Judge David Sentelle

David Sentelle serves as an associate judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. He served on the Special Division of the Court which appointed Kenneth Starr under the renewed Independent Counsel statute, replacing Robert B. Fiske, who had been appointed by Attorney General Janet Reno special prosecutor to investigate the allegations against President Bill Clinton with respect to the Whitewater affair. In 1998 I sent Judge Sentelle an inquiry into a judicial clerkship, to which he responded with a cordial reply.

United States Court of Appeals
District of Columbia Circuit
Washington DC 20001

David B. Sentelle
United States Circuit Judge

June 29, 1999

Mr. Gary Freedman
3801 Conn. Ave., NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530

Dear Mr. Freedman:

Receipt is acknowledged of your correspondence of June 26, 1999, expresing your interest in a clerkship in my chambers. We do not have any vacancies at the present and will not have any for the next two years.

With every good wish to you, I am

Sincerely yours,

David B. Sentelle

September 22, 1998
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008-4530

Honorable David B. Sentelle
Circuit Judge
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
333 Constitution Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-2802

Dear Judge Sentelle:

I am an attorney licensed to practice in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and qualify for consideration for a position as law clerk to a judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Preliminary to forwarding a copy of my resume to the Court I believe I have a legal duty to advise the Court of the following facts regarding concerns about my potential for armed violence or homicide, intent to purchase firearms to commit a felony, and the illegal transport of a deadly weapon: concerns placed in controversy and affirmed, by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel, as relating to genuine fears about my criminal intent.

The Government of the District of Columbia has affirmed that my former employer, the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump") terminated my employment in October 1991 on the basis of genuine concerns about my mental health and stability, including the potential for violence. The employer's termination decision was made following an ex parte consultation with a psychiatrist who did not examine me personally. Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order, June 10, 1996), affirmed by the D.C. Court of Appeals (Terry, Reid, and King, associate judges), No. 96-CV-961 (Memorandum Opinion and Judgment filed Sept. 1, 1998). As of the filing of the complaint in the Superior Court proceedings, in October 1995, and at all times thereafter, it was unlawful under the laws of the District of Columbia for a psychiatrist to offer a professional psychiatric opinion about an individual without benefit of personal examination as is strongly recommended by the American Psychiatric Association's Principles of Medical Ethics. The D.C. Code in its latest revision makes it unlawful for a physician to "[fail] to conform to standards of acceptable conduct and prevailing practice within a health profession." See D.C. Code 2-3305.14(26). This provision was added to the District of Columbia Health Occupations Revision Act by D.C. Law 10-247, enacted on March 23, 1995.

The District of Columbia Superior Court as well as the Court of Appeals did not find that the action of my Akin Gump supervisor in stating to employees that she feared that I might have had plans to kill her and the action of the supervisor in arranging to have her office secured against such a homicidal assault, see record on appeal at 41, was invidiously motivated.

The District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel expressly affirmed to the D.C. Superior Court and to the Court of Appeals in pleadings filed in the above-referenced proceedings, relying on legally-irrelevant "after-acquired" evidence, see McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S.Ct. 879, 885 (1995), that my coworkers had formed genuine fears (i.e., not motivated by discriminatory animus) that I might have been armed and dangerous and poised to carry out a homicidal assault on the firm's premises. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia Department of Human Rights and Minority Business Development at 9, Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Court of Appeals No. 96-CV-961 (citing record on appeal at 276). The District implicitly asserted that my coworkers' concerns about my potential for armed violence were relevant to the employer's decision to terminate my employment.

I stand by the "Statement of Gary Freedman to the Office of U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Regarding Intent to Commit Crime of Violence as Determined by the Law Firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld," ("Statement to the U.S. Attorney") dated April 24, 1995, and made under penalty of criminal sanctions (D.C. Code 22-2514).

I want to advise, however, that representations made by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (M. Justin Draycott, Esq.) to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals at oral argument in December 1997 that I "admitted" in pleadings that I filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights that my "coworkers" were genuinely "afraid" of me (specifically with regard to my potential for armed violence or homicide) conflict with the prior Statement to the U.S. Attorney, and that said conflict may give rise to the appearance that the exculpatory representations that I made in the Statement to the U.S. Attorney were unreliable, knowingly false, or perjured.

Additionally, the Court of Appeals has affirmed, see D.C. No. 96-CV-961 at 3 n. 1, that the Department of Human Rights had legally-valid concerns that a document I submitted to the agency may have been inauthentic (i.e., forged or fabricated), see record on appeal at 8; presumably, according to the agency, I submitted the possibly inauthentic document in order to deny forensic psychiatric evidence filed by Akin Gump with the agency: forensic psychiatric evidence relating to my mental health (specifically relating to the psychiatric symptom "ideas of reference") and stability (specifically relating to my potential for violence). But see Namerdy v. Generalcar, 217 A.2d 109, 111-112 (D.C. 1966) (circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that a letter is written on the author's letterhead, is sufficient for authentication).

Robert Chapman, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, is familiar with this matter, and will respond to any questions the Court may have. The telephone number of the U.S. Attorney's Office is (202) 514 7566.

I am confident that the above facts will in no way impair my chances for fair consideration by the U.S. Court of Appeals for employment as a law clerk.

Sincerely,

Gary Freedman