Wednesday, November 07, 2012

Akin Gump Perjury

To the Federal Bureau of Investigation--Washington Metropolitan Field Office:

There is circumstantial evidence that the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld may have committed perjury in the following case litigated in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (Judge Joyce Hens Green, presiding): McNeil v. Akin, Gump Strauss, Hauer & Feld,
Civil Action No. 93-0477 (1993).

Plaintiff McNeil, an African American employee in Akin Gump's Litigation Support Department, was fired for insubordination by Personnel Administrator, Laurel Digweed in April 1992.  Thereafter McNeil filed a suit for damages in U.S. District Court alleging discrimination under Title VII.  McNeil alleged that her supervisor, Litigation Support Director Christine Robertson was a known racist and that Robertson had colluded in the termination decision with Personnel Administrator Digweed.  Akin Gump denied that Robertson and Digweed colluded in the wrongful termination of McNeil, and the court granted Defendant Akin Gump's motion for summary judgment.  The court found that Robertson's alleged prior racist behavior was irrelevant to the case since Robertson played no role in Plaintiff McNeil's termination.  Defendant Akin Gump was represented by Robert J. Higgins, Esq.
(202 420 2272) of Dickstein Shapiro, LLP.  I believe that previously, Akin Gump management partner Dennis M. Race, Esq. (202 887 4028)  handled the case for the firm.

In late October 1991, six months before McNeil was terminated, I had filed a harassment complaint against my supervisor, Litigation Support Director Robertson and others with management attorney Dennis M. Race, Esq., alleging religious and sexual preference harassment under the D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977.  Several days later the firm terminated my employment, later alleging before the D.C. Department of Human Rights that the firm's investigation of my complaint disclosed that I suffered from psychological problems that rendered me unemployable and a direct threat in the workplace.  Akin Gump's Interrogatory Response filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights on May 22, 1992 (in full knowledge of the McNeil termination in April 1992) failed to disclose that I had ever alleged that I had been harassed by Litigation Support Director Robertson.  In effect, Akin Gump failed to disclose that as of late October 1991 it had knowledge that Robertson posed a Title VII problem for the firm.

Moreover, in my own case Akin Gump admitted that Robertson cooperated with Digweed (and Race) in my job termination.  In a termination chart prepared by the firm Akin Gump lists the following three individuals as the decisionmakers in my termination: Robertson, Digweed and Race.  Freedman v. Akin Gump, Hauer & Feld (agency record at 167).

statements contained in Akin Gump’s Response to Interrogatories, filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights on May 22, 1992, directly contradict the firm's production in McNeil v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld.

Akin Gump refers in the Freedman Response to my “transfer” or “transition,” in March 1990, from the firm’s legal assistant program to the firm’s litigation support department:

“In an attempt to find comparable work for the Claimant, a decision was made to transfer him to the Litigation Support Department.” Response to Particulars, Attachment A, page 1. (emphasis added).

“During his transition from a legal assistant position (paralegal) to his work with the litigation support department, Claimant had several discussions with his direct supervisor about problems with interacting with co-workers and occasional outbursts. . . .” Response to Particulars, Attachment A, page 5. (emphasis added).

In McNeil the court found that a transfer from Akin Gump’s litigation support department to the legal assistant program constituted a promotion. McNeil v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, No. 93-0477, footnote 2 at 2 (D.C.D.C., filed Nov. 29, 1993) (“McNeil could have applied for promotions outside of the [litigation support] department to legal secretary or legal assistant, however, she stated that she was not interested in either position. During her tenure, two of her coworkers both black, were promoted to legal assistant positions.”) Thus, according to McNeil, a necessary logical conclusion is that my own reverse transfer from legal assistant to litigation support employee in March 1990 was a demotion.

Akin Gump’s characterization of my demotion as a "transfer” or “transition” directly contradicts Akin Gump's production in McNeil that a "transfer" from the firm's Litigation Support Department to the Legal Assistant program constituted a promotion.

Gary Freedman
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apt. 136
Washington, DC  20008
202 362 7064