More Conspiracy Against Rights!

June 4, 2015

3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW

Apartment 136

Washington, DC  20008

Social Security Administration
Mid-Atlantic Program Service Center
Module 7
300 Spring Garden Street
Philadelphia PA  19123-2999
 
RE:  Disability Claim xxx xx xxxx

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is my affirmation, made under penalty of perjury, of prior allegations of fact made by the D.C. Office of Corporation Counsel (predecessor of the D.C. Office of Attorney General) concerning my current mental state (as of June 4, 2015) as it relates to my former place of employment, the D.C. law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld.  My mental state (and, presumably, whether I currently pose a direct threat in the workplace and therefore do not enjoy the protections of the Americans With Disabilities Act “ADA”) remains unchanged since the District of Columbia affirmed that I was unemployable effective October 29, 1991 (date disability began according to SSA) because I posed a direct threat in the workplace.  See ADA Direct Threat Defense.  See Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights, D.C.C.A. no. 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998) (Akin Gump learned, on a psychiatrist’s advice, that I was potentially violent).

The District of Columbia Department of Human Rights and Minority Business Development found that my employer had genuine and credible reasons to find that I posed a risk of violence in the workplace as of October 29, 1991 (Finding of Fact 6, Initial Determination dated June 30, 1993). 

The D.C. Office of Corporation Counsel found, sua sponte, based on legally-irrelevant after-acquired evidence that my coworkers formed a genuine and credible belief that I might become armed and extremely dangerous in August 1989.   Brief of Appellee District of Columbia, Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights, D.C.C.A. no. 96-CV-961 at 9 (Sept. 1, 1998) (affirming that the statements of Stacey Schaar made to me in August 1989 that she and others feared I might become armed and extremely dangerous were genuine and credible and not evidence of job harassment).

The D.C. Court of Appeals was unpersuaded by my argument that my former direct superviser’s (Christine Robertson’s) published statements made on about October 29, 1991 that she feared I might carry out a mass homicidal assault on the firm’s premises and that she needed to have the office secured against such an assault, see record on appeal at 41, were malicious and defamatory and evidence of job harassment.

Sincerely,

 Gary Freedman

cc:  U.S. Department of Justice; D.C. Office of Attorney General