Social Security Disability -- Continuing Disability -- Direct Threat in the Workplace

June 3, 2014
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apartment 136
Washington, DC  20008
 
Social Security Administration
Mid-Atlantic Program Service Center
Module 7
300 Spring Garden Street
Philadelphia PA  19123-2999
RE:  Disability Claim xxx-xx-xxxx

Dear Sir:


Enclosed is documentation tending to show that I pose a direct threat in the workplace and that I therefore do not enjoy the protections of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA).  

An employee who has a disability as defined by the ADA, and who can perform the essential functions of the job, may be fired based on his or her disability if the employee poses a “direct threat.” Under the direct threat defense, an employer may fire or refuse to hire an employee who poses a significant safety risk.  A direct threat is defined as a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of that employee or others, which cannot be eliminated or reduced by a reasonable accommodation.   

The D.C. Superior Court (Judge xxxxx xxxxx xxxxxxx, currently, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia) as well as the D.C. Court of Appeals found that my former employer's concerns that I suffered from a paranoid disorder associated with a risk of violence, based as they were on the advice of a practicing psychiatrist, were genuine and not "unworthy of credence." See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 411 U.S. 804-805. Texas Dept. of Commun. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). 


The D.C. Superior Court and the D.C. Court of Appeals failed to find that my former supervisor's published concern that I might carry out a mass homicidal assault on the firm's premises and her action in having the firm secure her department's office suite against such a homicidal assault was malicious or discriminatory.  The supervisor in question, Christine Robertson, was designated by the employer as one of the decisionmakers who terminated my employment, effective October 29, 1991 in concert with Dennis M. Race, Esq.  Robertson was a senior supervisory employee who reported directly to R. Bruce McLean, Esq., who was a member of the firm's management committee and a former firm managing partner.  The D.C. Court of Appeals was not persuaded by my argument that decisionmaker Robertson's statement that she feared I was homicidal -- made (presumably) on the day of my termination -- was evidence of unlawful animus in the termination decision.


The D.C. Office of Corporation Counsel (predecessor of the D.C. Office of Attorney General) represented to the D.C. Superior Court and the D.C. Court of Appeals (in pleadings filed on July 25, 1997) that my coworkers formed genuine and credible fears that I might become armed and extremely dangerous.

Psychological testing that I took on February 24, 2014 disclosed that I continue to suffer from the paranoid disorder first diagnosed by Dennis M. Race, Esq. (senior counsel at my former place of employment, the law firm of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld) (202 887-4028) in consultation with Gertrude M. Ticho, M.D. (deceased) in October 1991.


Sincerely,


Gary Freedman


cc: Mark F. Giuliano, FBI Deputy Director