April 14, 1998
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Frank Cummings, Esq.
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae
1875 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Suite 1200
Washington, DC 20009
RE: Leboeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae Employment Inquiry - Homicide/Violence Risk
Dear Mr. Cummings:
I am writing to assure the law firm of Leboeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae that at the time of my employment inquiry in 1985, to which Hiring Partner Austin P. Olney, Esq. responded by letter dated March 5, 1985 (copy attached), I did not intentionally withhold any facts pertinent to my current mental illness: an apparently rare form of paranoid schizophrenia--a debilitating psychotic disorder--that has left my intellectual functioning intact even as the illness worsens in severity, and which disorder cannot be detected on comprehensive psychological testing as performed by a major medical center (The George Washington University Medical Center).
As a courtesy to Leboeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae I forward (on the enclosed computer disc) two pleadings that I filed in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in a currently pending appeal, that will satisfy any questions you or your partners may have concerning the risk of violence (including armed violence and homicide) to which I unintentionally subjected your firm. The disc also contains a document pertinent to a criminal investigation instituted by the Federal Protective Service (Jerry McGill, S.A.), ancillary to concerns, affirmed as genuine by the Government of the District of Columbia, relating to a reported risk of violence (including homicide) that I posed at the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, my former employer.
I know that you are a nationally-recognized expert in employment discrimination law. You may have an academic interest in precisely how an individual diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, a disabling psychotic mental disorder, might go about applying the law of employment discrimination to the facts relating to a job termination.
Supervisory Special Agent David M. Bowie at the Washington Field Office of the FBI is familiar with this matter. The telephone number of the FBI Washington Field Office is 252-7801.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
Thursday, December 31, 2009
Hogan & Hartson: What Does Vinnie Cohen Know And When Did He Know It?
June 25, 1997
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Vincent Cohen, Esq.
Hogan & Hartson
555 13th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20004-1109
RE: Weapons Possession - Intent to Inflict Grievous Bodily Harm/Possible Intent to Commit Murder - D.C. Corporation Counsel Affirmation - Possible Concealment of State and/or Federal Weapons Law Violations
Dear Mr. Cohen:
During the period March 1988 to October 1991 I was employed as a legal assistant at the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump"). Attorney managers at Akin Gump terminated my employment effective October 29, 1991 upon determining, in consultation with a psychiatrist, that a complaint of harassment I had lodged against several co-workers was attributable to a psychiatric symptom ("ideas of reference") prominent in the psychotic disorders and typically associated with a risk of violent behavior. See Freedman v. D.C. Dept. of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order issued June 10, 1996). In the period immediately after my job termination senior Akin Gump managers determined that it was advisable to secure the office of my direct supervisor against a possible homicidal assault, which it was feared I might commit.
In pleadings filed in the District of Columbia Superior Court, the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.) affirmed that Akin Gump personnel had geniune concerns that I might have had plans to procure firearms for an unlawful purpose and possessed the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm or commit murder. Mr. Ruff currently serves as chief White House Counsel to President Clinton (telephone no. 202 456 1414).
During the period September 1985 until late February 1988 I worked at Hogan & Hartson in the capacity of an agency-supplied temporary employee, assigned to the Computer Applications Department supervised by Sheryl Ferguson. During the period 1986 to late summer 1987 Laura Mayo served as secretary to the Computer Applications Department under Sheryl Ferguson and, later, under Miriam Chilton and the department's data base administrator, Esperanza ("Espe") Rebollar. 1/ As you know Laura Mayo had been employed as your secretary for a number of years prior to her transfer to the Computer Applications Department.
I have been under investigation by the U.S. Secret Service as a potential security risk to President Clinton, and was interrogated at the Washington Field Office by Special Agent Philip C. Leadroot (202 435-5100) as recently as February 1996, about 16 months ago. Questioning by Mr. Leadroot centered on the issue of presidential assassination.
I request that, if it is at all feasible, you counsel Laura Mayo to disclose to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (David M. Bowie, Supervisory Special Agent, Washington Field Office, 202 252 7801) the content of any communications she may have had with any Akin Gump attorneys regarding me, or any rumor or innuendo of which she may have come to be apprised via any source concerning me. Attorneys who may have directed inquiries to Mrs. Mayo include Earl L. Segal, Malcolm Lassman, or Laurence J. Hoffman (managing partner), among others.
Enclosed are some additional documents that provide background to the matters discussed in this letter.
Be advised: President Clinton's own lawyer, chief White House Counsel Charles F.C. Ruff, is talking real guns, real bullets, real brain tissue.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
______________________________
1/ In about June 1987 Laura Mayo showed me a draft version of a letter addressed to Hogan's then legal assistant administrator, Freddie Rios, that detailed alleged incompetencies of Esperanza Rebollar, including an alleged chemical (alcohol) dependency that interfered with Rebollar's work performance. I do not know whether Mrs. Mayo subsequently delivered the letter to Freddie Rios.
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Vincent Cohen, Esq.
Hogan & Hartson
555 13th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20004-1109
RE: Weapons Possession - Intent to Inflict Grievous Bodily Harm/Possible Intent to Commit Murder - D.C. Corporation Counsel Affirmation - Possible Concealment of State and/or Federal Weapons Law Violations
Dear Mr. Cohen:
During the period March 1988 to October 1991 I was employed as a legal assistant at the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump"). Attorney managers at Akin Gump terminated my employment effective October 29, 1991 upon determining, in consultation with a psychiatrist, that a complaint of harassment I had lodged against several co-workers was attributable to a psychiatric symptom ("ideas of reference") prominent in the psychotic disorders and typically associated with a risk of violent behavior. See Freedman v. D.C. Dept. of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order issued June 10, 1996). In the period immediately after my job termination senior Akin Gump managers determined that it was advisable to secure the office of my direct supervisor against a possible homicidal assault, which it was feared I might commit.
In pleadings filed in the District of Columbia Superior Court, the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.) affirmed that Akin Gump personnel had geniune concerns that I might have had plans to procure firearms for an unlawful purpose and possessed the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm or commit murder. Mr. Ruff currently serves as chief White House Counsel to President Clinton (telephone no. 202 456 1414).
During the period September 1985 until late February 1988 I worked at Hogan & Hartson in the capacity of an agency-supplied temporary employee, assigned to the Computer Applications Department supervised by Sheryl Ferguson. During the period 1986 to late summer 1987 Laura Mayo served as secretary to the Computer Applications Department under Sheryl Ferguson and, later, under Miriam Chilton and the department's data base administrator, Esperanza ("Espe") Rebollar. 1/ As you know Laura Mayo had been employed as your secretary for a number of years prior to her transfer to the Computer Applications Department.
I have been under investigation by the U.S. Secret Service as a potential security risk to President Clinton, and was interrogated at the Washington Field Office by Special Agent Philip C. Leadroot (202 435-5100) as recently as February 1996, about 16 months ago. Questioning by Mr. Leadroot centered on the issue of presidential assassination.
I request that, if it is at all feasible, you counsel Laura Mayo to disclose to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (David M. Bowie, Supervisory Special Agent, Washington Field Office, 202 252 7801) the content of any communications she may have had with any Akin Gump attorneys regarding me, or any rumor or innuendo of which she may have come to be apprised via any source concerning me. Attorneys who may have directed inquiries to Mrs. Mayo include Earl L. Segal, Malcolm Lassman, or Laurence J. Hoffman (managing partner), among others.
Enclosed are some additional documents that provide background to the matters discussed in this letter.
Be advised: President Clinton's own lawyer, chief White House Counsel Charles F.C. Ruff, is talking real guns, real bullets, real brain tissue.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
______________________________
1/ In about June 1987 Laura Mayo showed me a draft version of a letter addressed to Hogan's then legal assistant administrator, Freddie Rios, that detailed alleged incompetencies of Esperanza Rebollar, including an alleged chemical (alcohol) dependency that interfered with Rebollar's work performance. I do not know whether Mrs. Mayo subsequently delivered the letter to Freddie Rios.
Mary Tyler Moore? -- Surely, You're Joking, Mr. Freedman!
July 13, 1998
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Mary Tyler Moore
510 East 86th Street
#21A
New York, NY 10028
Dear Miss Moore:
During the period March 1988 to October 1991 I was employed as a legal assistant at the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump"). Attorney managers at Akin Gump terminated my employment effective October 29, 1991 upon determining, in consultation with a psychiatrist, that a complaint of harassment I had lodged against several co-workers was attributable to a psychiatric symptom ("ideas of reference") prominent in the psychotic disorders and typically associated with a risk of violent behavior. See Freedman v. D.C. Dept. of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order issued June 10, 1996). In the period immediately after my job termination senior Akin Gump managers determined that it was advisable to secure the office of my direct supervisor against a possible homicidal assault, which it was feared I might commit.
I have been under investigation by the U.S. Secret Service as a potential security risk to President William J. Clinton, and was interrogated at the Washington Field Office by Special Agent Philip C. Leadroot as recently as February 1996 on a referral by high-ranking attorneys at the U.S. Department of Justice.
I have also been under investigation by the Federal Protective Service (Jerry McGill, S.A.) incident to concerns, affirmed as genuine in 1996 by then District of Columbia Corporation Counsel--now White House Counsel to President Clinton--Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq., that I posed a risk of violence, including armed violence or homicide, at the law firm of Akin Gump.
Pursuant to the investigation instituted by the Federal Protective Service ("FPS") I forwarded a document to the FPS (letter dated July 18, 1994 addressed to my then treating psychiatrist, Dimitrios Georgopoulos, M.D.), that contains references to The Dick Van Dyke Show (in which you co-starred) as well as references to cardiac surgery and issues of Jewish interest.
I request that you disclose to the Washington Field Office of the U.S. Secret Service (Phillip C. Leadroot, S.A., telephone no. 202 435 5100) whether you have at any time been made aware, by any source, of the existence of this document. I enclose a copy of the first page of the document to refresh your possible recollection. I know that you will appreciate the serious nature of any concerns relating to presidential security and that any disclosure you make to the U.S. Secret Service will be full, candid, and truthful.
Background facts that prompt this inquiry are the following:
You co-starred on The Dick Van Dyke Show in the early 1960's;
Your husband Robert Levine, M.D. specializes in cardiac medicine; he is Jewish;
I believe that The Mary Tyler Moore Show, in which you starred in the period late 1960's to early 1970's, was produced by Ed. Weinberger, who is a graduate of my high school in Philadelphia, Central High School;
I believe that Ed. Weinberger was associated with The Bill Cosby Show, a television show that aired in the 1980's; Bill Cosby attended Central High School in Philadelphia;
Alvin Poussaint, M.D., a nationally-prominent African-American psychiatrist, is a professor of psychiatry at Harvard Medical School and an expert on the psychology of racism; Dr. Poussaint served as a consultant to Dr. Cosby in the production of his television series;
The law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld is managed by, among others, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., a nationally-prominent civil rights leader and trustee of Howard University; Jordan has ties to numerous persons in the entertainment field.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Mary Tyler Moore
510 East 86th Street
#21A
New York, NY 10028
Dear Miss Moore:
During the period March 1988 to October 1991 I was employed as a legal assistant at the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump"). Attorney managers at Akin Gump terminated my employment effective October 29, 1991 upon determining, in consultation with a psychiatrist, that a complaint of harassment I had lodged against several co-workers was attributable to a psychiatric symptom ("ideas of reference") prominent in the psychotic disorders and typically associated with a risk of violent behavior. See Freedman v. D.C. Dept. of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order issued June 10, 1996). In the period immediately after my job termination senior Akin Gump managers determined that it was advisable to secure the office of my direct supervisor against a possible homicidal assault, which it was feared I might commit.
I have been under investigation by the U.S. Secret Service as a potential security risk to President William J. Clinton, and was interrogated at the Washington Field Office by Special Agent Philip C. Leadroot as recently as February 1996 on a referral by high-ranking attorneys at the U.S. Department of Justice.
I have also been under investigation by the Federal Protective Service (Jerry McGill, S.A.) incident to concerns, affirmed as genuine in 1996 by then District of Columbia Corporation Counsel--now White House Counsel to President Clinton--Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq., that I posed a risk of violence, including armed violence or homicide, at the law firm of Akin Gump.
Pursuant to the investigation instituted by the Federal Protective Service ("FPS") I forwarded a document to the FPS (letter dated July 18, 1994 addressed to my then treating psychiatrist, Dimitrios Georgopoulos, M.D.), that contains references to The Dick Van Dyke Show (in which you co-starred) as well as references to cardiac surgery and issues of Jewish interest.
I request that you disclose to the Washington Field Office of the U.S. Secret Service (Phillip C. Leadroot, S.A., telephone no. 202 435 5100) whether you have at any time been made aware, by any source, of the existence of this document. I enclose a copy of the first page of the document to refresh your possible recollection. I know that you will appreciate the serious nature of any concerns relating to presidential security and that any disclosure you make to the U.S. Secret Service will be full, candid, and truthful.
Background facts that prompt this inquiry are the following:
You co-starred on The Dick Van Dyke Show in the early 1960's;
Your husband Robert Levine, M.D. specializes in cardiac medicine; he is Jewish;
I believe that The Mary Tyler Moore Show, in which you starred in the period late 1960's to early 1970's, was produced by Ed. Weinberger, who is a graduate of my high school in Philadelphia, Central High School;
I believe that Ed. Weinberger was associated with The Bill Cosby Show, a television show that aired in the 1980's; Bill Cosby attended Central High School in Philadelphia;
Alvin Poussaint, M.D., a nationally-prominent African-American psychiatrist, is a professor of psychiatry at Harvard Medical School and an expert on the psychology of racism; Dr. Poussaint served as a consultant to Dr. Cosby in the production of his television series;
The law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld is managed by, among others, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., a nationally-prominent civil rights leader and trustee of Howard University; Jordan has ties to numerous persons in the entertainment field.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
An Inside Joke To The President of the American Bar Association
February 20, 1998
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Jerome J. Shestak, Esq.
Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen
Philadelphia, PA 19102-2678
RE: Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld Homicide/Violence Risk Assessment -- Pennsylvania Attorney ID 41032
Dear Mr. Shestak:
Further to my letter to you dated February 3, 1997, I submit two computer discs that contain all of my personal computer files for the period November 1996 to the present. The documents contained on the discs will address any possible concerns that the American Bar Association may have with respect to my professional conduct as an attorney licensed to practice in Pennsylvania.
I want to relate an anecdote. My psychiatrist recently said to me: "Mr. Freedman, tell me, how would you describe your present life circumstances? And, please, limit yourself to one word. I'm a busy man." In response to his question I said: "Good." He said: "That tells me that you engage in massive denial." My psychiatrist then said: "Now, if you would, Mr. Freedman, expand that to two words. Describe for me in two words the nature of your present circumstances." I said: "Fine. -- Not Good." He said: "Mr. Freedman, that tells me that you're a paranoid malingerer."
And that, Mr. Shestak (to quote an ancient Rabbi), is the sum total of psychiatry. The rest is commentary.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
cc: Prof. Samuel Dash [now deceased] [ethics adviser to Kenneth Starr, Esq.-Whitewater Special Counsel]
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Jerome J. Shestak, Esq.
Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen
Philadelphia, PA 19102-2678
RE: Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld Homicide/Violence Risk Assessment -- Pennsylvania Attorney ID 41032
Dear Mr. Shestak:
Further to my letter to you dated February 3, 1997, I submit two computer discs that contain all of my personal computer files for the period November 1996 to the present. The documents contained on the discs will address any possible concerns that the American Bar Association may have with respect to my professional conduct as an attorney licensed to practice in Pennsylvania.
I want to relate an anecdote. My psychiatrist recently said to me: "Mr. Freedman, tell me, how would you describe your present life circumstances? And, please, limit yourself to one word. I'm a busy man." In response to his question I said: "Good." He said: "That tells me that you engage in massive denial." My psychiatrist then said: "Now, if you would, Mr. Freedman, expand that to two words. Describe for me in two words the nature of your present circumstances." I said: "Fine. -- Not Good." He said: "Mr. Freedman, that tells me that you're a paranoid malingerer."
And that, Mr. Shestak (to quote an ancient Rabbi), is the sum total of psychiatry. The rest is commentary.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
cc: Prof. Samuel Dash [now deceased] [ethics adviser to Kenneth Starr, Esq.-Whitewater Special Counsel]
What Does The Philadelphia U.S. Attorney Know?
November 17, 1997
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Michael R. Stiles, Esq.
U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania
Suite 1250
615 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19106-4476
Dear Mr. Stiles:
Further to my letter to your office dated July 1, 1997, I am writing to alert the Office of U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania I will be forwarding employment inquiries to individual judges of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as well as judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Notwithstanding the determination by the District of Columbia Superior Court that my former employer, the Washington, D.C. office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, had valid business reasons to terminate my employment in October 1991 based on the employer's concerns about my mental health and stability (including the potential for violence), see Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order issued June 10, 1996); and notwithstanding the assertions of the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles L. Reischel, Esq., Deputy Corporation Counsel) contained in pleadings filed in the D.C. Court of Appeals in a currently pending appeal of the above-referenced order (no. 96-CV-961) that (1) my coworkers had genuine concerns that I might have been armed and homicidal, implicitly affirmed that (2) the employer had genuine concerns that I might have formed the intent to engage in a homicidal assault on the employer's premises, and which pleadings left undisturbed the speculations of the D.C. Department of Human Rights that I might have filed (with the intent to defraud) inauthentic (i.e., forged or fabricated) documentary evidence intended to overcome the employer's proffered forensic psychiatric evidence that I suffered from a psychiatric symptom associated with a risk of violence, --
I hereby state:
I did not form an intent to commit murder at any time during my tenure at the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, which employment ended October 29, 1991, notwithstanding the allegations of the Government of the District of Columbia;
I did not plan to acquire firearms with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm or commit murder, notwithstanding the allegations of the Government of the District of Columbia;
I had no plans to engage in a homicidal assault on the premises of my former employer, and did not behave in any manner that might have caused the employer reasonably to believe that I might engage in such an assault, notwithstanding the allegations of the Government of the District of Columbia;
I did not file inauthentic (forged or fabricated) documents with a government agency in order to dispute forensic psychiatric evidence proffered by the employer that showed that I suffered from a psychiatric symptom associated with a risk of violent behavior, notwithstanding the speculations of the D.C. Department of Human Rights.
The enclosed computer disc contains copies of the pleadings I filed in the D.C. Court of Appeals in the above-referenced appeal (no. 96-CV-961), together with several other pertinent documents.
I stand ready to clarify further these matters to the Office of U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as well as to the judges of the U.S. District Court (Philadelphia) and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in connection with my contemplated employment inquiries.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman, Esq.
cc: John C. Keeney, Jr., Ass't U.S. Attorney General, Criminal Div., DOJ
Hon. Arlen Specter (member, Senate Judiciary Committee)
Charles L. Reischel, Esq. (202) 727-6252
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Michael R. Stiles, Esq.
U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania
Suite 1250
615 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19106-4476
Dear Mr. Stiles:
Further to my letter to your office dated July 1, 1997, I am writing to alert the Office of U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania I will be forwarding employment inquiries to individual judges of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as well as judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Notwithstanding the determination by the District of Columbia Superior Court that my former employer, the Washington, D.C. office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, had valid business reasons to terminate my employment in October 1991 based on the employer's concerns about my mental health and stability (including the potential for violence), see Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order issued June 10, 1996); and notwithstanding the assertions of the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles L. Reischel, Esq., Deputy Corporation Counsel) contained in pleadings filed in the D.C. Court of Appeals in a currently pending appeal of the above-referenced order (no. 96-CV-961) that (1) my coworkers had genuine concerns that I might have been armed and homicidal, implicitly affirmed that (2) the employer had genuine concerns that I might have formed the intent to engage in a homicidal assault on the employer's premises, and which pleadings left undisturbed the speculations of the D.C. Department of Human Rights that I might have filed (with the intent to defraud) inauthentic (i.e., forged or fabricated) documentary evidence intended to overcome the employer's proffered forensic psychiatric evidence that I suffered from a psychiatric symptom associated with a risk of violence, --
I hereby state:
I did not form an intent to commit murder at any time during my tenure at the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, which employment ended October 29, 1991, notwithstanding the allegations of the Government of the District of Columbia;
I did not plan to acquire firearms with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm or commit murder, notwithstanding the allegations of the Government of the District of Columbia;
I had no plans to engage in a homicidal assault on the premises of my former employer, and did not behave in any manner that might have caused the employer reasonably to believe that I might engage in such an assault, notwithstanding the allegations of the Government of the District of Columbia;
I did not file inauthentic (forged or fabricated) documents with a government agency in order to dispute forensic psychiatric evidence proffered by the employer that showed that I suffered from a psychiatric symptom associated with a risk of violent behavior, notwithstanding the speculations of the D.C. Department of Human Rights.
The enclosed computer disc contains copies of the pleadings I filed in the D.C. Court of Appeals in the above-referenced appeal (no. 96-CV-961), together with several other pertinent documents.
I stand ready to clarify further these matters to the Office of U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as well as to the judges of the U.S. District Court (Philadelphia) and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in connection with my contemplated employment inquiries.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman, Esq.
cc: John C. Keeney, Jr., Ass't U.S. Attorney General, Criminal Div., DOJ
Hon. Arlen Specter (member, Senate Judiciary Committee)
Charles L. Reischel, Esq. (202) 727-6252
What Does A Former U.S. Attorney Know?
March 13, 1998
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Joseph E. DiGenova, Esq.
DiGenova & Toensing
901 15th Street, NW- Suite 430
Washington, DC 20005
Dear Mr. DiGenova:
I request that you counsel your law partner at Manatt, Phelps & Phillips LLP, David H. Larry, Esq. (Administrative Partner), to candidly disclose to the Federal Bureau of Investigation the content of any possible communications Mr. Larry has had with attorney managers of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, my former employer, concerning my employment history at that firm or the circumstances surrounding my job termination by Akin Gump attorney manager Dennis M. Race, Esq., on October 29, 1991.
Supervisory Special Agent David M. Bowie at the FBI Washington Field Office is familiar with this matter.
My records indicate that I submitted a resume to Karen Van Allen (Manatt Phelps) on October 2, 1992; that the employment inquiry was routed to Mr. Larry; and that Mr. Larry responded personally by letter dated October 29, 1992. The cover letter that accompanied the resume I submitted included the name and telephone number of Dennis M. Race as a reference.
The present communication is prompted by the fact that of the approximately 78 law firms to which I submitted job inquiries in the year 1992--virtually all of which were addressed to law firm support personnel--only a handful (including that of Manatt Phelps) were subsequently routed to a partner for personal response: possible circumstantial evidence that Mr. Larry may have communicated with someone at Akin Gump concerning my prior employment at that firm.
Enclosed are a collection of letters that explain the background of this matter.
Thank you very much for your assistance.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
cc: Kenneth W. Starr, Esq. (Office of Independent Counsel)
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Joseph E. DiGenova, Esq.
DiGenova & Toensing
901 15th Street, NW- Suite 430
Washington, DC 20005
Dear Mr. DiGenova:
I request that you counsel your law partner at Manatt, Phelps & Phillips LLP, David H. Larry, Esq. (Administrative Partner), to candidly disclose to the Federal Bureau of Investigation the content of any possible communications Mr. Larry has had with attorney managers of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, my former employer, concerning my employment history at that firm or the circumstances surrounding my job termination by Akin Gump attorney manager Dennis M. Race, Esq., on October 29, 1991.
Supervisory Special Agent David M. Bowie at the FBI Washington Field Office is familiar with this matter.
My records indicate that I submitted a resume to Karen Van Allen (Manatt Phelps) on October 2, 1992; that the employment inquiry was routed to Mr. Larry; and that Mr. Larry responded personally by letter dated October 29, 1992. The cover letter that accompanied the resume I submitted included the name and telephone number of Dennis M. Race as a reference.
The present communication is prompted by the fact that of the approximately 78 law firms to which I submitted job inquiries in the year 1992--virtually all of which were addressed to law firm support personnel--only a handful (including that of Manatt Phelps) were subsequently routed to a partner for personal response: possible circumstantial evidence that Mr. Larry may have communicated with someone at Akin Gump concerning my prior employment at that firm.
Enclosed are a collection of letters that explain the background of this matter.
Thank you very much for your assistance.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
cc: Kenneth W. Starr, Esq. (Office of Independent Counsel)
What Does President Nixon's Lawyer Know?
July 2, 1998
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
R. Stan Mortenson, Esq.
Miller, Cassidy, Larroca & Lewin
2555 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037-1353
(202) 293-6400
RE: Miller, Cassidy, Larroca & Lewin Employment Inquiry - Homicide/Violence Risk
Dear Mr. Mortenson:
During the period March 1988 to October 1991 I was employed as a legal assistant at the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump"). Attorney managers at Akin Gump terminated my employment effective October 29, 1991 upon determining, in consultation with a psychiatrist, that a complaint of harassment I had lodged against several co-workers was attributable to a psychiatric symptom ("ideas of reference") prominent in the psychotic disorders and typically associated with a risk of violent behavior. See Freedman v. D.C. Dept. of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order issued June 10, 1996). In the period immediately after my job termination senior Akin Gump managers determined that it was advisable to secure the office of my direct supervisor against a possible homicidal assault, which it was feared I might commit.
My records indicate that in August 1992, approximately nine months after my job termination by Akin Gump, I submitted an employment inquiry to legal assistant manager Colleen McEnroe at Miller Cassidy. I do not know what communications, if any, Colleen McEnroe may have had with Akin Gump's attorney managers or supervisors at the time of this employment inquiry.
I have been under investigation by the U.S. Secret Service as a potential security risk to President William J. Clinton, and was interrogated at the Washington Field Office by Special Agent Philip C. Leadroot as recently as February 1996 on a referral by high-ranking attorneys at the U.S. Department of Justice.
I request that Miller Cassidy disclose to the U.S. Secret Service (Phillip C. Leadroot, S.A., telephone no.: 202 435 5100) any evidence of a communication between Miller Cassidy and any Akin Gump supervisors or attorney managers, including Dennis M. Race, Esq. (whom I expressly designated as a job reference in the employment inquiry to Miller Cassidy), relating to the subject matter of my job termination by Akin Gump, including facts relating to the firm's alleged determination that I suffered from a paranoid mental state that rendered me potentially violent, or facts relating to the firm's concerns that I might have been armed and homicidal and possibly poised to carry out a homicidal assault on the firm's premises.
I know that you served as legal counsel to former President Richard M. Nixon in connection with litigation concerning President Nixon's assertion of a property interest in certain of his presidential papers held by the National Archives. I know that you will appreciate the serious nature of any concerns relating to presidential security.
Incidentally, you may recall that Akin Gump partner Vernon E. Jordan, Jr. was President Clinton's personal representative at the funeral of President Nixon's wife, in 1993.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
R. Stan Mortenson, Esq.
Miller, Cassidy, Larroca & Lewin
2555 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037-1353
(202) 293-6400
RE: Miller, Cassidy, Larroca & Lewin Employment Inquiry - Homicide/Violence Risk
Dear Mr. Mortenson:
During the period March 1988 to October 1991 I was employed as a legal assistant at the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump"). Attorney managers at Akin Gump terminated my employment effective October 29, 1991 upon determining, in consultation with a psychiatrist, that a complaint of harassment I had lodged against several co-workers was attributable to a psychiatric symptom ("ideas of reference") prominent in the psychotic disorders and typically associated with a risk of violent behavior. See Freedman v. D.C. Dept. of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order issued June 10, 1996). In the period immediately after my job termination senior Akin Gump managers determined that it was advisable to secure the office of my direct supervisor against a possible homicidal assault, which it was feared I might commit.
My records indicate that in August 1992, approximately nine months after my job termination by Akin Gump, I submitted an employment inquiry to legal assistant manager Colleen McEnroe at Miller Cassidy. I do not know what communications, if any, Colleen McEnroe may have had with Akin Gump's attorney managers or supervisors at the time of this employment inquiry.
I have been under investigation by the U.S. Secret Service as a potential security risk to President William J. Clinton, and was interrogated at the Washington Field Office by Special Agent Philip C. Leadroot as recently as February 1996 on a referral by high-ranking attorneys at the U.S. Department of Justice.
I request that Miller Cassidy disclose to the U.S. Secret Service (Phillip C. Leadroot, S.A., telephone no.: 202 435 5100) any evidence of a communication between Miller Cassidy and any Akin Gump supervisors or attorney managers, including Dennis M. Race, Esq. (whom I expressly designated as a job reference in the employment inquiry to Miller Cassidy), relating to the subject matter of my job termination by Akin Gump, including facts relating to the firm's alleged determination that I suffered from a paranoid mental state that rendered me potentially violent, or facts relating to the firm's concerns that I might have been armed and homicidal and possibly poised to carry out a homicidal assault on the firm's premises.
I know that you served as legal counsel to former President Richard M. Nixon in connection with litigation concerning President Nixon's assertion of a property interest in certain of his presidential papers held by the National Archives. I know that you will appreciate the serious nature of any concerns relating to presidential security.
Incidentally, you may recall that Akin Gump partner Vernon E. Jordan, Jr. was President Clinton's personal representative at the funeral of President Nixon's wife, in 1993.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
3801 Connecticut Avenue -- Julie Sherman
For years, Julie Sherman served as the Tenants Association President at my apartment building in upper northwest Washington, DC -- 3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW.
Julie Sherman lived with her adult daughter Simone.
A few years ago, Julie Sherman and her daughter decided to make a fresh start by moving to Boston, Massachusetts. I do not know their current whereabouts.
I'm sure Julie Sherman knows a lot. Current 3801 tenant Stanley Schmulewitz is a senior member of the tenants association.
Julie Sherman lived with her adult daughter Simone.
A few years ago, Julie Sherman and her daughter decided to make a fresh start by moving to Boston, Massachusetts. I do not know their current whereabouts.
I'm sure Julie Sherman knows a lot. Current 3801 tenant Stanley Schmulewitz is a senior member of the tenants association.
3801 Connecticut Avenue -- Bonnie Jensen
For years, Bonnie Jensen was employed as the rental manager at my apartment building at 3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW, in Washington, DC. She retired a few years ago and moved to a house she had purchased for her retirement in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina.
I'm sure Bonnie Jensen knows a lot.
I'm sure Bonnie Jensen knows a lot.
Wednesday, December 30, 2009
Akin Gump: Workplace Bullying -- It's All About Context
How to Identify Bullying Behavior
Recent commentators have used different ways to describe bullying behavior, but they agree that a bully is only interested in maintaining his or her power and control. Because bullies are cowards and are driven by deep-seated insecurities and fears of inadequacy, they intentionally wage a covert war against an organization's best employees -- those who are highly-skilled, intelligent, creative, ethical, able to work well with others, and independent (who refuse to be subservient or controlled by others). Bullies can act alone or in groups. Bullying behavior can exist at any level of an organization. Bullies can be superiors, subordinates, co-workers and colleagues.
Some bullies are obvious -- they throw things, slam doors, engage in angry tirades, and are insulting and rude. Others, however, are much more subtle. While appearing to be acting reasonably and courteously on the surface, in reality they are engaging in vicious and fabricated character assassination, petty humiliations and small interferences, any one of which might be insignificant in itself, but taken together over a period of time, poison the working environment for the targeted individuals.
Under the totality of the circumstances analysis, a court should not carve the work environment into a series of discrete incidents and then measure the harm occurring in each episode. Instead, the trier of fact must keep in mind that "each successive episode has its predecessors, that the impact of the separate incidents may accumulate, and that the work environment created may exceed the sum of the individual episodes." Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F.Supp. 1486, 1524 (M.D.Fla.1991). "A play cannot be understood on the basis of some of its scenes but only on its entire performance, and similarly, a discrimination analysis must concentrate not on individual incidents but on the overall scenario." Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1484 (3d Cir.1990); see also Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1510 (11th Cir.1989).
Bullying is not about being "tough" or insisting on high standards. It is "abusive disrespect."
Recent commentators have used different ways to describe bullying behavior, but they agree that a bully is only interested in maintaining his or her power and control. Because bullies are cowards and are driven by deep-seated insecurities and fears of inadequacy, they intentionally wage a covert war against an organization's best employees -- those who are highly-skilled, intelligent, creative, ethical, able to work well with others, and independent (who refuse to be subservient or controlled by others). Bullies can act alone or in groups. Bullying behavior can exist at any level of an organization. Bullies can be superiors, subordinates, co-workers and colleagues.
Some bullies are obvious -- they throw things, slam doors, engage in angry tirades, and are insulting and rude. Others, however, are much more subtle. While appearing to be acting reasonably and courteously on the surface, in reality they are engaging in vicious and fabricated character assassination, petty humiliations and small interferences, any one of which might be insignificant in itself, but taken together over a period of time, poison the working environment for the targeted individuals.
Under the totality of the circumstances analysis, a court should not carve the work environment into a series of discrete incidents and then measure the harm occurring in each episode. Instead, the trier of fact must keep in mind that "each successive episode has its predecessors, that the impact of the separate incidents may accumulate, and that the work environment created may exceed the sum of the individual episodes." Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F.Supp. 1486, 1524 (M.D.Fla.1991). "A play cannot be understood on the basis of some of its scenes but only on its entire performance, and similarly, a discrimination analysis must concentrate not on individual incidents but on the overall scenario." Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1484 (3d Cir.1990); see also Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1510 (11th Cir.1989).
Bullying is not about being "tough" or insisting on high standards. It is "abusive disrespect."
Me And Attorney General Holder
From the years 2001 to 2009 current U.S. Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., Esq. was a partner at the D.C. law firm of Covington & Burling. During this time I sent him several bizarre letters. I wonder if he made any inquiries about me. If I recall correctly, the letters were handwritten. (My word processor was in need of repair from 2001 to 2004).
I wish I had saved copies of those letters for "the archives!"
I wish I had saved copies of those letters for "the archives!"
Job Application -- Covington & Burling
I sent a job application to Covington & Burling in 1992 for a paralegal position. Mr. Dolin replied to my inquiry. This is a followup letter.
The copyee Lanny A. Breuer, Esq., who worked at the Clinton White House in 1997, had been a Covington & Burling partner.
Incidentally, current U.S. Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., Esq. practiced law at the firm from the years 2001 to 2009. Other partners have included Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq. (now deceased) who also served as D.C. Corporation Counsel in the 1990s; and Eugene Lambert, Esq., a trustee of the George Washington University where I underwent psychiatric treatment in the 1990s.
October 20, 1997
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Mitchell F. Dolin, Esq.
Covington & Burling
1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20044-7566
RE: Covington & Burling Employment Inquiry - Homicide/Violence Risk
Dear Mr. Dolin:
The enclosed documentation is submitted further to my letter to you dated December 9, 1996.
I am writing to assure the law firm of Covington & Burling that at the time of my employment inquiry in the year 1992, to which you responded by letter dated July 22, 1992 (copy attached), I did not intentionally withhold any facts pertinent to my current mental illness: an apparently rare form of paranoid schizophrenia--a debilitating psychotic disorder--that causes me to become more intelligent even as the illness worsens in severity, and which cannot be detected on comprehensive psychological testing as performed by a major medical center.
As a courtesy to Covington & Burling I forward (on the enclosed computer disc) two pleadings that I filed in the D.C. Court of Appeals, in a currently pending appeal, that will satisfy any questions you or your partners may have concerning the risk of violence (including homicide) to which I unintentionally subjected your firm. The disc also contains a document pertinent to a criminal investigation instituted by the Federal Protective Service (Jerry McGill, S.A.), ancillary to concerns, affirmed as genuine by the Government of the District of Columbia (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq., Corporation Counsel) relating to a reported risk of violence (including homicide) that I posed at the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, my former employer.
For your additional information, I enclose a collection of letters that, hopefully, will clarify this matter for Covington & Burling.
Supervisory Special Agent David M. Bowie, FBI Washington Field Office, is familiar with this matter. Mr. Bowie may be reached at (202) 252 7801.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
cc: Lanny A. Breuer, Esq. (The White House)
The copyee Lanny A. Breuer, Esq., who worked at the Clinton White House in 1997, had been a Covington & Burling partner.
Incidentally, current U.S. Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., Esq. practiced law at the firm from the years 2001 to 2009. Other partners have included Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq. (now deceased) who also served as D.C. Corporation Counsel in the 1990s; and Eugene Lambert, Esq., a trustee of the George Washington University where I underwent psychiatric treatment in the 1990s.
October 20, 1997
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Mitchell F. Dolin, Esq.
Covington & Burling
1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20044-7566
RE: Covington & Burling Employment Inquiry - Homicide/Violence Risk
Dear Mr. Dolin:
The enclosed documentation is submitted further to my letter to you dated December 9, 1996.
I am writing to assure the law firm of Covington & Burling that at the time of my employment inquiry in the year 1992, to which you responded by letter dated July 22, 1992 (copy attached), I did not intentionally withhold any facts pertinent to my current mental illness: an apparently rare form of paranoid schizophrenia--a debilitating psychotic disorder--that causes me to become more intelligent even as the illness worsens in severity, and which cannot be detected on comprehensive psychological testing as performed by a major medical center.
As a courtesy to Covington & Burling I forward (on the enclosed computer disc) two pleadings that I filed in the D.C. Court of Appeals, in a currently pending appeal, that will satisfy any questions you or your partners may have concerning the risk of violence (including homicide) to which I unintentionally subjected your firm. The disc also contains a document pertinent to a criminal investigation instituted by the Federal Protective Service (Jerry McGill, S.A.), ancillary to concerns, affirmed as genuine by the Government of the District of Columbia (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq., Corporation Counsel) relating to a reported risk of violence (including homicide) that I posed at the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, my former employer.
For your additional information, I enclose a collection of letters that, hopefully, will clarify this matter for Covington & Burling.
Supervisory Special Agent David M. Bowie, FBI Washington Field Office, is familiar with this matter. Mr. Bowie may be reached at (202) 252 7801.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
cc: Lanny A. Breuer, Esq. (The White House)
A Job Application to the FBI
August 14, 1997
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Larry R. Parkinson, Esq.
FBI General Counsel
935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20535
RE: Employment Opportunities - Office of General Counsel
Dear General Counsel Parkinson:
I am an attorney, and am licensed to practice in Pennsylvania. I qualify for employment as an attorney in the Office of General Counsel at the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
I am writing to inquire about present and anticipated employment opportunities for lawyers at the FBI Office of General Counsel, as well as any information pertinent to the specific hiring procedures of the FBI Office of General Counsel. Any information you can provide will be useful to me.
Incidentally, I believe I have a duty to advise you of the following facts about my background.
During the period March 1988 to October 1991 I was employed as a legal assistant in the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump"). Attorney managers at Akin Gump terminated my employment effective October 29, 1991 upon determining, in consultation with a psychiatrist, that a complaint of harassment I had lodged against several co-workers was attributable to a psychiatric symptom ("ideas of reference") prominent in the psychotic disorders and typically associated with a risk of violent behavior. See Freedman v. D.C. Dept. of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order issued June 10, 1996). In the period immediately after my job termination senior Akin Gump managers determined that it was advisable to secure the office of my direct supervisor against a possible homicidal assault, which it was feared I might commit.
In pleadings filed in the District of Columbia Superior Court, the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.) affirmed that Akin Gump personnel had geniune concerns that I might have had plans to procure firearms for an unlawful purpose and possessed the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm or commit murder. Mr. Ruff currently serves as chief White House Counsel to President Clinton (telephone no.: 202 456 1414).
I have been under investigation by the U.S. Secret Service as a potential security risk to President Clinton, and was interrogated at the Washington Field Office by Special Agent Philip C. Leadroot (202 435-5100) as recently as February 1996, about 16 months ago. Questioning by Mr. Leadroot centered on the issue of presidential assassination. During one of my meetings with Mr. Leadroot, he encouraged me to seek employment, and expressly told me that I need to engage actively in a job search. My present job inquiry to you is consistent with the express direction of a special agent of the U.S. Secret Service.
Thank you for your assistance. I look forward to hearing from you.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman, Esq.
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Larry R. Parkinson, Esq.
FBI General Counsel
935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20535
RE: Employment Opportunities - Office of General Counsel
Dear General Counsel Parkinson:
I am an attorney, and am licensed to practice in Pennsylvania. I qualify for employment as an attorney in the Office of General Counsel at the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
I am writing to inquire about present and anticipated employment opportunities for lawyers at the FBI Office of General Counsel, as well as any information pertinent to the specific hiring procedures of the FBI Office of General Counsel. Any information you can provide will be useful to me.
Incidentally, I believe I have a duty to advise you of the following facts about my background.
During the period March 1988 to October 1991 I was employed as a legal assistant in the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump"). Attorney managers at Akin Gump terminated my employment effective October 29, 1991 upon determining, in consultation with a psychiatrist, that a complaint of harassment I had lodged against several co-workers was attributable to a psychiatric symptom ("ideas of reference") prominent in the psychotic disorders and typically associated with a risk of violent behavior. See Freedman v. D.C. Dept. of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order issued June 10, 1996). In the period immediately after my job termination senior Akin Gump managers determined that it was advisable to secure the office of my direct supervisor against a possible homicidal assault, which it was feared I might commit.
In pleadings filed in the District of Columbia Superior Court, the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.) affirmed that Akin Gump personnel had geniune concerns that I might have had plans to procure firearms for an unlawful purpose and possessed the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm or commit murder. Mr. Ruff currently serves as chief White House Counsel to President Clinton (telephone no.: 202 456 1414).
I have been under investigation by the U.S. Secret Service as a potential security risk to President Clinton, and was interrogated at the Washington Field Office by Special Agent Philip C. Leadroot (202 435-5100) as recently as February 1996, about 16 months ago. Questioning by Mr. Leadroot centered on the issue of presidential assassination. During one of my meetings with Mr. Leadroot, he encouraged me to seek employment, and expressly told me that I need to engage actively in a job search. My present job inquiry to you is consistent with the express direction of a special agent of the U.S. Secret Service.
Thank you for your assistance. I look forward to hearing from you.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman, Esq.
Senator Orrin Hatch -- Judicial Clerkship -- Background Check
October 2, 1998
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Hon. Orrin G. Hatch
SR-131 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510-4402
Dear Senator Hatch:
Enclosed are copies of two letters that I have submitted to members of the federal judiciary in regard to my possible future application for a judicial clerkship.
This will assure Senator Hatch, in his capacity as Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, that I will cooperate fully in any FBI background check that any federal court deems necessary in the wake of the determination made by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals on September 1, 1998 that my former employer (the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld) terminated my employment in October 1991 on the basis of genuine concerns about my mental health and stability, including the potential for violence. See Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, No. 96-CV-961 (Memorandum Opinion and Judgment filed Sept. 1, 1998).
FBI Supervisory Special Agent Jerome O. Campane (Washington Field Office) is familiar with this matter.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Hon. Orrin G. Hatch
SR-131 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510-4402
Dear Senator Hatch:
Enclosed are copies of two letters that I have submitted to members of the federal judiciary in regard to my possible future application for a judicial clerkship.
This will assure Senator Hatch, in his capacity as Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, that I will cooperate fully in any FBI background check that any federal court deems necessary in the wake of the determination made by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals on September 1, 1998 that my former employer (the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld) terminated my employment in October 1991 on the basis of genuine concerns about my mental health and stability, including the potential for violence. See Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, No. 96-CV-961 (Memorandum Opinion and Judgment filed Sept. 1, 1998).
FBI Supervisory Special Agent Jerome O. Campane (Washington Field Office) is familiar with this matter.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
The Former Law Firm of U.S. Attorney Joseph E. diGenova
December 11, 1996
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
David H. Larry, Esq.
Manatt, Phelps, Phillips & Kantor
1501 M Street, NW
Washington, DC
RE: Manatt, Phelps, Phillips & Kantor Employment Inquiry - Homicide/Violence Risk Dear Mr. Larry:
During the period March 1988 to October 1991 I was employed as a legal assistant at the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump"). Attorney managers at Akin Gump terminated my employment effective October 29, 1991 upon determining, in consultation with a psychiatrist, that a complaint of harassment I had lodged against several co-workers was attributable to a psychiatric symptom ("ideas of reference") prominent in the psychotic disorders and typically associated with a risk of violent behavior. See Freedman v. D.C. Dept. of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order issued June 10, 1996). In the period immediately after my job termination senior Akin Gump managers determined that it was advisable to secure the office of my direct supervisor against a possible homicidal assault, which it was feared I might commit.
During the summer of 1992, approximately nine months after my job termination by Akin Gump, I submitted an employment inquiry to Manatt, Phelps, Phillips & Kantor, as evidenced by the enclosed response signed by you and dated October 29, 1992. I do not know what communications, if any, you may have had with Akin Gump's attorney managers or supervisors at the time of this employment inquiry.
I have been under investigation by the U.S. Secret Service as a potential security risk to President William J. Clinton, and was interrogated at the Washington Field Office by Special Agent Philip C. Leadroot as recently as February 1996.
I request that you candidly disclose to federal authorities the content of any communications you may have had with any senior Akin Gump supervisors or attorney managers, including Dennis M. Race, Esq. (whom I expressly designated as a job reference in the employment inquiry to Manatt, Phelps, Phillips & Kantor), relating to the subject matter of my job termination by Akin Gump, including facts relating to the firm's alleged determination that I suffered from a paranoid mental state that rendered me potentially violent, or facts relating to the firm's concerns that I might have been armed and homicidal and possibly poised to carry out a homicidal assault on the firm's premises.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
cc: Joseph E. diGenova
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
David H. Larry, Esq.
Manatt, Phelps, Phillips & Kantor
1501 M Street, NW
Washington, DC
RE: Manatt, Phelps, Phillips & Kantor Employment Inquiry - Homicide/Violence Risk Dear Mr. Larry:
During the period March 1988 to October 1991 I was employed as a legal assistant at the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump"). Attorney managers at Akin Gump terminated my employment effective October 29, 1991 upon determining, in consultation with a psychiatrist, that a complaint of harassment I had lodged against several co-workers was attributable to a psychiatric symptom ("ideas of reference") prominent in the psychotic disorders and typically associated with a risk of violent behavior. See Freedman v. D.C. Dept. of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order issued June 10, 1996). In the period immediately after my job termination senior Akin Gump managers determined that it was advisable to secure the office of my direct supervisor against a possible homicidal assault, which it was feared I might commit.
During the summer of 1992, approximately nine months after my job termination by Akin Gump, I submitted an employment inquiry to Manatt, Phelps, Phillips & Kantor, as evidenced by the enclosed response signed by you and dated October 29, 1992. I do not know what communications, if any, you may have had with Akin Gump's attorney managers or supervisors at the time of this employment inquiry.
I have been under investigation by the U.S. Secret Service as a potential security risk to President William J. Clinton, and was interrogated at the Washington Field Office by Special Agent Philip C. Leadroot as recently as February 1996.
I request that you candidly disclose to federal authorities the content of any communications you may have had with any senior Akin Gump supervisors or attorney managers, including Dennis M. Race, Esq. (whom I expressly designated as a job reference in the employment inquiry to Manatt, Phelps, Phillips & Kantor), relating to the subject matter of my job termination by Akin Gump, including facts relating to the firm's alleged determination that I suffered from a paranoid mental state that rendered me potentially violent, or facts relating to the firm's concerns that I might have been armed and homicidal and possibly poised to carry out a homicidal assault on the firm's premises.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
cc: Joseph E. diGenova
Leaving No Stone Unturned -- Earl L. Segal, Esq.
The partner in charge of the legal assistant program at my former employer, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld -- Earl L. Segal, Esq. -- used to be a partner at the firm of Linowes & Blocher.
June 4, 1998
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
R. Robert Linowes, Esq.
Linowes & Blocher
Suite 1000
1010 Wayne Avenue
Silver Spring, MD 20910
Tel.: (301) 588 8580
Dear Mr. Linowes:
I congratulate you on the recent honors bestowed on you and your brothers by the Washington Institute for Jewish Leadership and Values, as reported in the Thursday June 4, 1998 issue of The Washington Post.
I am sending along on the enclosed computer disc a copy of a manuscript I have been working on that may be of interest to you as an individual actively involved in matters of Jewish interest as well as an individual honored by the Folger Shakespeare Library. The manuscript is a somewhat unusual creative piece that is written entirely in the form of quotations, and is on the borderline between a kind of novel and a play. You don't have to return the disc.
I used to be employed at the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld in the capacity of paralegal. Coincidentally, the head of the paralegal program at Akin Gump during my tenure was one of your former real estate partners, Earl L. Segal, Esq. It was a genuine pleasure to work with Mr. Segal.
And, of course, one of your brothers, Ambassador Sol Linowitz, served in the Carter Administration with Akin Gump partner Robert S. Strauss, Esq.
Once again, congratulations!
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
bcc: Philip C. Leadroot, S.A. (U.S. Secret Service)
June 4, 1998
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
R. Robert Linowes, Esq.
Linowes & Blocher
Suite 1000
1010 Wayne Avenue
Silver Spring, MD 20910
Tel.: (301) 588 8580
Dear Mr. Linowes:
I congratulate you on the recent honors bestowed on you and your brothers by the Washington Institute for Jewish Leadership and Values, as reported in the Thursday June 4, 1998 issue of The Washington Post.
I am sending along on the enclosed computer disc a copy of a manuscript I have been working on that may be of interest to you as an individual actively involved in matters of Jewish interest as well as an individual honored by the Folger Shakespeare Library. The manuscript is a somewhat unusual creative piece that is written entirely in the form of quotations, and is on the borderline between a kind of novel and a play. You don't have to return the disc.
I used to be employed at the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld in the capacity of paralegal. Coincidentally, the head of the paralegal program at Akin Gump during my tenure was one of your former real estate partners, Earl L. Segal, Esq. It was a genuine pleasure to work with Mr. Segal.
And, of course, one of your brothers, Ambassador Sol Linowitz, served in the Carter Administration with Akin Gump partner Robert S. Strauss, Esq.
Once again, congratulations!
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
bcc: Philip C. Leadroot, S.A. (U.S. Secret Service)
Sharon Miriam White Glick -- The Franklin Institute
From 1976 to 1979 I worked with a woman at the Franklin Institute named Sharon Miriam White in the Science Information Services Department headed by Bruce H. Kleinstein, Ph.D., J.D. She invited me to her wedding in 1979; I did not attend.
Her husband, Kenneth Glick, was an attorney. They moved to Princeton, New Jersey. I sent Mr. Glick the following letter in 1997. I wonder if the Glicks made any telephone calls about the letter.
June 28, 1997
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Kenneth R. Glick, Esq.
Morrison & Foerster
1290 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10104-0185
RE: Weapons Possession - Intent to Inflict Grievous Bodily Harm/Possible Intent to Commit Murder - D.C. Corporation Counsel Affirmation - Possible Concealment of State and/or Federal Weapons Law Violations
Dear Mr. Glick:
During the period March 1988 to October 1991 I was employed as a legal assistant in the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump"). Attorney managers at Akin Gump terminated my employment effective October 29, 1991 upon determining, in consultation with a psychiatrist, that a complaint of harassment I had lodged against several co-workers was attributable to a psychiatric symptom ("ideas of reference") prominent in the psychotic disorders and typically associated with a risk of violent behavior. See Freedman v. D.C. Dept. of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order issued June 10, 1996). In the period immediately after my job termination senior Akin Gump managers determined that it was advisable to secure the office of my direct supervisor against a possible homicidal assault, which it was feared I might commit.
In pleadings filed in the District of Columbia Superior Court, the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.) affirmed that Akin Gump personnel had geniune concerns that I might have had plans to procure firearms for an unlawful purpose and possessed the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm or commit murder. Mr. Ruff currently serves as chief White House Counsel to President Clinton (telephone no.: 202 456 1414).
During the late 1970's I worked with your wife, the former Sharon Miriam White, at the Franklin Institute in Philadelphia, in a unit of the Science Information Services Department supervised by Bruce H. Kleinstein, Ph.D. I recall meeting you during the summer of 1979 at a party at the home of Sheryl Dyner, who also worked at the Franklin Institute. If I recall correctly your wife's father, Dr. David White, was chairman of the chemistry department at the University of Pennsylvania, and she had two siblings: a brother, an architecture student named Edward, and a sister named Jackie, who married a dentist.
I have been under investigation by the U.S. Secret Service as a potential security risk to President Clinton, and was interrogated at the Washington Field Office by Special Agent Philip C. Leadroot (202 435-5100) as recently as February 1996, about 16 months ago. Questioning by Mr. Leadroot centered on the issue of presidential assassination.
I request that you and Mrs. Sharon White Glick disclose to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (David M. Bowie, Supervisory Special Agent, Washington Field Office, 202 252 7801) the content of any communications that either of you may have had with any Akin Gump attorneys regarding me. Attorneys who may have directed inquiries to you include Earl L. Segal, Malcolm Lassman, or Laurence J. Hoffman (managing partner), among others. I have formed the (unsubstantiated) belief that Akin Gump did contact your wife in the year 1990.
Enclosed are some additional documents that provide background to the matters discussed in this letter.
Be advised: President Clinton's own lawyer, chief White House Counsel Charles F.C. Ruff, is talking real guns, real bullets, real brain tissue.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
Her husband, Kenneth Glick, was an attorney. They moved to Princeton, New Jersey. I sent Mr. Glick the following letter in 1997. I wonder if the Glicks made any telephone calls about the letter.
June 28, 1997
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Kenneth R. Glick, Esq.
Morrison & Foerster
1290 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10104-0185
RE: Weapons Possession - Intent to Inflict Grievous Bodily Harm/Possible Intent to Commit Murder - D.C. Corporation Counsel Affirmation - Possible Concealment of State and/or Federal Weapons Law Violations
Dear Mr. Glick:
During the period March 1988 to October 1991 I was employed as a legal assistant in the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump"). Attorney managers at Akin Gump terminated my employment effective October 29, 1991 upon determining, in consultation with a psychiatrist, that a complaint of harassment I had lodged against several co-workers was attributable to a psychiatric symptom ("ideas of reference") prominent in the psychotic disorders and typically associated with a risk of violent behavior. See Freedman v. D.C. Dept. of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order issued June 10, 1996). In the period immediately after my job termination senior Akin Gump managers determined that it was advisable to secure the office of my direct supervisor against a possible homicidal assault, which it was feared I might commit.
In pleadings filed in the District of Columbia Superior Court, the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.) affirmed that Akin Gump personnel had geniune concerns that I might have had plans to procure firearms for an unlawful purpose and possessed the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm or commit murder. Mr. Ruff currently serves as chief White House Counsel to President Clinton (telephone no.: 202 456 1414).
During the late 1970's I worked with your wife, the former Sharon Miriam White, at the Franklin Institute in Philadelphia, in a unit of the Science Information Services Department supervised by Bruce H. Kleinstein, Ph.D. I recall meeting you during the summer of 1979 at a party at the home of Sheryl Dyner, who also worked at the Franklin Institute. If I recall correctly your wife's father, Dr. David White, was chairman of the chemistry department at the University of Pennsylvania, and she had two siblings: a brother, an architecture student named Edward, and a sister named Jackie, who married a dentist.
I have been under investigation by the U.S. Secret Service as a potential security risk to President Clinton, and was interrogated at the Washington Field Office by Special Agent Philip C. Leadroot (202 435-5100) as recently as February 1996, about 16 months ago. Questioning by Mr. Leadroot centered on the issue of presidential assassination.
I request that you and Mrs. Sharon White Glick disclose to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (David M. Bowie, Supervisory Special Agent, Washington Field Office, 202 252 7801) the content of any communications that either of you may have had with any Akin Gump attorneys regarding me. Attorneys who may have directed inquiries to you include Earl L. Segal, Malcolm Lassman, or Laurence J. Hoffman (managing partner), among others. I have formed the (unsubstantiated) belief that Akin Gump did contact your wife in the year 1990.
Enclosed are some additional documents that provide background to the matters discussed in this letter.
Be advised: President Clinton's own lawyer, chief White House Counsel Charles F.C. Ruff, is talking real guns, real bullets, real brain tissue.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
The Philadelphia District Attorney
I sent the following letter to the Philadelphia District Attorney Lynne Abraham in 1997. Judge Abraham is married to a retired Philadelphia talk show host named Edward Felbin -- his professional name is Frank Ford.
June 11, 1997
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Hon. Lynn Abraham
Office of the District Attorney
City Hall
Philadelphia, PA 19107
RE: Weapons Possession - Intent to Inflict Grievous Bodily Harm/Possible Intent to Commit Murder - D.C. Corporation Counsel Affirmation - Possible Concealment of State and/or Federal Weapons Law Violations
Dear Judge Abraham:
This will advise the Office of District Attorney that I have filed the enclosed Certificate of Admission of Disability of Attorney with the Disciplinary Board of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
The District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.) has affirmed the determination of my former employer, the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, that I might have been armed and homicidal during my tenure, which ended October 29, 1991. Mr. Ruff currently serves as chief White House Counsel to President Clinton.
I have been keeping federal law enforcement authorities apprised of all material facts pertinent to this homicide risk determination.
I have been under investigation by the U.S. Secret Service as a potential security risk to President William J. Clinton, and was interrogated at the Washington Field Office as recently as February 1996 by Special Agent Philip C. Leadroot. Questioning by Mr. Leadroot centered on the issue of presidential assassination.
You may review this matter with Philip C. Leadroot, S.A., U.S. Secret Service, (202) 435 5100, or David M. Bowie, FBI Supervisory Special Agent (Washington Metropolitan Area Field Office) (202) 252 7801.
This is a matter of extreme gravity, and I urge you to candidly disclose any information relevant to the security concerns (presidential assassination) of the Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Please give my regards to Mr. Felbin.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
Attorney no. 41032
June 11, 1997
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Hon. Lynn Abraham
Office of the District Attorney
City Hall
Philadelphia, PA 19107
RE: Weapons Possession - Intent to Inflict Grievous Bodily Harm/Possible Intent to Commit Murder - D.C. Corporation Counsel Affirmation - Possible Concealment of State and/or Federal Weapons Law Violations
Dear Judge Abraham:
This will advise the Office of District Attorney that I have filed the enclosed Certificate of Admission of Disability of Attorney with the Disciplinary Board of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
The District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.) has affirmed the determination of my former employer, the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, that I might have been armed and homicidal during my tenure, which ended October 29, 1991. Mr. Ruff currently serves as chief White House Counsel to President Clinton.
I have been keeping federal law enforcement authorities apprised of all material facts pertinent to this homicide risk determination.
I have been under investigation by the U.S. Secret Service as a potential security risk to President William J. Clinton, and was interrogated at the Washington Field Office as recently as February 1996 by Special Agent Philip C. Leadroot. Questioning by Mr. Leadroot centered on the issue of presidential assassination.
You may review this matter with Philip C. Leadroot, S.A., U.S. Secret Service, (202) 435 5100, or David M. Bowie, FBI Supervisory Special Agent (Washington Metropolitan Area Field Office) (202) 252 7801.
This is a matter of extreme gravity, and I urge you to candidly disclose any information relevant to the security concerns (presidential assassination) of the Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Please give my regards to Mr. Felbin.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
Attorney no. 41032
E. Chambers Fowler -- For Those With Inquiring Minds
From late August 1980 to late August 1983 (ages 26 to 29) I resided at 1324 E. Locust Street, Apartment 415, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. My next door neighbor was a middle-aged man named E. Chambers Fowler. Mr. Fowler was employed at the Philadelphia Saving Fund Society (PSFS), a now defunct bank. I believe he was a veteran of the U.S. Navy. He was unmarried and a practicing homosexual.
Dale Green -- For Those With Inquiring Minds
From late August 1979 to late August 1980 (ages 25-26) I resided at E15 1/2 Augusta Avenue in Spokane, Washington. My next door neighbor was a middle-aged man named Dale Green.
Tuesday, December 29, 2009
On Doing Your Own Investigation
On January 26, 1981, former Representative Richard Kelly (R-FL) became the sixth member of Congress, and the only Republican, to be convicted of bribery charges in the wake of the government's Abscam probe.
Kelly, who was defeated for renomination in September 1980, said he would appeal. He acknowledged taking $25,000 in cash from undercover FBI agents but said he had done so as part of his own investigation into the "suspicious characters" he was dealing with.
Kelly, who was defeated for renomination in September 1980, said he would appeal. He acknowledged taking $25,000 in cash from undercover FBI agents but said he had done so as part of his own investigation into the "suspicious characters" he was dealing with.
Jesse Raben: "Yes, I Knew Him. Gary Was A Severely Disturbed Individual"
March 28, 1998
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Edward J. Grenier, Jr., Esq.
Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, LLP
1275 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20004-2404
RE: Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan Employment Inquiry - Homicide/Violence Risk
Dear Mr. Grenier:
I am writing to assure the law firm of Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan that at the time of my employment inquiry in 1985, to which the late Francis M. Gregory, Jr. responded by letter dated February 25, 1985 (copy attached), I did not intentionally withhold any facts pertinent to my current mental illness: an apparently rare form of paranoid schizophrenia--a debilitating psychotic disorder--that has left my intellectual functioning intact even as the illness worsens in severity, and which disorder cannot be detected on comprehensive psychological testing as performed by a major medical center (The George Washington University Medical Center).
As a courtesy to Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan I forward (on the enclosed computer disc) two pleadings that I filed in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in a currently pending appeal, that will satisfy any questions you or your partners may have concerning the risk of violence (including armed violence and homicide) to which I unintentionally subjected your firm. The disc also contains a document pertinent to a criminal investigation instituted by the Federal Protective Service (Jerry McGill, S.A.), ancillary to concerns, affirmed as genuine by the Government of the District of Columbia, relating to a reported risk of violence (including homicide) that I posed at the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, my former employer.
Incidentally, an attorney currently associated with Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, Jesse Raben, Esq., was employed at Akin Gump in the capacity of legal assistant from 1988-1990 during my tenure with that firm. Mr. Raben may possibly remember me, and may be able to elaborate issues raised in the enclosed materials.
Supervisory Special Agent David M. Bowie at the Washington Field Office of the FBI is familiar with this matter. The telephone number of the FBI Washington Field Office is 252-7801.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Edward J. Grenier, Jr., Esq.
Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, LLP
1275 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20004-2404
RE: Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan Employment Inquiry - Homicide/Violence Risk
Dear Mr. Grenier:
I am writing to assure the law firm of Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan that at the time of my employment inquiry in 1985, to which the late Francis M. Gregory, Jr. responded by letter dated February 25, 1985 (copy attached), I did not intentionally withhold any facts pertinent to my current mental illness: an apparently rare form of paranoid schizophrenia--a debilitating psychotic disorder--that has left my intellectual functioning intact even as the illness worsens in severity, and which disorder cannot be detected on comprehensive psychological testing as performed by a major medical center (The George Washington University Medical Center).
As a courtesy to Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan I forward (on the enclosed computer disc) two pleadings that I filed in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in a currently pending appeal, that will satisfy any questions you or your partners may have concerning the risk of violence (including armed violence and homicide) to which I unintentionally subjected your firm. The disc also contains a document pertinent to a criminal investigation instituted by the Federal Protective Service (Jerry McGill, S.A.), ancillary to concerns, affirmed as genuine by the Government of the District of Columbia, relating to a reported risk of violence (including homicide) that I posed at the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, my former employer.
Incidentally, an attorney currently associated with Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, Jesse Raben, Esq., was employed at Akin Gump in the capacity of legal assistant from 1988-1990 during my tenure with that firm. Mr. Raben may possibly remember me, and may be able to elaborate issues raised in the enclosed materials.
Supervisory Special Agent David M. Bowie at the Washington Field Office of the FBI is familiar with this matter. The telephone number of the FBI Washington Field Office is 252-7801.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
Did The Attorney General Make Any Phone Calls?
Dick Thornburgh is a lawyer and Republican politician who served as the Governor of Pennsylvania from 1979 to 1987, and then as the U.S. Attorney General from 1988 to 1991 in the administration of former President George H.W. Bush, in which Robert S. Strauss, Esq. served as U.S. Ambassador to Russia.
October 14, 1997
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Hon. Richard Thornburgh
Kirkpatrick & Lockhart
1800 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
RE: Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Employment Inquiry - Homicide/Violence Risk
Dear Governor Thornburgh:
I am writing to assure the law firm of Kirkpatrick & Lockhart that at the time of my employment inquiry in the year 1992, to which Paralegal/Law Clerk Coordinator Patricia A. Keller responded by letter dated October 28, 1992 (copy attached), I did not intentionally withhold any facts pertinent to my current mental illness: an apparently rare form of paranoid schizophrenia--a debilitating psychotic disorder--that causes me to become more intelligent even as the illness worsens in severity, and which cannot be detected on comprehensive psychological testing as performed by a major medical center.
As a courtesy to Kirkpatrick & Lockhart I forward (on the enclosed computer disc) two pleadings that I filed in the D.C. Court of Appeals, in a currently pending appeal, that will satisfy any questions you or the firm's partners may have concerning the risk of violence (including homicide) to which I unintentionally subjected your firm. The disc also contains a document pertinent to a criminal investigation instituted by the Federal Protective Service (Jerry McGill, S.A.), ancillary to concerns, affirmed as genuine by the Government of the District of Columbia, relating to a reported risk of violence (including homicide) that I posed at the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, my former employer.
For your additional information, I enclose a collection of letters that, hopefully, will clarify this matter for Kirkpatrick & Lockhart.
Supervisory Special Agent David M. Bowie, FBI Washington Field Office, is familiar with this matter. Mr. Bowie may be reached at (202) 252 7801.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
cc: Hon. Arlen Specter
October 14, 1997
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Hon. Richard Thornburgh
Kirkpatrick & Lockhart
1800 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
RE: Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Employment Inquiry - Homicide/Violence Risk
Dear Governor Thornburgh:
I am writing to assure the law firm of Kirkpatrick & Lockhart that at the time of my employment inquiry in the year 1992, to which Paralegal/Law Clerk Coordinator Patricia A. Keller responded by letter dated October 28, 1992 (copy attached), I did not intentionally withhold any facts pertinent to my current mental illness: an apparently rare form of paranoid schizophrenia--a debilitating psychotic disorder--that causes me to become more intelligent even as the illness worsens in severity, and which cannot be detected on comprehensive psychological testing as performed by a major medical center.
As a courtesy to Kirkpatrick & Lockhart I forward (on the enclosed computer disc) two pleadings that I filed in the D.C. Court of Appeals, in a currently pending appeal, that will satisfy any questions you or the firm's partners may have concerning the risk of violence (including homicide) to which I unintentionally subjected your firm. The disc also contains a document pertinent to a criminal investigation instituted by the Federal Protective Service (Jerry McGill, S.A.), ancillary to concerns, affirmed as genuine by the Government of the District of Columbia, relating to a reported risk of violence (including homicide) that I posed at the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, my former employer.
For your additional information, I enclose a collection of letters that, hopefully, will clarify this matter for Kirkpatrick & Lockhart.
Supervisory Special Agent David M. Bowie, FBI Washington Field Office, is familiar with this matter. Mr. Bowie may be reached at (202) 252 7801.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
cc: Hon. Arlen Specter
Did President Nixon's Son-in-Law Make Any Calls?
Edward F. Cox is the chairman of the New York Republican State Committee and the son-in-law of the late President Richard M. Nixon. Cox is a lawyer in the Manhattan law firm of Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP where he has served as the Chairman of the Corporate Department and a member of the Management Committee. In 2008, Cox was named in Super Lawyers in the area of Securities & Corporate Finance and his firm was ranked third on The American Lawyer’s 2008 "A-List" of leading law firms in the United States.
In 1998 I sent Mr. Cox an unusual letter. I wonder if he made any phone calls about me. The copyee, Mr. Mortenson (Baker Botts, LLP), was President Nixon's lawyer. The "Baker" in Baker and Botts is former U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, Esq., a close personal friend of Robert S. Strauss, Esq. Mr. Strauss served as U.S. Ambassador to Russia under Secretary Baker in the George H.W. Bush administration.
July 8, 1998
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Edward F. Cox, Esq.
Donovan, Leisure, Newton & Irvine
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, NY 10112
(212) 632-3000
Dear Mr. Cox:
During the period March 1988 to October 1991 I was employed as a legal assistant at the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump"). Attorney managers at Akin Gump terminated my employment effective October 29, 1991 upon determining, in consultation with a psychiatrist, that a complaint of harassment I had lodged against several co-workers was attributable to a psychiatric symptom ("ideas of reference") prominent in the psychotic disorders and typically associated with a risk of violent behavior. See Freedman v. D.C. Dept. of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order issued June 10, 1996). In the period immediately after my job termination senior Akin Gump managers determined that it was advisable to secure the office of my direct supervisor against a possible homicidal assault, which it was feared I might commit.
I have been under investigation by the U.S. Secret Service as a potential security risk to President William J. Clinton, and was interrogated at the Washington Field Office by Special Agent Philip C. Leadroot as recently as February 1996 on a referral by high-ranking attorneys at the U.S. Department of Justice.
I have also been under investigation by the Federal Protective Service (Jerry McGill, S.A.) incident to concerns, affirmed as genuine in 1996 by then District of Columbia Corporation Counsel--now White House Counsel to President Clinton--Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq., that I posed a risk of violence, including armed violence or homicide, at the law firm of Akin Gump.
Pursuant to the investigation instituted by the Federal Protective Service ("FPS") I forwarded a document to the FPS, under cover letter dated September 8, 1997 (copy attached), that contains references to former President Richard M. Nixon, your father-in-law, as well as references to the Central Intelligence Agency. The document is titled "Significant Moments."
I request that you disclose to the Washington Field Office of the U.S. Secret Service (Phillip C. Leadroot, S.A., telephone no. 202 435 5100) whether you have at any time been made aware, by any source, of the existence of this document. I enclose a copy of the first page of the document to refresh your recollection. I know that you will appreciate the serious nature of any concerns relating to presidential security and that any disclosure you make to the U.S. Secret Service will be full, candid, and truthful.
Background facts that prompt this inquiry are the following:
-- You are the son-in-law of former President Richard M. Nixon;
-- Donovan Leisure of counsel William E. Colby, Esq. (now deceased) was Director of the CIA during the administration of President Nixon;
-- Former President George Bush was Director of the CIA during the administration of President Nixon and is a close friend of Akin Gump partner, Robert S. Strauss, Esq.;
-- Akin Gump partner Vernon E. Jordan, Jr. was President Clinton's personal representative at the funeral of Mrs. Nixon, your mother-in-law, in 1993; and
-- A member of your law school class, Edwin Rutan, Esq. (Harvard Law School, 1972), is the older brother of an old friend of mine.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
cc: R. Stan Mortenson, Esq.
In 1998 I sent Mr. Cox an unusual letter. I wonder if he made any phone calls about me. The copyee, Mr. Mortenson (Baker Botts, LLP), was President Nixon's lawyer. The "Baker" in Baker and Botts is former U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, Esq., a close personal friend of Robert S. Strauss, Esq. Mr. Strauss served as U.S. Ambassador to Russia under Secretary Baker in the George H.W. Bush administration.
July 8, 1998
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Edward F. Cox, Esq.
Donovan, Leisure, Newton & Irvine
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, NY 10112
(212) 632-3000
Dear Mr. Cox:
During the period March 1988 to October 1991 I was employed as a legal assistant at the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump"). Attorney managers at Akin Gump terminated my employment effective October 29, 1991 upon determining, in consultation with a psychiatrist, that a complaint of harassment I had lodged against several co-workers was attributable to a psychiatric symptom ("ideas of reference") prominent in the psychotic disorders and typically associated with a risk of violent behavior. See Freedman v. D.C. Dept. of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order issued June 10, 1996). In the period immediately after my job termination senior Akin Gump managers determined that it was advisable to secure the office of my direct supervisor against a possible homicidal assault, which it was feared I might commit.
I have been under investigation by the U.S. Secret Service as a potential security risk to President William J. Clinton, and was interrogated at the Washington Field Office by Special Agent Philip C. Leadroot as recently as February 1996 on a referral by high-ranking attorneys at the U.S. Department of Justice.
I have also been under investigation by the Federal Protective Service (Jerry McGill, S.A.) incident to concerns, affirmed as genuine in 1996 by then District of Columbia Corporation Counsel--now White House Counsel to President Clinton--Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq., that I posed a risk of violence, including armed violence or homicide, at the law firm of Akin Gump.
Pursuant to the investigation instituted by the Federal Protective Service ("FPS") I forwarded a document to the FPS, under cover letter dated September 8, 1997 (copy attached), that contains references to former President Richard M. Nixon, your father-in-law, as well as references to the Central Intelligence Agency. The document is titled "Significant Moments."
I request that you disclose to the Washington Field Office of the U.S. Secret Service (Phillip C. Leadroot, S.A., telephone no. 202 435 5100) whether you have at any time been made aware, by any source, of the existence of this document. I enclose a copy of the first page of the document to refresh your recollection. I know that you will appreciate the serious nature of any concerns relating to presidential security and that any disclosure you make to the U.S. Secret Service will be full, candid, and truthful.
Background facts that prompt this inquiry are the following:
-- You are the son-in-law of former President Richard M. Nixon;
-- Donovan Leisure of counsel William E. Colby, Esq. (now deceased) was Director of the CIA during the administration of President Nixon;
-- Former President George Bush was Director of the CIA during the administration of President Nixon and is a close friend of Akin Gump partner, Robert S. Strauss, Esq.;
-- Akin Gump partner Vernon E. Jordan, Jr. was President Clinton's personal representative at the funeral of Mrs. Nixon, your mother-in-law, in 1993; and
-- A member of your law school class, Edwin Rutan, Esq. (Harvard Law School, 1972), is the older brother of an old friend of mine.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
cc: R. Stan Mortenson, Esq.
Did The FBI Director Make Any Phone Calls?
William H. Webster is an American lawyer and current Chairman of the Homeland Security Advisory Council. Previously Webster was the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) from 1978 to 1987 and Director of Central Intelligence from 1987 to 1991. He was a former federal judge who ascended to the CIA after his successful coups against the New York mafia families while director of the FBI under President Jimmy Carter. Judge Webster is the only American to serve as both Director of Central Intelligence and Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
In 1998 I senty Judge Webster an unusual letter. I wonder if he made any phone calls about me.
July 9, 1998
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
William H. Webster, Esq.
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy
Suite 1100
1825 Eye Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 835-7500
Dear Judge Webster:
During the period March 1988 to October 1991 I was employed as a legal assistant at the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump"). Attorney managers at Akin Gump terminated my employment effective October 29, 1991 upon determining, in consultation with a psychiatrist, that a complaint of harassment I had lodged against several co-workers was attributable to a psychiatric symptom ("ideas of reference") prominent in the psychotic disorders and typically associated with a risk of violent behavior. See Freedman v. D.C. Dept. of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order issued June 10, 1996). In the period immediately after my job termination senior Akin Gump managers determined that it was advisable to secure the office of my direct supervisor against a possible homicidal assault, which it was feared I might commit.
I have been under investigation by the U.S. Secret Service as a potential security risk to President William J. Clinton, and was interrogated at the Washington Field Office by Special Agent Philip C. Leadroot as recently as February 1996 on a referral by high-ranking attorneys at the U.S. Department of Justice.
I have also been under investigation by the Federal Protective Service (Jerry McGill, S.A.) incident to concerns, affirmed as genuine in 1996 by then District of Columbia Corporation Counsel--now White House Counsel to President Clinton--Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq., that I posed a risk of violence, including armed violence or homicide, at the law firm of Akin Gump.
Pursuant to the investigation instituted by the Federal Protective Service ("FPS") I forwarded a document to the FPS, under cover letter dated September 8, 1997 (copy attached), that contains references to former President Richard M. Nixon, as well as references to the Central Intelligence Agency. The document is titled "Significant Moments."
I request that you disclose to the Washington Field Office of the U.S. Secret Service (Phillip C. Leadroot, S.A., telephone no. 202 435 5100) whether you have at any time been made aware, by any source, of the existence of this document. I enclose a copy of the first page of the document to refresh your recollection. I know that you will appreciate the serious nature of any concerns relating to presidential security and that any disclosure you make to the U.S. Secret Service will be full, candid, and truthful.
Background facts that prompt this inquiry are the following:
-- You were Director of the Central Intelligence Agency during the period 1987-1991, a period that included the administration of former President George Bush;
-- Former President George Bush, himself a former CIA Director (during the administration of former President Richard M. Nixon), is a close friend of Akin Gump partner Robert S. Strauss, Esq.;
-- Milbank Tweed retired partner Elliott L. Richardson, Esq. served as Attorney General of the United States in 1973; his tenure as Attorney General was abruptly terminated in a Watergate-related matter, in October 1973;
-- I interviewed for a position as operative with the Central Intelligence Agency in about September 1982, by a CIA recruiter who called himself "Mr. Scott." The interview was conducted in a hotel room in downtown Philadelphia; and
-- You were appointed, in 1978, by former President Jimmy Carter, to the position of Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and served in that position until 1987; coincidentally, Robert S. Strauss, Esq., is a former FBI agent and served in the Carter Administration in several posts.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
In 1998 I senty Judge Webster an unusual letter. I wonder if he made any phone calls about me.
July 9, 1998
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
William H. Webster, Esq.
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy
Suite 1100
1825 Eye Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 835-7500
Dear Judge Webster:
During the period March 1988 to October 1991 I was employed as a legal assistant at the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump"). Attorney managers at Akin Gump terminated my employment effective October 29, 1991 upon determining, in consultation with a psychiatrist, that a complaint of harassment I had lodged against several co-workers was attributable to a psychiatric symptom ("ideas of reference") prominent in the psychotic disorders and typically associated with a risk of violent behavior. See Freedman v. D.C. Dept. of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order issued June 10, 1996). In the period immediately after my job termination senior Akin Gump managers determined that it was advisable to secure the office of my direct supervisor against a possible homicidal assault, which it was feared I might commit.
I have been under investigation by the U.S. Secret Service as a potential security risk to President William J. Clinton, and was interrogated at the Washington Field Office by Special Agent Philip C. Leadroot as recently as February 1996 on a referral by high-ranking attorneys at the U.S. Department of Justice.
I have also been under investigation by the Federal Protective Service (Jerry McGill, S.A.) incident to concerns, affirmed as genuine in 1996 by then District of Columbia Corporation Counsel--now White House Counsel to President Clinton--Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq., that I posed a risk of violence, including armed violence or homicide, at the law firm of Akin Gump.
Pursuant to the investigation instituted by the Federal Protective Service ("FPS") I forwarded a document to the FPS, under cover letter dated September 8, 1997 (copy attached), that contains references to former President Richard M. Nixon, as well as references to the Central Intelligence Agency. The document is titled "Significant Moments."
I request that you disclose to the Washington Field Office of the U.S. Secret Service (Phillip C. Leadroot, S.A., telephone no. 202 435 5100) whether you have at any time been made aware, by any source, of the existence of this document. I enclose a copy of the first page of the document to refresh your recollection. I know that you will appreciate the serious nature of any concerns relating to presidential security and that any disclosure you make to the U.S. Secret Service will be full, candid, and truthful.
Background facts that prompt this inquiry are the following:
-- You were Director of the Central Intelligence Agency during the period 1987-1991, a period that included the administration of former President George Bush;
-- Former President George Bush, himself a former CIA Director (during the administration of former President Richard M. Nixon), is a close friend of Akin Gump partner Robert S. Strauss, Esq.;
-- Milbank Tweed retired partner Elliott L. Richardson, Esq. served as Attorney General of the United States in 1973; his tenure as Attorney General was abruptly terminated in a Watergate-related matter, in October 1973;
-- I interviewed for a position as operative with the Central Intelligence Agency in about September 1982, by a CIA recruiter who called himself "Mr. Scott." The interview was conducted in a hotel room in downtown Philadelphia; and
-- You were appointed, in 1978, by former President Jimmy Carter, to the position of Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and served in that position until 1987; coincidentally, Robert S. Strauss, Esq., is a former FBI agent and served in the Carter Administration in several posts.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
Doing My Duty As A Good Citizen!
July 20, 1998
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Hon. Orrin G. Hatch
SR-131 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510-4402
Dear Senator Hatch:
This will advise the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee that in the event that the jurisdiction of the Office of Independent Counsel (Kenneth W. Starr, Esq.) is expanded to investigate the possible receipt by President Clinton of documents obtained unlawfully from the office of my treating psychiatrists, I will--to the extent that my mental disability permits--offer my complete assistance and cooperation.
I enclose a document submission that I made to the Federal Protective Service (Jerry McGill, S.A.) under cover letter dated September 8, 1997.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
cc: U.S. Social Security Administration (Disability Claim no. xxx-xx-xxxx)
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Hon. Orrin G. Hatch
SR-131 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510-4402
Dear Senator Hatch:
This will advise the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee that in the event that the jurisdiction of the Office of Independent Counsel (Kenneth W. Starr, Esq.) is expanded to investigate the possible receipt by President Clinton of documents obtained unlawfully from the office of my treating psychiatrists, I will--to the extent that my mental disability permits--offer my complete assistance and cooperation.
I enclose a document submission that I made to the Federal Protective Service (Jerry McGill, S.A.) under cover letter dated September 8, 1997.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
cc: U.S. Social Security Administration (Disability Claim no. xxx-xx-xxxx)
Matt Damon's Mother? Am I Nuts Or What?
July 22, 1998
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Nancy Carlsson-Paige
Prof. of Education
Lesley College
29 Everett Street
Cambridge, MA 02138-2790
(617) 868-9600
Dear Professor Carlsson-Paige:
During the period March 1988 to October 1991 I was employed as a legal assistant at the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump"). Attorney managers at Akin Gump terminated my employment effective October 29, 1991 upon determining, in consultation with a psychiatrist, that a complaint of harassment I had lodged against several co-workers was attributable to a psychiatric symptom ("ideas of reference") prominent in the psychotic disorders and typically associated with a risk of violent behavior. See Freedman v. D.C. Dept. of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order issued June 10, 1996). In the period immediately after my job termination senior Akin Gump managers determined that it was advisable to secure the office of my direct supervisor against a possible homicidal assault, which it was feared I might commit.
I have been under investigation by the U.S. Secret Service as a potential security risk to President William J. Clinton, and was interrogated at the Washington Field Office by Special Agent Philip C. Leadroot as recently as February 1996 on a referral by high-ranking attorneys at the U.S. Department of Justice.
I have also been under investigation by the Federal Protective Service (Jerry McGill, S.A.) incident to concerns, affirmed as genuine in 1996 by then District of Columbia Corporation Counsel--now White House Counsel to President Clinton--Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq., that I posed a risk of violence, including armed violence or homicide, at the law firm of Akin Gump.
Pursuant to the investigation instituted by the Federal Protective Service ("FPS") I forwarded a document to the FPS, under cover letter dated September 8, 1997 (copy attached). The document is a somewhat unusual creative piece titled "Significant Moments" that contains references to, among other issues, the creative process, child development, and male friendships.
I request that you disclose to the Washington Field Office of the U.S. Secret Service (Phillip C. Leadroot, S.A., telephone no. 202 435 5100) whether you have at any time been made aware, by any source, of the existence of this document. I enclose a copy of the first page of the document to refresh your possible recollection. I know that you will appreciate the serious nature of any concerns relating to presidential security and that any disclosure you make to the U.S. Secret Service will be full, candid, and truthful.
Background facts that prompt this inquiry are the following:
-- You are the mother of the actor Matt Damon, a film actor and screenwriter, who co-wrote, with his life-long friend Ben Affleck, the screenplay for the Oscar-winning movie Good Will Hunting, a story about a man whose genius is discovered while he is working as a janitor at MIT;
-- You are a professor of early-childhood education;
-- Matt Damon has close professional ties to Steven Spielberg who directed the movie Schindler's List and to the actor Robin Williams who portrayed the nationally-prominent neurologist-writer Oliver Sacks, M.D. in the movie Awakenings.
-- Matt Damon attended Harvard University as an English major.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Nancy Carlsson-Paige
Prof. of Education
Lesley College
29 Everett Street
Cambridge, MA 02138-2790
(617) 868-9600
Dear Professor Carlsson-Paige:
During the period March 1988 to October 1991 I was employed as a legal assistant at the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump"). Attorney managers at Akin Gump terminated my employment effective October 29, 1991 upon determining, in consultation with a psychiatrist, that a complaint of harassment I had lodged against several co-workers was attributable to a psychiatric symptom ("ideas of reference") prominent in the psychotic disorders and typically associated with a risk of violent behavior. See Freedman v. D.C. Dept. of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order issued June 10, 1996). In the period immediately after my job termination senior Akin Gump managers determined that it was advisable to secure the office of my direct supervisor against a possible homicidal assault, which it was feared I might commit.
I have been under investigation by the U.S. Secret Service as a potential security risk to President William J. Clinton, and was interrogated at the Washington Field Office by Special Agent Philip C. Leadroot as recently as February 1996 on a referral by high-ranking attorneys at the U.S. Department of Justice.
I have also been under investigation by the Federal Protective Service (Jerry McGill, S.A.) incident to concerns, affirmed as genuine in 1996 by then District of Columbia Corporation Counsel--now White House Counsel to President Clinton--Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq., that I posed a risk of violence, including armed violence or homicide, at the law firm of Akin Gump.
Pursuant to the investigation instituted by the Federal Protective Service ("FPS") I forwarded a document to the FPS, under cover letter dated September 8, 1997 (copy attached). The document is a somewhat unusual creative piece titled "Significant Moments" that contains references to, among other issues, the creative process, child development, and male friendships.
I request that you disclose to the Washington Field Office of the U.S. Secret Service (Phillip C. Leadroot, S.A., telephone no. 202 435 5100) whether you have at any time been made aware, by any source, of the existence of this document. I enclose a copy of the first page of the document to refresh your possible recollection. I know that you will appreciate the serious nature of any concerns relating to presidential security and that any disclosure you make to the U.S. Secret Service will be full, candid, and truthful.
Background facts that prompt this inquiry are the following:
-- You are the mother of the actor Matt Damon, a film actor and screenwriter, who co-wrote, with his life-long friend Ben Affleck, the screenplay for the Oscar-winning movie Good Will Hunting, a story about a man whose genius is discovered while he is working as a janitor at MIT;
-- You are a professor of early-childhood education;
-- Matt Damon has close professional ties to Steven Spielberg who directed the movie Schindler's List and to the actor Robin Williams who portrayed the nationally-prominent neurologist-writer Oliver Sacks, M.D. in the movie Awakenings.
-- Matt Damon attended Harvard University as an English major.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
Monday, December 28, 2009
Akin Gump: Ideas Of Reference -- Sexual Double Entendres
The following California employment discrimination case grew out of an ambiguous double-entendre used in an office setting. Note that the offended employees' complaints could have been easily dismissed by an employer as signs of hypersensitivity or paranoia.
A California office worker found the phrase "How about a little head?" flashed across her computer terminal from an unknown source within the company. She reported it to her supervisor, who was a woman, and the two women reported the incident to higher management. In response to their complaint the company embarked upon a campaign of downgrading their jobs and benefits until both women were forced to resign.
The court held that the injuries suffered by the two women were in retaliation for their reporting the sexual harassment incident. The legal consequences of these acts of retaliation were the same as if the injuries had resulted from the sexual harassment.
Whether the company would have been held responsible for the original solicitation by the co-worker is unclear, but the act of retaliating against the two women employees made the company clearly liable for what later happened.
Monge v. Superior Court (Crown Gibralter Graphic Center, Inc.), 176 Cal. App. 3d 503 (1986).
__________________________________________
The following text comprises Findings of Fact 4(f) and 4(g) made by the D.C. Department of Human Rights in Freedman v. Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld. The agency adopted the employer's (Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld) conclusion that my complaint that the following were acts of harassment was a result of a psychiatric disorder I exhibited, "ideas of reference." See Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights, D.C.C.A. no. 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998).
4(f) Some time in April 1991, when it was warm enough to eat lunch outdoors, Complainant began to eat lunch on a park bench at Dupont Circle. One afternoon upon Complainant's return to the office from lunch, at about the time he first began to eat lunch at Dupont Circle, as Complainant was seated at his desk, his supervisor, Chris Robertson, said, in a loud tone of voice to another employee, Melissa Whitney, seated near Complainant, "Are you wet?"
Complainant could not specifically recall whether he mentioned this incident to Messrs. Race and Lassman. If Complainant did mention this incident he would have explained that he interpreted the phrase "Are you wet?" as alluding to a state of sexual excitation.
(g) Upon Complainant's return to the office from lunch one afternoon during the summer of 1991, his supervisor, Chris Robertson, offered Complainant a piece of chocolate, and stated to Complainant the peculiar phrase, "Here, you look like you need some chocolate."
Complainant specifically recalls that he told Messrs. Race and Lassman that he interpreted the phrase "Here, you look like you need some chocolate" as a reference to anal intercourse. Complainant specifically recalls his using the phrase "anal intercourse."
See record on appeal at 15, Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights, no. 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998).
The above agency Findings of Fact are based verbatim on Complainant's Reply to Respondent's Response to Interrogatories and Document Request (record on appeal at 239-284) that I filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights in early January 1993.
I brought the Monge case (see above) to the attention of the D.C. Department of Human Rights. In my submission, paragraph 4(g.) reads in full:
"Upon Complainant's return to the office from lunch one afternoon during the summer of 1991, his supervisor, Chris Robertson, offered Complainant a piece of chocolate, and stated to Complainant the peculiar phrase, "Here, you look like you need some chocolate."
Complainant specifically recalls that he told Messrs. Race and Lassman that he interpreted the phrase "Here, you look like you need some chocolate" as a reference to anal intercourse. Complainant specifically recalls his using the phrase "anal intercourse." (Cf. Monge v. Superior Court (Crown Gibralter), 176 Cal. App. 3d 503, 222 Cal. Rptr. 64 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1986). An employer's failure to investigate or correct an employee's complaint regarding an anonymous -- and sexually ambiguous -- phrase "How about a little head?" that was displayed on an employee's computer terminal was found to support an action for wrongful termination and harassment. The court did not inquire as to whether the employee's sexual interpretation of the ambiguous phrase was an 'idea of reference.'" (Record on appeal at 255-256.)
_________________________________________
The following is a brief scene from the British television comedy series "The Office." My reading of the scene is that the characters Tim and Dawn are tormenting the character Gareth with homosexual double-entendres. Query: Does Gareth's failure to appreciate the fact that he is being harassed a sign that Gareth is not paranoid or is it a sign that he is dim-witted? Is my belief that I was being harassed at Akin Gump a sign that I was paranoid or is it a sign that I am not dim-witted?
Tim: I was wondering if a military man like you, um -- a soldier -- could -- could you give a man a lethal blow?
Gareth: If I was forced to. I could. If it was absolutely necessary. If he was attacking me.
Tim: If he was coming really hard.
Gareth: Yeah, if my life was in danger, yeah.
Dawn: And do you always imagine doing it face to face with a bloke or could you take a man from behind?
Gareth: Either way is easy.
Dawn: Either way. And so you could do a man from behind?
Gareth: Yeah . . .
Tim: So . . . you've dug your foxhole, and you've pitched your tent, right? They've discovered your camp, and you're lying there, and they've caught you with your trousers down, and they've all entered your hole without you knowing.
Gareth: No, 'cause I'd be ready for them.
Tim: You'd just be lying there waiting for it?
Gareth: Yeah. Well, no. What's more likely is that I wouldn't be there if I knew they knew where I was. I'd be hiding, watching the hole, using it as a trap.
Tim: So, you'd be using your hole as bait?
Gareth: Yeah.
A California office worker found the phrase "How about a little head?" flashed across her computer terminal from an unknown source within the company. She reported it to her supervisor, who was a woman, and the two women reported the incident to higher management. In response to their complaint the company embarked upon a campaign of downgrading their jobs and benefits until both women were forced to resign.
The court held that the injuries suffered by the two women were in retaliation for their reporting the sexual harassment incident. The legal consequences of these acts of retaliation were the same as if the injuries had resulted from the sexual harassment.
Whether the company would have been held responsible for the original solicitation by the co-worker is unclear, but the act of retaliating against the two women employees made the company clearly liable for what later happened.
Monge v. Superior Court (Crown Gibralter Graphic Center, Inc.), 176 Cal. App. 3d 503 (1986).
__________________________________________
The following text comprises Findings of Fact 4(f) and 4(g) made by the D.C. Department of Human Rights in Freedman v. Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld. The agency adopted the employer's (Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld) conclusion that my complaint that the following were acts of harassment was a result of a psychiatric disorder I exhibited, "ideas of reference." See Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights, D.C.C.A. no. 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998).
4(f) Some time in April 1991, when it was warm enough to eat lunch outdoors, Complainant began to eat lunch on a park bench at Dupont Circle. One afternoon upon Complainant's return to the office from lunch, at about the time he first began to eat lunch at Dupont Circle, as Complainant was seated at his desk, his supervisor, Chris Robertson, said, in a loud tone of voice to another employee, Melissa Whitney, seated near Complainant, "Are you wet?"
Complainant could not specifically recall whether he mentioned this incident to Messrs. Race and Lassman. If Complainant did mention this incident he would have explained that he interpreted the phrase "Are you wet?" as alluding to a state of sexual excitation.
(g) Upon Complainant's return to the office from lunch one afternoon during the summer of 1991, his supervisor, Chris Robertson, offered Complainant a piece of chocolate, and stated to Complainant the peculiar phrase, "Here, you look like you need some chocolate."
Complainant specifically recalls that he told Messrs. Race and Lassman that he interpreted the phrase "Here, you look like you need some chocolate" as a reference to anal intercourse. Complainant specifically recalls his using the phrase "anal intercourse."
See record on appeal at 15, Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights, no. 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998).
The above agency Findings of Fact are based verbatim on Complainant's Reply to Respondent's Response to Interrogatories and Document Request (record on appeal at 239-284) that I filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights in early January 1993.
I brought the Monge case (see above) to the attention of the D.C. Department of Human Rights. In my submission, paragraph 4(g.) reads in full:
"Upon Complainant's return to the office from lunch one afternoon during the summer of 1991, his supervisor, Chris Robertson, offered Complainant a piece of chocolate, and stated to Complainant the peculiar phrase, "Here, you look like you need some chocolate."
Complainant specifically recalls that he told Messrs. Race and Lassman that he interpreted the phrase "Here, you look like you need some chocolate" as a reference to anal intercourse. Complainant specifically recalls his using the phrase "anal intercourse." (Cf. Monge v. Superior Court (Crown Gibralter), 176 Cal. App. 3d 503, 222 Cal. Rptr. 64 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1986). An employer's failure to investigate or correct an employee's complaint regarding an anonymous -- and sexually ambiguous -- phrase "How about a little head?" that was displayed on an employee's computer terminal was found to support an action for wrongful termination and harassment. The court did not inquire as to whether the employee's sexual interpretation of the ambiguous phrase was an 'idea of reference.'" (Record on appeal at 255-256.)
_________________________________________
The following is a brief scene from the British television comedy series "The Office." My reading of the scene is that the characters Tim and Dawn are tormenting the character Gareth with homosexual double-entendres. Query: Does Gareth's failure to appreciate the fact that he is being harassed a sign that Gareth is not paranoid or is it a sign that he is dim-witted? Is my belief that I was being harassed at Akin Gump a sign that I was paranoid or is it a sign that I am not dim-witted?
Tim: I was wondering if a military man like you, um -- a soldier -- could -- could you give a man a lethal blow?
Gareth: If I was forced to. I could. If it was absolutely necessary. If he was attacking me.
Tim: If he was coming really hard.
Gareth: Yeah, if my life was in danger, yeah.
Dawn: And do you always imagine doing it face to face with a bloke or could you take a man from behind?
Gareth: Either way is easy.
Dawn: Either way. And so you could do a man from behind?
Gareth: Yeah . . .
Tim: So . . . you've dug your foxhole, and you've pitched your tent, right? They've discovered your camp, and you're lying there, and they've caught you with your trousers down, and they've all entered your hole without you knowing.
Gareth: No, 'cause I'd be ready for them.
Tim: You'd just be lying there waiting for it?
Gareth: Yeah. Well, no. What's more likely is that I wouldn't be there if I knew they knew where I was. I'd be hiding, watching the hole, using it as a trap.
Tim: So, you'd be using your hole as bait?
Gareth: Yeah.
What Does Esther Know?
I moved to 3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW, an apartment building in upper Northwest Washington, DC in late August 1983.
My next door neighbors in apartment 137 were two elderly women: Bernice Stiles and Genevieve Topliff ("Toppie").
Bernice was retired from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. She died in the 1990s.
Toppie was originally from Minnesota, I believe. She was born in 1910 and died in the year 2000. Toppie was friendly with front desk manager Elizabeth Joyce, who worked at 3801 from 1986 to mid-year 2003. Toppie was also friendly with a tenant who lived on the first floor named Geraldine "Gerry" Poland, an elderly woman.
When I moved into the building, Bernice Stiles and Genevieve Topliff were the guardians of a young girl named Esther. In 1983 Esther appeared to be the same age as my older niece, who was born in 1975. So, in 1983, Esther was about eight years old. Esther attended the Oyster School in Washington; she was fluent in Spanish. Esther continued to live in apartment 137 until she got married in the 1990s.
I do not know the current whereabouts of Esther or her maiden or married names.
Odd recollection: In early October 1994 I sent a letter to the FBI that referred to presidential assassination. The FBI referred the letter to the U.S. Secret Service (S.A. Phillip C. Leadroot), who interviewed me in December 1994. Some time in October 1994 I happened to see Esther, and she had a look of horror when she looked at me. I don't know if her reaction to me was a reaction to any law enforcement inquiry.
My next door neighbors in apartment 137 were two elderly women: Bernice Stiles and Genevieve Topliff ("Toppie").
Bernice was retired from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. She died in the 1990s.
Toppie was originally from Minnesota, I believe. She was born in 1910 and died in the year 2000. Toppie was friendly with front desk manager Elizabeth Joyce, who worked at 3801 from 1986 to mid-year 2003. Toppie was also friendly with a tenant who lived on the first floor named Geraldine "Gerry" Poland, an elderly woman.
When I moved into the building, Bernice Stiles and Genevieve Topliff were the guardians of a young girl named Esther. In 1983 Esther appeared to be the same age as my older niece, who was born in 1975. So, in 1983, Esther was about eight years old. Esther attended the Oyster School in Washington; she was fluent in Spanish. Esther continued to live in apartment 137 until she got married in the 1990s.
I do not know the current whereabouts of Esther or her maiden or married names.
Odd recollection: In early October 1994 I sent a letter to the FBI that referred to presidential assassination. The FBI referred the letter to the U.S. Secret Service (S.A. Phillip C. Leadroot), who interviewed me in December 1994. Some time in October 1994 I happened to see Esther, and she had a look of horror when she looked at me. I don't know if her reaction to me was a reaction to any law enforcement inquiry.
Sally R. Gonzalez -- the Sheryl Ferguson Connection
Sally R. Gonzalez is currently Director at Baker Robbins & Company in Washington, DC.
In the 1980s Sally Gonzalez was Sheryl Ferguson's supervisor at Hogan & Hartson. Sheryl Ferguson, as an employee of ATLIS, performed a consulting job for Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld in 1988-1989. Sheryl Ferguson analyzed Akin Gump's litigation support capabilities and met with firm partners David Callet, Esq., Jack Gallagher, and others. She also met with Akin Gump associate David C. Tobin, Esq. Sheryl Ferguson also worked with Litigation Support Administrator Chris Robertson as part of her consulting assignment.
Akin Gump hired Sally Gonzalez in the late 1990s as its Chief Information Officer, or CIO, handling the nuts and bolts of the firm’s hardware and software. She had had ten years’ experience in law firms.
Sally Gonzalez at Hogan & Hartson knew Espe Rebollar and Craig W. Dye, both of whom were senior employees in Hogan's Computer Applications Department.
In the 1980s Sally Gonzalez was Sheryl Ferguson's supervisor at Hogan & Hartson. Sheryl Ferguson, as an employee of ATLIS, performed a consulting job for Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld in 1988-1989. Sheryl Ferguson analyzed Akin Gump's litigation support capabilities and met with firm partners David Callet, Esq., Jack Gallagher, and others. She also met with Akin Gump associate David C. Tobin, Esq. Sheryl Ferguson also worked with Litigation Support Administrator Chris Robertson as part of her consulting assignment.
Akin Gump hired Sally Gonzalez in the late 1990s as its Chief Information Officer, or CIO, handling the nuts and bolts of the firm’s hardware and software. She had had ten years’ experience in law firms.
Sally Gonzalez at Hogan & Hartson knew Espe Rebollar and Craig W. Dye, both of whom were senior employees in Hogan's Computer Applications Department.
Akin Gump: This Memo Must Have Made Some Partners' Heads Turn
M E M O R A N D U M
TO: Laurel Digweed
Joe Blessing
Maggie Sinnott
FROM: Margarita Babb [initialed MCB]
DATE: June 9, 1988
RE: Hiring of Gary Freedman for Legal Assistant Position
____________________________________
Gary Freedman has accepted a temporary legal assistant position, starting Monday, June 13, 1988, with Akin, Gump's Labor Section to work with Eastern Airlines projects.
Mr. Freedman will be paid at the rate of $13.00 per hour, without benefits of any kind. Mr. Freedman received his J.D. degree in 1982 from Temple Universioty's School of Law and his LL.M. degree from American University in 1985. Mr. Freedman recently completed a two-year assignment as a legal assistant at Hogan & Hartson.
Mr. Freedman will be billed at a rate of $65 per hour. Initials for billing purposes are GF.
Attached is a copy of Mr. Freedman's resume.
cc: Elizabeth Haile Hayes
Earl Segal
Karen Stillitano [professional assistant to the Managing Partner, Larry Hoffman, Esq.]
Frances Horne
Marilyn Mickelson
MCB/lmr
TO: Laurel Digweed
Joe Blessing
Maggie Sinnott
FROM: Margarita Babb [initialed MCB]
DATE: June 9, 1988
RE: Hiring of Gary Freedman for Legal Assistant Position
____________________________________
Gary Freedman has accepted a temporary legal assistant position, starting Monday, June 13, 1988, with Akin, Gump's Labor Section to work with Eastern Airlines projects.
Mr. Freedman will be paid at the rate of $13.00 per hour, without benefits of any kind. Mr. Freedman received his J.D. degree in 1982 from Temple Universioty's School of Law and his LL.M. degree from American University in 1985. Mr. Freedman recently completed a two-year assignment as a legal assistant at Hogan & Hartson.
Mr. Freedman will be billed at a rate of $65 per hour. Initials for billing purposes are GF.
Attached is a copy of Mr. Freedman's resume.
cc: Elizabeth Haile Hayes
Earl Segal
Karen Stillitano [professional assistant to the Managing Partner, Larry Hoffman, Esq.]
Frances Horne
Marilyn Mickelson
MCB/lmr
Me and Elizabeth Taylor
July 11, 1998
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Elizabeth Taylor
700 Nimes Road
Los Angeles, CA 90077
Dear Miss Taylor:
During the period March 1988 to October 1991 I was employed as a legal assistant at the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump"). Attorney managers at Akin Gump terminated my employment effective October 29, 1991 upon determining, in consultation with a psychiatrist, that a complaint of harassment I had lodged against several co-workers was attributable to a psychiatric symptom ("ideas of reference") prominent in the psychotic disorders and typically associated with a risk of violent behavior. See Freedman v. D.C. Dept. of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order issued June 10, 1996). In the period immediately after my job termination senior Akin Gump managers determined that it was advisable to secure the office of my direct supervisor against a possible homicidal assault, which it was feared I might commit.
I have been under investigation by the U.S. Secret Service as a potential security risk to President William J. Clinton, and was interrogated at the Washington Field Office by Special Agent Philip C. Leadroot as recently as February 1996 on a referral by high-ranking attorneys at the U.S. Department of Justice.
I have also been under investigation by the Federal Protective Service (Jerry McGill, S.A.) incident to concerns, affirmed as genuine in 1996 by then District of Columbia Corporation Counsel--now White House Counsel to President Clinton--Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq., that I posed a risk of violence, including armed violence or homicide, at the law firm of Akin Gump.
Pursuant to the investigation instituted by the Federal Protective Service ("FPS") I forwarded a document to the FPS, under cover letter dated September 8, 1997 (copy attached), that contains references to the German opera composer Richard Wagner. The document is titled "Significant Moments."
I request that you disclose to the Washington Field Office of the U.S. Secret Service (Phillip C. Leadroot, S.A., telephone no. 202 435 5100) whether you have at any time been made aware, by any source, of the existence of this document. I enclose a copy of the first page of the document to refresh your recollection. I know that you will appreciate the serious nature of any concerns relating to presidential security and that any disclosure you make to the U.S. Secret Service will be full, candid, and truthful.
Background facts that prompt this inquiry are the following:
-- Your former husband Senator John Warner (R.-Va.) has been a partner of the law firm of Hogan & Hartson, where I was employed in the capacity of legal assistant ("paralegal") for a period in the late 1980's;
-- You have been a client of the law firm of Hogan & Hartson; it was reported to me by a coworker at the firm (Sara Shea) that you visited the firm's office (815 Connecticut Avenue) in Washington, D.C. on at least one occasion;
-- Your former husband Richard Burton (now deceased) portrayed the German opera composer Richard Wagner in a British made-for-television production in the early 1980's; and
-- You may have had occasion to socialize with former first lady Mrs. Nancy Reagan, who, like yourself, resides in Bel Air (668 St. Cloud Road, 90077); Mrs. Reagan (together with Akin Gump partner, Robert S. Strauss, Esq.) is a member of the Board of Directors of the Ronald Reagan Institute of Emergency Medicine of the George Washington University Medical Center in Washington, DC where, coincidentally, I have received out-patient psychiatric treatment.
I thank you in advance for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Elizabeth Taylor
700 Nimes Road
Los Angeles, CA 90077
Dear Miss Taylor:
During the period March 1988 to October 1991 I was employed as a legal assistant at the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump"). Attorney managers at Akin Gump terminated my employment effective October 29, 1991 upon determining, in consultation with a psychiatrist, that a complaint of harassment I had lodged against several co-workers was attributable to a psychiatric symptom ("ideas of reference") prominent in the psychotic disorders and typically associated with a risk of violent behavior. See Freedman v. D.C. Dept. of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order issued June 10, 1996). In the period immediately after my job termination senior Akin Gump managers determined that it was advisable to secure the office of my direct supervisor against a possible homicidal assault, which it was feared I might commit.
I have been under investigation by the U.S. Secret Service as a potential security risk to President William J. Clinton, and was interrogated at the Washington Field Office by Special Agent Philip C. Leadroot as recently as February 1996 on a referral by high-ranking attorneys at the U.S. Department of Justice.
I have also been under investigation by the Federal Protective Service (Jerry McGill, S.A.) incident to concerns, affirmed as genuine in 1996 by then District of Columbia Corporation Counsel--now White House Counsel to President Clinton--Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq., that I posed a risk of violence, including armed violence or homicide, at the law firm of Akin Gump.
Pursuant to the investigation instituted by the Federal Protective Service ("FPS") I forwarded a document to the FPS, under cover letter dated September 8, 1997 (copy attached), that contains references to the German opera composer Richard Wagner. The document is titled "Significant Moments."
I request that you disclose to the Washington Field Office of the U.S. Secret Service (Phillip C. Leadroot, S.A., telephone no. 202 435 5100) whether you have at any time been made aware, by any source, of the existence of this document. I enclose a copy of the first page of the document to refresh your recollection. I know that you will appreciate the serious nature of any concerns relating to presidential security and that any disclosure you make to the U.S. Secret Service will be full, candid, and truthful.
Background facts that prompt this inquiry are the following:
-- Your former husband Senator John Warner (R.-Va.) has been a partner of the law firm of Hogan & Hartson, where I was employed in the capacity of legal assistant ("paralegal") for a period in the late 1980's;
-- You have been a client of the law firm of Hogan & Hartson; it was reported to me by a coworker at the firm (Sara Shea) that you visited the firm's office (815 Connecticut Avenue) in Washington, D.C. on at least one occasion;
-- Your former husband Richard Burton (now deceased) portrayed the German opera composer Richard Wagner in a British made-for-television production in the early 1980's; and
-- You may have had occasion to socialize with former first lady Mrs. Nancy Reagan, who, like yourself, resides in Bel Air (668 St. Cloud Road, 90077); Mrs. Reagan (together with Akin Gump partner, Robert S. Strauss, Esq.) is a member of the Board of Directors of the Ronald Reagan Institute of Emergency Medicine of the George Washington University Medical Center in Washington, DC where, coincidentally, I have received out-patient psychiatric treatment.
I thank you in advance for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
Did a Former CIA Director Make any Phone Calls?
R. James Woolsey Jr., Esq. is a foreign policy specialist and former Director of Central Intelligence and head of the Central Intelligence Agency (February 5, 1993 - January 10, 1995) during the Clinton Administration.
In the year 1999 I sent a job application to Mr. Woolsey. I wonder if he made any calls about me.
March 29, 1999
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
R. James Woolsey, Esq.
Shea & Gardner
1800 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036-1806
(202) 828-2000
Dear Mr. Woolsey:
I am an attorney licensed to practice in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and qualify for consideration for a position as associate with the firm of Shea & Gardner. Preliminary to forwarding a copy of my resume to Shea & Gardner I believe I have a legal duty to advise the firm of the following facts regarding concerns about my potential for armed violence or homicide, intent to purchase firearms to commit a felony, and the illegal transport of a deadly weapon: concerns placed in controversy and affirmed, by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.), as relating to genuine fears about my criminal intent.
The Government of the District of Columbia has affirmed that my former employer, the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump") terminated my employment in October 1991 on the basis of genuine concerns about my mental health and stability, including the potential for violence. The employer's termination decision was made following an ex parte consultation with a psychiatrist who did not examine me personally. Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order, June 10, 1996), affirmed by the D.C. Court of Appeals (Terry, Reid, and King, associate judges), No. 96-CV-961 (Memorandum Opinion and Judgment filed Sept. 1, 1998).
As of the filing of the complaint in the Superior Court proceedings, in October 1995, and at all times thereafter, it was unlawful under the laws of the District of Columbia for a psychiatrist to offer a professional psychiatric opinion about an individual without benefit of personal examination as is strongly recommended by the American Psychiatric Association's Principles of Medical Ethics. The D.C. Code in its latest revision makes it unlawful for a physician to "[fail] to conform to standards of acceptable conduct and prevailing practice within a health profession." See D.C. Code 2-3305.14(26). This provision was added to the District of Columbia Health Occupations Revision Act by D.C. Law 10-247, enacted on March 23, 1995. The Court of Appeals expressly found that the professional psychiatric opinion offered by the psychiatrist to the employer amounted to the diagnosis of a "disorder." See No. 96-CV-961 at 4.
The District of Columbia Superior Court as well as the Court of Appeals did not find that the action of my Akin Gump supervisor in stating to employees that she feared that I might have had plans to kill her, and the action of the supervisor in arranging to have her office secured against such a homicidal assault, see record on appeal at 41, was invidiously motivated. The supervisor (Robertson) is designated by the employer as one of the three decisionmakers who terminated my employment, see record on appeal at 167, which termination decision was based in part on the above-referenced psychiatric evidence that tended to show that I posed a risk of violence. Robertson's termination decision was made in consultation with Dennis M. Race, Esq., a senior Akin Gump partner, see record on appeal at 138 and 167.
Mr. Race has expressly affirmed, under penalty of D.C. Code 1-2529 (D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977: false documents or testimony), that (unspecified) acts of "violence," see record on appeal at 140, that I committed during my tenure at the firm coupled with the firm's reasonable fear that my future conduct might expose the firm to tort liability, see record on appeal at 148 (possibly including tort damages for wrongful death, cf. record on appeal at 41), justified the firm's decision to terminate my employment.
The District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel expressly affirmed to the D.C. Superior Court and to the Court of Appeals in pleadings filed in the above-referenced proceedings, relying on legally-irrelevant "after-acquired" evidence, see McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S.Ct. 879, 885 (1995), that my coworkers had formed genuine fears (i.e., not motivated by discriminatory animus) that I might have been armed and dangerous and poised to carry out a homicidal assault on the firm's premises. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia Department of Human Rights and Minority Business Development at 9, Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Court of Appeals No. 96-CV-961 (citing record on appeal at 276). The District implicitly asserted that my coworkers' concerns about my potential for armed violence were relevant to the employer's decision to terminate my employment.
I stand by the "Statement of Gary Freedman to the Office of U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Regarding Intent to Commit Crime of Violence as Determined by the Law Firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld," ("Statement to the U.S. Attorney") dated April 24, 1995, and made under penalty of criminal sanctions (D.C. Code 22-2514).
I want to advise, however, that representations made by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (M. Justin Draycott, Esq.) to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals at oral argument in December 1997 that I "admitted" in pleadings that I filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights that my "coworkers" were genuinely "afraid" of me (specifically with regard to my potential for armed violence or homicide) conflict with the prior Statement to the U.S. Attorney, and that said conflict may give rise to the appearance that the exculpatory representations that I made in the Statement to the U.S. Attorney were knowingly false, misleading, or perjurious.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals has affirmed, see D.C. No. 96-CV-961 at 3 n. 1, that the Department of Human Rights had legally-valid concerns that a document I submitted to the agency (which purports to have been written by the psychiatrist consulted by Akin Gump) may have been inauthentic (i.e., forged or fabricated), see record on appeal at 8. Presumably, according to the agency, I submitted the possibly inauthentic document in order to deny forensic psychiatric evidence filed by Akin Gump with the agency: forensic psychiatric evidence that related to my mental health (specifically relating to a psychiatric "disorder" that my employer had attributed to me, see D.C. No. 96-CV-961 at 4) and stability (specifically relating to my potential for violence). But see Namerdy v. Generalcar, 217 A.2d 109, 111-112 (D.C. 1966) (circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that a letter is written on the author's letterhead, is sufficient for authentication).
For your additional information I forward a document submission that I made to the Federal Protective Service (Jerry McGill, S.A.) under cover letter dated Sept. 8, 1997 under penalty of a criminal investigation.
Robert Chapman, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, is familiar with this matter. The telephone number of the U.S. Attorney's Office in Washington is (202) 514-7566.
I am confident that defamatory statements about me that may raise substantial concerns about my mental stability and fitness to practice law, even acts of defamation committed by the law partners of a close friend of the President of the United States (Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Esq.) and acts of defamation committed by the current chief White House counsel to President Clinton (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.), will in no way impair my chances for fair consideration for employment by your firm.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
In the year 1999 I sent a job application to Mr. Woolsey. I wonder if he made any calls about me.
March 29, 1999
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
R. James Woolsey, Esq.
Shea & Gardner
1800 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036-1806
(202) 828-2000
Dear Mr. Woolsey:
I am an attorney licensed to practice in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and qualify for consideration for a position as associate with the firm of Shea & Gardner. Preliminary to forwarding a copy of my resume to Shea & Gardner I believe I have a legal duty to advise the firm of the following facts regarding concerns about my potential for armed violence or homicide, intent to purchase firearms to commit a felony, and the illegal transport of a deadly weapon: concerns placed in controversy and affirmed, by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.), as relating to genuine fears about my criminal intent.
The Government of the District of Columbia has affirmed that my former employer, the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump") terminated my employment in October 1991 on the basis of genuine concerns about my mental health and stability, including the potential for violence. The employer's termination decision was made following an ex parte consultation with a psychiatrist who did not examine me personally. Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order, June 10, 1996), affirmed by the D.C. Court of Appeals (Terry, Reid, and King, associate judges), No. 96-CV-961 (Memorandum Opinion and Judgment filed Sept. 1, 1998).
As of the filing of the complaint in the Superior Court proceedings, in October 1995, and at all times thereafter, it was unlawful under the laws of the District of Columbia for a psychiatrist to offer a professional psychiatric opinion about an individual without benefit of personal examination as is strongly recommended by the American Psychiatric Association's Principles of Medical Ethics. The D.C. Code in its latest revision makes it unlawful for a physician to "[fail] to conform to standards of acceptable conduct and prevailing practice within a health profession." See D.C. Code 2-3305.14(26). This provision was added to the District of Columbia Health Occupations Revision Act by D.C. Law 10-247, enacted on March 23, 1995. The Court of Appeals expressly found that the professional psychiatric opinion offered by the psychiatrist to the employer amounted to the diagnosis of a "disorder." See No. 96-CV-961 at 4.
The District of Columbia Superior Court as well as the Court of Appeals did not find that the action of my Akin Gump supervisor in stating to employees that she feared that I might have had plans to kill her, and the action of the supervisor in arranging to have her office secured against such a homicidal assault, see record on appeal at 41, was invidiously motivated. The supervisor (Robertson) is designated by the employer as one of the three decisionmakers who terminated my employment, see record on appeal at 167, which termination decision was based in part on the above-referenced psychiatric evidence that tended to show that I posed a risk of violence. Robertson's termination decision was made in consultation with Dennis M. Race, Esq., a senior Akin Gump partner, see record on appeal at 138 and 167.
Mr. Race has expressly affirmed, under penalty of D.C. Code 1-2529 (D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977: false documents or testimony), that (unspecified) acts of "violence," see record on appeal at 140, that I committed during my tenure at the firm coupled with the firm's reasonable fear that my future conduct might expose the firm to tort liability, see record on appeal at 148 (possibly including tort damages for wrongful death, cf. record on appeal at 41), justified the firm's decision to terminate my employment.
The District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel expressly affirmed to the D.C. Superior Court and to the Court of Appeals in pleadings filed in the above-referenced proceedings, relying on legally-irrelevant "after-acquired" evidence, see McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S.Ct. 879, 885 (1995), that my coworkers had formed genuine fears (i.e., not motivated by discriminatory animus) that I might have been armed and dangerous and poised to carry out a homicidal assault on the firm's premises. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia Department of Human Rights and Minority Business Development at 9, Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Court of Appeals No. 96-CV-961 (citing record on appeal at 276). The District implicitly asserted that my coworkers' concerns about my potential for armed violence were relevant to the employer's decision to terminate my employment.
I stand by the "Statement of Gary Freedman to the Office of U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Regarding Intent to Commit Crime of Violence as Determined by the Law Firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld," ("Statement to the U.S. Attorney") dated April 24, 1995, and made under penalty of criminal sanctions (D.C. Code 22-2514).
I want to advise, however, that representations made by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (M. Justin Draycott, Esq.) to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals at oral argument in December 1997 that I "admitted" in pleadings that I filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights that my "coworkers" were genuinely "afraid" of me (specifically with regard to my potential for armed violence or homicide) conflict with the prior Statement to the U.S. Attorney, and that said conflict may give rise to the appearance that the exculpatory representations that I made in the Statement to the U.S. Attorney were knowingly false, misleading, or perjurious.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals has affirmed, see D.C. No. 96-CV-961 at 3 n. 1, that the Department of Human Rights had legally-valid concerns that a document I submitted to the agency (which purports to have been written by the psychiatrist consulted by Akin Gump) may have been inauthentic (i.e., forged or fabricated), see record on appeal at 8. Presumably, according to the agency, I submitted the possibly inauthentic document in order to deny forensic psychiatric evidence filed by Akin Gump with the agency: forensic psychiatric evidence that related to my mental health (specifically relating to a psychiatric "disorder" that my employer had attributed to me, see D.C. No. 96-CV-961 at 4) and stability (specifically relating to my potential for violence). But see Namerdy v. Generalcar, 217 A.2d 109, 111-112 (D.C. 1966) (circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that a letter is written on the author's letterhead, is sufficient for authentication).
For your additional information I forward a document submission that I made to the Federal Protective Service (Jerry McGill, S.A.) under cover letter dated Sept. 8, 1997 under penalty of a criminal investigation.
Robert Chapman, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, is familiar with this matter. The telephone number of the U.S. Attorney's Office in Washington is (202) 514-7566.
I am confident that defamatory statements about me that may raise substantial concerns about my mental stability and fitness to practice law, even acts of defamation committed by the law partners of a close friend of the President of the United States (Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Esq.) and acts of defamation committed by the current chief White House counsel to President Clinton (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.), will in no way impair my chances for fair consideration for employment by your firm.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
Saturday, December 26, 2009
Akin Gump: High Standards and Dubious Employment Practices!
In the year 2004 the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld terminated the employment of Senior Counsel, Donald G. Gross, Esq., alleging there was a "lack of fit" between Mr. Gross and other firm attorneys; and, according to Mr. Gross, citing the fact that he was "too senior." Mr. Gross was about 51 years old when he was fired. Akin Gump also alleged that Mr. Gross's writing skills were subpar. Mr. Gross subsequently filed a discrimination complaint against Akin Gump, his former employer, alleging age discrimination. In 2009, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted Akin Gump's motion for summary judgment.
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2009/12/akin-gump-lack-of-fit-same-old-story.html
When Dennis M. Race, Esq. terminated my employment with Akin Gump on October 29, 1991 he told me that there was a "lack of fit" between me and other firm personnel. Although I was not told that I was too old to be employed as a paralegal, in fact, I was 37 years old when I was fired: older than most, if not all, of the firm's legal assistants and litigation support personnel.
Also, in the year 1991, the country was in the midst of an economic recession. On the afternoon of Friday April 5, 1991 Malcolm Lassman, the management partner in charge of legal assistants, held a meeting of all legal assistants and litigation support employees. Malcolm Lassman said that the firm was doing everything it could to retain staff, but that the firm was experiencing the effects of the recession. Specifically, he said the firm was having a problem with some clients not paying their bills. The firm was, in fact, laying off personnel which had triggered rumors among the legal assistants -- rumors that Malcolm Lassman attempted to dispel. Oddly enough, it was on Monday April 8, 1991 that I was moved from a group office on the ninth floor of the firm (where I had worked since October 1989: a year and a half) to the litigation suppport suite in firm's basement (Terrace Level). It was in the Terrace Level office that I faced severe harassment.
As of the date of my termination (October 1991) I was earning $30,000 per year. My starting salary of $26,000 (June 1988) was already higher than other starting paralegals because, it was explained to me, I had prior experience. In March 1990 I was demoted from the paralegal group (under Maggie Sinnott) to the litigation support group (under Chris Robertson); presumably, I was earning significantly more than other litigation support personnel when I was fired.
Is it possible that my job termination in October 1991 was really a layoff motivated by economic considerations, disguised as a job termination? Is there a rational reason why an employer would take such a course of action against an overcompensated employee who has filed a harassment complaint with his employer?
Back to Donald G. Gross. Here is Mr. Gross's resume. On paper, Mr. Gross's credentials appear to be competitive with other Akin Gump attorneys -- but then, Akin Gump has high standards:
Donald G. Gross serves as Counselor of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). He currently advises the Director of ACDA on a broad range of arms control and nonproliferation matters, including negotiations to conclude a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, arms control with Russia and regional arms control initiatives. Mr. Gross develops and implements diplomatic strategy for ACDA and coordinates the agency's China Task Force. He serves as a principal representative of the Director to the National Security Council and other national security agencies in the formulation and execution of arms control policy. Mr. Gross was a member of the U.S. Delegation to the 1995 Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference which successfully achieved indefinite extension of the NPT.
Prior to joining ACDA, Mr. Gross was Director of Legislative Affairs at the National Security Council, where he coordinated the legislative activities of the State Department, Defense Department, White House and CIA on key foreign and defense policy issues. Mr. Gross graduated magna cum laude from Cornell University and holds a law degree from the University of Chicago.
Here is a nonlegal writing sample of Mr. Gross's:
Hyping North Korea's nuclear threat
By Donald G. Gross -- May 26, 2009
North Korea derives satisfaction from international condemnation. Time for a more nuanced approach.
Let's be honest: North Korea's nuclear test on Sunday does not, as U.S. President Barack Obama put it, "pose a grave threat to the peace and stability of the world" much beyond the threat that North Korea posed on Saturday -- the day before it conducted the test. And hyping the test, as Obama did in his White House statement, actually makes matters worse.
To understand why, think back to your schoolyard days. The bullies who tried to rule the playground became more powerful if their victims grew upset. This time, North Korea is the menace, and the strong U.S. rhetoric only brings satisfaction to that country's misguided leadership. Raising the stakes increases Pyongyang's diplomatic leverage and makes it even harder to eliminate North Korea's nuclear program. The United States is giving this bully exactly what it craves.
North Korea has had a proven nuclear weapons capability since October 2006, when it carried out its first nuclear test. Back then, U.S. intelligence estimated that Pyongyang possessed enough nuclear material to build six to eight nuclear bombs. North Korea has not added to its nuclear stockpile since its first test, thanks to the hard-nosed diplomacy pursued in the second Bush term through Amb. Christopher Hill, who persuaded Pyongyang to disable its reactor at Yongbyon.
It is understandable that some Obama advisors would like the young president to appear tough and resolute. But one of the lessons the Bush administration learned, after difficult years of dealing with North Korea, is to respond to Pyongyang's brinkmanship with calm and quiet determination. This is the one diplomatic approach most likely to give pause to Kim Jong Il and his generals -- and the Obama administration would do well to give it a try.
The greater the threat North Korea appears to pose, the more satisfaction it gives that country's leadership and the more diplomatic leverage it confers on the cabal in Pyongyang. They see nuclear weapons as a way to compensate for the country's severe economic failure, extreme poverty, and inability to feed its own citizens. The sad truth is that the people of North Korea are the foremost victims of their leaders' nuclear policies.
Let's imagine what might happen if, instead of showing patient disapproval, the Obama administration gets drawn into a game of chicken with Pyongyang. Signaling that a U.S. military response is "on the table" would merely further North Korea's strategy of brinkmanship. Threatening bombing or a naval blockade could well be a self-fulfilling prophecy -- if it becomes necessary to act to preserve U.S. "credibility."
But making good on military threats wouldn't work, in any case. After talking with his security advisors, President Obama will discover, if he hasn't already, that the United States does not have any good military options for eliminating North Korea's nuclear program. Quite the contrary: U.S. military action could trigger war on the Korean peninsula, putting at serious risk the lives of hundreds of thousands of South Koreans, not to mention American troops.
What to do?
Energizing the Six Party nuclear talks and pursuing vigorous bilateral diplomacy to advance a creative negotiated settlement with North Korea is not just the best option, it is also the only real way to preserve stability in Northeast Asia -- the shared goal of the United States and its closest allies in the region, Japan and South Korea, as well as China and Russia.
Rallying the U.N. Security Council to condemn Pyongyang is a necessary step, but going down the road of simply isolating and imposing further sanctions on North Korea will not achieve the results the U.S. seeks. Pressure on North Korea needs to be coupled with other diplomatic measures that strengthen Pyongyang's sense of security (independent of nuclear weapons) and help reverse its economic decline.
To persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear capability, the United States and the international community must take away that country's best weapon: fear. Through careful calculation and skillful diplomacy, the world can overcome the menace by proving that Pyongyang's desire for security, respect and economic growth are best achieved through other, less hostile means.
Donald G. Gross is former counselor of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He currently serves as adjunct fellow of Pacific Forum CSIS, a research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2009/12/akin-gump-lack-of-fit-same-old-story.html
When Dennis M. Race, Esq. terminated my employment with Akin Gump on October 29, 1991 he told me that there was a "lack of fit" between me and other firm personnel. Although I was not told that I was too old to be employed as a paralegal, in fact, I was 37 years old when I was fired: older than most, if not all, of the firm's legal assistants and litigation support personnel.
Also, in the year 1991, the country was in the midst of an economic recession. On the afternoon of Friday April 5, 1991 Malcolm Lassman, the management partner in charge of legal assistants, held a meeting of all legal assistants and litigation support employees. Malcolm Lassman said that the firm was doing everything it could to retain staff, but that the firm was experiencing the effects of the recession. Specifically, he said the firm was having a problem with some clients not paying their bills. The firm was, in fact, laying off personnel which had triggered rumors among the legal assistants -- rumors that Malcolm Lassman attempted to dispel. Oddly enough, it was on Monday April 8, 1991 that I was moved from a group office on the ninth floor of the firm (where I had worked since October 1989: a year and a half) to the litigation suppport suite in firm's basement (Terrace Level). It was in the Terrace Level office that I faced severe harassment.
As of the date of my termination (October 1991) I was earning $30,000 per year. My starting salary of $26,000 (June 1988) was already higher than other starting paralegals because, it was explained to me, I had prior experience. In March 1990 I was demoted from the paralegal group (under Maggie Sinnott) to the litigation support group (under Chris Robertson); presumably, I was earning significantly more than other litigation support personnel when I was fired.
Is it possible that my job termination in October 1991 was really a layoff motivated by economic considerations, disguised as a job termination? Is there a rational reason why an employer would take such a course of action against an overcompensated employee who has filed a harassment complaint with his employer?
Back to Donald G. Gross. Here is Mr. Gross's resume. On paper, Mr. Gross's credentials appear to be competitive with other Akin Gump attorneys -- but then, Akin Gump has high standards:
Donald G. Gross serves as Counselor of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). He currently advises the Director of ACDA on a broad range of arms control and nonproliferation matters, including negotiations to conclude a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, arms control with Russia and regional arms control initiatives. Mr. Gross develops and implements diplomatic strategy for ACDA and coordinates the agency's China Task Force. He serves as a principal representative of the Director to the National Security Council and other national security agencies in the formulation and execution of arms control policy. Mr. Gross was a member of the U.S. Delegation to the 1995 Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference which successfully achieved indefinite extension of the NPT.
Prior to joining ACDA, Mr. Gross was Director of Legislative Affairs at the National Security Council, where he coordinated the legislative activities of the State Department, Defense Department, White House and CIA on key foreign and defense policy issues. Mr. Gross graduated magna cum laude from Cornell University and holds a law degree from the University of Chicago.
Here is a nonlegal writing sample of Mr. Gross's:
Hyping North Korea's nuclear threat
By Donald G. Gross -- May 26, 2009
North Korea derives satisfaction from international condemnation. Time for a more nuanced approach.
Let's be honest: North Korea's nuclear test on Sunday does not, as U.S. President Barack Obama put it, "pose a grave threat to the peace and stability of the world" much beyond the threat that North Korea posed on Saturday -- the day before it conducted the test. And hyping the test, as Obama did in his White House statement, actually makes matters worse.
To understand why, think back to your schoolyard days. The bullies who tried to rule the playground became more powerful if their victims grew upset. This time, North Korea is the menace, and the strong U.S. rhetoric only brings satisfaction to that country's misguided leadership. Raising the stakes increases Pyongyang's diplomatic leverage and makes it even harder to eliminate North Korea's nuclear program. The United States is giving this bully exactly what it craves.
North Korea has had a proven nuclear weapons capability since October 2006, when it carried out its first nuclear test. Back then, U.S. intelligence estimated that Pyongyang possessed enough nuclear material to build six to eight nuclear bombs. North Korea has not added to its nuclear stockpile since its first test, thanks to the hard-nosed diplomacy pursued in the second Bush term through Amb. Christopher Hill, who persuaded Pyongyang to disable its reactor at Yongbyon.
It is understandable that some Obama advisors would like the young president to appear tough and resolute. But one of the lessons the Bush administration learned, after difficult years of dealing with North Korea, is to respond to Pyongyang's brinkmanship with calm and quiet determination. This is the one diplomatic approach most likely to give pause to Kim Jong Il and his generals -- and the Obama administration would do well to give it a try.
The greater the threat North Korea appears to pose, the more satisfaction it gives that country's leadership and the more diplomatic leverage it confers on the cabal in Pyongyang. They see nuclear weapons as a way to compensate for the country's severe economic failure, extreme poverty, and inability to feed its own citizens. The sad truth is that the people of North Korea are the foremost victims of their leaders' nuclear policies.
Let's imagine what might happen if, instead of showing patient disapproval, the Obama administration gets drawn into a game of chicken with Pyongyang. Signaling that a U.S. military response is "on the table" would merely further North Korea's strategy of brinkmanship. Threatening bombing or a naval blockade could well be a self-fulfilling prophecy -- if it becomes necessary to act to preserve U.S. "credibility."
But making good on military threats wouldn't work, in any case. After talking with his security advisors, President Obama will discover, if he hasn't already, that the United States does not have any good military options for eliminating North Korea's nuclear program. Quite the contrary: U.S. military action could trigger war on the Korean peninsula, putting at serious risk the lives of hundreds of thousands of South Koreans, not to mention American troops.
What to do?
Energizing the Six Party nuclear talks and pursuing vigorous bilateral diplomacy to advance a creative negotiated settlement with North Korea is not just the best option, it is also the only real way to preserve stability in Northeast Asia -- the shared goal of the United States and its closest allies in the region, Japan and South Korea, as well as China and Russia.
Rallying the U.N. Security Council to condemn Pyongyang is a necessary step, but going down the road of simply isolating and imposing further sanctions on North Korea will not achieve the results the U.S. seeks. Pressure on North Korea needs to be coupled with other diplomatic measures that strengthen Pyongyang's sense of security (independent of nuclear weapons) and help reverse its economic decline.
To persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear capability, the United States and the international community must take away that country's best weapon: fear. Through careful calculation and skillful diplomacy, the world can overcome the menace by proving that Pyongyang's desire for security, respect and economic growth are best achieved through other, less hostile means.
Donald G. Gross is former counselor of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He currently serves as adjunct fellow of Pacific Forum CSIS, a research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
What Does Elizabeth Taylor Know?
Oddly enough, possibly something.
Elizabeth Taylor used to be married to former U.S. Senator John Warner, Republican of Virginia. John Warner, Esq. used to be managing partner of the Washington, D.C. law firm of Hogan & Hartson, where I worked from mid-September 1985 to late February 1988. Elizabeth Taylor used to be a client of Hogan & Hartson. The Hogan paralegal Sara Shea told me in 1986 that she once saw Elizabeth Taylor visit the Washington office.
Elizabeth Taylor also used to be married to the late actor Richard Burton. Richard Burton portrayed the German opera composer Richard Wagner in the movie "Wagner"--an eight-hour extravaganza.
Former Senator John Warner rejoined Hogan & Hartson as a partner in March 2009.
Elizabeth Taylor used to be married to former U.S. Senator John Warner, Republican of Virginia. John Warner, Esq. used to be managing partner of the Washington, D.C. law firm of Hogan & Hartson, where I worked from mid-September 1985 to late February 1988. Elizabeth Taylor used to be a client of Hogan & Hartson. The Hogan paralegal Sara Shea told me in 1986 that she once saw Elizabeth Taylor visit the Washington office.
Elizabeth Taylor also used to be married to the late actor Richard Burton. Richard Burton portrayed the German opera composer Richard Wagner in the movie "Wagner"--an eight-hour extravaganza.
Former Senator John Warner rejoined Hogan & Hartson as a partner in March 2009.
What Does Elizabeth Joyce Know?
My opinion is that Elizabeth Joyce knows everything!
Elizabeth Joyce was the front desk manager at my apartment building, 3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Washington, DC from 1986 to mid-year 2003. She worked under apartment managers Elaine Wranik (now deceased), John Reuss, and David Castleberry. The apartment is managed by WRIT, the Washington Real Estate Investment Trust.
Elizabeth Joyce was friendly with several tenants including Patricia Marx Ellsberg (the wife of Daniel Ellsberg, yes, THE Daniel Ellsberg of Watergate fame); Dawn White, who still lives in the building and continues to communicate with Mrs. Joyce; as well as Barbara D'Jabbour who also resides in the building with her husband Frank and continues to speak with Mrs. Joyce.
Dawn White is friendly with another tenant named Isabelle Fine. I've been having coffee with Miss Fine in the lobby of the building for years now.
Incidentally, Elizabeth Joyce is originally from London, England and was born in the year 1930. Imagine this -- she survived the London Blitz, but she didn't survive David Castleberry! Amazing!
Elizabeth Joyce was the front desk manager at my apartment building, 3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Washington, DC from 1986 to mid-year 2003. She worked under apartment managers Elaine Wranik (now deceased), John Reuss, and David Castleberry. The apartment is managed by WRIT, the Washington Real Estate Investment Trust.
Elizabeth Joyce was friendly with several tenants including Patricia Marx Ellsberg (the wife of Daniel Ellsberg, yes, THE Daniel Ellsberg of Watergate fame); Dawn White, who still lives in the building and continues to communicate with Mrs. Joyce; as well as Barbara D'Jabbour who also resides in the building with her husband Frank and continues to speak with Mrs. Joyce.
Dawn White is friendly with another tenant named Isabelle Fine. I've been having coffee with Miss Fine in the lobby of the building for years now.
Incidentally, Elizabeth Joyce is originally from London, England and was born in the year 1930. Imagine this -- she survived the London Blitz, but she didn't survive David Castleberry! Amazing!
Wednesday, December 23, 2009
Akin Gump: "A Lack of Fit" -- The Same Old Story
When I was terminated by the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, on October 29, 1991, I was told by Dennis M. Race, Esq. that there was "a lack of fit" between me and other firm personnel.
Here's a more recent case in which Akin Gump used the same "lack of fit" rationale to terminate an employee, here an attorney.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_______________________________
DONALD G. GROSS,
Plaintiff,
Civ. No. 07-399(EGS)
v.
AKIN, GUMP, STRAUSS, HAUER, &
FELD LLP,
Defendant
_______________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Donald G. Gross ("Gross" or "plaintiff") filed suit against
his former employer, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer, & Feld, LLP
("Akin Gump" or "defendants"), alleging age discrimination under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §
621 et seq., and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act
("DCHRA"), D.C. Code § 2-1401.01 et seq. Gross claims that his
termination was based on Akin Gump's discrimination against him
because of his age. Akin Gump denies the charges, and after
finding evidence of alleged wrong-doing by Gross during
discovery, Akin Gump filed counterclaims against him for breach
of fiduciary duty of loyalty and tortious interference with
economic advantage. Gross counterclaimed for retaliation under
ADEA and DCHRA and moved for partial summary judgment on Akin
Gump's counterclaims. Akin Gump moved for summary judgment on
Gross's age discrimination and retaliation claims. After careful
consideration of the parties’ filings and applicable case law,
this Court GRANTS Akin Gump's motion for summary judgment for all
claims and DENIES Gross's cross-motion for partial summary
judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Age Discrimination Claims
This Court recites the facts in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party. Hatch v. District of Columbia, 184 F.3d
846, 848 (D.C. Cir. 1999). As this case involves both a motion
and a cross-motion for summary judgment, the non-moving parties
differ for the separate motions.
In June 2003, Gross was hired as Senior Counsel in the
Washington, D.C. office of Akin Gump, a law firm. Compl. at 8.
Though several Akin Gump attorneys raised concerns about Gross's
qualifications before he was hired, Sukhan Kim, the head of the
Korea Practice Group, recommended that Akin Gump hire Gross. As
a result of the misgivings within the firm about Gross's
qualifications, Akin Gump made an atypical decision to put a
clause in Gross's offer letter which specifically stated that the
firm would review his employment situation after one year and
The Korea Practice Group is an informal group of attorneys who
reassess the needs of the firm and the terms of his employment.
First Amended Answer and Counterclaims ("CC") at 5.
Gross was fifty years old at the time he was hired. He was
assigned to work in the International Trade Practice Group and
with Akin Gump's Korea Practice Group helping to organize and
administer the group. As Senior Counsel, he was told numerous 1
times by his superiors at the firm that he was expected to bill
2,100 hours a year. See Def. Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts ("Statement") at 22.
Gross alleges that during his interview, Kim indicated that
he was uncomfortable hiring a fifty year-old attorney. Compl. at
9-10. Gross also alleges that Kim stated, "I am concerned about
your age," and "you seem very old to be starting out in a major
law firm." Id. Gross claims that Michael Quigley, the
second-highest ranking partner in the Korea Group, was present
for these comments and did not interject, thereby condoning these
ageist remarks. In response, Gross alleges that he told Kim that
he hoped that Defendants would not take his age and experience
against him. Id. at 11.
In March 2004, Gross took a three-week absence for
minimally-invasive heart-valve surgery. Id. at 12. Gross
alleges that upon his return from surgery, Kim's demeanor towards
plaintiff changed and that his work assignments changed
considerably. Gross claims that Kim avoided meeting with him or
contacting him by phone or e-mail. Gross alleges that Kim began
communicating with him only through David Park, a significantly
younger attorney in the Korea Practice Group. Id.
Gross claims that in or around April 2004, he asked Park why
Kim refused to communicate with him directly. Gross alleges that
Park explained that for cultural reasons, "Korean employers like
Kim prefer a clear superior-subordinate relationship, and that
Mr. Kim felt that Plaintiff [fifty-one] was too old to work in a
relationship in which he was subordinate to Mr. Kim [fifty-four]
as well as Mr. Quigley, who was approximately [forty-six] years
old." Id. at 13. Gross claims that Park told him that his age
was a "big problem" for Kim and that Gross's recent heart surgery
deepened Kim's concerns about Gross's age. Id. Gross alleges
that Park told him that Kim had directed Park, who is in his
thirties, to take charge of the projects headed by Gross. Id. at
14.
Gross also claims that shortly after he returned from his
surgery, Kim said to him, "we're both getting older." Id. at 16.
Gross alleges that Kim asked him when he planned to retire,
"suggesting that it was appropriate for him to be moving in that
direction." Id. at 18. Gross also claims that in July 2004, Kim
and Quigley made negative comments about Gross's age and
suggested that he should not be working for Akin Gump. Id. at
19. Specifically, on July 13, 2004, Gross alleges that Kim told
him that he was "too old to do the kind of work [he was] doing."
Id. at 20. Gross claims that Kim asked him his age again, and
when he said that he was fifty-one, Kim stated that he was "'very
uncomfortable' that [Gross] was 'still doing writing and
research' at his age." Id.
Gross alleges that Kim suggested to him that he should
explore other opportunities within the firm, particularly working
with the firm's public law and policy practice group. Id. at 21.
Gross claims that the only reason Kim provided for seeking his
removal from the Korea Practice Group was that Kim was
uncomfortable with Gross's age. Id. A few days after that,
Gross alleges that Quigley, who said that he completely agreed
with Kim, said that Gross was "not a good fit" with the Korea
Practice Group because he was "too old to be doing junior-level
work." Id. at 22.
Over the year Gross was employed at Akin Gump, a number of
different attorneys with whom Gross worked complained about the
quality of his work and his productivity. See Def. Mot. for
Summ. J. at 2. For example, Val Slater, the head of the
International Trade Practice Group, brought her concerns about
Gross's low billable hours to the attention of R. Bruce McLean,
Akin Gump's Chairman. McLean initiated an independent assessment
of Gross's productivity and performance. McLean spoke with
Quigley about Gross's failure to meet his billable hours
requirement. Id. Quigley told McLean that Gross was not a "good
fit" for the Korea Group. Former Akin Gump partner Michael Kaye
and associates David Park and Lisa Ross complained about Gross's
poor writing skills and his unsatisfactory work product. Id. at
7. A senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies also commented that Gross's work was of a
poor quality. See id.
After conducting his independent assessment, McLean made the
decision to terminate Gross. McLean noted the two main problems
with Gross: "First of all, there was a very substantial lack of
productivity. Secondly, even with respect to the tasks that he
was asked to accomplish there were performance issues with
respect to . . . his ability to carry out those tasks."
Statement at 52. McLean testified that he made this decision
without any input from Kim. According to Akin Gump, the extent
to which Kim was involved in the decision to terminate Gross
included relaying the termination decision to him. See id. at
52-55.
On July 13, 2004, Kim informed Gross that Akin Gump was
terminating his employment effective October 1, 2004. Id. at 61.
On August 6, 2004, Gross wrote an e-mail to Kim expressing how
upset he was that he was being asked to leave the firm. CC at
15. Gross solicited Kim's support for a position somewhere else
in the firm, and Gross asked Kim if he would recommend him to one
of Kim's contacts outside of the firm. Id. at 17. Kim told
Gross that he would do his best.
On September 1, 2004, Gross met with Rick Burdick, the
partner who heads the Washington, D.C. office. Burdick told
Gross that he had not heard about his termination. Burdick said
that he would speak to McLean and Quigley about Gross's
termination. Id. at 25. Later, Burdick informed Gross that he
could explore opportunities in the public law and policy group,
but he would have to leave the firm if he could not find work
with another group. Gross was unable to find a position in the
public law and policy group. Id. at 26-27. Kim, however,
negotiated a one-month extension for Gross. On or about October
27, 2004, Gross alleges that Kim reiterated that Gross was being
terminated because he was "too senior" and "not a good fit." Id.
at 28. Akin Gump terminated Gross's employment on October 31,
2004.
In his deposition, Gross admitted that he never complained
to anyone at Akin Gump about any alleged age discrimination at
Akin Gump. See id. at 74. There is nothing on the record that
indicates that he complained to anyone outside of Akin Gump
either. He waited six months after his termination to file a
charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
in April 2005.
B. Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Tortious Interference
Claims
During the discovery phase of this litigation, Akin Gump
uncovered evidence of an alleged breach of fiduciary duty and
tortious interference with economic advantage by Gross. See CC
at 24-25. The bases for Akin Gump's allegations were only
uncovered in response to discovery requests from Gross in May and
June 2007. Id. at 25. Prior to leaving the firm, Gross had been
working to help persuade a prospective client ("Prospective
Client") to retain Akin Gump and sign a proposed engagement
letter which Gross had drafted and negotiated with the help of
others at the firm. Id. at 10. Gross and others at the firm had
done significant work in anticipation of certain exclusive rights
to perform services for Prospective Client. Id.
On July 25, 2004, Gross conveyed reservations to Prospective
Client about retaining Akin Gump. Gross wrote: "Before you
commit yourself to a partnership with Akin Gump, I want to make
sure that the law firm is a hundred percent behind your project."
Id. at 11. On July 29, 2004, Gross encouraged Prospective Client
not to sign a retainer with Akin Gump. Specifically, Gross
wrote: "For the moment, I think you should delay signing the
engagement letter. The law firm will be unhappy with this
recommendation, but I can't in good conscience ask you to rely
exclusively on Akin Gump until I see actions matching words."
Id. at 12. The Prospective Client did not sign an engagement
letter with Akin Gump.
Gross also made numerous disparaging comments about Akin
Gump to Prospective Client, who was an advisor to a company
("Company X") that Akin Gump had been working with to retain
business. He sent the following messages in separate e-mails to
Prospective Client and Company X:
If [Company X] thinks it needs Washington
representation, it should stick with its
current law firm which has recently merged
with a top D.C. firm.
Sukhan [Kim] said he thought [CEO of Company
X] might explore retaining Akin Gump to help
make a deal with [Company Y.] This didn't
make sense to me at the time, and still
doesn't, because Sukhan is so close to
[Company Y] and a couple of other Korean
business groups that [CEO of Company X] could
not possibly trust him to serve as an "honest
broker." Sukhan has never represented an
American company doing business in Korea, so
far as I know, and is a highly specialized
trade lawyer whose practice consists of
representing Korean companies in the United
States.
Moreover, Sukhan plans to retire soon so I
can't imagine he wants to spend his own time
helping [Company X].
I didn't know Jaemin [Park] was involved in
this, until you mentioned she had a meeting
with [CEO of Company X] in Seoul. Her help
is even more questionable. . . . She claims
to have Blue House connections, but except
for knowing Hun-jai Lee through her family,
she exaggerates her influence.
If [the CEO of Company X] wants to get in
touch with some Korean business groups, there
are other ways to do it.
Def. Mot. at 26. Gross admits that he sent the e-mails quoted
above. See Pl. Answer to Def. Counterclaims 11, 12, and 17.
C. Procedural History
Gross filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on
April 29, 2005, alleging age discrimination under the ADEA and
the DCHRA. On February 26, 2007, Gross filed his Complaint in
this Court repeating the allegations in the EEOC charge. Akin
Gump filed an Answer denying the allegations, and the parties
commenced discovery. On June 25, 2007, Akin Gump filed a motion
to amend its Answer to add an affirmative defense of "after
acquired evidence" based on e-mails it discovered in responding
to Gross's document request. Akin Gump then added counterclaims
for breach of fiduciary duty and tortious interference with
economic relations based on the newly discovered evidence. In
response, Gross amended his Complaint to add a retaliation claim
based on Akin Gump's counterclaims.
This Court granted both Motions to Amend on September 10,
2007. Akin Gump filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on all
claims on November 2, 2007. Gross filed an opposition to Akin
Gump's Motion for Summary Judgment on December 11, 2007, and a
Motion for Summary Judgment on Akin Gump's counterclaims on
January 22, 2008.
II. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings on file,
together with any affidavits, depositions, interrogatories, and
admissions show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Dunaway v. Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 310 F.3d 758, 761 (D.C. Cir. 2002). A dispute of fact
is genuine "'if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Steele v. Schafer,
535 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Facts are material if
they "'might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law.'" Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden
of demonstrating an absence of genuine issues of material fact.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Tao v. Freeh,
27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994). "When a motion for summary
judgment is properly made and supported, [however,] an opposing
party may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own
pleading; rather, its response must . . . set out specific facts
showing a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2);
see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. "'[A] mere unsubstantiated
allegation . . . creates no genuine issue of fact and will not
withstand summary judgment.'" Ginger v. District of Columbia,
527 F.3d 1340, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Harding v. Gray, 9
F.3d 150, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1993)) (alterations in original).
"Accepting . . . conclusory allegations as true . . . would
defeat the central purpose of the summary judgment device, which
is to weed out those cases insufficiently meritorious to warrant
the expense of a jury trial." Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671,
675 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court
draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.
See Keyes v. District of Columbia, 372 F.3d 434, 436 (D.C. Cir.
2004). "'As employers rarely maintain records directly
evidencing discrimination, an added measure of rigor or caution
is appropriate in applying this standard to motions for summary
judgment in employment discrimination cases.'" Brownfield v.
Bair, 541 F. Supp. 2d 35, 41 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Woodruff v.
Peters, 482 F.3d 521, 526 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Gross's Age Discrimination Claims
Gross alleges that he was terminated by Akin Gump because of
his age in violation of the ADEA and the DCHRA. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), outlines the correct
analytical approach through which this Court must review
plaintiff's claims. Employee allegations of discrimination
trigger this familiar McDonnell Douglass burden-shifting
framework in federal courts. See Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135,
144 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In the absence of direct evidence of
discrimination, the courts use this framework to determine
whether an employee-plaintiff has a colorable claim against his
or her employer. Claims under the DCHRA are also analyzed under
the McDonnell Douglass framework. See Arthur Young & Co. v.
Sutherland, 631 A.2d 354, 361-62 (D.C. 1993); Gleklen v.
Democratic Cong. Campaign Comm., Inc., 199 F.3d 1365, 1367 (D.C.
Cir. 2000). Given this congruence, any DCHRA claim necessarily
fails if a plaintiff's federal claims cannot survive. A separate
analysis under D.C. law, therefore, is unnecessary.
According to the McDonnell Douglass framework, the plaintiff
has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. See McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Stella, 284 F.3d at 144. If the
plaintiff succeeds in making out a prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Stella, 284 F.3d at
144 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). If the employer
articulates a non-discriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff,
who must demonstrate that the employer's stated reason was merely
pretext and that the true reason was discriminatory. Id. (citing
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). If the plaintiff cannot
demonstrate pretext, the employee's claims necessarily fail.
To make out a prima facie case of age discrimination, Gross
must demonstrate that he (1) "is a member of a protected class;"
(2) "suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the
unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of discrimination."
Mastro v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 447 F.3d 843, 850 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1140 (2007).
The parties agree that Gross is a member of a protected
class and that he suffered an adverse employment action. Akin
Gump disputes whether or not the unfavorable action gives rise to
an inference of discrimination. Accepting the pleadings as true,
however, as the Court is required to do here, defendant's alleged
comments that Gross was "too old" do indeed give rise to an
inference of discrimination. "'[T]he burden of establishing a
prima facie case . . . is not onerous.'" Wiley v. Glassman, 511
F.3d 151, 155-56 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Tex. Dep't of Cmty.
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)) (second alterationa
in original). Gross's allegations satisfy the requirements for a
prima facie case of age discrimination. The burden then shifts
to Akin Gump to demonstrate a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for terminating Gross. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at
802.
Akin Gump submitted evidence in the record which
overwhelmingly demonstrates that Gross was terminated because he
failed to meet the terms of his contract. Numerous lawyers and
partners at Akin Gump complained about Gross's poor work product.
Further, Gross was not able to bill the hours he was expected to
bill as Senior Counsel; he sent himself e-mails acknowledging
this shortcoming. See Statement at 48. Simply put, Gross was
not able to adequately perform the essential functions for which
he was hired. The evidence in the record demonstrates that Akin
Gump had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating
him. Gross's offer letter provided clear notice that he was
hired on a probationary period and that if he did not adequately
perform his duties, he would be terminated.
Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit has repeatedly upheld grants
of summary judgment in discrimination cases where the
decision-maker completed an independent assessment of the
relevant facts and made an independent decision to terminate an
employee. See Vickers v. Powell, 493 F.3d 186, 195-96 (D.C. Cir.
2007); Hall v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 1074, 1079 (D.C. Cir.
1999); see also Blackman v. Visiting Nurses Ass'n, 694 A.2d 865,
870 (D.C. 1997). Gross makes no allegations of ageism against
McLean. See Thompson v. Coca-Cola Co., 522 F.3d 168, 178 (1st
Cir. 2008) ("'Actionable discrimination cannot exist in a vacuum.
Rather the discriminatory intent of which a plaintiff complains
must be traceable to the person or persons who made the decision
to fire him.'" (quoting Bennett v. Saint-Gobain Corp., 507 F.3d
23, 31 (1st Cir. 2007))). "Statements made by those who are not
involved in the decisional process 'normally are insufficient,
standing alone, to establish either pretext or the requisite
discriminatory animus.'" Bennett, 507 F.3d at 31 (quoting
Velázquez-Fernández v. NCE Foods, Inc., 476 F.3d 6, 11-12 (1st
Cir. 2007)). There is no evidence in the record that contradicts
McLean's insistence that he conducted an independent assessment
of Gross and that the decision to terminate Gross's employment
was made without input from Kim. McLean testified that he
decided to terminate Gross "because there were serious
performance issues." Def. Mot. at 18. The record supports this
determination.
There is also no evidence that Kim recommended to Quigley
that Gross's employment be terminated. If anything, it is clear
that Kim went out of his way to attempt to assist Gross after the
decision was made to terminate him. Kim encouraged him to look
for work in another group at the firm, told Gross that he would
see what he could do about finding Gross employment with Akin
Gump clients, and secured an additional month of employment for
Gross at the firm. All the while, Gross sent e-mails to Kim
thanking him for assistance.
Since Akin Gump has provided a legitimate non-discriminatory
reason for terminating Gross's employment, the burden shifts back
to Gross to demonstrate a pretext for his termination. See
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. When evaluating allegations
of pretext, D.C. Circuit case law is clear: this Court may not
"second-guess an employer's personnel decision absent
demonstrably discriminatory motive." Milton v. Weinberger, 696
F.2d 94, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1982). "Once the employer has
articulated a non-discriminatory explanation for its action, . .
. the issue is not 'the correctness or desirability of [the]
reasons offered . . . [but] whether the employer honestly
believes in the reasons it offers." Fischbach v. D.C. Dep't of
Corr., 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting McCoy v. WGN
Cont'l Broad. Co., 957 F.2d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 1992)) (first
alteration added). The evidence on the record suggests that
McLean in fact believed that Gross was not performing as
expected. There is an abundance of evidence, furthermore,
demonstrating that Gross was not meeting the expectations that
were set for him when he was hired by defendants. Gross has not
been able to demonstrate that his termination was based on
pretext, and he "cannot establish pretext simply based on [his]
own subjective assessment of [his] own performance, for
'plaintiff's perception of himself, and of his work performance,
is not relevant. It is the perception of the decisionmaker which
is relevant." Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 124 F. Supp.
2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2000) (quoting Smith v. Chamber of Commerce of
the U.S., 645 F. Supp. 604, 608 (D.D.C. 1986)) (original
alterations omitted and alterations added). Gross's claims fail,
and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the age
discrimination claims is GRANTED.
B. Akin Gump's Counterclaims Alleging Breach of
Fiduciary Duty and Tortious Interference
Akin Gump argues that Gross's e-mails to Prospective Client
and Company X breached his fiduciary duty with the firm and
tortiously interfered with economic advantage. Gross argues that
Akin Gump fails to demonstrate the requisite intent necessary to
make out a claim for tortious interference. The Court is not
persuaded by Gross's argument.
a. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
As an employee, Gross owed "’an undivided and unselfish
loyalty’" to Akin Gump "such that 'there shall be no conflict
between duty and self interest.'" PM Servs. Co. v. Odoi Assoc.,
2006 WL 20382, at *27 (D.D.C. Jan. 4, 2006) (quoting Mercer Mgmt.
Consulting v. Wilde, 920 F. Supp 219, 233 (D.D.C. 1996)). Unless
otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to his principal
to act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters
concerned with his agency. See id. (quoting Restatement (Second)
of Agency § 387). Since Gross does not dispute that he sent
e-mails to Prospective Client and Company X which depicted Akin
Gump in a negative light, a reasonable jury could find that he
breached the fiduciary duty he owed to Akin Gump while under
their employ. Gross's Motion for Summary Judgment is therefore
DENIED.
b. Tortious Interference
To make out a claim of tortious interference with
prospective economic advantage, a party must prove "(1) the
existence of a valid business relationship or expectancy, (2)
knowledge of the relationship or expectancy on the part of the
interferer, (3) intentional interference inducing or causing a
breach [or] termination of the relationship or expectancy, and
(4) resultant damage." Bennett Entm't, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza,
Inc., 45 F.3d 493, 499 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The
evidence in the record clearly demonstrates that Akin Gump meets
the threshold showings for a claim of tortious interference with
prospective economic advantage.
By Gross's own admission, he had been working on securing a
contract with Prospective Client for Akin Gump. It is fair to
say, then, that Akin Gump had a valid expectancy of a business
relationship with Prospective Client. Gross clearly knew of the
expectancy, as he was intimately involved in the relationship
with and courting of Prospective Client. Gross admits that he
sent e-mails to Prospective Client and Company X relating to Akin
Gump's possible representation. The e-mails he sent were harmful
to Akin Gump, as they specifically discouraged Prospective Client
from retaining Akin Gump. Indeed, Gross specifically advised
Prospective Client not to sign a retainer with Akin Gump, and he
acknowledged in the same e-mail that Akin Gump would not be happy
with his recommendation. The resulting damage is that
Prospective Client did not sign a retainer with Akin Gump. Gross
admits all of these allegations. His attempts at explaining why
he sent the e-mails he sent are unavailing. He claims, for
example, that he felt that Kim could not ethically represent both
Company X and Company Y. See Pl. Opp. to Mot. Sum J. at 9.
Gross did not, however, express any misgivings he may have had to
anyone at Akin Gump. Gross claimed that he had a duty to
Prospective Client. In fact, his duty was to Akin Gump. See PM
Servs. Co., 2006 WL 20382, at *27. A reasonable jury could find
that he tortiously interfered with Akin Gump's and Prospective
Client's relationship. See Furash & Co. v. McClave, 130 F. Supp.
2d 48, 56 (D.D.C. 2001) ("A reasonable jury might find that [the
defendant's] alleged breach of fiduciary duty destroyed [the
plaintiff's] client relationships.") Summary judgment for Gross
is improper and the motion is DENIED.
C. Gross's Retaliation Claims
Gross asserts that Akin Gump's breach of fiduciary duty and
tortious interference claims were filed in retaliation for his
age discrimination claims. Akin Gump argues that their
counterclaims were filed only after the firm discovered that
Gross sent e-mails to their prospective clients disparaging the
firm. Akin Gump contends that it only discovered these e-mails
in a response to a discovery request made by Gross as part of
this litigation. Furthermore, Akin Gump argues that they could
not have retaliated against Gross because he was no longer
employed by defendants when they filed their counterclaims. This
Court agrees with Akin Gump.
To make out a prima facie case for retaliation under the
ADEA or the DCHRA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) s/he
engaged in protected activity; (2) s/he suffered adverse
employment action; and (3) there is a causal link between the
protected activity and the adverse action. Taylor v. Small, 350
F.3d 1286, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
The protected activity Gross alleges that he engaged in was
the filing of his complaint against Akin Gump. Defendants do not
contest this, and it is clear that the filing of a complaint is a
protected activity. See Fabiano v. Hopkins, 352 F.3d 447, 453
(1st Cir. 2003) ("As an initial matter, every citizen has the
right 'to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.'
U.S. Const. amend. I. The right of access to the courts is an
established aspect of this right." (citing Bill Johnson's
Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983))). Gross,
therefore, satisfies the first prong of the prima facie test.
The second prong, however, requires more in-depth analysis.
Gross argues that the counterclaim Akin Gump filed in this case
is an adverse employment action. Gross relies on Burlington
Northern & Santa Fe Railway. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006),
but that case undermines Gross's argument for two reasons. In
Burlington, the Supreme Court agreed with the D.C. Circuit and
held that "a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would
have found the challenged action materially adverse, 'which in
this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable
worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.'"
Id. at 68 (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C.
Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
As a threshold matter, Gross is no longer an employee of
Akin Gump, and he was not an employee when Akin Gump filed its
counterclaims. Akin Gump only filed its counterclaims after
Gross's discovery request revealed evidence of his alleged
wrong-doing. Gross was terminated in October 2004; Akin Gump
filed its counterclaims in September 2007, nearly three years
later. For this reason alone, Gross does not fit within the
group of people Burlington seeks to protect. Furthermore,
Burlington's reasoning for protecting employees was to prevent
employers from dissuading employees from filing discrimination
charges. Id. Given that Akin Gump's counterclaim was filed
after Gross filed suit for age discrimination, there is no way
Akin Gump's counterclaim could dissuade Gross from filing his
claim.
The D.C. Circuit has never found that the filing of a
counterclaim constitutes an adverse employment action. Moreover,
other federal courts have specifically held that counterclaims
cannot, as a matter of law, constitute an adverse employment
action. See Earl v. Electro-Coatings of Iowa, Inc., 2002 WL
32172298, at *2 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 29, 2002) (unpublished)
("Although many different post-termination actions may constitute
retaliation, this court holds that, ordinarily, a counterclaim
may not. Initially, the court notes that a counterclaim is not
to be considered an employment-related action. Only in the rare
case will conduct that occurs within the scope of litigation
amount to retaliation." (citing Steffes v. Stepan Co., 144 F.3d
1070, 1075 (7th Cir. 1998))); Beltran v. Brentwood N. Healthcare
Ctr., LLC, 426 F. Supp. 2d 827, 833-34 (N.D. Ill. 2006) ("[I]f
the mere filing of a counterclaim were sufficient to give rise to
a retaliation claim, then every defendant in an FLSA, Title VII
or ADA lawsuit who asserts a counterclaim would be subject to a
retaliation claim."). Filing a counterclaim is different from
initiating a lawsuit against a complaining employee, as "filing a
counterclaim will not chill plaintiffs from exercising and
enforcing their statutory rights because by the time the employer
files its counterclaim, plaintiffs have already made their
charges and initiated a lawsuit." Beltran, 426 F. Supp. 2d at
834 (citing EEOC v. K&J Mgmt. Inc., 2000 WL 34248366, at *4 (N.D.
Ill. 2000) (unpublished)).
Furthermore, as a matter of law, Akin Gump was required to
file its counterclaim. Rule 13 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure requires parties to file counterclaims that "arise[]
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the opposing party's claim." Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(1)(A). Akin
Gump's counterclaims were compulsory under the federal rules, and
it would have waived those claims had it failed to allege them.
It is clear that Akin Gump filed its counterclaim because it
was compulsory, not in retaliation for Gross's suit. Gross has
failed to satisfy the second prong of the prima facie test, and
the Court need go no further in the analysis. Akin Gump's Motion
for Summary Judgment on this claim is GRANTED.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED; plaintiff's cross-motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
March 3, 2009
Here's a more recent case in which Akin Gump used the same "lack of fit" rationale to terminate an employee, here an attorney.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_______________________________
DONALD G. GROSS,
Plaintiff,
Civ. No. 07-399(EGS)
v.
AKIN, GUMP, STRAUSS, HAUER, &
FELD LLP,
Defendant
_______________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Donald G. Gross ("Gross" or "plaintiff") filed suit against
his former employer, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer, & Feld, LLP
("Akin Gump" or "defendants"), alleging age discrimination under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §
621 et seq., and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act
("DCHRA"), D.C. Code § 2-1401.01 et seq. Gross claims that his
termination was based on Akin Gump's discrimination against him
because of his age. Akin Gump denies the charges, and after
finding evidence of alleged wrong-doing by Gross during
discovery, Akin Gump filed counterclaims against him for breach
of fiduciary duty of loyalty and tortious interference with
economic advantage. Gross counterclaimed for retaliation under
ADEA and DCHRA and moved for partial summary judgment on Akin
Gump's counterclaims. Akin Gump moved for summary judgment on
Gross's age discrimination and retaliation claims. After careful
consideration of the parties’ filings and applicable case law,
this Court GRANTS Akin Gump's motion for summary judgment for all
claims and DENIES Gross's cross-motion for partial summary
judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Age Discrimination Claims
This Court recites the facts in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party. Hatch v. District of Columbia, 184 F.3d
846, 848 (D.C. Cir. 1999). As this case involves both a motion
and a cross-motion for summary judgment, the non-moving parties
differ for the separate motions.
In June 2003, Gross was hired as Senior Counsel in the
Washington, D.C. office of Akin Gump, a law firm. Compl. at 8.
Though several Akin Gump attorneys raised concerns about Gross's
qualifications before he was hired, Sukhan Kim, the head of the
Korea Practice Group, recommended that Akin Gump hire Gross. As
a result of the misgivings within the firm about Gross's
qualifications, Akin Gump made an atypical decision to put a
clause in Gross's offer letter which specifically stated that the
firm would review his employment situation after one year and
The Korea Practice Group is an informal group of attorneys who
reassess the needs of the firm and the terms of his employment.
First Amended Answer and Counterclaims ("CC") at 5.
Gross was fifty years old at the time he was hired. He was
assigned to work in the International Trade Practice Group and
with Akin Gump's Korea Practice Group helping to organize and
administer the group. As Senior Counsel, he was told numerous 1
times by his superiors at the firm that he was expected to bill
2,100 hours a year. See Def. Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts ("Statement") at 22.
Gross alleges that during his interview, Kim indicated that
he was uncomfortable hiring a fifty year-old attorney. Compl. at
9-10. Gross also alleges that Kim stated, "I am concerned about
your age," and "you seem very old to be starting out in a major
law firm." Id. Gross claims that Michael Quigley, the
second-highest ranking partner in the Korea Group, was present
for these comments and did not interject, thereby condoning these
ageist remarks. In response, Gross alleges that he told Kim that
he hoped that Defendants would not take his age and experience
against him. Id. at 11.
In March 2004, Gross took a three-week absence for
minimally-invasive heart-valve surgery. Id. at 12. Gross
alleges that upon his return from surgery, Kim's demeanor towards
plaintiff changed and that his work assignments changed
considerably. Gross claims that Kim avoided meeting with him or
contacting him by phone or e-mail. Gross alleges that Kim began
communicating with him only through David Park, a significantly
younger attorney in the Korea Practice Group. Id.
Gross claims that in or around April 2004, he asked Park why
Kim refused to communicate with him directly. Gross alleges that
Park explained that for cultural reasons, "Korean employers like
Kim prefer a clear superior-subordinate relationship, and that
Mr. Kim felt that Plaintiff [fifty-one] was too old to work in a
relationship in which he was subordinate to Mr. Kim [fifty-four]
as well as Mr. Quigley, who was approximately [forty-six] years
old." Id. at 13. Gross claims that Park told him that his age
was a "big problem" for Kim and that Gross's recent heart surgery
deepened Kim's concerns about Gross's age. Id. Gross alleges
that Park told him that Kim had directed Park, who is in his
thirties, to take charge of the projects headed by Gross. Id. at
14.
Gross also claims that shortly after he returned from his
surgery, Kim said to him, "we're both getting older." Id. at 16.
Gross alleges that Kim asked him when he planned to retire,
"suggesting that it was appropriate for him to be moving in that
direction." Id. at 18. Gross also claims that in July 2004, Kim
and Quigley made negative comments about Gross's age and
suggested that he should not be working for Akin Gump. Id. at
19. Specifically, on July 13, 2004, Gross alleges that Kim told
him that he was "too old to do the kind of work [he was] doing."
Id. at 20. Gross claims that Kim asked him his age again, and
when he said that he was fifty-one, Kim stated that he was "'very
uncomfortable' that [Gross] was 'still doing writing and
research' at his age." Id.
Gross alleges that Kim suggested to him that he should
explore other opportunities within the firm, particularly working
with the firm's public law and policy practice group. Id. at 21.
Gross claims that the only reason Kim provided for seeking his
removal from the Korea Practice Group was that Kim was
uncomfortable with Gross's age. Id. A few days after that,
Gross alleges that Quigley, who said that he completely agreed
with Kim, said that Gross was "not a good fit" with the Korea
Practice Group because he was "too old to be doing junior-level
work." Id. at 22.
Over the year Gross was employed at Akin Gump, a number of
different attorneys with whom Gross worked complained about the
quality of his work and his productivity. See Def. Mot. for
Summ. J. at 2. For example, Val Slater, the head of the
International Trade Practice Group, brought her concerns about
Gross's low billable hours to the attention of R. Bruce McLean,
Akin Gump's Chairman. McLean initiated an independent assessment
of Gross's productivity and performance. McLean spoke with
Quigley about Gross's failure to meet his billable hours
requirement. Id. Quigley told McLean that Gross was not a "good
fit" for the Korea Group. Former Akin Gump partner Michael Kaye
and associates David Park and Lisa Ross complained about Gross's
poor writing skills and his unsatisfactory work product. Id. at
7. A senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies also commented that Gross's work was of a
poor quality. See id.
After conducting his independent assessment, McLean made the
decision to terminate Gross. McLean noted the two main problems
with Gross: "First of all, there was a very substantial lack of
productivity. Secondly, even with respect to the tasks that he
was asked to accomplish there were performance issues with
respect to . . . his ability to carry out those tasks."
Statement at 52. McLean testified that he made this decision
without any input from Kim. According to Akin Gump, the extent
to which Kim was involved in the decision to terminate Gross
included relaying the termination decision to him. See id. at
52-55.
On July 13, 2004, Kim informed Gross that Akin Gump was
terminating his employment effective October 1, 2004. Id. at 61.
On August 6, 2004, Gross wrote an e-mail to Kim expressing how
upset he was that he was being asked to leave the firm. CC at
15. Gross solicited Kim's support for a position somewhere else
in the firm, and Gross asked Kim if he would recommend him to one
of Kim's contacts outside of the firm. Id. at 17. Kim told
Gross that he would do his best.
On September 1, 2004, Gross met with Rick Burdick, the
partner who heads the Washington, D.C. office. Burdick told
Gross that he had not heard about his termination. Burdick said
that he would speak to McLean and Quigley about Gross's
termination. Id. at 25. Later, Burdick informed Gross that he
could explore opportunities in the public law and policy group,
but he would have to leave the firm if he could not find work
with another group. Gross was unable to find a position in the
public law and policy group. Id. at 26-27. Kim, however,
negotiated a one-month extension for Gross. On or about October
27, 2004, Gross alleges that Kim reiterated that Gross was being
terminated because he was "too senior" and "not a good fit." Id.
at 28. Akin Gump terminated Gross's employment on October 31,
2004.
In his deposition, Gross admitted that he never complained
to anyone at Akin Gump about any alleged age discrimination at
Akin Gump. See id. at 74. There is nothing on the record that
indicates that he complained to anyone outside of Akin Gump
either. He waited six months after his termination to file a
charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
in April 2005.
B. Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Tortious Interference
Claims
During the discovery phase of this litigation, Akin Gump
uncovered evidence of an alleged breach of fiduciary duty and
tortious interference with economic advantage by Gross. See CC
at 24-25. The bases for Akin Gump's allegations were only
uncovered in response to discovery requests from Gross in May and
June 2007. Id. at 25. Prior to leaving the firm, Gross had been
working to help persuade a prospective client ("Prospective
Client") to retain Akin Gump and sign a proposed engagement
letter which Gross had drafted and negotiated with the help of
others at the firm. Id. at 10. Gross and others at the firm had
done significant work in anticipation of certain exclusive rights
to perform services for Prospective Client. Id.
On July 25, 2004, Gross conveyed reservations to Prospective
Client about retaining Akin Gump. Gross wrote: "Before you
commit yourself to a partnership with Akin Gump, I want to make
sure that the law firm is a hundred percent behind your project."
Id. at 11. On July 29, 2004, Gross encouraged Prospective Client
not to sign a retainer with Akin Gump. Specifically, Gross
wrote: "For the moment, I think you should delay signing the
engagement letter. The law firm will be unhappy with this
recommendation, but I can't in good conscience ask you to rely
exclusively on Akin Gump until I see actions matching words."
Id. at 12. The Prospective Client did not sign an engagement
letter with Akin Gump.
Gross also made numerous disparaging comments about Akin
Gump to Prospective Client, who was an advisor to a company
("Company X") that Akin Gump had been working with to retain
business. He sent the following messages in separate e-mails to
Prospective Client and Company X:
If [Company X] thinks it needs Washington
representation, it should stick with its
current law firm which has recently merged
with a top D.C. firm.
Sukhan [Kim] said he thought [CEO of Company
X] might explore retaining Akin Gump to help
make a deal with [Company Y.] This didn't
make sense to me at the time, and still
doesn't, because Sukhan is so close to
[Company Y] and a couple of other Korean
business groups that [CEO of Company X] could
not possibly trust him to serve as an "honest
broker." Sukhan has never represented an
American company doing business in Korea, so
far as I know, and is a highly specialized
trade lawyer whose practice consists of
representing Korean companies in the United
States.
Moreover, Sukhan plans to retire soon so I
can't imagine he wants to spend his own time
helping [Company X].
I didn't know Jaemin [Park] was involved in
this, until you mentioned she had a meeting
with [CEO of Company X] in Seoul. Her help
is even more questionable. . . . She claims
to have Blue House connections, but except
for knowing Hun-jai Lee through her family,
she exaggerates her influence.
If [the CEO of Company X] wants to get in
touch with some Korean business groups, there
are other ways to do it.
Def. Mot. at 26. Gross admits that he sent the e-mails quoted
above. See Pl. Answer to Def. Counterclaims 11, 12, and 17.
C. Procedural History
Gross filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on
April 29, 2005, alleging age discrimination under the ADEA and
the DCHRA. On February 26, 2007, Gross filed his Complaint in
this Court repeating the allegations in the EEOC charge. Akin
Gump filed an Answer denying the allegations, and the parties
commenced discovery. On June 25, 2007, Akin Gump filed a motion
to amend its Answer to add an affirmative defense of "after
acquired evidence" based on e-mails it discovered in responding
to Gross's document request. Akin Gump then added counterclaims
for breach of fiduciary duty and tortious interference with
economic relations based on the newly discovered evidence. In
response, Gross amended his Complaint to add a retaliation claim
based on Akin Gump's counterclaims.
This Court granted both Motions to Amend on September 10,
2007. Akin Gump filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on all
claims on November 2, 2007. Gross filed an opposition to Akin
Gump's Motion for Summary Judgment on December 11, 2007, and a
Motion for Summary Judgment on Akin Gump's counterclaims on
January 22, 2008.
II. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings on file,
together with any affidavits, depositions, interrogatories, and
admissions show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Dunaway v. Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 310 F.3d 758, 761 (D.C. Cir. 2002). A dispute of fact
is genuine "'if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Steele v. Schafer,
535 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Facts are material if
they "'might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law.'" Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden
of demonstrating an absence of genuine issues of material fact.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Tao v. Freeh,
27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994). "When a motion for summary
judgment is properly made and supported, [however,] an opposing
party may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own
pleading; rather, its response must . . . set out specific facts
showing a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2);
see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. "'[A] mere unsubstantiated
allegation . . . creates no genuine issue of fact and will not
withstand summary judgment.'" Ginger v. District of Columbia,
527 F.3d 1340, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Harding v. Gray, 9
F.3d 150, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1993)) (alterations in original).
"Accepting . . . conclusory allegations as true . . . would
defeat the central purpose of the summary judgment device, which
is to weed out those cases insufficiently meritorious to warrant
the expense of a jury trial." Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671,
675 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court
draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.
See Keyes v. District of Columbia, 372 F.3d 434, 436 (D.C. Cir.
2004). "'As employers rarely maintain records directly
evidencing discrimination, an added measure of rigor or caution
is appropriate in applying this standard to motions for summary
judgment in employment discrimination cases.'" Brownfield v.
Bair, 541 F. Supp. 2d 35, 41 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Woodruff v.
Peters, 482 F.3d 521, 526 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Gross's Age Discrimination Claims
Gross alleges that he was terminated by Akin Gump because of
his age in violation of the ADEA and the DCHRA. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), outlines the correct
analytical approach through which this Court must review
plaintiff's claims. Employee allegations of discrimination
trigger this familiar McDonnell Douglass burden-shifting
framework in federal courts. See Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135,
144 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In the absence of direct evidence of
discrimination, the courts use this framework to determine
whether an employee-plaintiff has a colorable claim against his
or her employer. Claims under the DCHRA are also analyzed under
the McDonnell Douglass framework. See Arthur Young & Co. v.
Sutherland, 631 A.2d 354, 361-62 (D.C. 1993); Gleklen v.
Democratic Cong. Campaign Comm., Inc., 199 F.3d 1365, 1367 (D.C.
Cir. 2000). Given this congruence, any DCHRA claim necessarily
fails if a plaintiff's federal claims cannot survive. A separate
analysis under D.C. law, therefore, is unnecessary.
According to the McDonnell Douglass framework, the plaintiff
has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. See McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Stella, 284 F.3d at 144. If the
plaintiff succeeds in making out a prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Stella, 284 F.3d at
144 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). If the employer
articulates a non-discriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff,
who must demonstrate that the employer's stated reason was merely
pretext and that the true reason was discriminatory. Id. (citing
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). If the plaintiff cannot
demonstrate pretext, the employee's claims necessarily fail.
To make out a prima facie case of age discrimination, Gross
must demonstrate that he (1) "is a member of a protected class;"
(2) "suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the
unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of discrimination."
Mastro v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 447 F.3d 843, 850 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1140 (2007).
The parties agree that Gross is a member of a protected
class and that he suffered an adverse employment action. Akin
Gump disputes whether or not the unfavorable action gives rise to
an inference of discrimination. Accepting the pleadings as true,
however, as the Court is required to do here, defendant's alleged
comments that Gross was "too old" do indeed give rise to an
inference of discrimination. "'[T]he burden of establishing a
prima facie case . . . is not onerous.'" Wiley v. Glassman, 511
F.3d 151, 155-56 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Tex. Dep't of Cmty.
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)) (second alterationa
in original). Gross's allegations satisfy the requirements for a
prima facie case of age discrimination. The burden then shifts
to Akin Gump to demonstrate a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for terminating Gross. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at
802.
Akin Gump submitted evidence in the record which
overwhelmingly demonstrates that Gross was terminated because he
failed to meet the terms of his contract. Numerous lawyers and
partners at Akin Gump complained about Gross's poor work product.
Further, Gross was not able to bill the hours he was expected to
bill as Senior Counsel; he sent himself e-mails acknowledging
this shortcoming. See Statement at 48. Simply put, Gross was
not able to adequately perform the essential functions for which
he was hired. The evidence in the record demonstrates that Akin
Gump had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating
him. Gross's offer letter provided clear notice that he was
hired on a probationary period and that if he did not adequately
perform his duties, he would be terminated.
Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit has repeatedly upheld grants
of summary judgment in discrimination cases where the
decision-maker completed an independent assessment of the
relevant facts and made an independent decision to terminate an
employee. See Vickers v. Powell, 493 F.3d 186, 195-96 (D.C. Cir.
2007); Hall v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 1074, 1079 (D.C. Cir.
1999); see also Blackman v. Visiting Nurses Ass'n, 694 A.2d 865,
870 (D.C. 1997). Gross makes no allegations of ageism against
McLean. See Thompson v. Coca-Cola Co., 522 F.3d 168, 178 (1st
Cir. 2008) ("'Actionable discrimination cannot exist in a vacuum.
Rather the discriminatory intent of which a plaintiff complains
must be traceable to the person or persons who made the decision
to fire him.'" (quoting Bennett v. Saint-Gobain Corp., 507 F.3d
23, 31 (1st Cir. 2007))). "Statements made by those who are not
involved in the decisional process 'normally are insufficient,
standing alone, to establish either pretext or the requisite
discriminatory animus.'" Bennett, 507 F.3d at 31 (quoting
Velázquez-Fernández v. NCE Foods, Inc., 476 F.3d 6, 11-12 (1st
Cir. 2007)). There is no evidence in the record that contradicts
McLean's insistence that he conducted an independent assessment
of Gross and that the decision to terminate Gross's employment
was made without input from Kim. McLean testified that he
decided to terminate Gross "because there were serious
performance issues." Def. Mot. at 18. The record supports this
determination.
There is also no evidence that Kim recommended to Quigley
that Gross's employment be terminated. If anything, it is clear
that Kim went out of his way to attempt to assist Gross after the
decision was made to terminate him. Kim encouraged him to look
for work in another group at the firm, told Gross that he would
see what he could do about finding Gross employment with Akin
Gump clients, and secured an additional month of employment for
Gross at the firm. All the while, Gross sent e-mails to Kim
thanking him for assistance.
Since Akin Gump has provided a legitimate non-discriminatory
reason for terminating Gross's employment, the burden shifts back
to Gross to demonstrate a pretext for his termination. See
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. When evaluating allegations
of pretext, D.C. Circuit case law is clear: this Court may not
"second-guess an employer's personnel decision absent
demonstrably discriminatory motive." Milton v. Weinberger, 696
F.2d 94, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1982). "Once the employer has
articulated a non-discriminatory explanation for its action, . .
. the issue is not 'the correctness or desirability of [the]
reasons offered . . . [but] whether the employer honestly
believes in the reasons it offers." Fischbach v. D.C. Dep't of
Corr., 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting McCoy v. WGN
Cont'l Broad. Co., 957 F.2d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 1992)) (first
alteration added). The evidence on the record suggests that
McLean in fact believed that Gross was not performing as
expected. There is an abundance of evidence, furthermore,
demonstrating that Gross was not meeting the expectations that
were set for him when he was hired by defendants. Gross has not
been able to demonstrate that his termination was based on
pretext, and he "cannot establish pretext simply based on [his]
own subjective assessment of [his] own performance, for
'plaintiff's perception of himself, and of his work performance,
is not relevant. It is the perception of the decisionmaker which
is relevant." Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 124 F. Supp.
2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2000) (quoting Smith v. Chamber of Commerce of
the U.S., 645 F. Supp. 604, 608 (D.D.C. 1986)) (original
alterations omitted and alterations added). Gross's claims fail,
and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the age
discrimination claims is GRANTED.
B. Akin Gump's Counterclaims Alleging Breach of
Fiduciary Duty and Tortious Interference
Akin Gump argues that Gross's e-mails to Prospective Client
and Company X breached his fiduciary duty with the firm and
tortiously interfered with economic advantage. Gross argues that
Akin Gump fails to demonstrate the requisite intent necessary to
make out a claim for tortious interference. The Court is not
persuaded by Gross's argument.
a. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
As an employee, Gross owed "’an undivided and unselfish
loyalty’" to Akin Gump "such that 'there shall be no conflict
between duty and self interest.'" PM Servs. Co. v. Odoi Assoc.,
2006 WL 20382, at *27 (D.D.C. Jan. 4, 2006) (quoting Mercer Mgmt.
Consulting v. Wilde, 920 F. Supp 219, 233 (D.D.C. 1996)). Unless
otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to his principal
to act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters
concerned with his agency. See id. (quoting Restatement (Second)
of Agency § 387). Since Gross does not dispute that he sent
e-mails to Prospective Client and Company X which depicted Akin
Gump in a negative light, a reasonable jury could find that he
breached the fiduciary duty he owed to Akin Gump while under
their employ. Gross's Motion for Summary Judgment is therefore
DENIED.
b. Tortious Interference
To make out a claim of tortious interference with
prospective economic advantage, a party must prove "(1) the
existence of a valid business relationship or expectancy, (2)
knowledge of the relationship or expectancy on the part of the
interferer, (3) intentional interference inducing or causing a
breach [or] termination of the relationship or expectancy, and
(4) resultant damage." Bennett Entm't, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza,
Inc., 45 F.3d 493, 499 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The
evidence in the record clearly demonstrates that Akin Gump meets
the threshold showings for a claim of tortious interference with
prospective economic advantage.
By Gross's own admission, he had been working on securing a
contract with Prospective Client for Akin Gump. It is fair to
say, then, that Akin Gump had a valid expectancy of a business
relationship with Prospective Client. Gross clearly knew of the
expectancy, as he was intimately involved in the relationship
with and courting of Prospective Client. Gross admits that he
sent e-mails to Prospective Client and Company X relating to Akin
Gump's possible representation. The e-mails he sent were harmful
to Akin Gump, as they specifically discouraged Prospective Client
from retaining Akin Gump. Indeed, Gross specifically advised
Prospective Client not to sign a retainer with Akin Gump, and he
acknowledged in the same e-mail that Akin Gump would not be happy
with his recommendation. The resulting damage is that
Prospective Client did not sign a retainer with Akin Gump. Gross
admits all of these allegations. His attempts at explaining why
he sent the e-mails he sent are unavailing. He claims, for
example, that he felt that Kim could not ethically represent both
Company X and Company Y. See Pl. Opp. to Mot. Sum J. at 9.
Gross did not, however, express any misgivings he may have had to
anyone at Akin Gump. Gross claimed that he had a duty to
Prospective Client. In fact, his duty was to Akin Gump. See PM
Servs. Co., 2006 WL 20382, at *27. A reasonable jury could find
that he tortiously interfered with Akin Gump's and Prospective
Client's relationship. See Furash & Co. v. McClave, 130 F. Supp.
2d 48, 56 (D.D.C. 2001) ("A reasonable jury might find that [the
defendant's] alleged breach of fiduciary duty destroyed [the
plaintiff's] client relationships.") Summary judgment for Gross
is improper and the motion is DENIED.
C. Gross's Retaliation Claims
Gross asserts that Akin Gump's breach of fiduciary duty and
tortious interference claims were filed in retaliation for his
age discrimination claims. Akin Gump argues that their
counterclaims were filed only after the firm discovered that
Gross sent e-mails to their prospective clients disparaging the
firm. Akin Gump contends that it only discovered these e-mails
in a response to a discovery request made by Gross as part of
this litigation. Furthermore, Akin Gump argues that they could
not have retaliated against Gross because he was no longer
employed by defendants when they filed their counterclaims. This
Court agrees with Akin Gump.
To make out a prima facie case for retaliation under the
ADEA or the DCHRA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) s/he
engaged in protected activity; (2) s/he suffered adverse
employment action; and (3) there is a causal link between the
protected activity and the adverse action. Taylor v. Small, 350
F.3d 1286, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
The protected activity Gross alleges that he engaged in was
the filing of his complaint against Akin Gump. Defendants do not
contest this, and it is clear that the filing of a complaint is a
protected activity. See Fabiano v. Hopkins, 352 F.3d 447, 453
(1st Cir. 2003) ("As an initial matter, every citizen has the
right 'to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.'
U.S. Const. amend. I. The right of access to the courts is an
established aspect of this right." (citing Bill Johnson's
Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983))). Gross,
therefore, satisfies the first prong of the prima facie test.
The second prong, however, requires more in-depth analysis.
Gross argues that the counterclaim Akin Gump filed in this case
is an adverse employment action. Gross relies on Burlington
Northern & Santa Fe Railway. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006),
but that case undermines Gross's argument for two reasons. In
Burlington, the Supreme Court agreed with the D.C. Circuit and
held that "a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would
have found the challenged action materially adverse, 'which in
this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable
worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.'"
Id. at 68 (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C.
Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
As a threshold matter, Gross is no longer an employee of
Akin Gump, and he was not an employee when Akin Gump filed its
counterclaims. Akin Gump only filed its counterclaims after
Gross's discovery request revealed evidence of his alleged
wrong-doing. Gross was terminated in October 2004; Akin Gump
filed its counterclaims in September 2007, nearly three years
later. For this reason alone, Gross does not fit within the
group of people Burlington seeks to protect. Furthermore,
Burlington's reasoning for protecting employees was to prevent
employers from dissuading employees from filing discrimination
charges. Id. Given that Akin Gump's counterclaim was filed
after Gross filed suit for age discrimination, there is no way
Akin Gump's counterclaim could dissuade Gross from filing his
claim.
The D.C. Circuit has never found that the filing of a
counterclaim constitutes an adverse employment action. Moreover,
other federal courts have specifically held that counterclaims
cannot, as a matter of law, constitute an adverse employment
action. See Earl v. Electro-Coatings of Iowa, Inc., 2002 WL
32172298, at *2 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 29, 2002) (unpublished)
("Although many different post-termination actions may constitute
retaliation, this court holds that, ordinarily, a counterclaim
may not. Initially, the court notes that a counterclaim is not
to be considered an employment-related action. Only in the rare
case will conduct that occurs within the scope of litigation
amount to retaliation." (citing Steffes v. Stepan Co., 144 F.3d
1070, 1075 (7th Cir. 1998))); Beltran v. Brentwood N. Healthcare
Ctr., LLC, 426 F. Supp. 2d 827, 833-34 (N.D. Ill. 2006) ("[I]f
the mere filing of a counterclaim were sufficient to give rise to
a retaliation claim, then every defendant in an FLSA, Title VII
or ADA lawsuit who asserts a counterclaim would be subject to a
retaliation claim."). Filing a counterclaim is different from
initiating a lawsuit against a complaining employee, as "filing a
counterclaim will not chill plaintiffs from exercising and
enforcing their statutory rights because by the time the employer
files its counterclaim, plaintiffs have already made their
charges and initiated a lawsuit." Beltran, 426 F. Supp. 2d at
834 (citing EEOC v. K&J Mgmt. Inc., 2000 WL 34248366, at *4 (N.D.
Ill. 2000) (unpublished)).
Furthermore, as a matter of law, Akin Gump was required to
file its counterclaim. Rule 13 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure requires parties to file counterclaims that "arise[]
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the opposing party's claim." Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(1)(A). Akin
Gump's counterclaims were compulsory under the federal rules, and
it would have waived those claims had it failed to allege them.
It is clear that Akin Gump filed its counterclaim because it
was compulsory, not in retaliation for Gross's suit. Gross has
failed to satisfy the second prong of the prima facie test, and
the Court need go no further in the analysis. Akin Gump's Motion
for Summary Judgment on this claim is GRANTED.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED; plaintiff's cross-motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
March 3, 2009
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