Thursday, September 15, 2011

Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights -- Court Order re: Jurisdiction -- No. 93-AA-1342

In September 1993 the D.C. Department of Human Rights (DOHR) determined that there was no probable cause to believe that my job termination by the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld in October 1991 was discriminatory in violation of the D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977. I thereupon filed a Petition for Review with the D.C. Court of Appeals. At oral argument in October 1994 the Court (Judge John A. Terry) questioned whether it had jurisdiction; by order of the Court filed October 17, 1994 the Court requested that I brief the issue. Under case law, a DOHR no probable cause determination must first be reviewed in a civil action filed in the D.C. Superior Court; an unfavorable ruling by the Superior Court may then be reviewed in the Court of Appeals. 
____________________________


DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No.93-AA-1342

GARY FREEDMAN, PETITIONER
v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
RESPONDENT

Before FERREN and TERRY, Associate Judges, and MACK, Senior Judge.
ORDER

At oral argument before this court, a question arose regarding the court's jurisdiction to hear this case.  In Lamont v. Rogers, 479 A.2d 1274, 1278 (D.C. 1984), this court held that a finding of no probable cause by the Office of Human Rights (OHR) was not a decision in a "contested case," D.C. Code Section 1-1510(a) (1992), and that such a finding was therefore not directly reviewable in this court.  In Simpson v. District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, 597 A.2d 392, 397-399 (D.C. 1991), we held, citing Lamont and other cases, that a finding of no probable cause by the OHR was subject to judicial review, but only in a civil action filed in the Superior Court.  In light of Lamont and Simpson, it is

ORDERED that petitioner, within 21 days from the date of this order, shall file a supplemental memorandum with this court addressing the question of whether this court has jurisdiction to consider this case on direct review under D.C. Code Section 1-1510(a) (1992).  Respondent and petitioner's employer may each file a supplemental memorandum within 21 days after the filing of petitioner's memorandum. 1/

The Clerk is directed to serve a copy of this order on petitioner, respondent, and petitioner's employer.

PER CURIAM.
________________________

1/ For the purpose of filing a memorandum pursuant to this order, petitioner's employer shall be deemed an intervenor.

No. 93-AA-1342

Copies to:

Mr. Gary Freedman
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Suite 136
Washington, D.C.  20008

Charles L. Reischel, Esquire
Deputy Corporation Counsel

Dennis M. Race, Esquire
1333 New Hampshire Avenue, NW
Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20036

9 comments:

  1. So six judges ruled against me -- Ferren, Mack, Terry, Reid King and one judge in Superior Court. Yet, the USMS was concerned that I was only angry with one judge.

    That one judge was the one judge who has ties to the DOJ's Criminal Division Chief (Lanny Breuer) and to the U.S. Attorney General himself (Eric Holder). Attorney General Holder has ties to Vernon Jordan -- whose law partner (Dennis Race) terminated my employment. The USMS expressly asked me how I would react to Dennis Race if I saw him, but didn't ask me about my feelings about any of the Appeals Court judges (5 of them) who ruled against me!

    You can see how a paranoid person would be suspicious.

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  2. Akin Gump did not intervene in this matter.

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  3. Akin Gump determined that I was mentally ill and potentially violent effective October 29, 1991, the date I was terminated.

    I filed pleadings in this matter in 1994. I was not on any medication when I filed these pleadings.

    The Social Security Administration determined, based on Akin Gump's sworn allegations about my mental state, that I was unemployable as of October 29, 1991. A disability determination by SSA means that a person cannot do the work he was trained to do or which he has done in the past.

    In effect, SSA determined that I was unable to do the work of a paralegal or a lawyer effective October 29, 1991.

    The D.C. Court of Appeals knew that I was on Social Security Disability when I filed this matter. My Petition to Proceed In Forma Pauperis filed with the Court stated that I was on Social Security Disability.

    http://dailstrug.blogspot.com/2011/06/dc-court-of-appeals-express-notice-that_21.html

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  4. So the D.C. Court of Appeals had persuasive evidence that I was not in fact disabled but did not report me to SSA or the U.S. Attorney as a case of possible Social Security fraud. Isn't that a hoot!!

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  5. The D.C. Corporation Counsel declined to respond to this petition for review, apparently relying on the Court's prior holdings that there was a lack of jurisdiction.

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  6. What I find interesting is that when Judge Judy has a litigant before her who is on Social Security disability but she believes is not disabled, or who admits to facts that call into question the validity of the claim, she will say: "I am sending a copy of a tape of this proceedings to the Social Security Administration."

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