attorneys, the firm had determined, in consultation with a practicing psychiatrist, Gertrude R. Ticho, M.D., that my beliefs were the product of a psychiatric "disorder" (ideas of reference) that might dispose me to commit an act of violence. (Akin Gump apparently disputed, or failed to affirm, the determination of the D.C. Department of Human Rights that I had ever lodged a complaint against my direct supervisor.)
I continue to believe that I was a victim of job harassment at Akin Gump; arguably--by reason of my beliefs about Akin Gump alone--I remain unemployable per the Americans With Disabilities Act by reason of business necessity.
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2010/04/americans-with-disabilities-act-my.html
But there is more. On January 15, 2010 the U.S. Marshal determined that I pose a risk of harm to one of its protectees (and that protectee's family), and barred me from visiting my local synagogue as well as the U.S. District Court without prior (discretionary) approval by the U.S. Marshal.
At oral argument before the D.C. Court of Appeals on December 16, 1997 assistant D.C. Corporation Counsel M. Justin Draycott, Esq. stated to the Court that I "admitted" that my "coworkers were afraid" of me, affirming record evidence I had proffered to the D.C. Department of Human Rights that my former direct supervisor advised her employees on about October 29, 1991 that I might have had plans to return to the firm's premises after my termination to kill her: requiring the supervisor (and unnamed others) to take protective measures against a feared homicidal assault.
Akin Gump did not dispute pleadings filed by the D.C. Office of Corporation Counsel with the D.C. Court of Appeals that among the facts material to the firm's termination decision were the following:
1. I admitted (according to the Corporation Counsel) that a coworker, speaking for herself and others, in August 1989, was afraid that I might be armed and extremely dangerous;
2. I believed that I was a victim of frequent harassing acts by firm personnel (as an agency-supplied employee and later) throughout my tenure, from March 1988 to late October 1991, including the act of "gaslighting" and the spreading of false and malicious rumors;
3. I believed the law firm of Akin Gump violated the D.C. Mental Health Information Act by soliciting and obtaining confidential mental health information about me from a treating psychiatrist;
4. I believed that the law firm of Akin Gump may have committed a criminal act in gaining access to my apartment in January 1990, inspecting the premises, and videotaping the premises and its contents: that this possible criminal act was likely approved by the firm's management committee, which included Robert S. Strauss, Esq., Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Esq. Richard Wyatt, Esq. Laurence J. Hoffman, Esq. (managing partner), Malcolm Lassman, Esq., Joel Jankowski, Esq. and others; and
5. I believed that the law firm of Akin Gump shared confidential personal information about me, some of it obtained unlawfully, with firm personnel who thereafter used the information to harass me, thereby intentionally inflicting severe emotional distress.
My current treating psychiatrists do not believe that I pose a risk of harm to myself or others. However, comprehensive psychological testing performed by the George Washington University Medical Center Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences in May 1994 (William Fabian, Ph.D.) disclosed that I have a (deeply ingrained) tendency to decompensate under stress (such as, presumably, the stresses of the workplace) and that I have poor coping skills. There is no evidence that I currently have the ability to cope with workplace stresses. In fact, my present circumstances suggest I do not. I am totally socially isolated; I speak by telephone to my sister, my only sibling, about once a week; the U.S. Marshal believes that my writings evidence anger of an intensity that merits law enforcement scrutiny as well as the imposition of protective measures; at my psychiatric consultations I speak of imaginary friends, criminal conspiracies involving high level government officials, nationally-prominent lawyers, and the U.S. Marshal Service. On June 17, 2010 my psychiatrist Abbas Jama, MD, observed that I am obsessively preoccupied with the past, which he considers pathological.
I believe that my SSA claim is fraudulent, that I do not suffer from psychotic mental illness, and that my beliefs about my environment are accurate. However, I accept the determinations made by my treating psychiatrists since 1992 that I suffer from severe mental illness; I accept the determination made by the U.S. Marshal that I pose a risk of harm to others and that I am therefore unemployable by reason of business necessity per the Americans With Disabilities Act; I accept the fact that my beliefs that I am employable and that my claim for disability benefits is fraudulent are symptoms of severe (psychotic) mental illness; I accept the fact that my belief that I do not suffer from psychotic mental illness is itself a symptom of psychotic mental illness, namely, my inability to appreciate, or have insight 1/ into, the nature and severity of my disorder. I have disclosed to the U.S. Marshal, a representative of the U.S. Department of Justice, that I believe my continued receipt of disability benefits paid by the SSA is fraudulent and amounts to the commission of a felony.
I have not withheld or misrepresented any material facts about the illness diagnosed by my psychiatrists from either the U.S. Social Security Administration or the U.S. Department of Justice. I have diligently provided facts adverse to my disability claim to the U.S. Social Security Administration, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Office of U.S. Attorney (District of Columbia).
I affirm under penalty of law that the above statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
GARY FREEDMAN
June 27, 2010
________________________________
1/ See initial assessment, Napoleon Cuenco, MD, George Washington University Department of Psychiatry, September 24, 1992, which stated that my insight into my disorder was "poor."
1 a representation of an existing fact;
2 its materiality;
3 its falsity;
4 the speaker's knowledge of its falsity;
5 the speaker's intent that it shall be acted upon by the plaintiff;
6 plaintiff's ignorance of its falsity;
7 plaintiff's reliance on the truth of the representation;
8 plaintiff's right to rely upon it; and
9 consequent damages suffered by plaintiff.
In April 1993 I filed for disability benefits from the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA) by reason of severe mental illness, which according to my former employer, the D.C. law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, rendered me unfit for employment by reason of business necessity effective October 29, 1991. The firm alleged in a sworn statement dated May 22, 1992 filed under penalty of criminal sanctions with the D.C. Department of Human Rights that I posed a tort risk to the firm, a statement that I submitted to the SSA in support of my disability claim. I do not know the precise facts upon which the SSA relied to determine that I became unemployable on October 29, 1991 nor the facts upon which the SSA has determined that I have been continuously unemployable and eligible for benefits to the present date.
I have not misrepresented any material facts about myself or my beliefs upon which treating psychiatrists, since September 1992, have diagnosed me with severe (psychotic) mental illness including bipolar disorder (Napoleon Cuenco, MD, Daniel Tsao, MD, Suzanne M. Pitts); paranoid schizophrenia (Dimitrios Georgopoulos, MD, Albert H. Taub, Betsy Jane Cooper, MD) and delusional (paranoid) disorder (Albert H. Taub, MD, Rhoda Ruttenberg, MD, Henry C. Barbot, MD, Didi Bailey, MD, Jeremy Carpenter, MD, Umar Rahman, MD). I did not misrepresent any material facts about my beliefs in the harassment complaint I lodged at Akin Gump in October 1991, upon which a psychiatrist advised Akin Gump that I suffered from a "disorder" known as "ideas of reference" that might dispose me to commit an act of violence.
My beliefs, upon which my treating psychiatrists have diagnosed severe (psychotic) mental illness, are genuine and long-held. See U.S. v. Francisco Martin Duran, United States Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, 96 F.3d 1495 (Oct. 8, 1996 ). Duran pleaded not guilty to the charge of attempting to assassinate the President of the United States and mounted an insanity defense, claiming that he was trying to save the world by destroying an alien "mist", connected by an umbilical cord to an alien in the Colorado mountains. Duran's insanity defense failed based on expert prosecution testimony that Duran's purported belief, or "delusion," was not genuine and long-held.
http://cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/F3/96/1495/504003/
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals decided in an opinion issued on September 1, 1998 that the reasons my former employer, Akin Gump, submitted to the D.C. Department of Human Rights in support of its decision to terminate my employment, effective October 29, 1991, were genuine and worthy of credence. Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights, D.C.C.A. no. 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998) (the Court implicitly affirmed that I had a disturbed mental state during the entire period March 1988 to October 29, 1991, cf. Duran, in other words, that my belief that I was a victim of harassment, which was the product of a psychiatric "disorder," was long-held and genuine).
Akin Gump had advised the D.C. Department Human Rights that following its investigation of a complaint of job harassment I had lodged against my direct supervisor, coworkers, and attorneys, the firm had determined, in consultation with a practicing psychiatrist, Gertrude R. Ticho, M.D., that my beliefs were the product of a psychiatric "disorder" (ideas of reference) that might dispose me to commit an act of violence. (Akin Gump apparently disputed, or failed to affirm, the determination of the D.C. Department of Human Rights that I had ever lodged a complaint against my direct supervisor.)
I continue to believe that I was a victim of job harassment at Akin Gump; arguably--by reason of my beliefs about Akin Gump alone--I remain unemployable per the Americans With Disabilities Act by reason of business necessity.
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2010/04/americans-with-disabilities-act-my.html
But there is more. On January 15, 2010 the U.S. Marshal determined that I pose a risk of harm to one of its protectees (and that protectee's family), and barred me from visiting my local synagogue as well as the U.S. District Court without prior (discretionary) approval by the U.S. Marshal.
At oral argument before the D.C. Court of Appeals on December 16, 1997 assistant D.C. Corporation Counsel M. Justin Draycott, Esq. stated to the Court that I "admitted" that my "coworkers were afraid" of me, affirming record evidence I had proffered to the D.C. Department of Human Rights that my former direct supervisor advised her employees on about October 29, 1991 that I might have had plans to return to the firm's premises after my termination to kill her: requiring the supervisor (and unnamed others) to take protective measures against a feared homicidal assault.
Akin Gump did not dispute pleadings filed by the D.C. Office of Corporation Counsel with the D.C. Court of Appeals that among the facts material to the firm's termination decision were the following:
1. I admitted (according to the Corporation Counsel) that a coworker, speaking for herself and others, in August 1989, was afraid that I might be armed and extremely dangerous;
2. I believed that I was a victim of frequent harassing acts by firm personnel (as an agency-supplied employee and later) throughout my tenure, from March 1988 to late October 1991, including the act of "gaslighting" and the spreading of false and malicious rumors;
3. I believed the law firm of Akin Gump violated the D.C. Mental Health Information Act by soliciting and obtaining confidential mental health information about me from a treating psychiatrist;
4. I believed that the law firm of Akin Gump may have committed a criminal act in gaining access to my apartment in January 1990, inspecting the premises, and videotaping the premises and its contents: that this possible criminal act was likely approved by the firm's management committee, which included Robert S. Strauss, Esq., Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Esq. Richard Wyatt, Esq. Laurence J. Hoffman, Esq. (managing partner), Malcolm Lassman, Esq., Joel Jankowski, Esq. and others; and
5. I believed that the law firm of Akin Gump shared confidential personal information about me, some of it obtained unlawfully, with firm personnel who thereafter used the information to harass me, thereby intentionally inflicting severe emotional distress.
My current treating psychiatrists do not believe that I pose a risk of harm to myself or others. However, comprehensive psychological testing performed by the George Washington University Medical Center Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences in May 1994 (William Fabian, Ph.D.) disclosed that I have a (deeply ingrained) tendency to decompensate under stress (such as, presumably, the stresses of the workplace) and that I have poor coping skills. There is no evidence that I currently have the ability to cope with workplace stresses. In fact, my present circumstances suggest I do not. I am totally socially isolated; I speak by telephone to my sister, my only sibling, about once a week; the U.S. Marshal believes that my writings evidence anger of an intensity that merits law enforcement scrutiny as well as the imposition of protective measures; at my psychiatric consultations I speak of imaginary friends, criminal conspiracies involving high level government officials, nationally-prominent lawyers, and the U.S. Marshal Service. On June 17, 2010 my psychiatrist Abbas Jama, MD, observed that I am obsessively preoccupied with the past, which he considers pathological.
I have not withheld or misrepresented any material facts about the illness diagnosed by my psychiatrists from either the U.S. Social Security Administration or the U.S. Department of Justice. I have diligently provided facts adverse to my disability claim to the U.S. Social Security Administration, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Office of U.S. Attorney (District of Columbia).
I affirm under penalty of law that the above statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
GARY FREEDMAN
June 27, 2010
________________________________
1/ See initial assessment, Napoleon Cuenco, MD, George Washington University Department of Psychiatry, September 24, 1992, which stated that my insight into my disorder was "poor."
Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights and HeLa Cells: The Closest Things to Immortality
A HeLa cell (also Hela or hela cell) is a cell type in an immortal cell line used in scientific research. It is one of the oldest and most commonly used human cell lines. The line was derived from cervical cancer cells taken from Henrietta Lacks, a patient who eventually died of her cancer on October 4, 1951. The cell line was found to be remarkably durable and prolific as illustrated by its contamination of many other cell lines used in research.
HeLa cells are termed "immortal" in that they can divide an unlimited number of times in a laboratory cell culture plate as long as fundamental cell survival conditions are met (i.e. being maintained and sustained in a suitable environment). There are many strains of HeLa cells as they continue to evolve by being grown in cell cultures, but all HeLa cells are descended from the same tumor cells removed from Mrs. Lacks. It has been estimated that the total number of HeLa cells that have been propagated in cell culture far exceeds the total number of cells that were in Henrietta Lacks' body.
HeLa cells and Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights are the closest things to immortality on God's green earth! Henrietta Lacks died in 1951 but her cells will live on forever, or so it seems.
Negligent Hiring of an Employee Rationally Determined to be Potentially Violent and Homicidal
If an employee was lawfully terminated by reason of business necessity on the basis of an assessment made by a psychiatrist that he was potentially violent and posed a negligence risk in the workplace, does that employee have a legal duty to advise prospective employers in the future about that termination decision?
If the highest legal officer in the state makes a quasi-judicial determination that an employee was lawfully terminated by reason of business necessity on the basis of an assessment made by a psychiatrist that the employee was potentially violent and posed a negligence risk in the workplace and that coworkers reasonably feared that the employee might have been armed and extremely dangerous, does that employee have a legal duty to advise prospective employers in the future about that court-affirmed determination?
The answer is arguably yes. The employee has a duty of care to a prospective employer to advise that employer that a state supreme court had affirmed that at a previous place of employment fears that the employee might have been violent and capable of armed, mass homicide were genuine, worthy of credence, and not the product of discriminatory animus.
"An employer is often unaware of an employee's past problems. However, the courts usually conclude that a reasonable investigation would call for affirmative statements which attest to an applicant's honesty, trustworthiness, and reliability, and that background checks should disclose relevant information that might not otherwise be uncovered."
http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/article/78058270.html
If a worker does not disclose to a prospective employer that a state supreme court had affirmed that a prior employer had reasonable and credible fears that the worker might have been violent, armed and extremely dangerous, the worker's failure to disclose will at the very least raise substantial concerns about the worker's honesty, trustworthiness, and reliability even if such information does not establish that the worker is in fact a negligence risk.
Query: Does an employee's duty of care, arising under the law of negligence, to advise a prospective employer of reasonable past fears that he might have posed a negligence risk at a prior place of employment render the employee for all practical purposes permanently unemployable by reason of business necessity?
If the answer is yes, have the employee's civil rights -- specifically, his constitutionally-protected right to seek employment -- been violated in a situation in which the assessing psychiatrist did not personally examine the employee, persuasive non-record evidence tends to prove that the employer had fabricated evidence that it based its termination decision on the advice of mental health professionals, and record evidence tends to prove that the employee was a victim of a form of subtle job harassment known as "mobbing" in which unfounded fears that an employee may become violent are prominent and typical.
"An employer is often unaware of an employee's past problems. However, the courts usually conclude that a reasonable investigation would call for affirmative statements which attest to an applicant's honesty, trustworthiness, and reliability, and that background checks should disclose relevant information that might not otherwise be uncovered."
http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/article/78058270.html
If a worker does not disclose to a prospective employer that a state supreme court had affirmed that a prior employer had reasonable and credible fears that the worker might have been violent, armed and extremely dangerous, the worker's failure to disclose will at the very least raise substantial concerns about the worker's honesty, trustworthiness, and reliability even if such information does not establish that the worker is in fact a negligence risk.
Query: Does an employee's duty of care, arising under the law of negligence, to advise a prospective employer of reasonable past fears that he might have posed a negligence risk at a prior place of employment render the employee for all practical purposes permanently unemployable by reason of business necessity?
If the answer is yes, have the employee's civil rights -- specifically, his constitutionally-protected right to seek employment -- been violated in a situation in which the assessing psychiatrist did not personally examine the employee, persuasive non-record evidence tends to prove that the employer had fabricated evidence that it based its termination decision on the advice of mental health professionals, and record evidence tends to prove that the employee was a victim of a form of subtle job harassment known as "mobbing" in which unfounded fears that an employee may become violent are prominent and typical.
Saturday, June 26, 2010
America Wants to Know! On the Politicization of the Enforcement of Civil Rights
What Did Eric Holder Know and When Did He Know It?
- 04.23.2010 - 1:55 PM
- 04.23.2010 - 1:55 PM
From the beginning of the New Black Panther Party scandal, the Obama Justice Department insisted that the decision to dismiss a case of egregious voter intimidation was made by career attorneys. Now we are learning that there was significant involvement by political appointees, including the attorney general himself. In a prepared testimony before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, which opened its hearing today, Rep. Frank Wolf explained:
“According to the Appellate Division memos first disclosed in the Times article, Appellate Chief Diana K. Flynn said that ‘the appropriate action was to pursue the default judgment’ and that Justice had made a ‘reasonable argument in favor of default relief against all defendants.’Flynn’s opinion was shared by a second Appellate Division official, Marie K. McElderry, who stated, ‘The government’s predominant interest is preventing intimidation, threats and coercion against voters or persons urging or aiding persons to vote or attempt to vote.’Given these troubling disclosures, I have repeatedly called on the attorney general to re-file this civil suit and allow a ruling from the judge based on the merits of the case, not political expediency. The career trial team should be allowed to bring the case again – per the guidance I obtained from the Congressional Research Service’s American Law Division in its July 30 memo – to allow our nation’s justice system to work as it was intended: impartially and without bias.Sources within the department stated that Associate Attorney General Thomas Perrelli, a political appointee, in conjunction with the acting assistant attorney general for civil rights, Ms. Loretta King, and her deputy, Mr. Steve Rosenbaum, overruled the career attorneys in the Voting Rights section. Earlier this week, the department finally acknowledged that the Attorney General was made aware – on multiple occasions – of the steps being taken to dismiss this case.”
Wolf may be referring to the Justice Department’s supplemental response to an interrogation from the Commission, a copy of which I have received. The Department confirms, “The Attorney General was generally made aware by the then-Acting Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights and the Associate’s staff that the Civil Rights Division was considering the appropriate actions to take in the New Black Panther Party litigation case.” The response states that Holder was “likely provided a brief update” but “did not make the decisions regarding any aspect” of the case. Did he weigh in? Did he advocate a position? Did his underlings? We don’t know.
But one thing is certain: if the case was significant enough to brief the attorney general on, you can bet that the decisions were approved if not instigated by political appointees. The veil is beginning to be lifted. Now it is time to put Holder and Perrelli under oath and find out what they knew and when they knew it. And then we can determine whether the Justice Department has been covering up the politicization of the enforcement of civil rights.
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Akin Gump: Fraud and Racketeering Conspiracy -- Department of Labor
U.S. Department of Labor
Office of the Assistant Secretary
for Administration and Management
Washington, D.C. 20210
Jan 10 2005
Jan 10 2005
Reference: CRC Complaint No. 05-DC-001
Mr. Gary Freedman
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Apt. 136
Washington, DC 20008
Dear Mr. Freedman
This will acknowledge receipt, by the Department of Labor's (DOL) Civil Rights Center (CRC), of your complaint on 1/4/2005.
The CRC is responsible for enforcing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended; the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, as amended; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended; Section 188 of the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998; and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, as amended. Collectively, these laws prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, age, sex, disability, citizenship, political affiliation or belief and status as a WIA participant in programs funded, in whole or in part, by the Department of Labor (DOL). CRC also has responsibility for enforcing Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by public entities. Programs funded by DOL include, but are not limited to, WIA Programs (Job Corps, Older Workers, Dislocated Workers, Youth Employment and Training, Native Americans, Migrant and Seasonal Farm Workers, etc.) and the State Employment Service, the Unemployment Insurance Program, and grant programs administered by the Mine Safety and Health Administration, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the Veterans' Employment and Training Service. The regulations require that complaints be filed within 180 days from the date of the alleged discrimination.
Based on the information you provided, CRC does not have jurisdiction over your complaint. You may wish to contact a private attorney to handle the fraud and racketeering problems you are alleging. Therefore, we are returning your disc to you.
I hope this information is helpful to you.
Sincerely,
/s/
Annabelle T. Lockhart
Director
Civil Rights Center
Enclosure
Friday, June 25, 2010
GW: Submission of Legal Writing Samples
January 13, 1993
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apartment 136
Washington, DC 20008
Dr. Suzanne M. Pitts
Dept. of Psychiatry
George Washington University
Medical Center
2150 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20037
Dear Dr. Pitts:
Attached are two legal writing samples: one written by a senior partner in a major law firm, the other written by a first-semester law student who had just completed his 12th week of law school. (I had begun law school in late August 1979; shortly thereafter, on November 30, 1979, I submitted the attached writing for a course in legal writing and research).
Review of the two writings will give you some idea of what really troubles me about my former employer's Response, which I first read on the evening of December 23, 1992, and, indeed what troubles me about the termination itself. From the onset one is vaguely reminded of the decision in 1987 by the great legal scholars on the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee to refuse to affirm the nomination of Judge Robert Bork to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
[Handwritten note by Dr. Pitts: "Pt considered this letter very aggressive & hostile." Dr. Pitts underlined the word "very" three times.]
Great Ideas that Helped Mankind!
First Great Idea: Fire Freedman! He was an outstanding employee, but he was more trouble than he was worth. The wisdom of that decision is made more clear with each passing day.
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/
Second Great Idea: Boycott Israel! Do we really need a Jewish state? The following video demonstrates that Israel is more trouble than it's worth.
Third Great Idea: Deep Sea Oil Drilling: And isn't that a dream come true!
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/
Second Great Idea: Boycott Israel! Do we really need a Jewish state? The following video demonstrates that Israel is more trouble than it's worth.
Third Great Idea: Deep Sea Oil Drilling: And isn't that a dream come true!
Thursday, June 24, 2010
Taking on The World: You and Me, Baby!
by Geeta Malik
 Acres of water spread out in every direction; icebergs lay in wait under the surface of the freezing ocean. Later, the sun would become blinding and the wind would tear through Ellen MacArthur's sails as she pushed forward alone, near Antarctica, in her Kingfisher boat. She would have to make numerous back-breaking repairs, facing battering weather and harsh conditions. The food was freeze-dried, her water rationed, and her naptimes often limited to twenty minutes in 24 hours. Physical, mental and emotional exhaustion were only a few of the obstacles she faced on her odyssey around the world.  A year ago, Ellen MacArthur competed in the prestigious Vendee Globe 2000, a sailing race that takes a round-the-world tour of rough seas and debilitating conditions. At the age of 24, being one of two women in the race, Ellen was facing all the odds. She came in second place, making history with her strength and determination. Ever since she was a little girl, Ellen knew she wanted to sail. She fought hard for sponsorships and saved her money to buy boats and equipment. When she began the Vendee Globe race as the youngest person and also the smallest in stature (at 5'2), Ellen's goal was simply to place in the top five. At one point, her sail tore and she had to shimmy up the 90-foot mast in stormy weather to repair it; another time, her boat hit a solid object floating in the water and the daggerboard broke. The daggerboard, many times Ellen's size and weight, had to be hauled on deck and replaced. Ellen lost her lead at this point, but soon returned to second place with barely a hitch.  Ellen ended the Vendee Globe race after 94 days alone at sea. She broke records by being both the youngest solo sailor and completing the fastest non-stop circumnavigation of the globe by a woman. |
The Perfect Felony
I am currently engaged in the commission of a felony. I am in the process of defrauding the federal government of $500,000.
I cannot be prosecuted for my crime. On January 15, 2010 the U.S. Marshal Service admitted that I pose a risk of harm to persons in my environment, and therefore I am unemployable by reason of business necessity; I pose a negligence risk to a prospective employer. I am not permitted to visit my local synagogue or the U.S. District Court without prior approval of the U.S. Marshal.
Also, I admitted to the U.S. Marshal in a taped interview that I am defrauding the federal government; the U.S. Marshal expressly waived an investigation of my crime.
I guess you could say I am committing the perfect felony, the perfect crime. Thanks, Lanny! Apparently, it is the intent of the Justice Department to protect the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld at all costs -- literally and metaphorically. And that, as we say in the trade, is good for business.
Burton Caine Law Review Article -- Critique
The following is the first page of my critique of a law review article that was written by one of my law professors at Temple University, Burton Caine. Professor Caine telephoned me about the letter in early January 1984. When I locate the remaining pages of the letter I will post them.
Professor Caine's article "Judicial Review, Democracy v. Constitutionality," which appeared in the Temple Law Review, has been reprinted by the government and circulated throughout the world. He has also written on new interpretations of significant stories in the Hebrew Bible.
December 28, 1983
3801 Connecticut Ave., NW
Apt. 136
Washington, DC 20008
Prof. Burton Caine
Temple University School of Law
1719 N. Broad Street
Philadelphia, PA 19122
Dear Professor Caine:
I was a student in your course in Political and Civil Rights in the Fall 1981 semester and am currently an LL.M. candidate in International Law at the Washington College of Law, American University.
I read with great interest your article “Judicial Review--Democracy versus Constitutionality” and am writing to offer an alternative view of Marbury v Madison. It is an analysis that emphasizes an aspect of Marbury you seem to have overlooked, yet an analysis that nonetheless inferentially supports your conclusions.
The conclusions of your paper are indisputable. However, from a purely logical perspective, I believe you have “skipped a step” in your reasoning. Interestingly, although you quote the preamble to the Constitution, you omit the one phrase that illustrates the sub silencio, unstated aim of Marbury -- “In order to form a more perfect Union . . . “. Marbury illustrates an intent to establish the supremacy of federal law, an intent to form a more perfect union in which state interests are subordinated to the interests of the federal government. Judicial review must best seen as an attempt to check encroachment of state interests on the then newly-created federal entity. It is in promoting federal supremacy--the supremacy of a federal, and purely federal, interpretation of the Constitution -- that Marbury helps ensure individual rights. Judicial review affords the Federal Courts the means to fashion a purely federally-defined version of individual rights as embodied in the Bill of Rights, and in so doing, protects individual rights from encroachment by majoritarian, state-oriented interests.
This analysis is rooted in an understanding of the nature and form of the U.S. as it appeared to John Marshall. The U.S. had only fairly recently been united. So-called states rights and state interests must have appeared to Marshall as a grave threat to federal supremacy--a threat, though not apparent today, that cannot be overlooked in an analysis of Marbury. The federal union in the early nineteenth century must have appeared to Marshall as a fragile entity and Marbury must be viewed as Marshall’s response to this perception.
While John Marshall “does not search out the framers’ intent,”
Professor Caine's article "Judicial Review, Democracy v. Constitutionality," which appeared in the Temple Law Review, has been reprinted by the government and circulated throughout the world. He has also written on new interpretations of significant stories in the Hebrew Bible.
December 28, 1983
3801 Connecticut Ave., NW
Apt. 136
Washington, DC 20008
Prof. Burton Caine
Temple University School of Law
1719 N. Broad Street
Philadelphia, PA 19122
Dear Professor Caine:
I was a student in your course in Political and Civil Rights in the Fall 1981 semester and am currently an LL.M. candidate in International Law at the Washington College of Law, American University.
I read with great interest your article “Judicial Review--Democracy versus Constitutionality” and am writing to offer an alternative view of Marbury v Madison. It is an analysis that emphasizes an aspect of Marbury you seem to have overlooked, yet an analysis that nonetheless inferentially supports your conclusions.
The conclusions of your paper are indisputable. However, from a purely logical perspective, I believe you have “skipped a step” in your reasoning. Interestingly, although you quote the preamble to the Constitution, you omit the one phrase that illustrates the sub silencio, unstated aim of Marbury -- “In order to form a more perfect Union . . . “. Marbury illustrates an intent to establish the supremacy of federal law, an intent to form a more perfect union in which state interests are subordinated to the interests of the federal government. Judicial review must best seen as an attempt to check encroachment of state interests on the then newly-created federal entity. It is in promoting federal supremacy--the supremacy of a federal, and purely federal, interpretation of the Constitution -- that Marbury helps ensure individual rights. Judicial review affords the Federal Courts the means to fashion a purely federally-defined version of individual rights as embodied in the Bill of Rights, and in so doing, protects individual rights from encroachment by majoritarian, state-oriented interests.
This analysis is rooted in an understanding of the nature and form of the U.S. as it appeared to John Marshall. The U.S. had only fairly recently been united. So-called states rights and state interests must have appeared to Marshall as a grave threat to federal supremacy--a threat, though not apparent today, that cannot be overlooked in an analysis of Marbury. The federal union in the early nineteenth century must have appeared to Marshall as a fragile entity and Marbury must be viewed as Marshall’s response to this perception.
While John Marshall “does not search out the framers’ intent,”
Wednesday, June 23, 2010
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