The following is excerpted from "Richard Wagner: The Man, His Mind, and His Music" by Robert W. Gutman. In 1881 the King of Bavaria, Ludwig II, had placed his court orchestra, chorus and conductor, Hermann Levi, at the disposal of Richard Wagner to perform the premiere of Wagner's opera, Parsifal. Wagner was forced by the liberal-minded King to accept the Jewish conductor despite Wagner's best efforts to rid himself of Levi.
Since King Ludwig had granted Wagner the use of the Munich orchestra and chorus, it was understood that the royal Kapellmeister, Hermann Levi, would conduct Parsifal. Through devotion to Wagner's works and extraordinary performances of them, this man had forged a strong and sympathetic relationship with Cosima Wagner. Her letters to him are among her warmest. The two new friends had become confidants on artistic and also on highly personal matters, despite the embarrassing fact that the gentleman was Hermann Levi, son of the Rabbi of Giessen. She considered him "a most excellent person, with real delicacy of feeling." He moved in the artistic circles congenial to her, for he had been an intimate of Anselm Feuerbach's and was close to Lenbach and Wilhelm Busch. Only illness had prevented Levi's accepting Cosima's fervid invitations to visit during the last Italian sojourn. She even felt constrained to interpret to him Wagner's latest racist writings and thus soften their blows, especially "Know Thyself, a rabidly anti-Semitic supplement to "Religion and Art." During the early years of their friendship Levi's charm drew from her an uncharacteristic charity.
Wagner had the highest opinion of the young conductor’s abilities. Weingartner remarked upon the spiritual nature of his interpretations and a baton technique so perfect that gestures were reduced to a minimum. (Weingartner's musical approach owed much to his example.) But although Wagner declared his respect for a Jew who clung to the Biblical Levi and did not change to Lowe or Lewy (a rather nasty glance at Lilli Lehmann's maternal name), this was about the extent of his enthusiasm for installing Israel in the Bayreuth pit; the conductor's Jewishness was a bitter pill for him. He even flew at King Ludwig for commenting that confessional differences were unimportant, considering the essential brotherhood of men, anger, as will be remarked, being reinforced by sudden awareness that Ludwig had rejected the racial message of the Parsifal poem. That he shared the Hohenzollerns' revulsion from anti-Semitism was infuriating. The nation was seething with the agitations awakened in the seventies by financial failures and swindles for which the Jew provided a scapegoat. The reference in "Know Thyself" to the Jew as "the darling of liberal princes" was not only Wagner's sneer at the protests of the Prussian Crown Prince Friedrich and his wife, Princess Victoria of England, against this rabble-rousing movement but also an unfriendly jab at Ludwig and Levi. Bismarck had in him much of that traditional sympathy of Prussian officialdom for Jewish emancipation; his doltish tolerance of a decade before, Wagner was sure, would yet bring the Reich down in ruins. In "Know Thyself" Wagner expressed outrage that the Reichstag's bestowal of full citizenship upon Jews permitted them to "consider themselves in every conceivable respect to be Germans -- much as Negroes in Mexico were authorized through a carte blanche to look upon themselves as whites."
****
Ludwig's broad-mindedness, unlike the worldly Bismarck's, Wagner blamed on naiveté; the King was told that, lacking experience of Jews in everyday situations, he naturally could idealize them. Wagner blustered, but Munich stood firm. Since no artistic reason could be advanced to justify Levi's removal [Levi's substantial work performance was very good, as Dennis Race would say], Ludwig resolved that without his royal Kapellmeister there would be no royal orchestra, no royal chorus, and hence no Parsifal. It is a tribute to the young man's character that, like Nietzsche, he felt this point important enough to defy Wagner's tyranny.
And the latter had pushed matters to the point of crisis. During the preparations for Parsifal in 1881, Levi had on occasion journeyed to Bayreuth, where he resided in the Wagner's villa, Wahnfried. So offensive did Wagner's conduct toward his guest eventually become that Levi, his veneration of genius notwithstanding, had felt compelled late in June to flee the house and wrote Wagner asking to be relieved of conducting Parsifal. Not only had there been Wagner's tasteless efforts to persuade the Rabbi's son to undergo baptism so as not to profane the temple scenes of the opera, but during the summer Wahnfried had been thrown into turmoil by an anonymous letter to Wagner accusing Levi of being Cosima's lover. Did Wagner for a moment look at both his wife, almost a quarter of a century his junior, and her special friend, the handsome, soulful Jew, two years younger, and, remembering her vagabond nocturnal habits at Villa Pellet wonder whether he had finally been cast as a Hans von Bulow?
His behavior was compulsive, beyond control. With many Jews -- Tausig, Rubenstein, Levi, Lilli Lehmann and her mother, and Neumann (who was just entering his life) -- he could never disentangle genuine affection for the individual from a general, consuming hate in which sadism played an ugly part, a sadism calculated and raw in the case of Levi, a cruel ritual Theodor Adorno compared to a cat's play with a mouse. Despite the sham Christian piety of Parsifal, Wagner remained a nonbeliever to his death. Yet he delighted in tormenting Levi with plans for his baptism and even enjoyed painting the insolent picture of their going to Communion together! (In later years it hurt Weingartner to observe the contempt with which the Wagner family treated Levi behind the mask of friendship; the cats kept the mouse frisking.)
It was essential to coax Levi back to Bayreuth, for reports of Wagner's baiting would not be well received in Munich, and the conductor's absence would tend to confirm the gossip about Cosima. And, since Wagner's hatred of Levi's people did not exclude an admiration for his artistry [Levi was as close to the perfect conductor as it is possible to find!--as they would say at Akin Gump], while Levi's appreciation of Wagner's genius outweighed his disgust at the man's ill-breeding, a rapprochement was effected, Cosima no doubt contributing her diplomatic best. Levi admitted that he had become a Wagnerite "through long detours and after many inner battles," his letters from Bayreuth to his father revealing a struggle to forgive the composer his faults and to believe him essentially free of "petty prejudice" ("kleinliches Risches") in respect to individuals. However, what was written to calm the worried Rabbi does not agree with Levi's later confidences to Weingartner, to whom he remarked of Wahnfried, "It is easy enough for you in that house, Aryan that you are."
Though behind the scenes Wagner was doing his utmost to rid himself of Levi, he finally on September 19 felt it politic to write Ludwig that after all, he would accept the head of the Munich orchestra without asking his religion, a letter often naively trotted forth to demonstrate Wagner’s essential tolerance! In answer, on October 11, Ludwig made his remark about the brotherhood of man and voiced his opinion that racism was loathsome ("nichts ist widerlicher"). This was more than Wagner could stand. He realized how utterly he had failed with Ludwig. No longer able to control his rage, in a letter dated November 22, 1881 [mind you, that's November 1881 and not "early in the year" as wrongly believed in court circles], he read to the King that famous lecture on the Jews as the congenital enemies of humanity and all that is noble in it ("dass ich die juedische Race fuer den geborenen Feind der reinen Menschheit und alles Edlen in ihr halte"). And this foulness he vented on the King, who early in his reign (1866) had visited the synagogue in Fuerth and pledged to follow his father's example in working toward Jewish emancipation. To Wagner's outburst Ludwig made no reply until over two months later, when he subtly referred to the faithful Jews with whom the composer surrounded himself. It was too late to discuss openly and reasonably a subject on which Wagner was completely deranged. (Nietzsche had described him to Seydlitz as "an old, unchanging man.) In such an atmosphere of hate and rancor the "Christian" drama Parsifal was completed and prepared.
Wednesday, December 23, 2009
Tuesday, December 22, 2009
The Longest Evening of the Year
Stopping By Woods on a Snowy Evening
Whose woods these are I think I know.
His house is in the village though;
He will not see me stopping here
To watch his woods fill up with snow.
My little horse must think it queer
To stop without a farmhouse near
Between the woods and frozen lake
The darkest evening of the year.
He gives his harness bells a shake
To ask if there is some mistake.
The only other sound's the sweep
Of easy wind and downy flake.
The woods are lovely, dark and deep.
But I have promises to keep,
And miles to go before I sleep,
And miles to go before I sleep.
Robert Frost, 1923.
Whose woods these are I think I know.
His house is in the village though;
He will not see me stopping here
To watch his woods fill up with snow.
My little horse must think it queer
To stop without a farmhouse near
Between the woods and frozen lake
The darkest evening of the year.
He gives his harness bells a shake
To ask if there is some mistake.
The only other sound's the sweep
Of easy wind and downy flake.
The woods are lovely, dark and deep.
But I have promises to keep,
And miles to go before I sleep,
And miles to go before I sleep.
Robert Frost, 1923.
Of Geniuses and Crackpots
Anna Karenina by the great Russian writer Leo Tolstoy is one of my favorite novels. In his introduction to the novel Malcolm Cowley writes about Tolstoy: "Genius is energy -- mental energy first of all, but sometimes this is combined, as in Tolstoy's case, with physical, emotional, and sexual energy. Genius is vision, often involving the gift of finding patterns where others see nothing but a chance collection of objects. Genius is a memory for essential details. Genius is 'the transcendent capacity for taking trouble,' as Carlyle said; it is the capacity for brooding over a subject until it reveals its full potentialities; but that again is a form of energy. Genius is also a belief in oneself and the importance of one's mission, without which the energy is dissipated in hesitations and inner conflicts."
What's interesting is that these same characteristics also apply to many crackpots: not giving up when most normal people see the futility of the endeavor; seeing patterns in random objects when there is in fact no pattern at all; a memory of details that has devolved into attaching a nonexistent meaning to trivial events; brooding on a subject in situations where the normal individual would abandon brooding and embark on fruitful action; and a grandiose belief in the importance of one's mission -- a mission that amounts to no more than building a bridge to nowhere.
What's interesting is that these same characteristics also apply to many crackpots: not giving up when most normal people see the futility of the endeavor; seeing patterns in random objects when there is in fact no pattern at all; a memory of details that has devolved into attaching a nonexistent meaning to trivial events; brooding on a subject in situations where the normal individual would abandon brooding and embark on fruitful action; and a grandiose belief in the importance of one's mission -- a mission that amounts to no more than building a bridge to nowhere.
I Wonder If Marilyn Quayle, Esq. Made Any Phone Calls?
Marilyn Quayle (née Tucker) is the wife of former U.S. Vice President James Danforth Quayle and held the unofficial title of Second Lady of the United States from 1989 until 1993.
Marilyn Quayle is the author or co-author of several books, including two works of thriller fiction written with her sister, Nancy Tucker Northcott. The novels (Embrace The Serpent and The Campaign) follow a fictional black evangelical Republican senator, the victim of a liberal-media smear campaign and an unnamed Democratic president of questionable morality. The senator clears his name, and the novels conclude with the suicide of the Democratic president.
Mrs. Quayle also wrote Moments that Matter with her husband.
Robert S. Strauss, Esq. served in the administration of former President George H.W. Bush as U.S. Ambassador to Russia (The Soviet Union). Mr. Strauss is a longtime friend of the Bush family. Former First Lady Barbara Bush adores Mr. Strauss (don't we all?) Barbara Bush is a best-selling author and an advocate for reading. Her daughter-in-law, former First Lady Laura Bush, used to be a librarian.
January 2, 1999
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Marilyn Tucker Quayle, Esq.
Krieg, DeVault, Alexander & Capehart
Indianapolis, IN 46204-2017
Dear Mrs. Quayle:
I am an attorney licensed to practice in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and qualify for consideration for a position as associate with the firm of Krieg, DeVault, Alexander & Capehart. Preliminary to forwarding a copy of my resume to Krieg, DeVault I believe I have a legal duty to advise the firm of the following facts regarding concerns about my potential for armed violence or homicide, intent to purchase firearms to commit a felony, and the illegal transport of a deadly weapon: concerns placed in controversy and affirmed, by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.), as relating to genuine fears about my criminal intent.
The Government of the District of Columbia has affirmed that my former employer, the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump") terminated my employment in October 1991 on the basis of genuine concerns about my mental health and stability, including the potential for violence. The employer's termination decision was made following an ex parte consultation with a psychiatrist who did not examine me personally. Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order, June 10, 1996), affirmed by the D.C. Court of Appeals (Terry, Reid, and King, associate judges), No. 96-CV-961 (Memorandum Opinion and Judgment filed Sept. 1, 1998).
As of the filing of the complaint in the Superior Court proceedings, in October 1995, and at all times thereafter, it was unlawful under the laws of the District of Columbia for a psychiatrist to offer a professional psychiatric opinion about an individual without benefit of personal examination as is strongly recommended by the American Psychiatric Association's Principles of Medical Ethics. The D.C. Code in its latest revision makes it unlawful for a physician to "[fail] to conform to standards of acceptable conduct and prevailing practice within a health profession." See D.C. Code 2-3305.14(26). This provision was added to the District of Columbia Health Occupations Revision Act by D.C. Law 10-247, enacted on March 23, 1995. The D.C. Court of Appeals expressly found that the professional psychiatric opinion offered by the psychiatrist to the employer amounted to the diagnosis of a "disorder." See No. 96-CV-961 at 4.
The District of Columbia Superior Court as well as the D.C. Court of Appeals did not find that the action of my Akin Gump supervisor in stating to employees that she feared that I might have had plans to kill her, and the action of the supervisor in arranging to have her office secured against such a homicidal assault, see record on appeal at 41, was invidiously motivated. The supervisor (Robertson) is designated by the employer as one of the three decisionmakers who terminated my employment, see record on appeal at 167, which termination decision was based in part on the above-referenced psychiatric evidence that tended to show that I posed a risk of violence. Robertson's termination decision was made in consultation with Dennis M. Race, Esq., a senior Akin Gump partner, see record on appeal at 138 and 167.
Mr. Race has expressly affirmed, under penalty of D.C. Code 1-2529 (D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977: false documents or testimony), that (unspecified) acts of "violence," see record on appeal at 140, that I committed during my tenure at the firm coupled with the firm's reasonable fear that my future conduct might expose the firm to tort liability, see record on appeal at 148 (possibly including tort damages for wrongful death, cf. record on appeal at 41), justified the firm's decision to terminate my employment.
The District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel expressly affirmed to the D.C. Superior Court and to the D.C. Court of Appeals in pleadings filed in the above-referenced proceedings, relying on legally-irrelevant "after-acquired" evidence, see McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S.Ct. 879, 885 (1995), that my coworkers had formed genuine fears (i.e., not motivated by discriminatory animus) that I might have been armed and dangerous and poised to carry out a homicidal assault on the firm's premises. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia Department of Human Rights and Minority Business Development at 9, Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Court of Appeals No. 96-CV-961 (citing record on appeal at 276). The District implicitly asserted that my coworkers' concerns about my potential for armed violence were relevant to the employer's decision to terminate my employment.
I stand by the "Statement of Gary Freedman to the Office of U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Regarding Intent to Commit Crime of Violence as Determined by the Law Firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld," ("Statement to the U.S. Attorney") dated April 24, 1995, and made under penalty of criminal sanctions (D.C. Code 22-2514).
I want to advise, however, that representations made by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (M. Justin Draycott, Esq.) to the D.C. Court of Appeals at oral argument in December 1997 that I "admitted" in pleadings that I filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights that my "coworkers" were genuinely "afraid" of me (specifically with regard to my potential for armed violence or homicide) conflict with the prior Statement to the U.S. Attorney, and that said conflict may give rise to the appearance that the exculpatory representations that I made in the Statement to the U.S. Attorney were misleading, knowingly false, or perjurious.
Additionally, the D.C. Court of Appeals has affirmed, see D.C. No. 96-CV-961 at 3 n. 1, that the Department of Human Rights had legally-valid concerns that a document I submitted to the agency (which purports to have been written by the psychiatrist consulted by Akin Gump) may have been inauthentic (i.e., forged or fabricated), see record on appeal at 8. Presumably, according to the agency, I submitted the possibly inauthentic document in order to deny forensic psychiatric evidence filed by Akin Gump with the agency: forensic psychiatric evidence that related to my mental health (specifically relating to a psychiatric "disorder" that my employer had attributed to me, see D.C. No. 96-CV-961 at 4) and stability (specifically relating to my potential for violence). But see Namerdy v. Generalcar, 217 A.2d 109, 111-112 (D.C. 1966) (circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that a letter is written on the author's letterhead, is sufficient for authentication).
The enclosed computer disc contains a copy of the pleadings I filed in the above-referenced appeal together with a document submission I made to the Federal Protective Service (Jerry McGill, S.A.) under cover letter dated Sept. 8, 1997 under compulsion of a criminal investigation.
Robert Chapman, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, is familiar with this matter. The telephone number of the U.S. Attorney's Office in Washington is (202) 514-7566.
I am confident that defamatory statements about me that may raise substantial concerns about my mental stability and fitness to practice law, even acts of defamation committed by the law partners of a close friend of the President of the United States (Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Esq.) and acts of defamation committed by the current chief White House counsel to President Clinton (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.), will in no way impair my chances for fair consideration for employment by your firm.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
cc: U.S. Secret Service (Marzano Lee, S.A.) (202 435 5100)
Marilyn Quayle is the author or co-author of several books, including two works of thriller fiction written with her sister, Nancy Tucker Northcott. The novels (Embrace The Serpent and The Campaign) follow a fictional black evangelical Republican senator, the victim of a liberal-media smear campaign and an unnamed Democratic president of questionable morality. The senator clears his name, and the novels conclude with the suicide of the Democratic president.
Mrs. Quayle also wrote Moments that Matter with her husband.
Robert S. Strauss, Esq. served in the administration of former President George H.W. Bush as U.S. Ambassador to Russia (The Soviet Union). Mr. Strauss is a longtime friend of the Bush family. Former First Lady Barbara Bush adores Mr. Strauss (don't we all?) Barbara Bush is a best-selling author and an advocate for reading. Her daughter-in-law, former First Lady Laura Bush, used to be a librarian.
January 2, 1999
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Marilyn Tucker Quayle, Esq.
Krieg, DeVault, Alexander & Capehart
Indianapolis, IN 46204-2017
Dear Mrs. Quayle:
I am an attorney licensed to practice in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and qualify for consideration for a position as associate with the firm of Krieg, DeVault, Alexander & Capehart. Preliminary to forwarding a copy of my resume to Krieg, DeVault I believe I have a legal duty to advise the firm of the following facts regarding concerns about my potential for armed violence or homicide, intent to purchase firearms to commit a felony, and the illegal transport of a deadly weapon: concerns placed in controversy and affirmed, by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.), as relating to genuine fears about my criminal intent.
The Government of the District of Columbia has affirmed that my former employer, the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump") terminated my employment in October 1991 on the basis of genuine concerns about my mental health and stability, including the potential for violence. The employer's termination decision was made following an ex parte consultation with a psychiatrist who did not examine me personally. Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order, June 10, 1996), affirmed by the D.C. Court of Appeals (Terry, Reid, and King, associate judges), No. 96-CV-961 (Memorandum Opinion and Judgment filed Sept. 1, 1998).
As of the filing of the complaint in the Superior Court proceedings, in October 1995, and at all times thereafter, it was unlawful under the laws of the District of Columbia for a psychiatrist to offer a professional psychiatric opinion about an individual without benefit of personal examination as is strongly recommended by the American Psychiatric Association's Principles of Medical Ethics. The D.C. Code in its latest revision makes it unlawful for a physician to "[fail] to conform to standards of acceptable conduct and prevailing practice within a health profession." See D.C. Code 2-3305.14(26). This provision was added to the District of Columbia Health Occupations Revision Act by D.C. Law 10-247, enacted on March 23, 1995. The D.C. Court of Appeals expressly found that the professional psychiatric opinion offered by the psychiatrist to the employer amounted to the diagnosis of a "disorder." See No. 96-CV-961 at 4.
The District of Columbia Superior Court as well as the D.C. Court of Appeals did not find that the action of my Akin Gump supervisor in stating to employees that she feared that I might have had plans to kill her, and the action of the supervisor in arranging to have her office secured against such a homicidal assault, see record on appeal at 41, was invidiously motivated. The supervisor (Robertson) is designated by the employer as one of the three decisionmakers who terminated my employment, see record on appeal at 167, which termination decision was based in part on the above-referenced psychiatric evidence that tended to show that I posed a risk of violence. Robertson's termination decision was made in consultation with Dennis M. Race, Esq., a senior Akin Gump partner, see record on appeal at 138 and 167.
Mr. Race has expressly affirmed, under penalty of D.C. Code 1-2529 (D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977: false documents or testimony), that (unspecified) acts of "violence," see record on appeal at 140, that I committed during my tenure at the firm coupled with the firm's reasonable fear that my future conduct might expose the firm to tort liability, see record on appeal at 148 (possibly including tort damages for wrongful death, cf. record on appeal at 41), justified the firm's decision to terminate my employment.
The District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel expressly affirmed to the D.C. Superior Court and to the D.C. Court of Appeals in pleadings filed in the above-referenced proceedings, relying on legally-irrelevant "after-acquired" evidence, see McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S.Ct. 879, 885 (1995), that my coworkers had formed genuine fears (i.e., not motivated by discriminatory animus) that I might have been armed and dangerous and poised to carry out a homicidal assault on the firm's premises. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia Department of Human Rights and Minority Business Development at 9, Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Court of Appeals No. 96-CV-961 (citing record on appeal at 276). The District implicitly asserted that my coworkers' concerns about my potential for armed violence were relevant to the employer's decision to terminate my employment.
I stand by the "Statement of Gary Freedman to the Office of U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Regarding Intent to Commit Crime of Violence as Determined by the Law Firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld," ("Statement to the U.S. Attorney") dated April 24, 1995, and made under penalty of criminal sanctions (D.C. Code 22-2514).
I want to advise, however, that representations made by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (M. Justin Draycott, Esq.) to the D.C. Court of Appeals at oral argument in December 1997 that I "admitted" in pleadings that I filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights that my "coworkers" were genuinely "afraid" of me (specifically with regard to my potential for armed violence or homicide) conflict with the prior Statement to the U.S. Attorney, and that said conflict may give rise to the appearance that the exculpatory representations that I made in the Statement to the U.S. Attorney were misleading, knowingly false, or perjurious.
Additionally, the D.C. Court of Appeals has affirmed, see D.C. No. 96-CV-961 at 3 n. 1, that the Department of Human Rights had legally-valid concerns that a document I submitted to the agency (which purports to have been written by the psychiatrist consulted by Akin Gump) may have been inauthentic (i.e., forged or fabricated), see record on appeal at 8. Presumably, according to the agency, I submitted the possibly inauthentic document in order to deny forensic psychiatric evidence filed by Akin Gump with the agency: forensic psychiatric evidence that related to my mental health (specifically relating to a psychiatric "disorder" that my employer had attributed to me, see D.C. No. 96-CV-961 at 4) and stability (specifically relating to my potential for violence). But see Namerdy v. Generalcar, 217 A.2d 109, 111-112 (D.C. 1966) (circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that a letter is written on the author's letterhead, is sufficient for authentication).
The enclosed computer disc contains a copy of the pleadings I filed in the above-referenced appeal together with a document submission I made to the Federal Protective Service (Jerry McGill, S.A.) under cover letter dated Sept. 8, 1997 under compulsion of a criminal investigation.
Robert Chapman, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, is familiar with this matter. The telephone number of the U.S. Attorney's Office in Washington is (202) 514-7566.
I am confident that defamatory statements about me that may raise substantial concerns about my mental stability and fitness to practice law, even acts of defamation committed by the law partners of a close friend of the President of the United States (Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Esq.) and acts of defamation committed by the current chief White House counsel to President Clinton (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.), will in no way impair my chances for fair consideration for employment by your firm.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
cc: U.S. Secret Service (Marzano Lee, S.A.) (202 435 5100)
Did Mayor Ed Koch Make Any Telephone Calls?
In 1998 I sent the following job application to former Democratic New York City mayor Ed Koch. I wonder if he made any telephone calls about me.
December 4, 1998
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Hon. Edward I. Koch
Robinson, Silverman, Pearce, Aronsohn & Berman, LLP
New York, NY 10104-0053
Dear Mayor Koch:
I am an attorney licensed to practice in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and qualify for consideration for a position as associate with the firm of Robinson, Silverman, Pearce, Aronsohn & Berman. Preliminary to forwarding a copy of my resume to Robinson, Silverman I believe I have a legal duty to advise the firm of the following facts regarding concerns about my potential for armed violence or homicide, intent to purchase firearms to commit a felony, and the illegal transport of a deadly weapon: concerns placed in controversy and affirmed, by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.), as relating to genuine fears about my criminal intent.
The Government of the District of Columbia has affirmed that my former employer, the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump") terminated my employment in October 1991 on the basis of genuine concerns about my mental health and stability, including the potential for violence. The employer's termination decision was made following an ex parte consultation with a psychiatrist who did not examine me personally. Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order, June 10, 1996), affirmed by the D.C. Court of Appeals (Terry, Reid, and King, associate judges), No. 96-CV-961 (Memorandum Opinion and Judgment filed Sept. 1, 1998).
As of the filing of the complaint in the Superior Court proceedings, in October 1995, and at all times thereafter, it was unlawful under the laws of the District of Columbia for a psychiatrist to offer a professional psychiatric opinion about an individual without benefit of personal examination as is strongly recommended by the American Psychiatric Association's Principles of Medical Ethics. The D.C. Code in its latest revision makes it unlawful for a physician to "[fail] to conform to standards of acceptable conduct and prevailing practice within a health profession." See D.C. Code 2-3305.14(26). This provision was added to the District of Columbia Health Occupations Revision Act by D.C. Law 10-247, enacted on March 23, 1995. The Court of Appeals expressly found that the professional psychiatric opinion offered by the psychiatrist to the employer amounted to the diagnosis of a "disorder." See No. 96-CV-961 at 4.
The District of Columbia Superior Court as well as the Court of Appeals did not find that the action of my Akin Gump supervisor in stating to employees that she feared that I might have had plans to kill her, and the action of the supervisor in arranging to have her office secured against such a homicidal assault, see record on appeal at 41, was invidiously motivated. The supervisor (Robertson) is designated by the employer as one of the three decisionmakers who terminated my employment, see record on appeal at 167, which termination decision was based in part on the above-referenced psychiatric evidence that tended to show that I posed a risk of violence. Robertson's termination decision was made in consultation with Dennis M. Race, Esq., a senior Akin Gump partner, see record on appeal at 138 and 167.
Mr. Race has expressly affirmed, under penalty of D.C. Code 1-2529 (D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977: false documents or testimony), that (unspecified) acts of "violence," see record on appeal at 140, that I committed during my tenure at the firm coupled with the firm's reasonable fear that my future conduct might expose the firm to tort liability, see record on appeal at 148 (possibly including tort damages for wrongful death, cf. record on appeal at 41), justified the firm's decision to terminate my employment.
The District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel expressly affirmed to the D.C. Superior Court and to the Court of Appeals in pleadings filed in the above-referenced proceedings, relying on legally-irrelevant "after-acquired" evidence, see McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S.Ct. 879, 885 (1995), that my coworkers had formed genuine fears (i.e., not motivated by discriminatory animus) that I might have been armed and dangerous and poised to carry out a homicidal assault on the firm's premises. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia Department of Human Rights and Minority Business Development at 9, Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Court of Appeals No. 96-CV-961 (citing record on appeal at 276). The District implicitly asserted that my coworkers' concerns about my potential for armed violence were relevant to the employer's decision to terminate my employment.
I stand by the "Statement of Gary Freedman to the Office of U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Regarding Intent to Commit Crime of Violence as Determined by the Law Firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld," ("Statement to the U.S. Attorney") dated April 24, 1995, and made under penalty of criminal sanctions (D.C. Code 22-2514).
I want to advise, however, that representations made by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (M. Justin Draycott, Esq.) to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals at oral argument in December 1997 that I "admitted" in pleadings that I filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights that my "coworkers" were genuinely "afraid" of me (specifically with regard to my potential for armed violence or homicide) conflict with the prior Statement to the U.S. Attorney, and that said conflict may give rise to the appearance that the exculpatory representations that I made in the Statement to the U.S. Attorney were unreliable, knowingly false, or perjured.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals has affirmed, see D.C. No. 96-CV-961 at 3 n. 1, that the Department of Human Rights had legally-valid concerns that a document I submitted to the agency (which purports to have been written by the psychiatrist consulted by Akin Gump) may have been inauthentic (i.e., forged or fabricated), see record on appeal at 8. Presumably, according to the agency, I submitted the possibly inauthentic document in order to deny forensic psychiatric evidence filed by Akin Gump with the agency: forensic psychiatric evidence that related to my mental health (specifically relating to a psychiatric "disorder" that my employer had attributed to me, see D.C. No. 96-CV-961 at 4) and stability (specifically relating to my potential for violence). But see Namerdy v. Generalcar, 217 A.2d 109, 111-112 (D.C. 1966) (circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that a letter is written on the author's letterhead, is sufficient for authentication).
For your additional information I forward a document submission that I made to the Federal Protective Service (Jerry McNeill, S.A.) under cover letter dated Sept. 8, 1997 under penalty of a criminal investigation.
Robert Chapman, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, is familiar with this matter. The telephone number of the U.S. Attorney's Office in Washington is (202) 514-7566.
I am confident that defamatory statements about me that may raise substantial concerns about my mental stability and fitness to practice law, even acts of defamation committed by the law partners of a close friend of the President of the United States (Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Esq.) and acts of defamation committed by the current chief White House counsel to President Clinton (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.), will in no way impair my chances for fair consideration for employment by your firm.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
December 4, 1998
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Hon. Edward I. Koch
Robinson, Silverman, Pearce, Aronsohn & Berman, LLP
New York, NY 10104-0053
Dear Mayor Koch:
I am an attorney licensed to practice in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and qualify for consideration for a position as associate with the firm of Robinson, Silverman, Pearce, Aronsohn & Berman. Preliminary to forwarding a copy of my resume to Robinson, Silverman I believe I have a legal duty to advise the firm of the following facts regarding concerns about my potential for armed violence or homicide, intent to purchase firearms to commit a felony, and the illegal transport of a deadly weapon: concerns placed in controversy and affirmed, by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.), as relating to genuine fears about my criminal intent.
The Government of the District of Columbia has affirmed that my former employer, the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump") terminated my employment in October 1991 on the basis of genuine concerns about my mental health and stability, including the potential for violence. The employer's termination decision was made following an ex parte consultation with a psychiatrist who did not examine me personally. Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order, June 10, 1996), affirmed by the D.C. Court of Appeals (Terry, Reid, and King, associate judges), No. 96-CV-961 (Memorandum Opinion and Judgment filed Sept. 1, 1998).
As of the filing of the complaint in the Superior Court proceedings, in October 1995, and at all times thereafter, it was unlawful under the laws of the District of Columbia for a psychiatrist to offer a professional psychiatric opinion about an individual without benefit of personal examination as is strongly recommended by the American Psychiatric Association's Principles of Medical Ethics. The D.C. Code in its latest revision makes it unlawful for a physician to "[fail] to conform to standards of acceptable conduct and prevailing practice within a health profession." See D.C. Code 2-3305.14(26). This provision was added to the District of Columbia Health Occupations Revision Act by D.C. Law 10-247, enacted on March 23, 1995. The Court of Appeals expressly found that the professional psychiatric opinion offered by the psychiatrist to the employer amounted to the diagnosis of a "disorder." See No. 96-CV-961 at 4.
The District of Columbia Superior Court as well as the Court of Appeals did not find that the action of my Akin Gump supervisor in stating to employees that she feared that I might have had plans to kill her, and the action of the supervisor in arranging to have her office secured against such a homicidal assault, see record on appeal at 41, was invidiously motivated. The supervisor (Robertson) is designated by the employer as one of the three decisionmakers who terminated my employment, see record on appeal at 167, which termination decision was based in part on the above-referenced psychiatric evidence that tended to show that I posed a risk of violence. Robertson's termination decision was made in consultation with Dennis M. Race, Esq., a senior Akin Gump partner, see record on appeal at 138 and 167.
Mr. Race has expressly affirmed, under penalty of D.C. Code 1-2529 (D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977: false documents or testimony), that (unspecified) acts of "violence," see record on appeal at 140, that I committed during my tenure at the firm coupled with the firm's reasonable fear that my future conduct might expose the firm to tort liability, see record on appeal at 148 (possibly including tort damages for wrongful death, cf. record on appeal at 41), justified the firm's decision to terminate my employment.
The District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel expressly affirmed to the D.C. Superior Court and to the Court of Appeals in pleadings filed in the above-referenced proceedings, relying on legally-irrelevant "after-acquired" evidence, see McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S.Ct. 879, 885 (1995), that my coworkers had formed genuine fears (i.e., not motivated by discriminatory animus) that I might have been armed and dangerous and poised to carry out a homicidal assault on the firm's premises. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia Department of Human Rights and Minority Business Development at 9, Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Court of Appeals No. 96-CV-961 (citing record on appeal at 276). The District implicitly asserted that my coworkers' concerns about my potential for armed violence were relevant to the employer's decision to terminate my employment.
I stand by the "Statement of Gary Freedman to the Office of U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Regarding Intent to Commit Crime of Violence as Determined by the Law Firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld," ("Statement to the U.S. Attorney") dated April 24, 1995, and made under penalty of criminal sanctions (D.C. Code 22-2514).
I want to advise, however, that representations made by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (M. Justin Draycott, Esq.) to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals at oral argument in December 1997 that I "admitted" in pleadings that I filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights that my "coworkers" were genuinely "afraid" of me (specifically with regard to my potential for armed violence or homicide) conflict with the prior Statement to the U.S. Attorney, and that said conflict may give rise to the appearance that the exculpatory representations that I made in the Statement to the U.S. Attorney were unreliable, knowingly false, or perjured.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals has affirmed, see D.C. No. 96-CV-961 at 3 n. 1, that the Department of Human Rights had legally-valid concerns that a document I submitted to the agency (which purports to have been written by the psychiatrist consulted by Akin Gump) may have been inauthentic (i.e., forged or fabricated), see record on appeal at 8. Presumably, according to the agency, I submitted the possibly inauthentic document in order to deny forensic psychiatric evidence filed by Akin Gump with the agency: forensic psychiatric evidence that related to my mental health (specifically relating to a psychiatric "disorder" that my employer had attributed to me, see D.C. No. 96-CV-961 at 4) and stability (specifically relating to my potential for violence). But see Namerdy v. Generalcar, 217 A.2d 109, 111-112 (D.C. 1966) (circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that a letter is written on the author's letterhead, is sufficient for authentication).
For your additional information I forward a document submission that I made to the Federal Protective Service (Jerry McNeill, S.A.) under cover letter dated Sept. 8, 1997 under penalty of a criminal investigation.
Robert Chapman, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, is familiar with this matter. The telephone number of the U.S. Attorney's Office in Washington is (202) 514-7566.
I am confident that defamatory statements about me that may raise substantial concerns about my mental stability and fitness to practice law, even acts of defamation committed by the law partners of a close friend of the President of the United States (Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Esq.) and acts of defamation committed by the current chief White House counsel to President Clinton (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.), will in no way impair my chances for fair consideration for employment by your firm.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
I Wonder If Caroline Kennedy Knows Who I Am?
In 1999 I sent a job application to John F. Kennedy, Jr.--founder of George magazine. Oddly enough, that was just months before Mr. Kennedy died. Mr. Kennedy's surviving sister is the accomplished lawyer and author, Caroline Kennedy.
January 4, 1999
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Marzano Lee, S.A.
U.S. Secret Service
Washington, DC 20036
Dear Mr. Lee:
Enclosed is a copy of a letter addressed to John F. Kennedy, Jr. at George Magazine that I plan to forward in connection with a job inquiry. I hold a degree in journalism, and qualify for consideration for an editorial position at that publication.
Coincidentally, Mr. Kennedy's mother, Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis, was a friend of Akin Gump partner Vernon E. Jordan, Jr. Mr. Jordan and Mrs. Kennedy, who worked in publishing as a book editor, both had summer homes on Martha's Vineyard. Maurice Tempelsman, a New York diamond dealer, whose firm Lazare Kaplan International, has extensive business ties to several African countries, was a close friend and financial adviser of Mrs. Kennedy's. Tempelsman is a major Democratic party donor and has had personal contacts with President Clinton. Tempelsman has flown with the President on Air Force One. Tempelsman, who is Jewish, is a cultivated man with an interest in the arts and literature.
Incidentally, Mr. Kennedy was a student at the University of Dehli in India in the year 1985.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
January 4, 1999
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
John F. Kennedy, Jr.
George Magazine
1633 Broadway -- 41st Floor
New York, NY 10019-6708
Dear Mr. Kennedy:
I hold a degree in journalism awarded by The Pennsylvania State University (B.A., 1975), and qualify for consideration for an editorial position at George Magazine. Preliminary to forwarding a copy of my resume to George Magazine I believe I have a legal duty to advise you of the following facts regarding concerns about my potential for armed violence or homicide, intent to purchase firearms to commit a felony, and the illegal transport of a deadly weapon: concerns placed in controversy and affirmed, by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.), as relating to genuine fears about my criminal intent.
The Government of the District of Columbia has affirmed that my former employer, the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump") terminated my employment in October 1991 on the basis of genuine concerns about my mental health and stability, including the potential for violence. The employer's termination decision was made following an ex parte consultation with a psychiatrist who did not examine me personally. Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order, June 10, 1996), affirmed by the D.C. Court of Appeals (Terry, Reid, and King, associate judges), No. 96-CV-961 (Memorandum Opinion and Judgment filed Sept. 1, 1998).
As of the filing of the complaint in the Superior Court proceedings, in October 1995, and at all times thereafter, it was unlawful under the laws of the District of Columbia for a psychiatrist to offer a professional psychiatric opinion about an individual without benefit of personal examination as is strongly recommended by the American Psychiatric Association's Principles of Medical Ethics. The D.C. Code in its latest revision makes it unlawful for a physician to "[fail] to conform to standards of acceptable conduct and prevailing practice within a health profession." See D.C. Code 2-3305.14(26). This provision was added to the District of Columbia Health Occupations Revision Act by D.C. Law 10-247, enacted on March 23, 1995. The Court of Appeals expressly found that the professional psychiatric opinion offered by the psychiatrist to the employer amounted to the diagnosis of a "disorder." See No. 96-CV-961 at 4.
The District of Columbia Superior Court as well as the Court of Appeals did not find that the action of my Akin Gump supervisor in stating to employees that she feared that I might have had plans to kill her, and the action of the supervisor in arranging to have her office secured against such a homicidal assault, see record on appeal at 41, was invidiously motivated. The supervisor (Robertson) is designated by the employer as one of the three decisionmakers who terminated my employment, see record on appeal at 167, which termination decision was based in part on the above-referenced psychiatric evidence that tended to show that I posed a risk of violence. Robertson's termination decision was made in consultation with Dennis M. Race, Esq., a senior Akin Gump partner, see record on appeal at 138 and 167.
Mr. Race has expressly affirmed, under penalty of D.C. Code 1-2529 (D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977: false documents or testimony), that (unspecified) acts of "violence," see record on appeal at 140, that I committed during my tenure at the firm coupled with the firm's reasonable fear that my future conduct might expose the firm to tort liability, see record on appeal at 148 (possibly including tort damages for wrongful death, cf. record on appeal at 41), justified the firm's decision to terminate my employment.
The District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel expressly affirmed to the D.C. Superior Court and to the Court of Appeals in pleadings filed in the above-referenced proceedings, relying on legally-irrelevant "after-acquired" evidence, see McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S.Ct. 879, 885 (1995), that my coworkers had formed genuine fears (i.e., not motivated by discriminatory animus) that I might have been armed and dangerous and poised to carry out a homicidal assault on the firm's premises. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia Department of Human Rights and Minority Business Development at 9, Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Court of Appeals No. 96-CV-961 (citing record on appeal at 276). The District implicitly asserted that my coworkers' concerns about my potential for armed violence were relevant to the employer's decision to terminate my employment.
I stand by the "Statement of Gary Freedman to the Office of U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Regarding Intent to Commit Crime of Violence as Determined by the Law Firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld," ("Statement to the U.S. Attorney") dated April 24, 1995, and made under penalty of criminal sanctions (D.C. Code 22-2514).
I want to advise, however, that representations made by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (M. Justin Draycott, Esq.) to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals at oral argument in December 1997 that I "admitted" in pleadings that I filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights that my "coworkers" were genuinely "afraid" of me (specifically with regard to my potential for armed violence or homicide) conflict with the prior Statement to the U.S. Attorney, and that said conflict may give rise to the appearance that the exculpatory representations that I made in the Statement to the U.S. Attorney were misleading, knowingly false, or perjurious.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals has affirmed, see D.C. No. 96-CV-961 at 3 n. 1, that the Department of Human Rights had legally-valid concerns that a document I submitted to the agency (which purports to have been written by the psychiatrist consulted by Akin Gump) may have been inauthentic (i.e., forged or fabricated), see record on appeal at 8. Presumably, according to the agency, I submitted the possibly inauthentic document in order to deny forensic psychiatric evidence filed by Akin Gump with the agency: forensic psychiatric evidence that related to my mental health (specifically relating to a psychiatric "disorder" that my employer had attributed to me, see D.C. No. 96-CV-961 at 4) and stability (specifically relating to my potential for violence). But see Namerdy v. Generalcar, 217 A.2d 109, 111-112 (D.C. 1966) (circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that a letter is written on the author's letterhead, is sufficient for authentication).
The enclosed computer disc contains a copy of the pleadings I filed in the above-referenced appeal together with a document submission that I made to the Federal Protective Service (Jerry McGill, S.A.) under cover letter dated Sept. 8, 1997 under compulsion of a criminal investigation.
Robert Chapman, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, is familiar with this matter. The telephone number of the U.S. Attorney's Office in Washington is (202) 514-7566.
I am confident that defamatory statements about me that may raise substantial concerns about my mental stability and fitness as an employee of George Magazine, even acts of defamation committed by the law partners of a close friend of the President of the United States (Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Esq.) and acts of defamation committed by the current chief White House counsel to President Clinton (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.), will in no way impair my chances for fair consideration for employment by your publication.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
cc: U.S. Secret Service (Marzano Lee, S.A.) (telephone no. 202 435 5100)
__________________________________________________
A phrase in my book Significant Moments is a memorial to John F. Kennedy, Jr. and his father, the President. "A View From The Shore" by Lance Morrow was a Time Magazine piece written about Mr. Kennedy Jr. shortly after his death in 1999; "with a curiosity and awe" describes U.S. Senate colleagues' reaction to the newly-elected Senator John Kennedy in January 1953.
Of late, the effects of his personality had begun to dawn upon the young man. He became aware of his attraction for those below him, and gradually, belatedly, of how he affected those above him. And when he looked back from his new standpoint of awareness to his boyhood he found both lines running through his life and shaping it. Classmates and younger boys had always courted him; superiors had . . .
Hermann Hesse, Magister Ludi: The Glass Bead Game.
. . . with a curiosity and awe . . .
Lance Morrow, A View from the Shore.
. . . taken benevolent note of him. There had been exceptions, such as Headmaster Zbinden; but on the other hand he had been recipient of such distinctions as the patronage of the Music Master, and latterly of Dubois and the Magister Ludi. It was all perfectly plain, in spite of which Knecht had never been willing to see it and accept it in its entirety. Obviously his fate was to enter the elite everywhere, to find admiring friends and highly placed patrons. It happened of its own accord without his trying. Obviously he would not be allowed to settle down in the shadows at the base of the hierarchy; he must move steadily toward its apex, approach the bright light at the top. He would not be a subordinate or an independent scholar; he would be a master. That he grasped this later than others in a similar position gave him that indescribable extra magic, that note of innocence.
Hermann Hesse, Magister Ludi: The Glass Bead Game.
January 4, 1999
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Marzano Lee, S.A.
U.S. Secret Service
Washington, DC 20036
Dear Mr. Lee:
Enclosed is a copy of a letter addressed to John F. Kennedy, Jr. at George Magazine that I plan to forward in connection with a job inquiry. I hold a degree in journalism, and qualify for consideration for an editorial position at that publication.
Coincidentally, Mr. Kennedy's mother, Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis, was a friend of Akin Gump partner Vernon E. Jordan, Jr. Mr. Jordan and Mrs. Kennedy, who worked in publishing as a book editor, both had summer homes on Martha's Vineyard. Maurice Tempelsman, a New York diamond dealer, whose firm Lazare Kaplan International, has extensive business ties to several African countries, was a close friend and financial adviser of Mrs. Kennedy's. Tempelsman is a major Democratic party donor and has had personal contacts with President Clinton. Tempelsman has flown with the President on Air Force One. Tempelsman, who is Jewish, is a cultivated man with an interest in the arts and literature.
Incidentally, Mr. Kennedy was a student at the University of Dehli in India in the year 1985.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
January 4, 1999
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
John F. Kennedy, Jr.
George Magazine
1633 Broadway -- 41st Floor
New York, NY 10019-6708
Dear Mr. Kennedy:
I hold a degree in journalism awarded by The Pennsylvania State University (B.A., 1975), and qualify for consideration for an editorial position at George Magazine. Preliminary to forwarding a copy of my resume to George Magazine I believe I have a legal duty to advise you of the following facts regarding concerns about my potential for armed violence or homicide, intent to purchase firearms to commit a felony, and the illegal transport of a deadly weapon: concerns placed in controversy and affirmed, by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.), as relating to genuine fears about my criminal intent.
The Government of the District of Columbia has affirmed that my former employer, the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump") terminated my employment in October 1991 on the basis of genuine concerns about my mental health and stability, including the potential for violence. The employer's termination decision was made following an ex parte consultation with a psychiatrist who did not examine me personally. Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order, June 10, 1996), affirmed by the D.C. Court of Appeals (Terry, Reid, and King, associate judges), No. 96-CV-961 (Memorandum Opinion and Judgment filed Sept. 1, 1998).
As of the filing of the complaint in the Superior Court proceedings, in October 1995, and at all times thereafter, it was unlawful under the laws of the District of Columbia for a psychiatrist to offer a professional psychiatric opinion about an individual without benefit of personal examination as is strongly recommended by the American Psychiatric Association's Principles of Medical Ethics. The D.C. Code in its latest revision makes it unlawful for a physician to "[fail] to conform to standards of acceptable conduct and prevailing practice within a health profession." See D.C. Code 2-3305.14(26). This provision was added to the District of Columbia Health Occupations Revision Act by D.C. Law 10-247, enacted on March 23, 1995. The Court of Appeals expressly found that the professional psychiatric opinion offered by the psychiatrist to the employer amounted to the diagnosis of a "disorder." See No. 96-CV-961 at 4.
The District of Columbia Superior Court as well as the Court of Appeals did not find that the action of my Akin Gump supervisor in stating to employees that she feared that I might have had plans to kill her, and the action of the supervisor in arranging to have her office secured against such a homicidal assault, see record on appeal at 41, was invidiously motivated. The supervisor (Robertson) is designated by the employer as one of the three decisionmakers who terminated my employment, see record on appeal at 167, which termination decision was based in part on the above-referenced psychiatric evidence that tended to show that I posed a risk of violence. Robertson's termination decision was made in consultation with Dennis M. Race, Esq., a senior Akin Gump partner, see record on appeal at 138 and 167.
Mr. Race has expressly affirmed, under penalty of D.C. Code 1-2529 (D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977: false documents or testimony), that (unspecified) acts of "violence," see record on appeal at 140, that I committed during my tenure at the firm coupled with the firm's reasonable fear that my future conduct might expose the firm to tort liability, see record on appeal at 148 (possibly including tort damages for wrongful death, cf. record on appeal at 41), justified the firm's decision to terminate my employment.
The District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel expressly affirmed to the D.C. Superior Court and to the Court of Appeals in pleadings filed in the above-referenced proceedings, relying on legally-irrelevant "after-acquired" evidence, see McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S.Ct. 879, 885 (1995), that my coworkers had formed genuine fears (i.e., not motivated by discriminatory animus) that I might have been armed and dangerous and poised to carry out a homicidal assault on the firm's premises. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia Department of Human Rights and Minority Business Development at 9, Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Court of Appeals No. 96-CV-961 (citing record on appeal at 276). The District implicitly asserted that my coworkers' concerns about my potential for armed violence were relevant to the employer's decision to terminate my employment.
I stand by the "Statement of Gary Freedman to the Office of U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Regarding Intent to Commit Crime of Violence as Determined by the Law Firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld," ("Statement to the U.S. Attorney") dated April 24, 1995, and made under penalty of criminal sanctions (D.C. Code 22-2514).
I want to advise, however, that representations made by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (M. Justin Draycott, Esq.) to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals at oral argument in December 1997 that I "admitted" in pleadings that I filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights that my "coworkers" were genuinely "afraid" of me (specifically with regard to my potential for armed violence or homicide) conflict with the prior Statement to the U.S. Attorney, and that said conflict may give rise to the appearance that the exculpatory representations that I made in the Statement to the U.S. Attorney were misleading, knowingly false, or perjurious.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals has affirmed, see D.C. No. 96-CV-961 at 3 n. 1, that the Department of Human Rights had legally-valid concerns that a document I submitted to the agency (which purports to have been written by the psychiatrist consulted by Akin Gump) may have been inauthentic (i.e., forged or fabricated), see record on appeal at 8. Presumably, according to the agency, I submitted the possibly inauthentic document in order to deny forensic psychiatric evidence filed by Akin Gump with the agency: forensic psychiatric evidence that related to my mental health (specifically relating to a psychiatric "disorder" that my employer had attributed to me, see D.C. No. 96-CV-961 at 4) and stability (specifically relating to my potential for violence). But see Namerdy v. Generalcar, 217 A.2d 109, 111-112 (D.C. 1966) (circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that a letter is written on the author's letterhead, is sufficient for authentication).
The enclosed computer disc contains a copy of the pleadings I filed in the above-referenced appeal together with a document submission that I made to the Federal Protective Service (Jerry McGill, S.A.) under cover letter dated Sept. 8, 1997 under compulsion of a criminal investigation.
Robert Chapman, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, is familiar with this matter. The telephone number of the U.S. Attorney's Office in Washington is (202) 514-7566.
I am confident that defamatory statements about me that may raise substantial concerns about my mental stability and fitness as an employee of George Magazine, even acts of defamation committed by the law partners of a close friend of the President of the United States (Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Esq.) and acts of defamation committed by the current chief White House counsel to President Clinton (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.), will in no way impair my chances for fair consideration for employment by your publication.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
cc: U.S. Secret Service (Marzano Lee, S.A.) (telephone no. 202 435 5100)
__________________________________________________
A phrase in my book Significant Moments is a memorial to John F. Kennedy, Jr. and his father, the President. "A View From The Shore" by Lance Morrow was a Time Magazine piece written about Mr. Kennedy Jr. shortly after his death in 1999; "with a curiosity and awe" describes U.S. Senate colleagues' reaction to the newly-elected Senator John Kennedy in January 1953.
Of late, the effects of his personality had begun to dawn upon the young man. He became aware of his attraction for those below him, and gradually, belatedly, of how he affected those above him. And when he looked back from his new standpoint of awareness to his boyhood he found both lines running through his life and shaping it. Classmates and younger boys had always courted him; superiors had . . .
Hermann Hesse, Magister Ludi: The Glass Bead Game.
. . . with a curiosity and awe . . .
Lance Morrow, A View from the Shore.
. . . taken benevolent note of him. There had been exceptions, such as Headmaster Zbinden; but on the other hand he had been recipient of such distinctions as the patronage of the Music Master, and latterly of Dubois and the Magister Ludi. It was all perfectly plain, in spite of which Knecht had never been willing to see it and accept it in its entirety. Obviously his fate was to enter the elite everywhere, to find admiring friends and highly placed patrons. It happened of its own accord without his trying. Obviously he would not be allowed to settle down in the shadows at the base of the hierarchy; he must move steadily toward its apex, approach the bright light at the top. He would not be a subordinate or an independent scholar; he would be a master. That he grasped this later than others in a similar position gave him that indescribable extra magic, that note of innocence.
Hermann Hesse, Magister Ludi: The Glass Bead Game.
Doug Gansler
Did you see Maryland A.G. Doug Gansler last night on the Redskins pre-game show? Wow! What an amazing mind that guy has. That guy could be making a fortune in private practice.
Monday, December 21, 2009
Akin Gump: Poor Management
See Donald G. Gross v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Case No. 1:07CV00399 (ES).
http://dockets.justia.com/docket/court-dcdce/case_no-1:2007cv00399/case_id-124500/
http://dockets.justia.com/docket/court-dcdce/case_no-1:2007cv00399/case_id-124500/
Akin Gump: Who Becomes the Victim of Mobbing?
Mobbing is the impassioned psychological harassment of one individual by a group. The attack is usually instigated and led by one or two people who are typically in a position of authority or a peer leader. The instigator enlists his or her colleagues to engage in a form of group bullying.
The group victimization of a single target has several goals including: demeaning, discrediting, alienating, excluding, humiliating, scapegoating, isolating and, ultimately, eliminating the targeted individual.
These behaviors typically manifest as petty harassment and bureaucratic hassles (Rosen, Katz & Morahan, 2007). Mobbing is a form of emotional abuse, which can negatively impact your health, career, family, and the organization that harbors bullies.
Organizational impact of mobbing.
Companies that condone individual bullying and mobbing are affected by hard and “soft” costs. Hard costs include high employee turnover, high absenteeism, “presenteeism” (employees show up, but they’re on “autopilot”—they exercise discretionary effort), decreased productivity, and a bad reputation in regard to taking care of employees. A bad company reputation reduces the ability to attract talented recruits. Soft costs include decreased job satisfaction, poor communication and information sharing, low morale, and a sense of betrayal by management. Eventually, the poor morale and reduced creativity trickles down to a poor customer experience.
Who is likely to mob?
Mobbing ringleaders are bullies who try to dominate and control others. These behaviors usually aren’t overt. Instead, mobbing employs the surreptitious use of rumor, innuendo, making inappropriate jokes, and public discrediting. One of the most stressful aspects for targets of this abuse is the covert nature of what’s going on and the lack of concrete evidence. It’s a form of gaslighting in which the target begins to doubt his or her experiences and/or sanity.
Namie and Namie (2000) describe individuals who instigate mobbing as, “inadequate, defective, and poorly developed people.” They’re generally angry, unpredictable, critical, jealous, and manipulative (Davenport, Schwartz and Elliot, 1999; Namie and Namie, 2000). The emotionally abusive bullies who engage in mobbing revel in the excitement produced by their animosity. It produces a pleasurable buzz or rush in them. Westhues (2002) refers to this as “the euphoria of collective attack.”
Bullying and mobbing in any organization usually isn’t a one time occurrence. All bullies are “repeat offenders;” if they’ve bullied once and gotten away with it, they’ll most definitely bully again. Getting away with it is its own reward as is being able to manipulate and control both the target and management.
A bully always has an “enemy” in the cross hairs. After they force one target out of the system, they’ll move onto the next one within 2 hours to 2 weeks. Abusing others are how they derive a sense of power and control. A bully doesn’t stop bullying until someone with authority makes them stop and/or fires them.
Who is likely to become the target of mobbing?
Mobbing targets have certain characteristics in common. Typical targets include people who are:
average to high achievers
extremely competent
devoted
loyal
organized
cooperative
experienced
They become targets out of jealousy or because they’ve somehow put a co-worker or superior to shame. Creative people are also likely to be mobbed because they present new ideas that challenge others. Other likely targets include people who excel in some area, are different in some way (e.g., gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity), dissent with certain organizational practices, or have knowledge of wrongdoing or a breach of ethics by someone with authority in the workplace.
If you believe you’re being bullied by a co-worker and/or are the target of mobbing, take the time to research your options. Find out what you can do to protect yourself and come up with a strategy to find away out of this toxic situation. It may require that you to transfer to another department or seek employment elsewhere. If your company condones bullying, you may have no other choice but to leave.
The group victimization of a single target has several goals including: demeaning, discrediting, alienating, excluding, humiliating, scapegoating, isolating and, ultimately, eliminating the targeted individual.
These behaviors typically manifest as petty harassment and bureaucratic hassles (Rosen, Katz & Morahan, 2007). Mobbing is a form of emotional abuse, which can negatively impact your health, career, family, and the organization that harbors bullies.
Organizational impact of mobbing.
Companies that condone individual bullying and mobbing are affected by hard and “soft” costs. Hard costs include high employee turnover, high absenteeism, “presenteeism” (employees show up, but they’re on “autopilot”—they exercise discretionary effort), decreased productivity, and a bad reputation in regard to taking care of employees. A bad company reputation reduces the ability to attract talented recruits. Soft costs include decreased job satisfaction, poor communication and information sharing, low morale, and a sense of betrayal by management. Eventually, the poor morale and reduced creativity trickles down to a poor customer experience.
Who is likely to mob?
Mobbing ringleaders are bullies who try to dominate and control others. These behaviors usually aren’t overt. Instead, mobbing employs the surreptitious use of rumor, innuendo, making inappropriate jokes, and public discrediting. One of the most stressful aspects for targets of this abuse is the covert nature of what’s going on and the lack of concrete evidence. It’s a form of gaslighting in which the target begins to doubt his or her experiences and/or sanity.
Namie and Namie (2000) describe individuals who instigate mobbing as, “inadequate, defective, and poorly developed people.” They’re generally angry, unpredictable, critical, jealous, and manipulative (Davenport, Schwartz and Elliot, 1999; Namie and Namie, 2000). The emotionally abusive bullies who engage in mobbing revel in the excitement produced by their animosity. It produces a pleasurable buzz or rush in them. Westhues (2002) refers to this as “the euphoria of collective attack.”
Bullying and mobbing in any organization usually isn’t a one time occurrence. All bullies are “repeat offenders;” if they’ve bullied once and gotten away with it, they’ll most definitely bully again. Getting away with it is its own reward as is being able to manipulate and control both the target and management.
A bully always has an “enemy” in the cross hairs. After they force one target out of the system, they’ll move onto the next one within 2 hours to 2 weeks. Abusing others are how they derive a sense of power and control. A bully doesn’t stop bullying until someone with authority makes them stop and/or fires them.
Who is likely to become the target of mobbing?
Mobbing targets have certain characteristics in common. Typical targets include people who are:
average to high achievers
extremely competent
devoted
loyal
organized
cooperative
experienced
They become targets out of jealousy or because they’ve somehow put a co-worker or superior to shame. Creative people are also likely to be mobbed because they present new ideas that challenge others. Other likely targets include people who excel in some area, are different in some way (e.g., gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity), dissent with certain organizational practices, or have knowledge of wrongdoing or a breach of ethics by someone with authority in the workplace.
If you believe you’re being bullied by a co-worker and/or are the target of mobbing, take the time to research your options. Find out what you can do to protect yourself and come up with a strategy to find away out of this toxic situation. It may require that you to transfer to another department or seek employment elsewhere. If your company condones bullying, you may have no other choice but to leave.
Akin Gump: A Ludicrous Declaration!
When the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld was called upon to justify the termination of my employment, the firm told the District of Columbia Department of Human Rights that my work performance was not a factor in the termination decision.
In an interrogatory response filed with the Dept. of Human Rights dated May 22, 1992, Dennis M. Race, Esq. stated: "Respondent does not dispute that Claimant's written performance evaluations were very good. Claimant was a law school graduate performing paralegal or administrative duties. When terminated, he was told that his actual work product was not a problem." (Record on appeal at 139)
Again, in a response to additional interrogatories filed by the firm with the agency on May 18, 1993, Dennis Race stated: "As previously stated, Complainant's substantive performance, as reflected in his written evaluations, was not an issue in the ultimate decision to terminate."
Akin Gump's declarations about my performance evaluations contain several implicit assertions -- all of which are ludicrous!
Akin Gump seems to be implicitly stating the following: "Here at Akin Gump -- unlike about 99% of businesses -- we do not use an employee's performance evaluation as a vehicle to record instances of inappropriate or unprofessional behavior. Yes, Mr. Freedman's performance evaluations are outstanding; we admit that. But if Mr. Freedman was violent and disruptive, we would not have formally advised him of our concerns in his performance evaluations. Our policy is to record instances of inappropriate or unprofessional behavior only in reprimands. In fact, you can look through our personnel files and you will not find a single instance in which an Akin Gump employee's inappropriate or unprofessional behavior is recorded in an employee's performance evaluation. Mind you, we do record evidence of an employee's professionalism and good behavior in performance evaluations. That's why -- despite the fact that Mr. Freedman had a history of disruptive and violent behavior -- you will find only positive statements about his behavior and professionalism in his written performance evaluations."
Isn't that, in effect, what Akin Gump would have the world believe?
To invoke the immortal reply of General Anthony McAuliffe to the Nazis' demand that he surrender: "Nuts!"
Here is a transcript of the narrative portion of all my performance evaluations that were given to me at about the time they were prepared. See record on appeal at 291-293, Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights, D.C.C.A. no. 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998).
1. Year-end attorney evaluation: 1988; Constance Brown [no date]
Gary has the ability to identify and extract the smallest detail in a clear and efficient manner. He is dependable; works well independently and produces a neatly typed work product. Gary occasionally overlooks a coding form, leaving it intact with the original. Gary is extremely valuable because he came to us with the necessary experience, having performed such a task for another major client/law firm in the city.
[Suggestions for improving utilization of legal assistants at Akin Gump]: Well, maybe, opportunities to research and receive outside (courtroom, deposition) experience.
There is no task too much to ask of Gary. Gary began as a temporary; however, he worked very diligently and consistently (weekends and overtime) to reduce the coding backlog. I believe, because of past experience, Gary understood clearly the needs of Central Files; the categorizing, analyzing and use of standard terminology. He has a good sense of the big picture and works toward that goal. Gary realized that typing up summaries provide for easier reading and faster data entry. It is nice to have Gary around. He is always stable in the midst of other inconsistencies. I recommend that Gary receive due consideration for all his efforts and be offered a permanent position.
2. Mid-year attorney evaluation: 1989; Kathleen Winslow, 5/17/89[no narrative comments]
3. Mid-year attorney evaluation: 1989; John Potter, Esq., 5/14/89
Gary digested part of a deposition transcript for me. [Complainant was assigned to complete, and did complete, one transcript of a multi-part deposition.] Gary did not request a conference concerning his evaluation.
4. Mid-year attorney evaluation: 1989; Constance Brown, 5/19/89
Gary is dependable and is an invaluable asset when it comes to coding Eastern documents. He is always enthusiastic re coding which comes 99% of his time. Gary has worked extremely hard over the past few months, reducing weeks of backlog to absolutely nothing, at which time he was on loan to the Toxic Tort group and the Firm's legal assistant group. Because Gary is so persistent, he provides for smoother, more efficient searching and retrieval of critical information used for attorney briefings.
5. Year-end attorney evaluation: 1989; Constance Brown, 11/6/89
[During the immediate prior six-month period, in August 1989, paralegal Stacey Schaar said to me: "We're all afraid of you. We're all afraid you're going to buy a gun, bring it in, and shoot everybody. Even the manager of your apartment building is afraid of you." Stacey Schaar was terminated for gross misconduct in May 1990.]
Gary is well-organized, self-sufficient and knows the issues of the case. He is the only full-time permanent coder on the Eastern case. Although he spends 100% of his time coding, his actual contact with me is limited.
Gary is an invaluable, dedicated and highly motivated individual who takes pride in his work and seems to thrive on heavy volume. Gary recently trained and supervised five temporary coders who were brought in to expedite the coding of some 200,000 pages of document production. In doing so, he inspired the group who were always eager to work and adopted Gary's own sense of commitment to the case. It was Gary who had reservations about temporary help and suggested they only code standard information; and he prepare the detailed summary in order to preserve the integrity of the database. Also, Gary was instrumental in redesigning the document summary form to aid in more accurate coding and data entry of document production onto the Firm's network. Gary is as capable an conscientious in digesting depositions and hearing transcripts, always staying flexible and catering to individual needs. I appreciate the job that Gary has done and look forward to other projects with Gary's help.
6. Employee Review Evaluation--Litigation Support: May 1990, Chris Robertson/Constance Brown, 6/11/90
[The reader should keep in mind that I was transferred to the Litigation Support Group from the Legal Assistant Program two months earlier, in March 1990, the time period covered by this performance evaluation. Akin Gump offered the following declaration in its interrogatory response filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights, filed May 22, 1992: "During his transition from a legal assistant position (paralegal) to his work with the litigation support department [in March 1990], Claimant had several discussions with his direct supervisor (Robertson) about problems with interacting with co-workers and occasional outbursts." Record on appeal at 139.]
Gary has picked up the basics of on-line coding with very minimal instructions. With additional experience, he should adapt better to the software techniques. Always mindful of quality control, which aids in more efficient data entry. Relentless, thriving on huge volume while maintaining a good end product. Totally independent, self-sustaining and committed to his work. Extremely solid and aiming to please. I trust Gary's ability to meet whatever the demand with little guidance. Gary is receptive no matter what the task and takes every assignment seriously. Even at times when material has to be redone because of GPE's. Great pressure buffer. I can be at ease knowing Gary will prevail. Gary seems to find those small mistakes which are not obvious to the average eye. Well-tuned, good analytical eye for detail. He can turn any combination of words into a statement. [AREAS IN WHICH MOST CAPABLE]: His dedication to consistency and detail, eager attitude and independent nature. [AREAS OF SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT]: Working directly with the computer. [AREAS NEEDING IMPROVEMENT]: Adapting to the software environment, being aware of its characteristics and sensitivities and distinguishing those traits which are unique to each base. Of course, with time, this atmosphere will be more evident.
7. Employee review evaluation -- Litigation Support: October 1990, Chris Robertson, 11/20/90
[QUALITY OF WORK]: Outstanding! [QUANTITY OF WORK]: Gary is a self-starter in all respects. He is both thorough and accurate in his work. [DEPENDABILITY/RESPONSIBILITY] Gary is the soul of dependability and responsibility. [WRITING ABILITY] This is Gary's strong suit. Outstanding work! [AREAS MOST CAPABLE]: Gary's coding/summarizing is excellent! He pays attention to detail and is extremely thorough. He has outstanding writing/grammatical skills. He is a self-starter and thoroughly dependable. [AREAS OF SIGNIFICANT IMPORVEMENT] Gary has shown an aptitude for docket summaries. He is particularly suited to this task and has taken on more responsibilities in this area. [AREAS NEDING IMPROVEMENT]: [None noted by supervisor].
8. Employee review evaluation--Litigation Support: May 1991, Chris Robertson [not dated]
[Note that I was moved to the Litigation Support Group's terrace level office suite (in the basement) effective Monday April 8, 1991. At the time of this evaluation I had been working in a group setting with other litigation support personnel on a daily basis for at least four weeks. Akin Gump made the following declaration in its interrogatory response filed May 22, 1992 with the D.C. Department of Human Rights: "In the course of questioning Claimant's supervisor, former supervisor and co-workers, it was even more evident that Claimant had emotional problems which adversely effected his work and his co-workers. Claimant was uncomfortable communicating with his peers and required work that ensured total isolation. During the investigation of his concerns, it was also brought out that his behavior had been disruptive, with occasional violent outbursts, frightening to co-workers."
If my behavior did in fact deteriorate, it had to have been after May 1991 when this performance evaluation was written. Note that Robert S. Strauss, Esq. was nominated to the post of U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union in early June 1991 (immediately after this evaluation); Mr. Strauss withdrew from the partnership in August 1991. Query: Did my behavior deteriorate beginning in June 1991, or did my working conditions deteriorate beginning in June 1991 when my employment with the firm may have seemed vulnerable to certain employees?]
Gary's on-line coding is superior. He is flexible and can turn his attention to several cases at once and retain the necessary [illegible] for each one flawlessly. [QUALITY OF WORK]: Consistent, detail oriented. Excellent! [DEPENDABILITY/RELIABILITY]: Gary is a model employee in this regard. Always know he can be relied upon to complete a project with no supervision, and it will be done accurately and efficiently.
[Akin Gump declared in its interrogatory response filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights on May 22, 1992 that I was "difficult to supervise." Not only was Akin Gump unable to cite any specific evidence to support its declaration, but my direct supervisor directly contradicted the firm's declaration in May 1991 (see above), five months prior to the termination in October 1991.]
[PROFESSIONALISM]: Gary's interaction within Lit Support has improved considerably. He is more communicative and personable -- a team player.
[Note that from October 1989 to April 5, 1991 I was assigned to a group office on the firm's ninth floor; on the ninth floor I worked adjacent to a temporary paralegal named Ozie Jamison. Prior to April 5, 1991 I would have had little occasion to interact with Litigation Support employees on the firm's terrace level (basement).]
[ATTITUDE]: Gary maintains a positive, helpful attitude even through crisis periods.
[Here, my supervisor admits that I handle stressful situations in a group environment effectively.]
[PUNCTUALITY]: Exceptional! [GRAMMATICAL SKILLS]: Gary has excellent English Skills. [WRITING ABILITY]: Gary's forte! He is unsurpassed in this category. [AREAS MOST CAPABLE]: Gary seems as close to the perfect employee as it is possible to get! A self-starter--he works efficiently and consistently enjoying maximum productivity on a daily basis. He is reliable, hard working and extremely responsible. [AREAS OF SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT: Gary has recently moved down to the terrace level and has truly become a part of the Lit Support team after being isolated on the ninth floor. He is both communicative and personable and has made the adjustment well. [AREAS NEEDING IMPROVEMENT]: None!
In an interrogatory response filed with the Dept. of Human Rights dated May 22, 1992, Dennis M. Race, Esq. stated: "Respondent does not dispute that Claimant's written performance evaluations were very good. Claimant was a law school graduate performing paralegal or administrative duties. When terminated, he was told that his actual work product was not a problem." (Record on appeal at 139)
Again, in a response to additional interrogatories filed by the firm with the agency on May 18, 1993, Dennis Race stated: "As previously stated, Complainant's substantive performance, as reflected in his written evaluations, was not an issue in the ultimate decision to terminate."
Akin Gump's declarations about my performance evaluations contain several implicit assertions -- all of which are ludicrous!
Akin Gump seems to be implicitly stating the following: "Here at Akin Gump -- unlike about 99% of businesses -- we do not use an employee's performance evaluation as a vehicle to record instances of inappropriate or unprofessional behavior. Yes, Mr. Freedman's performance evaluations are outstanding; we admit that. But if Mr. Freedman was violent and disruptive, we would not have formally advised him of our concerns in his performance evaluations. Our policy is to record instances of inappropriate or unprofessional behavior only in reprimands. In fact, you can look through our personnel files and you will not find a single instance in which an Akin Gump employee's inappropriate or unprofessional behavior is recorded in an employee's performance evaluation. Mind you, we do record evidence of an employee's professionalism and good behavior in performance evaluations. That's why -- despite the fact that Mr. Freedman had a history of disruptive and violent behavior -- you will find only positive statements about his behavior and professionalism in his written performance evaluations."
Isn't that, in effect, what Akin Gump would have the world believe?
To invoke the immortal reply of General Anthony McAuliffe to the Nazis' demand that he surrender: "Nuts!"
Here is a transcript of the narrative portion of all my performance evaluations that were given to me at about the time they were prepared. See record on appeal at 291-293, Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights, D.C.C.A. no. 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998).
1. Year-end attorney evaluation: 1988; Constance Brown [no date]
Gary has the ability to identify and extract the smallest detail in a clear and efficient manner. He is dependable; works well independently and produces a neatly typed work product. Gary occasionally overlooks a coding form, leaving it intact with the original. Gary is extremely valuable because he came to us with the necessary experience, having performed such a task for another major client/law firm in the city.
[Suggestions for improving utilization of legal assistants at Akin Gump]: Well, maybe, opportunities to research and receive outside (courtroom, deposition) experience.
There is no task too much to ask of Gary. Gary began as a temporary; however, he worked very diligently and consistently (weekends and overtime) to reduce the coding backlog. I believe, because of past experience, Gary understood clearly the needs of Central Files; the categorizing, analyzing and use of standard terminology. He has a good sense of the big picture and works toward that goal. Gary realized that typing up summaries provide for easier reading and faster data entry. It is nice to have Gary around. He is always stable in the midst of other inconsistencies. I recommend that Gary receive due consideration for all his efforts and be offered a permanent position.
2. Mid-year attorney evaluation: 1989; Kathleen Winslow, 5/17/89[no narrative comments]
3. Mid-year attorney evaluation: 1989; John Potter, Esq., 5/14/89
Gary digested part of a deposition transcript for me. [Complainant was assigned to complete, and did complete, one transcript of a multi-part deposition.] Gary did not request a conference concerning his evaluation.
4. Mid-year attorney evaluation: 1989; Constance Brown, 5/19/89
Gary is dependable and is an invaluable asset when it comes to coding Eastern documents. He is always enthusiastic re coding which comes 99% of his time. Gary has worked extremely hard over the past few months, reducing weeks of backlog to absolutely nothing, at which time he was on loan to the Toxic Tort group and the Firm's legal assistant group. Because Gary is so persistent, he provides for smoother, more efficient searching and retrieval of critical information used for attorney briefings.
5. Year-end attorney evaluation: 1989; Constance Brown, 11/6/89
[During the immediate prior six-month period, in August 1989, paralegal Stacey Schaar said to me: "We're all afraid of you. We're all afraid you're going to buy a gun, bring it in, and shoot everybody. Even the manager of your apartment building is afraid of you." Stacey Schaar was terminated for gross misconduct in May 1990.]
Gary is well-organized, self-sufficient and knows the issues of the case. He is the only full-time permanent coder on the Eastern case. Although he spends 100% of his time coding, his actual contact with me is limited.
Gary is an invaluable, dedicated and highly motivated individual who takes pride in his work and seems to thrive on heavy volume. Gary recently trained and supervised five temporary coders who were brought in to expedite the coding of some 200,000 pages of document production. In doing so, he inspired the group who were always eager to work and adopted Gary's own sense of commitment to the case. It was Gary who had reservations about temporary help and suggested they only code standard information; and he prepare the detailed summary in order to preserve the integrity of the database. Also, Gary was instrumental in redesigning the document summary form to aid in more accurate coding and data entry of document production onto the Firm's network. Gary is as capable an conscientious in digesting depositions and hearing transcripts, always staying flexible and catering to individual needs. I appreciate the job that Gary has done and look forward to other projects with Gary's help.
6. Employee Review Evaluation--Litigation Support: May 1990, Chris Robertson/Constance Brown, 6/11/90
[The reader should keep in mind that I was transferred to the Litigation Support Group from the Legal Assistant Program two months earlier, in March 1990, the time period covered by this performance evaluation. Akin Gump offered the following declaration in its interrogatory response filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights, filed May 22, 1992: "During his transition from a legal assistant position (paralegal) to his work with the litigation support department [in March 1990], Claimant had several discussions with his direct supervisor (Robertson) about problems with interacting with co-workers and occasional outbursts." Record on appeal at 139.]
Gary has picked up the basics of on-line coding with very minimal instructions. With additional experience, he should adapt better to the software techniques. Always mindful of quality control, which aids in more efficient data entry. Relentless, thriving on huge volume while maintaining a good end product. Totally independent, self-sustaining and committed to his work. Extremely solid and aiming to please. I trust Gary's ability to meet whatever the demand with little guidance. Gary is receptive no matter what the task and takes every assignment seriously. Even at times when material has to be redone because of GPE's. Great pressure buffer. I can be at ease knowing Gary will prevail. Gary seems to find those small mistakes which are not obvious to the average eye. Well-tuned, good analytical eye for detail. He can turn any combination of words into a statement. [AREAS IN WHICH MOST CAPABLE]: His dedication to consistency and detail, eager attitude and independent nature. [AREAS OF SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT]: Working directly with the computer. [AREAS NEEDING IMPROVEMENT]: Adapting to the software environment, being aware of its characteristics and sensitivities and distinguishing those traits which are unique to each base. Of course, with time, this atmosphere will be more evident.
7. Employee review evaluation -- Litigation Support: October 1990, Chris Robertson, 11/20/90
[QUALITY OF WORK]: Outstanding! [QUANTITY OF WORK]: Gary is a self-starter in all respects. He is both thorough and accurate in his work. [DEPENDABILITY/RESPONSIBILITY] Gary is the soul of dependability and responsibility. [WRITING ABILITY] This is Gary's strong suit. Outstanding work! [AREAS MOST CAPABLE]: Gary's coding/summarizing is excellent! He pays attention to detail and is extremely thorough. He has outstanding writing/grammatical skills. He is a self-starter and thoroughly dependable. [AREAS OF SIGNIFICANT IMPORVEMENT] Gary has shown an aptitude for docket summaries. He is particularly suited to this task and has taken on more responsibilities in this area. [AREAS NEDING IMPROVEMENT]: [None noted by supervisor].
8. Employee review evaluation--Litigation Support: May 1991, Chris Robertson [not dated]
[Note that I was moved to the Litigation Support Group's terrace level office suite (in the basement) effective Monday April 8, 1991. At the time of this evaluation I had been working in a group setting with other litigation support personnel on a daily basis for at least four weeks. Akin Gump made the following declaration in its interrogatory response filed May 22, 1992 with the D.C. Department of Human Rights: "In the course of questioning Claimant's supervisor, former supervisor and co-workers, it was even more evident that Claimant had emotional problems which adversely effected his work and his co-workers. Claimant was uncomfortable communicating with his peers and required work that ensured total isolation. During the investigation of his concerns, it was also brought out that his behavior had been disruptive, with occasional violent outbursts, frightening to co-workers."
If my behavior did in fact deteriorate, it had to have been after May 1991 when this performance evaluation was written. Note that Robert S. Strauss, Esq. was nominated to the post of U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union in early June 1991 (immediately after this evaluation); Mr. Strauss withdrew from the partnership in August 1991. Query: Did my behavior deteriorate beginning in June 1991, or did my working conditions deteriorate beginning in June 1991 when my employment with the firm may have seemed vulnerable to certain employees?]
Gary's on-line coding is superior. He is flexible and can turn his attention to several cases at once and retain the necessary [illegible] for each one flawlessly. [QUALITY OF WORK]: Consistent, detail oriented. Excellent! [DEPENDABILITY/RELIABILITY]: Gary is a model employee in this regard. Always know he can be relied upon to complete a project with no supervision, and it will be done accurately and efficiently.
[Akin Gump declared in its interrogatory response filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights on May 22, 1992 that I was "difficult to supervise." Not only was Akin Gump unable to cite any specific evidence to support its declaration, but my direct supervisor directly contradicted the firm's declaration in May 1991 (see above), five months prior to the termination in October 1991.]
[PROFESSIONALISM]: Gary's interaction within Lit Support has improved considerably. He is more communicative and personable -- a team player.
[Note that from October 1989 to April 5, 1991 I was assigned to a group office on the firm's ninth floor; on the ninth floor I worked adjacent to a temporary paralegal named Ozie Jamison. Prior to April 5, 1991 I would have had little occasion to interact with Litigation Support employees on the firm's terrace level (basement).]
[ATTITUDE]: Gary maintains a positive, helpful attitude even through crisis periods.
[Here, my supervisor admits that I handle stressful situations in a group environment effectively.]
[PUNCTUALITY]: Exceptional! [GRAMMATICAL SKILLS]: Gary has excellent English Skills. [WRITING ABILITY]: Gary's forte! He is unsurpassed in this category. [AREAS MOST CAPABLE]: Gary seems as close to the perfect employee as it is possible to get! A self-starter--he works efficiently and consistently enjoying maximum productivity on a daily basis. He is reliable, hard working and extremely responsible. [AREAS OF SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT: Gary has recently moved down to the terrace level and has truly become a part of the Lit Support team after being isolated on the ninth floor. He is both communicative and personable and has made the adjustment well. [AREAS NEEDING IMPROVEMENT]: None!
Akin Gump: The Foul-Mouthed Partner
According to the experts "people who are good at their jobs, are popular with colleagues, speak out against unethical behaviour and are intolerant of hypocrisy are often targets of bullying."
In the spring of 1988, while I was still an agency-supplied temporary paralegal at the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, I was assigned to a conference room on the firm's second floor. Across the hall was the office of a foul-mouthed partner named Bruce Mendelsohn, Esq. All day long I could hear him across the hall in his office talking in a loud voice, using obscenities.
One day Bruce Mendelsohn walked out of his office into the hall, and I took the opportunity to confront him. Mind you I was just a temporary paralegal and Bruce Mendelsohn was a partner. I chastized him about his language. I thought his behavior was shameful and inappropriate.
Well, don't you know, a brief time after I spoke to Bruce Mendelsohn, I got a telephone call from my direct supervisor, Maggie Sinnott. She told me I had to work overtime that night. I had the suspicion that Bruce Mendelsohn had "run to mommy" and told Maggie Sinnott about the big, bad paralegal who spoke out of turn to him. I should have known that someone who used the language that he was used to using would lack the integrity to take his chastisement in a professional manner. Yes, I have a history with bullies.
In any event, Leonard Sagot, Esq. (of Sagot & Jennings in Philadelphia) would have been proud of me. Mr. Sagot despised obscene language.
In the spring of 1988, while I was still an agency-supplied temporary paralegal at the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, I was assigned to a conference room on the firm's second floor. Across the hall was the office of a foul-mouthed partner named Bruce Mendelsohn, Esq. All day long I could hear him across the hall in his office talking in a loud voice, using obscenities.
One day Bruce Mendelsohn walked out of his office into the hall, and I took the opportunity to confront him. Mind you I was just a temporary paralegal and Bruce Mendelsohn was a partner. I chastized him about his language. I thought his behavior was shameful and inappropriate.
Well, don't you know, a brief time after I spoke to Bruce Mendelsohn, I got a telephone call from my direct supervisor, Maggie Sinnott. She told me I had to work overtime that night. I had the suspicion that Bruce Mendelsohn had "run to mommy" and told Maggie Sinnott about the big, bad paralegal who spoke out of turn to him. I should have known that someone who used the language that he was used to using would lack the integrity to take his chastisement in a professional manner. Yes, I have a history with bullies.
In any event, Leonard Sagot, Esq. (of Sagot & Jennings in Philadelphia) would have been proud of me. Mr. Sagot despised obscene language.
Friday, December 18, 2009
Akin Gump: Poor Management and the Exceptional Individual
What's the Difference Between Workplace Mobbing and Bullying?
The word "bullying" is often used in the context of children abusing other children in a manner that often has a physical aspect. Due to laws, social constraints and company policies, etc. adult bullies in the workplace are forced to use more subtle tactics.
Mobbing usually does not involve actual physical violence, although threats of violence are used to intimidate and create mental distress in the target and is usually more of a psychological or emotional terrorization occurring in the workplace.
As such mobbing is also referred to as adult bullying, workplace bullying, psychological harassment or status-blind harassment. These various phrases allude to these characteristics: usually mental rather than physical abuse, the "bullying" is perpetrated by an adult against another adult, that this occurs in the workplace, and that there is group involvement. The word "mobbing" says all of this concisely.
When someone is being harassed at work by a bully they are indeed being bullied. If a bully harasses you for the first, the second or the hundredth time you are certainly being bullied, but you are not, necessarily, the target of a mobbing.
Mobbing occurs in environments conducive to its development. Like viruses they need the right conditions to thrive. This usually involves workplaces with poor management lacking in conflict resolution skills and lacking in awareness about mobbing and its consequences. See In re Morrell, 684 A.2d 361, 362-65 (D.C. 1996). Worse still are workplaces where management knowingly utilizes mobbing tactics as a means to eliminate staff in spite of the, sometimes fatal, devastation it causes.
The bullies will systematically discredit their target to erode any support the target may seek out later. Bullies slander their target's reputation to anyone who will listen: co-workers, management, union representatives, human resources, etc.
A mobbing is this larger involvement of the group in the bullying. Management withdraws support and eventually participates in attacking the target with as much enthusiasm as the (original) bully. Co-workers are afraid for themselves and either look the other way or actively participate. The group is set against the individual.
It is a dysfunctional group response to the abuse of one of its members. Rather than address the abuse, the group instead seeks to silence and destroy the messenger. It is like a disease that causes the body's immune system to destroy healthy parts of itself.
Responsible managers will want to protect their employees, their company and their bottom line from the ravages of bullies, but how can you tell if your workplace has become infected with the mobbing virus?
Research into the phenomenon of workplace mobbing was pioneered in the 1980s by German-born Swedish scientist Heinz Leymann, who borrowed the term from animal behavior due to it describing perfectly how a group can attack an individual based only on the negative covert communications from the group.
In the book MOBBING: Emotional Abuse in the American Workplace, the authors Noa Zanolli Davenport Ph.D., Ruth Distler Schwartz, and Gail Pursell Elliott say that mobbing is typically found in work environments that have poorly organized production and/or working methods and incapable or inattentive management and that mobbing victims are usually "exceptional individuals who demonstrated intelligence, competence, creativity, integrity, accomplishment and dedication." Noa Zanolli Davenport has been retained as an expert witness in legal cases.
A common misconception is that victims of bullying are invariably weak, timid, submissive and often possessing negative attitudes about themselves. This profile, particularly of adult victims of workplace bullying, is very much at variance with the majority view of those writing on the subject. The image of the victim as insipid and inadequate belies the reality of the many positive attributes typically possessed by the bullied victim. Integrity, empathy, and confidence are frequently cited among these attributes. People who are good at their jobs, are popular with colleagues, speak out against unethical behaviour and are intolerant of hypocrisy are often targets of bullying. Those with the integrity to withstand the efforts of the bully to create a group of "yes men or women" risk being victimized. It is often the person who tries to change the system, who introduces new systems with enthusiasm and is potentially an organisation’s best asset, who becomes the victim of bullying.
It's interesting that mobbing involves weak management and an employee-victim who is an exceptional individual. I wonder to what degree my early childhood experience of being a creative, sensitive child in a home with parents who possessed poor parenting skills prepared me for my adult workplace problems.
The word "bullying" is often used in the context of children abusing other children in a manner that often has a physical aspect. Due to laws, social constraints and company policies, etc. adult bullies in the workplace are forced to use more subtle tactics.
Mobbing usually does not involve actual physical violence, although threats of violence are used to intimidate and create mental distress in the target and is usually more of a psychological or emotional terrorization occurring in the workplace.
As such mobbing is also referred to as adult bullying, workplace bullying, psychological harassment or status-blind harassment. These various phrases allude to these characteristics: usually mental rather than physical abuse, the "bullying" is perpetrated by an adult against another adult, that this occurs in the workplace, and that there is group involvement. The word "mobbing" says all of this concisely.
When someone is being harassed at work by a bully they are indeed being bullied. If a bully harasses you for the first, the second or the hundredth time you are certainly being bullied, but you are not, necessarily, the target of a mobbing.
Mobbing occurs in environments conducive to its development. Like viruses they need the right conditions to thrive. This usually involves workplaces with poor management lacking in conflict resolution skills and lacking in awareness about mobbing and its consequences. See In re Morrell, 684 A.2d 361, 362-65 (D.C. 1996). Worse still are workplaces where management knowingly utilizes mobbing tactics as a means to eliminate staff in spite of the, sometimes fatal, devastation it causes.
The bullies will systematically discredit their target to erode any support the target may seek out later. Bullies slander their target's reputation to anyone who will listen: co-workers, management, union representatives, human resources, etc.
A mobbing is this larger involvement of the group in the bullying. Management withdraws support and eventually participates in attacking the target with as much enthusiasm as the (original) bully. Co-workers are afraid for themselves and either look the other way or actively participate. The group is set against the individual.
It is a dysfunctional group response to the abuse of one of its members. Rather than address the abuse, the group instead seeks to silence and destroy the messenger. It is like a disease that causes the body's immune system to destroy healthy parts of itself.
Responsible managers will want to protect their employees, their company and their bottom line from the ravages of bullies, but how can you tell if your workplace has become infected with the mobbing virus?
Research into the phenomenon of workplace mobbing was pioneered in the 1980s by German-born Swedish scientist Heinz Leymann, who borrowed the term from animal behavior due to it describing perfectly how a group can attack an individual based only on the negative covert communications from the group.
In the book MOBBING: Emotional Abuse in the American Workplace, the authors Noa Zanolli Davenport Ph.D., Ruth Distler Schwartz, and Gail Pursell Elliott say that mobbing is typically found in work environments that have poorly organized production and/or working methods and incapable or inattentive management and that mobbing victims are usually "exceptional individuals who demonstrated intelligence, competence, creativity, integrity, accomplishment and dedication." Noa Zanolli Davenport has been retained as an expert witness in legal cases.
A common misconception is that victims of bullying are invariably weak, timid, submissive and often possessing negative attitudes about themselves. This profile, particularly of adult victims of workplace bullying, is very much at variance with the majority view of those writing on the subject. The image of the victim as insipid and inadequate belies the reality of the many positive attributes typically possessed by the bullied victim. Integrity, empathy, and confidence are frequently cited among these attributes. People who are good at their jobs, are popular with colleagues, speak out against unethical behaviour and are intolerant of hypocrisy are often targets of bullying. Those with the integrity to withstand the efforts of the bully to create a group of "yes men or women" risk being victimized. It is often the person who tries to change the system, who introduces new systems with enthusiasm and is potentially an organisation’s best asset, who becomes the victim of bullying.
It's interesting that mobbing involves weak management and an employee-victim who is an exceptional individual. I wonder to what degree my early childhood experience of being a creative, sensitive child in a home with parents who possessed poor parenting skills prepared me for my adult workplace problems.
Idea of Reference: Cleveland Park Library
I am at the Cleveland Park Neighborhood Library. It's 1:50 PM, Friday, December 18, 2009. One of the librarians, of Indian descent presumably, said simply at about 1:45 PM -- in an audible tone: "Gotcha!"
I saw that one word as related to me. But then, I attach a negative meaning to trivial events. Apparently, I am still paranoid and unemployable.
I saw that one word as related to me. But then, I attach a negative meaning to trivial events. Apparently, I am still paranoid and unemployable.
Remote Associations -- Rudy Giuliani
In 1999 I sent a job application to one of New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani's old law partners. I wonder if Mr. Olick made any telephone calls about me.
July 10, 1999
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Arthur S. Olick, Esq.
Anderson, Kill & Olick, P.C.
1251 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10020-1182
Dear Mr. Olick:
I am an attorney licensed to practice in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and qualify for consideration for an associate position with Anderson, Kill & Olick, P.C. Preliminary to forwarding a copy of my resume to Anderson, Kill I believe I have a legal duty to advise you of the following facts regarding concerns about my potential for armed violence or homicide, intent to purchase firearms to commit a felony, and the illegal transport of a deadly weapon: concerns placed in controversy and affirmed, by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.), as relating to genuine fears about my criminal intent.
The Government of the District of Columbia has affirmed that my former employer, the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump") terminated my employment in October 1991 on the basis of genuine concerns about my mental health and stability, including the potential for violence. The employer's termination decision was made following an ex parte consultation with a psychiatrist who did not examine me personally. Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order, June 10, 1996), affirmed by the D.C. Court of Appeals (Terry, Reid, and King, associate judges), No. 96-CV-961 (Memorandum Opinion and Judgment filed Sept. 1, 1998).
As of the filing of the complaint in the Superior Court proceedings, in October 1995, and at all times thereafter, it was unlawful under the laws of the District of Columbia for a psychiatrist to offer a professional psychiatric opinion about an individual without benefit of personal examination as is strongly recommended by the American Psychiatric Association's Principles of Medical Ethics. The D.C. Code in its latest revision makes it unlawful for a physician to "[fail] to conform to standards of acceptable conduct and prevailing practice within a health profession." See D.C. Code 2-3305.14(26). This provision was added to the District of Columbia Health Occupations Revision Act by D.C. Law 10-247, enacted on March 23, 1995. The Court of Appeals expressly found that the professional psychiatric opinion offered by the psychiatrist to the employer amounted to the diagnosis of a "disorder." See No. 96-CV-961 at 4.
The District of Columbia Superior Court as well as the Court of Appeals did not find that the action of my Akin Gump supervisor in stating to employees that she feared that I might have had plans to kill her, and the action of the supervisor in arranging to have her office secured against such a homicidal assault, see record on appeal at 41, was invidiously motivated. The supervisor (Robertson) is designated by the employer as one of the three decisionmakers who terminated my employment, see record on appeal at 167, which termination decision was based in part on the above-referenced psychiatric evidence that tended to show that I posed a risk of violence. Robertson's termination decision was made in consultation with Dennis M. Race, Esq., a senior Akin Gump partner, see record on appeal at 138 and 167.
Mr. Race has expressly affirmed, under penalty of D.C. Code 1-2529 (D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977: false documents or testimony), that (unspecified) acts of "violence," see record on appeal at 140, that I committed during my tenure at the firm coupled with the firm's reasonable fear that my future conduct might expose the firm to tort liability, see record on appeal at 148 (possibly including tort damages for wrongful death, cf. record on appeal at 41), justified the firm's decision to terminate my employment.
The District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel expressly affirmed to the D.C. Superior Court and to the Court of Appeals in pleadings filed in the above-referenced proceedings, relying on legally-irrelevant "after-acquired" evidence, see McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S.Ct. 879, 885 (1995), that my coworkers had formed genuine fears (i.e., not motivated by discriminatory animus) that I might have been armed and dangerous and poised to carry out a homicidal assault on the firm's premises. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia Department of Human Rights and Minority Business Development at 9, Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Court of Appeals No. 96-CV-961 (citing record on appeal at 276). The District implicitly asserted that my coworkers' concerns about my potential for armed violence were relevant to the employer's decision to terminate my employment.
I stand by the "Statement of Gary Freedman to the Office of U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Regarding Intent to Commit Crime of Violence as Determined by the Law Firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld," ("Statement to the U.S. Attorney") dated April 24, 1995, and made under penalty of criminal sanctions (D.C. Code 22-2514).
I want to advise, however, that representations made by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (M. Justin Draycott, Esq.) to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals at oral argument in December 1997 that I "admitted" in pleadings that I filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights that my "coworkers" were genuinely "afraid" of me (specifically with regard to my potential for armed violence or homicide) conflict with the prior Statement to the U.S. Attorney, and that said conflict may give rise to the appearance that the exculpatory representations that I made in the Statement to the U.S. Attorney were knowingly false, misleading, or perjurious.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals has affirmed, see D.C. No. 96-CV-961 at 3 n. 1, that the Department of Human Rights had legally-valid concerns that a document I submitted to the agency (which purports to have been written by the psychiatrist consulted by Akin Gump) may have been inauthentic (i.e., forged or fabricated), see record on appeal at 8. Presumably, according to the agency, I submitted the possibly inauthentic document in order to deny forensic psychiatric evidence filed by Akin Gump with the agency: forensic psychiatric evidence that related to my mental health (specifically relating to a psychiatric "disorder" that my employer had attributed to me, see D.C. No. 96-CV-961 at 4) and stability (specifically relating to my potential for violence). But see Namerdy v. Generalcar, 217 A.2d 109, 111-112 (D.C. 1966) (circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that a letter is written on the author's letterhead, is sufficient for authentication).
For your additional information I forward a document submission that I made to the Federal Protective Service (Jerry McGill, S.A.) under cover letter dated Sept. 8, 1997 under penalty of a criminal investigation.
Robert R. Chapman, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, is familiar with this matter. The telephone number of the U.S. Attorney's Office in Washington is (202) 514-7566.
I am confident that defamatory statements about me that may raise substantial concerns about my mental stability and fitness to practice law, even acts of defamation committed by the law partners of a close friend of the President of the United States (Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Esq.) and acts of defamation committed by the current chief White House counsel to President Clinton (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.), will in no way impair my chances for fair consideration for employment by Anderson, Kill & Olick, P.C.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
July 10, 1999
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Arthur S. Olick, Esq.
Anderson, Kill & Olick, P.C.
1251 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10020-1182
Dear Mr. Olick:
I am an attorney licensed to practice in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and qualify for consideration for an associate position with Anderson, Kill & Olick, P.C. Preliminary to forwarding a copy of my resume to Anderson, Kill I believe I have a legal duty to advise you of the following facts regarding concerns about my potential for armed violence or homicide, intent to purchase firearms to commit a felony, and the illegal transport of a deadly weapon: concerns placed in controversy and affirmed, by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.), as relating to genuine fears about my criminal intent.
The Government of the District of Columbia has affirmed that my former employer, the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump") terminated my employment in October 1991 on the basis of genuine concerns about my mental health and stability, including the potential for violence. The employer's termination decision was made following an ex parte consultation with a psychiatrist who did not examine me personally. Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order, June 10, 1996), affirmed by the D.C. Court of Appeals (Terry, Reid, and King, associate judges), No. 96-CV-961 (Memorandum Opinion and Judgment filed Sept. 1, 1998).
As of the filing of the complaint in the Superior Court proceedings, in October 1995, and at all times thereafter, it was unlawful under the laws of the District of Columbia for a psychiatrist to offer a professional psychiatric opinion about an individual without benefit of personal examination as is strongly recommended by the American Psychiatric Association's Principles of Medical Ethics. The D.C. Code in its latest revision makes it unlawful for a physician to "[fail] to conform to standards of acceptable conduct and prevailing practice within a health profession." See D.C. Code 2-3305.14(26). This provision was added to the District of Columbia Health Occupations Revision Act by D.C. Law 10-247, enacted on March 23, 1995. The Court of Appeals expressly found that the professional psychiatric opinion offered by the psychiatrist to the employer amounted to the diagnosis of a "disorder." See No. 96-CV-961 at 4.
The District of Columbia Superior Court as well as the Court of Appeals did not find that the action of my Akin Gump supervisor in stating to employees that she feared that I might have had plans to kill her, and the action of the supervisor in arranging to have her office secured against such a homicidal assault, see record on appeal at 41, was invidiously motivated. The supervisor (Robertson) is designated by the employer as one of the three decisionmakers who terminated my employment, see record on appeal at 167, which termination decision was based in part on the above-referenced psychiatric evidence that tended to show that I posed a risk of violence. Robertson's termination decision was made in consultation with Dennis M. Race, Esq., a senior Akin Gump partner, see record on appeal at 138 and 167.
Mr. Race has expressly affirmed, under penalty of D.C. Code 1-2529 (D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977: false documents or testimony), that (unspecified) acts of "violence," see record on appeal at 140, that I committed during my tenure at the firm coupled with the firm's reasonable fear that my future conduct might expose the firm to tort liability, see record on appeal at 148 (possibly including tort damages for wrongful death, cf. record on appeal at 41), justified the firm's decision to terminate my employment.
The District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel expressly affirmed to the D.C. Superior Court and to the Court of Appeals in pleadings filed in the above-referenced proceedings, relying on legally-irrelevant "after-acquired" evidence, see McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S.Ct. 879, 885 (1995), that my coworkers had formed genuine fears (i.e., not motivated by discriminatory animus) that I might have been armed and dangerous and poised to carry out a homicidal assault on the firm's premises. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia Department of Human Rights and Minority Business Development at 9, Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Court of Appeals No. 96-CV-961 (citing record on appeal at 276). The District implicitly asserted that my coworkers' concerns about my potential for armed violence were relevant to the employer's decision to terminate my employment.
I stand by the "Statement of Gary Freedman to the Office of U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Regarding Intent to Commit Crime of Violence as Determined by the Law Firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld," ("Statement to the U.S. Attorney") dated April 24, 1995, and made under penalty of criminal sanctions (D.C. Code 22-2514).
I want to advise, however, that representations made by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (M. Justin Draycott, Esq.) to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals at oral argument in December 1997 that I "admitted" in pleadings that I filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights that my "coworkers" were genuinely "afraid" of me (specifically with regard to my potential for armed violence or homicide) conflict with the prior Statement to the U.S. Attorney, and that said conflict may give rise to the appearance that the exculpatory representations that I made in the Statement to the U.S. Attorney were knowingly false, misleading, or perjurious.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals has affirmed, see D.C. No. 96-CV-961 at 3 n. 1, that the Department of Human Rights had legally-valid concerns that a document I submitted to the agency (which purports to have been written by the psychiatrist consulted by Akin Gump) may have been inauthentic (i.e., forged or fabricated), see record on appeal at 8. Presumably, according to the agency, I submitted the possibly inauthentic document in order to deny forensic psychiatric evidence filed by Akin Gump with the agency: forensic psychiatric evidence that related to my mental health (specifically relating to a psychiatric "disorder" that my employer had attributed to me, see D.C. No. 96-CV-961 at 4) and stability (specifically relating to my potential for violence). But see Namerdy v. Generalcar, 217 A.2d 109, 111-112 (D.C. 1966) (circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that a letter is written on the author's letterhead, is sufficient for authentication).
For your additional information I forward a document submission that I made to the Federal Protective Service (Jerry McGill, S.A.) under cover letter dated Sept. 8, 1997 under penalty of a criminal investigation.
Robert R. Chapman, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, is familiar with this matter. The telephone number of the U.S. Attorney's Office in Washington is (202) 514-7566.
I am confident that defamatory statements about me that may raise substantial concerns about my mental stability and fitness to practice law, even acts of defamation committed by the law partners of a close friend of the President of the United States (Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Esq.) and acts of defamation committed by the current chief White House counsel to President Clinton (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.), will in no way impair my chances for fair consideration for employment by Anderson, Kill & Olick, P.C.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
Vernon Jordan In His Own Words -- Monica Lewinsky and American Express
Vernon Jordan in his own words: "May I have your attention? My name is Vernon Jordan. I first of all want to thank you for coming. And secondly, I want to say that I'm going to read a statement. And after I shall have read my statement, I will not take questions; I'm going to leave and go back to work.
I did two things for Ms. Monica Lewinsky.
I assisted her in trying to find employment in the private sector in New York City. I referred her for interviews at American Express and at Revlon, where I am privileged to serve as a director. I also referred her to Young & Rubicam, a New York advertising agency."
I sent the following job application to American Express in 1998. Let me state for the record: Vernon Jordan did not make any telephone calls for me. I never asked him to do that. The subject never came up. But then, I've never talked to Vernon Jordan.
November 13, 1998
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Louise Marie Parent, Esq.
Executive Vice President & General Counsel
American Express Company
American Express Tower
200 Vesey Street
New York, NY 10285-4900
Dear Ms. Parent:
I am an attorney licensed to practice in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and qualify for consideration for a position as an attorney in the office of general counsel of the American Express Company. Preliminary to forwarding a copy of my resume to the American Express Company I believe I have a legal duty to advise the office of general counsel of the following facts regarding concerns about my potential for armed violence or homicide, intent to purchase firearms to commit a felony, and the illegal transport of a deadly weapon: concerns placed in controversy and affirmed, by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel, as relating to genuine fears about my criminal intent.
The Government of the District of Columbia has affirmed that my former employer, the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump") (one of whose senior managers is Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Esq.) terminated my employment in October 1991 on the basis of genuine concerns about my mental health and stability, including the potential for violence. The employer's termination decision was made following an ex parte consultation with a psychiatrist who did not examine me personally. Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order, June 10, 1996), affirmed by the D.C. Court of Appeals (Terry, Reid, and King, associate judges),
No. 96-CV-961 (Memorandum Opinion and Judgment filed Sept. 1, 1998).
As of the filing of the complaint in the Superior Court proceedings, in October 1995, and at all times thereafter, it was unlawful under the laws of the District of Columbia for a psychiatrist to offer a professional psychiatric opinion about an individual without benefit of personal examination as is strongly recommended by the American Psychiatric Association's Principles of Medical Ethics. The D.C. Code in its latest revision makes it unlawful for a physician to "[fail] to conform to standards of acceptable conduct and prevailing practice within a health profession." See D.C. Code 2-3305.14(26). This provision was added to the District of Columbia Health Occupations Revision Act by D.C. Law 10-247, enacted on March 23, 1995. The Court of Appeals expressly found that the professional psychiatric opinion offered by the psychiatrist to the employer amounted to the diagnosis of a "disorder." See No. 96-CV-961 at 4.
The District of Columbia Superior Court as well as the Court of Appeals did not find that the action of my Akin Gump supervisor in stating to employees that she feared that I might have had plans to kill her, and the action of the supervisor in arranging to have her office secured against such a homicidal assault, see record on appeal at 41, was invidiously motivated. The supervisor (Robertson) is designated by the employer as one of the three decisionmakers who terminated my employment, see record on appeal at 167, which termination decision was based in part on the above-referenced psychiatric evidence that tended to show that I posed a risk of violence.
The District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel expressly affirmed to the D.C. Superior Court and to the Court of Appeals in pleadings filed in the above-referenced proceedings, relying on legally-irrelevant "after-acquired" evidence, see McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S.Ct. 879, 885 (1995), that my coworkers had formed genuine fears (i.e., not motivated by discriminatory animus) that I might have been armed and dangerous and poised to carry out a homicidal assault on the firm's premises. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia Department of Human Rights and Minority Business Development at 9, Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Court of Appeals No. 96-CV-961 (citing record on appeal at 276). The District implicitly asserted that my coworkers' concerns about my potential for armed violence were relevant to the employer's decision to terminate my employment.
I stand by the "Statement of Gary Freedman to the Office of U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Regarding Intent to Commit Crime of Violence as Determined by the Law Firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld," ("Statement to the U.S. Attorney") dated April 24, 1995, and made under penalty of criminal sanctions (D.C. Code 22-2514).
I want to advise, however, that representations made by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (M. Justin Draycott, Esq.) to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals at oral argument in December 1997 that I "admitted" in pleadings that I filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights that my "coworkers" were genuinely "afraid" of me (specifically with regard to my potential for armed violence or homicide) conflict with the prior Statement to the U.S. Attorney, and that said conflict may give rise to the appearance that the exculpatory representations that I made in the Statement to the U.S. Attorney were unreliable, knowingly false, or perjured.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals has affirmed, see D.C. No. 96-CV-961 at 3 n. 1, that the Department of Human Rights had legally-valid concerns that a document I submitted to the agency may have been inauthentic (i.e., forged or fabricated), see record on appeal at 8; presumably, according to the agency, I submitted the possibly inauthentic document in order to deny forensic psychiatric evidence filed by Akin Gump with the agency: forensic psychiatric evidence relating to my mental health (specifically relating to the psychiatric symptom "ideas of reference") and stability (specifically relating to my potential for violence). But see Namerdy v. Generalcar, 217 A.2d 109, 111-112 (D.C. 1966) (circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that a letter is written on the author's letterhead, is sufficient for authentication).
Robert Chapman, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, is familiar with this matter. The telephone number of the U.S. Attorney's Office in Washington is (202) 514-7566.
I am confident that defamatory statements about me that may raise substantial concerns about my mental stability and fitness to practice law, even acts of defamation committed by the law partners of a close friend of the President of the United States (Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Esq.) and acts of defamation committed by the current chief White House counsel to President Clinton (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.), will in no way impair my chances for fair consideration for employment by the American Express Company.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
I did two things for Ms. Monica Lewinsky.
I assisted her in trying to find employment in the private sector in New York City. I referred her for interviews at American Express and at Revlon, where I am privileged to serve as a director. I also referred her to Young & Rubicam, a New York advertising agency."
I sent the following job application to American Express in 1998. Let me state for the record: Vernon Jordan did not make any telephone calls for me. I never asked him to do that. The subject never came up. But then, I've never talked to Vernon Jordan.
November 13, 1998
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Louise Marie Parent, Esq.
Executive Vice President & General Counsel
American Express Company
American Express Tower
200 Vesey Street
New York, NY 10285-4900
Dear Ms. Parent:
I am an attorney licensed to practice in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and qualify for consideration for a position as an attorney in the office of general counsel of the American Express Company. Preliminary to forwarding a copy of my resume to the American Express Company I believe I have a legal duty to advise the office of general counsel of the following facts regarding concerns about my potential for armed violence or homicide, intent to purchase firearms to commit a felony, and the illegal transport of a deadly weapon: concerns placed in controversy and affirmed, by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel, as relating to genuine fears about my criminal intent.
The Government of the District of Columbia has affirmed that my former employer, the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump") (one of whose senior managers is Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Esq.) terminated my employment in October 1991 on the basis of genuine concerns about my mental health and stability, including the potential for violence. The employer's termination decision was made following an ex parte consultation with a psychiatrist who did not examine me personally. Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order, June 10, 1996), affirmed by the D.C. Court of Appeals (Terry, Reid, and King, associate judges),
No. 96-CV-961 (Memorandum Opinion and Judgment filed Sept. 1, 1998).
As of the filing of the complaint in the Superior Court proceedings, in October 1995, and at all times thereafter, it was unlawful under the laws of the District of Columbia for a psychiatrist to offer a professional psychiatric opinion about an individual without benefit of personal examination as is strongly recommended by the American Psychiatric Association's Principles of Medical Ethics. The D.C. Code in its latest revision makes it unlawful for a physician to "[fail] to conform to standards of acceptable conduct and prevailing practice within a health profession." See D.C. Code 2-3305.14(26). This provision was added to the District of Columbia Health Occupations Revision Act by D.C. Law 10-247, enacted on March 23, 1995. The Court of Appeals expressly found that the professional psychiatric opinion offered by the psychiatrist to the employer amounted to the diagnosis of a "disorder." See No. 96-CV-961 at 4.
The District of Columbia Superior Court as well as the Court of Appeals did not find that the action of my Akin Gump supervisor in stating to employees that she feared that I might have had plans to kill her, and the action of the supervisor in arranging to have her office secured against such a homicidal assault, see record on appeal at 41, was invidiously motivated. The supervisor (Robertson) is designated by the employer as one of the three decisionmakers who terminated my employment, see record on appeal at 167, which termination decision was based in part on the above-referenced psychiatric evidence that tended to show that I posed a risk of violence.
The District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel expressly affirmed to the D.C. Superior Court and to the Court of Appeals in pleadings filed in the above-referenced proceedings, relying on legally-irrelevant "after-acquired" evidence, see McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S.Ct. 879, 885 (1995), that my coworkers had formed genuine fears (i.e., not motivated by discriminatory animus) that I might have been armed and dangerous and poised to carry out a homicidal assault on the firm's premises. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia Department of Human Rights and Minority Business Development at 9, Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Court of Appeals No. 96-CV-961 (citing record on appeal at 276). The District implicitly asserted that my coworkers' concerns about my potential for armed violence were relevant to the employer's decision to terminate my employment.
I stand by the "Statement of Gary Freedman to the Office of U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Regarding Intent to Commit Crime of Violence as Determined by the Law Firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld," ("Statement to the U.S. Attorney") dated April 24, 1995, and made under penalty of criminal sanctions (D.C. Code 22-2514).
I want to advise, however, that representations made by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (M. Justin Draycott, Esq.) to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals at oral argument in December 1997 that I "admitted" in pleadings that I filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights that my "coworkers" were genuinely "afraid" of me (specifically with regard to my potential for armed violence or homicide) conflict with the prior Statement to the U.S. Attorney, and that said conflict may give rise to the appearance that the exculpatory representations that I made in the Statement to the U.S. Attorney were unreliable, knowingly false, or perjured.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals has affirmed, see D.C. No. 96-CV-961 at 3 n. 1, that the Department of Human Rights had legally-valid concerns that a document I submitted to the agency may have been inauthentic (i.e., forged or fabricated), see record on appeal at 8; presumably, according to the agency, I submitted the possibly inauthentic document in order to deny forensic psychiatric evidence filed by Akin Gump with the agency: forensic psychiatric evidence relating to my mental health (specifically relating to the psychiatric symptom "ideas of reference") and stability (specifically relating to my potential for violence). But see Namerdy v. Generalcar, 217 A.2d 109, 111-112 (D.C. 1966) (circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that a letter is written on the author's letterhead, is sufficient for authentication).
Robert Chapman, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, is familiar with this matter. The telephone number of the U.S. Attorney's Office in Washington is (202) 514-7566.
I am confident that defamatory statements about me that may raise substantial concerns about my mental stability and fitness to practice law, even acts of defamation committed by the law partners of a close friend of the President of the United States (Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Esq.) and acts of defamation committed by the current chief White House counsel to President Clinton (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.), will in no way impair my chances for fair consideration for employment by the American Express Company.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
Did Abbe Lowell, Esq. Make Any Telephone Calls?
Abbe Lowell heads the white-collar and special investigation group at Chadbourne & Parke, a highly-regarded international law firm. The firm's bio notes that The Best Lawyers in America includes him as one of the top white-collar defense attorneys in the United States. The National Law Journal says he is one of the nation's top 10 most successful trial attorneys. Every year for over twenty years, The Washingtonian Magazine has named him one of the top attorneys in the nation's capital.
Lowell was the attorney for uberlobbyist Jack Abramoff. He is currently defending a former lobbyist for the American Israeli Policy Affairs Committee who along with a colleague is accused of trafficking in classified information.
Lowell has acted as counsel to the U.S. House of Representatives, most notably as Chief Investigative Counsel to the Democratic Minority during the impeachment of Bill Clinton. He was Special Counsel to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and human rights violations in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.
In 1998 I sent a job application to Mr. Lowell. I wonder if he made any telephone calls about me.
August 18, 1998
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Abbe David Lowell, Esq.
Brand & Lowell & Ryan
923 15th Street, NW
Washington, DC
Dear Mr. Lowell:
I am an attorney licensed to practice in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and qualify for consideration for an associate position at Brand & Lowell & Ryan. Preliminary to forwarding a copy of my resume to you I believe I have a legal duty to advise you of the following facts regarding concerns about my potential for armed violence or homicide, intent to purchase firearms to commit a felony, and the illegal transport of a deadly weapon: concerns placed in controversy and affirmed, by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel, as relating to genuine fears about my criminal intent.
The Government of the District of Columbia has affirmed that my former employer, the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump") terminated my employment in October 1991 on the basis of genuine concerns about my mental health and stability, including the potential for violence. The employer's termination decision was made following an ex parte consultation with a psychiatrist who did not examine me personally. Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order, June 10, 1996). As of the filing of the complaint in the said proceedings, in October 1995, and at all times thereafter, it was unlawful under the laws of the District of Columbia for a psychiatrist to offer a professional psychiatric opinion about an individual without benefit of personal examination as is strongly recommended by the American Psychiatric Association's Principles of Medical Ethics. The D.C. Code in its latest revision makes it unlawful for a physician to "[fail] to conform to standards of acceptable conduct and prevailing practice within a health profession." See D.C. Code 2-3305.14(26). This provision was added to the District of Columbia Health Occupations Revision Act by D.C. Law 10-247, enacted on March 23, 1995.
The District of Columbia Superior Court did not find that the action of my Akin Gump supervisor in stating to employees that she feared that I might have had plans to kill her and the action of the supervisor in arranging to have her office secured against such a homicidal assault, see record on appeal at 41, was invidiously motivated.
The District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.) expressly affirmed to the D.C. Superior Court in pleadings filed in the above-referenced proceedings, relying on legally-irrelevant "after-acquired" evidence, see McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S.Ct. 879, 885 (1995), that my coworkers had formed genuine fears (i.e., not motivated by discriminatory animus) that I might have been armed and dangerous and poised to carry out a homicidal assault on the firm's premises. See Brief of Respondent in Opposition to Petition for Review of no Probable Cause Determination by Department of Human Rights at 6, Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (citing record on appeal at 276). The District implicitly asserted that my coworkers' concerns about my potential for armed violence were relevant to the employer's decision to terminate my employment.
I stand by the "Statement of Gary Freedman to the Office of U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Regarding Intent to Commit Crime of Violence as Determined by the Law Firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld," ("Statement to the U.S. Attorney") dated April 24, 1995, and made under penalty of criminal sanctions (D.C. Code 22-2514).
I want to advise, however, that representations made by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (M. Justin Draycott, Esq.) to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in December 1997, in the currently pending appeal of the above-referenced litigation, that my coworkers had genuine fears about my potential for armed violence or homicide conflict with the prior Statement to the U.S. Attorney, and that said conflict may give rise to the appearance that representations that I made in the Statement to the U.S. Attorney were unreliable, knowingly false, or perjured.
Additionally, the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel stands by speculation made by the District of Columbia Department of Human Rights that a document I submitted to the agency may have been inauthentic (i.e., forged or fabricated), see record on appeal at 8; presumably, according to the agency, I submitted the possibly inauthentic document in order to deny forensic psychiatric evidence filed by Akin Gump with the agency: forensic psychiatric evidence relating to my mental health (specifically relating to the psychiatric symptom "ideas of reference") and stability (specifically relating to my potential for violence).
In the early evening of Thursday August 6, 1998 two special agents of the U.S. Capitol Police arrived at my home, frisked me for weapons, sought my consent to search my home, and interrogated me in a combatively aggressive manner about an incident that had allegedly occurred earlier in the day. The agents advised me that they had obtained information from individuals employed by the District of Columbia that earlier in the day I had gotten into a violent argument at a mental health clinic operated by the District of Columbia, and that I had threatened to commit a brutally heinous crime involving the use of firearms against unidentified third parties, a threat that would constitute a prosecutable offense. I met the next day with one of the agents at U.S. Capitol Police headquarters at which time he advised me that he had confirmed that, in fact, I had not been at the clinic the previous day, that the incident as reported to the U.S. Capitol Police by individuals employed by the Government of the District of Columbia (Mental Health Services Administration) was based on totally erroneous information.
Robert Chapman, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, is familiar with this matter, and will respond to any questions you may have. The telephone number of the U.S. Attorney's Office is (202) 514 7566.
I enclose several documents pertinent to the matters described above.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
Enclosure: "Authorization for Disclosure" -- Gertrude R. Ticho, M.D.
Lowell was the attorney for uberlobbyist Jack Abramoff. He is currently defending a former lobbyist for the American Israeli Policy Affairs Committee who along with a colleague is accused of trafficking in classified information.
Lowell has acted as counsel to the U.S. House of Representatives, most notably as Chief Investigative Counsel to the Democratic Minority during the impeachment of Bill Clinton. He was Special Counsel to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and human rights violations in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.
In 1998 I sent a job application to Mr. Lowell. I wonder if he made any telephone calls about me.
August 18, 1998
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
#136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Abbe David Lowell, Esq.
Brand & Lowell & Ryan
923 15th Street, NW
Washington, DC
Dear Mr. Lowell:
I am an attorney licensed to practice in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and qualify for consideration for an associate position at Brand & Lowell & Ryan. Preliminary to forwarding a copy of my resume to you I believe I have a legal duty to advise you of the following facts regarding concerns about my potential for armed violence or homicide, intent to purchase firearms to commit a felony, and the illegal transport of a deadly weapon: concerns placed in controversy and affirmed, by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel, as relating to genuine fears about my criminal intent.
The Government of the District of Columbia has affirmed that my former employer, the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump") terminated my employment in October 1991 on the basis of genuine concerns about my mental health and stability, including the potential for violence. The employer's termination decision was made following an ex parte consultation with a psychiatrist who did not examine me personally. Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order, June 10, 1996). As of the filing of the complaint in the said proceedings, in October 1995, and at all times thereafter, it was unlawful under the laws of the District of Columbia for a psychiatrist to offer a professional psychiatric opinion about an individual without benefit of personal examination as is strongly recommended by the American Psychiatric Association's Principles of Medical Ethics. The D.C. Code in its latest revision makes it unlawful for a physician to "[fail] to conform to standards of acceptable conduct and prevailing practice within a health profession." See D.C. Code 2-3305.14(26). This provision was added to the District of Columbia Health Occupations Revision Act by D.C. Law 10-247, enacted on March 23, 1995.
The District of Columbia Superior Court did not find that the action of my Akin Gump supervisor in stating to employees that she feared that I might have had plans to kill her and the action of the supervisor in arranging to have her office secured against such a homicidal assault, see record on appeal at 41, was invidiously motivated.
The District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.) expressly affirmed to the D.C. Superior Court in pleadings filed in the above-referenced proceedings, relying on legally-irrelevant "after-acquired" evidence, see McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S.Ct. 879, 885 (1995), that my coworkers had formed genuine fears (i.e., not motivated by discriminatory animus) that I might have been armed and dangerous and poised to carry out a homicidal assault on the firm's premises. See Brief of Respondent in Opposition to Petition for Review of no Probable Cause Determination by Department of Human Rights at 6, Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (citing record on appeal at 276). The District implicitly asserted that my coworkers' concerns about my potential for armed violence were relevant to the employer's decision to terminate my employment.
I stand by the "Statement of Gary Freedman to the Office of U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Regarding Intent to Commit Crime of Violence as Determined by the Law Firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld," ("Statement to the U.S. Attorney") dated April 24, 1995, and made under penalty of criminal sanctions (D.C. Code 22-2514).
I want to advise, however, that representations made by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (M. Justin Draycott, Esq.) to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in December 1997, in the currently pending appeal of the above-referenced litigation, that my coworkers had genuine fears about my potential for armed violence or homicide conflict with the prior Statement to the U.S. Attorney, and that said conflict may give rise to the appearance that representations that I made in the Statement to the U.S. Attorney were unreliable, knowingly false, or perjured.
Additionally, the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel stands by speculation made by the District of Columbia Department of Human Rights that a document I submitted to the agency may have been inauthentic (i.e., forged or fabricated), see record on appeal at 8; presumably, according to the agency, I submitted the possibly inauthentic document in order to deny forensic psychiatric evidence filed by Akin Gump with the agency: forensic psychiatric evidence relating to my mental health (specifically relating to the psychiatric symptom "ideas of reference") and stability (specifically relating to my potential for violence).
In the early evening of Thursday August 6, 1998 two special agents of the U.S. Capitol Police arrived at my home, frisked me for weapons, sought my consent to search my home, and interrogated me in a combatively aggressive manner about an incident that had allegedly occurred earlier in the day. The agents advised me that they had obtained information from individuals employed by the District of Columbia that earlier in the day I had gotten into a violent argument at a mental health clinic operated by the District of Columbia, and that I had threatened to commit a brutally heinous crime involving the use of firearms against unidentified third parties, a threat that would constitute a prosecutable offense. I met the next day with one of the agents at U.S. Capitol Police headquarters at which time he advised me that he had confirmed that, in fact, I had not been at the clinic the previous day, that the incident as reported to the U.S. Capitol Police by individuals employed by the Government of the District of Columbia (Mental Health Services Administration) was based on totally erroneous information.
Robert Chapman, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, is familiar with this matter, and will respond to any questions you may have. The telephone number of the U.S. Attorney's Office is (202) 514 7566.
I enclose several documents pertinent to the matters described above.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
Enclosure: "Authorization for Disclosure" -- Gertrude R. Ticho, M.D.
A George Washington University Connection?
Sheldon S. Cohen, Esq. used to be a tax partner at the law firm of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius. Mr. Cohen is also a trustee of The George Washington University. In the 1990s I sent Mr. Cohen several letters about my difficulties with the GW Department of Psychiatry, where I was an outpatient. My letters discussed my suspicion that GW was transmitting confidential mental health information about me to my former employer, the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, in violation of the D.C. Mental Health information Act.
In 1999 I sent the following job application to an attorney at Mr. Cohen's law firm that refers to Mr. Cohen (see bold type). I wonder if Mr. Cohen made any telephone calls about me.
April 13, 1999
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Stephanie Naidoff, Esq.
Of Counsel
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius
2000 One Logan Square
Philadelphia, PA 19103-6993
Dear Ms. Naidoff:
I am an attorney licensed to practice in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and qualify for consideration for a position as associate with the firm of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius. Preliminary to forwarding a copy of my resume to Morgan, Lewis & Bockius I believe I have a legal duty to advise the firm of the following facts regarding concerns about my potential for armed violence or homicide, intent to purchase firearms to commit a felony, and the illegal transport of a deadly weapon: concerns placed in controversy and affirmed, by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.), as relating to genuine fears about my criminal intent.
The Government of the District of Columbia has affirmed that my former employer, the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump") terminated my employment in October 1991 on the basis of genuine concerns about my mental health and stability, including the potential for violence. The employer's termination decision was made following an ex parte consultation with a psychiatrist who did not examine me personally. Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order, June 10, 1996), affirmed by the D.C. Court of Appeals (Terry, Reid, and King, associate judges), No. 96-CV-961 (Memorandum Opinion and Judgment filed Sept. 1, 1998).
As of the filing of the complaint in the Superior Court proceedings, in October 1995, and at all times thereafter, it was unlawful under the laws of the District of Columbia for a psychiatrist to offer a professional psychiatric opinion about an individual without benefit of personal examination as is strongly recommended by the American Psychiatric Association's Principles of Medical Ethics. The D.C. Code in its latest revision makes it unlawful for a physician to "[fail] to conform to standards of acceptable conduct and prevailing practice within a health profession." See D.C. Code 2-3305.14(26). This provision was added to the District of Columbia Health Occupations Revision Act by D.C. Law 10-247, enacted on March 23, 1995. The Court of Appeals expressly found that the professional psychiatric opinion offered by the psychiatrist to the employer amounted to the diagnosis of a "disorder." See No. 96-CV-961 at 4.
The District of Columbia Superior Court as well as the Court of Appeals did not find that the action of my Akin Gump supervisor in stating to employees that she feared that I might have had plans to kill her, and the action of the supervisor in arranging to have her office secured against such a homicidal assault, see record on appeal at 41, was invidiously motivated. The supervisor (Robertson) is designated by the employer as one of the three decisionmakers who terminated my employment, see record on appeal at 167, which termination decision was based in part on the above-referenced psychiatric evidence that tended to show that I posed a risk of violence. Robertson's termination decision was made in consultation with Dennis M. Race, Esq., a senior Akin Gump partner, see record on appeal at 138 and 167.
Mr. Race has expressly affirmed, under penalty of D.C. Code 1-2529 (D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977: false documents or testimony), that (unspecified) acts of "violence," see record on appeal at 140, that I committed during my tenure at the firm coupled with the firm's reasonable fear that my future conduct might expose the firm to tort liability, see record on appeal at 148 (possibly including tort damages for wrongful death, cf. record on appeal at 41), justified the firm's decision to terminate my employment.
The District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel expressly affirmed to the D.C. Superior Court and to the Court of Appeals in pleadings filed in the above-referenced proceedings, relying on legally-irrelevant "after-acquired" evidence, see McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S.Ct. 879, 885 (1995), that my coworkers had formed genuine fears (i.e., not motivated by discriminatory animus) that I might have been armed and dangerous and poised to carry out a homicidal assault on the firm's premises. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia Department of Human Rights and Minority Business Development at 9, Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Court of Appeals No. 96-CV-961 (citing record on appeal at 276). The District implicitly asserted that my coworkers' concerns about my potential for armed violence were relevant to the employer's decision to terminate my employment.
I stand by the "Statement of Gary Freedman to the Office of U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Regarding Intent to Commit Crime of Violence as Determined by the Law Firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld," ("Statement to the U.S. Attorney") dated April 24, 1995, and made under penalty of criminal sanctions (D.C. Code 22-2514).
I want to advise, however, that representations made by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (M. Justin Draycott, Esq.) to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals at oral argument in December 1997 that I "admitted" in pleadings that I filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights that my "coworkers" were genuinely "afraid" of me (specifically with regard to my potential for armed violence or homicide) conflict with the prior Statement to the U.S. Attorney, and that said conflict may give rise to the appearance that the exculpatory representations that I made in the Statement to the U.S. Attorney were knowingly false, misleading, or perjurious.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals has affirmed, see D.C. No. 96-CV-961 at 3 n. 1, that the Department of Human Rights had legally-valid concerns that a document I submitted to the agency (which purports to have been written by the psychiatrist consulted by Akin Gump) may have been inauthentic (i.e., forged or fabricated), see record on appeal at 8. Presumably, according to the agency, I submitted the possibly inauthentic document in order to deny forensic psychiatric evidence filed by Akin Gump with the agency: forensic psychiatric evidence that related to my mental health (specifically relating to a psychiatric "disorder" that my employer had attributed to me, see D.C. No. 96-CV-961 at 4) and stability (specifically relating to my potential for violence). But see Namerdy v. Generalcar, 217 A.2d 109, 111-112 (D.C. 1966) (circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that a letter is written on the author's letterhead, is sufficient for authentication).
For your additional information I forward a document submission that I made to the Federal Protective Service (Jerry McGill, S.A.) under cover letter dated Sept. 8, 1997 under penalty of a criminal investigation.
Robert Chapman, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, is familiar with this matter. The telephone number of the U.S. Attorney's Office in Washington is (202) 514-7566. Also, I have had several written communications with Sheldon S. Cohen, Esq., a partner at the Washington, DC office of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius.
I am confident that defamatory statements about me that may raise substantial concerns about my mental stability and fitness to practice law, even acts of defamation committed by the law partners of a close friend of the President of the United States (Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Esq.) and acts of defamation committed by the current chief White House counsel to President Clinton (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.), will in no way impair my chances for fair consideration for employment by your firm.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
In 1999 I sent the following job application to an attorney at Mr. Cohen's law firm that refers to Mr. Cohen (see bold type). I wonder if Mr. Cohen made any telephone calls about me.
April 13, 1999
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Stephanie Naidoff, Esq.
Of Counsel
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius
2000 One Logan Square
Philadelphia, PA 19103-6993
Dear Ms. Naidoff:
I am an attorney licensed to practice in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and qualify for consideration for a position as associate with the firm of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius. Preliminary to forwarding a copy of my resume to Morgan, Lewis & Bockius I believe I have a legal duty to advise the firm of the following facts regarding concerns about my potential for armed violence or homicide, intent to purchase firearms to commit a felony, and the illegal transport of a deadly weapon: concerns placed in controversy and affirmed, by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.), as relating to genuine fears about my criminal intent.
The Government of the District of Columbia has affirmed that my former employer, the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump") terminated my employment in October 1991 on the basis of genuine concerns about my mental health and stability, including the potential for violence. The employer's termination decision was made following an ex parte consultation with a psychiatrist who did not examine me personally. Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order, June 10, 1996), affirmed by the D.C. Court of Appeals (Terry, Reid, and King, associate judges), No. 96-CV-961 (Memorandum Opinion and Judgment filed Sept. 1, 1998).
As of the filing of the complaint in the Superior Court proceedings, in October 1995, and at all times thereafter, it was unlawful under the laws of the District of Columbia for a psychiatrist to offer a professional psychiatric opinion about an individual without benefit of personal examination as is strongly recommended by the American Psychiatric Association's Principles of Medical Ethics. The D.C. Code in its latest revision makes it unlawful for a physician to "[fail] to conform to standards of acceptable conduct and prevailing practice within a health profession." See D.C. Code 2-3305.14(26). This provision was added to the District of Columbia Health Occupations Revision Act by D.C. Law 10-247, enacted on March 23, 1995. The Court of Appeals expressly found that the professional psychiatric opinion offered by the psychiatrist to the employer amounted to the diagnosis of a "disorder." See No. 96-CV-961 at 4.
The District of Columbia Superior Court as well as the Court of Appeals did not find that the action of my Akin Gump supervisor in stating to employees that she feared that I might have had plans to kill her, and the action of the supervisor in arranging to have her office secured against such a homicidal assault, see record on appeal at 41, was invidiously motivated. The supervisor (Robertson) is designated by the employer as one of the three decisionmakers who terminated my employment, see record on appeal at 167, which termination decision was based in part on the above-referenced psychiatric evidence that tended to show that I posed a risk of violence. Robertson's termination decision was made in consultation with Dennis M. Race, Esq., a senior Akin Gump partner, see record on appeal at 138 and 167.
Mr. Race has expressly affirmed, under penalty of D.C. Code 1-2529 (D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977: false documents or testimony), that (unspecified) acts of "violence," see record on appeal at 140, that I committed during my tenure at the firm coupled with the firm's reasonable fear that my future conduct might expose the firm to tort liability, see record on appeal at 148 (possibly including tort damages for wrongful death, cf. record on appeal at 41), justified the firm's decision to terminate my employment.
The District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel expressly affirmed to the D.C. Superior Court and to the Court of Appeals in pleadings filed in the above-referenced proceedings, relying on legally-irrelevant "after-acquired" evidence, see McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S.Ct. 879, 885 (1995), that my coworkers had formed genuine fears (i.e., not motivated by discriminatory animus) that I might have been armed and dangerous and poised to carry out a homicidal assault on the firm's premises. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia Department of Human Rights and Minority Business Development at 9, Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Court of Appeals No. 96-CV-961 (citing record on appeal at 276). The District implicitly asserted that my coworkers' concerns about my potential for armed violence were relevant to the employer's decision to terminate my employment.
I stand by the "Statement of Gary Freedman to the Office of U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Regarding Intent to Commit Crime of Violence as Determined by the Law Firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld," ("Statement to the U.S. Attorney") dated April 24, 1995, and made under penalty of criminal sanctions (D.C. Code 22-2514).
I want to advise, however, that representations made by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (M. Justin Draycott, Esq.) to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals at oral argument in December 1997 that I "admitted" in pleadings that I filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights that my "coworkers" were genuinely "afraid" of me (specifically with regard to my potential for armed violence or homicide) conflict with the prior Statement to the U.S. Attorney, and that said conflict may give rise to the appearance that the exculpatory representations that I made in the Statement to the U.S. Attorney were knowingly false, misleading, or perjurious.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals has affirmed, see D.C. No. 96-CV-961 at 3 n. 1, that the Department of Human Rights had legally-valid concerns that a document I submitted to the agency (which purports to have been written by the psychiatrist consulted by Akin Gump) may have been inauthentic (i.e., forged or fabricated), see record on appeal at 8. Presumably, according to the agency, I submitted the possibly inauthentic document in order to deny forensic psychiatric evidence filed by Akin Gump with the agency: forensic psychiatric evidence that related to my mental health (specifically relating to a psychiatric "disorder" that my employer had attributed to me, see D.C. No. 96-CV-961 at 4) and stability (specifically relating to my potential for violence). But see Namerdy v. Generalcar, 217 A.2d 109, 111-112 (D.C. 1966) (circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that a letter is written on the author's letterhead, is sufficient for authentication).
For your additional information I forward a document submission that I made to the Federal Protective Service (Jerry McGill, S.A.) under cover letter dated Sept. 8, 1997 under penalty of a criminal investigation.
Robert Chapman, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, is familiar with this matter. The telephone number of the U.S. Attorney's Office in Washington is (202) 514-7566. Also, I have had several written communications with Sheldon S. Cohen, Esq., a partner at the Washington, DC office of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius.
I am confident that defamatory statements about me that may raise substantial concerns about my mental stability and fitness to practice law, even acts of defamation committed by the law partners of a close friend of the President of the United States (Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Esq.) and acts of defamation committed by the current chief White House counsel to President Clinton (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.), will in no way impair my chances for fair consideration for employment by your firm.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
Did Floyd Abrams, Esq. Make Any Phone Calls About Me?
Floyd Abrams is an American attorney at Cahill Gordon & Reindel. He is an expert on constitutional law, and many arguments in the briefs he has written before the United States Supreme Court have been adopted as United States Constitutional interpretative law as it relates to the First Amendment and free speech. He is the William J. Brennan Jr. Visiting Professor at the Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University. Abrams argued for The New York Times and Judith Miller in the CIA leak grand jury investigation. Abrams joined Cahill Gordon & Reindel in 1963, and became a partner in 1970.
Mr. Abrams son, Dan Abrams, is an American television host, legal commentator, and web entrepreneur. He is the Chief Legal Analyst for NBC News, and formerly served as General Manager of MSNBC and as an anchor for that network. He is currently the publisher of Mediaite, a media news website, and the CEO of Abrams Research, a media-focused expert network. Dan Abrams reported on the O.J. Simpson case for NBC News in the 1990s (see the close of the letter, below).
In 1999 I sent Floyd Abrams a job application. I wonder if he made any telephone calls about me.
January 6, 1999
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Floyd Abrams, Esq.
Cahill Gordon & Reindel
New York, NY 10005-1702
Dear Mr. Abrams:
I am an attorney licensed to practice in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and qualify for consideration for a position as associate with the firm of Cahill Gordon & Reindel. Preliminary to forwarding a copy of my resume to Cahill Gordon I believe I have a legal duty to advise the firm of the following facts regarding concerns about my potential for armed violence or homicide, intent to purchase firearms to commit a felony, and the illegal transport of a deadly weapon: concerns placed in controversy and affirmed, by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.), as relating to genuine fears about my criminal intent.
The Government of the District of Columbia has affirmed that my former employer, the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump") terminated my employment in October 1991 on the basis of genuine concerns about my mental health and stability, including the potential for violence. The employer's termination decision was made following an ex parte consultation with a psychiatrist who did not examine me personally. Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order, June 10, 1996), affirmed by the D.C. Court of Appeals (Terry, Reid, and King, associate judges), No. 96-CV-961 (Memorandum Opinion and Judgment filed Sept. 1, 1998).
As of the filing of the complaint in the Superior Court proceedings, in October 1995, and at all times thereafter, it was unlawful under the laws of the District of Columbia for a psychiatrist to offer a professional psychiatric opinion about an individual without benefit of personal examination as is strongly recommended by the American Psychiatric Association's Principles of Medical Ethics. The D.C. Code in its latest revision makes it unlawful for a physician to "[fail] to conform to standards of acceptable conduct and prevailing practice within a health profession." See D.C. Code 2-3305.14(26). This provision was added to the District of Columbia Health Occupations Revision Act by D.C. Law 10-247, enacted on March 23, 1995. The Court of Appeals expressly found that the professional psychiatric opinion offered by the psychiatrist to the employer amounted to the diagnosis of a "disorder." See No. 96-CV-961 at 4.
The District of Columbia Superior Court as well as the Court of Appeals did not find that the action of my Akin Gump supervisor in stating to employees that she feared that I might have had plans to kill her, and the action of the supervisor in arranging to have her office secured against such a homicidal assault, see record on appeal at 41, was invidiously motivated. The supervisor (Robertson) is designated by the employer as one of the three decisionmakers who terminated my employment, see record on appeal at 167, which termination decision was based in part on the above-referenced psychiatric evidence that tended to show that I posed a risk of violence. Robertson's termination decision was made in consultation with Dennis M. Race, Esq., a senior Akin Gump partner, see record on appeal at 138 and 167.
Mr. Race has expressly affirmed, under penalty of D.C. Code 1-2529 (D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977: false documents or testimony), that (unspecified) acts of "violence," see record on appeal at 140, that I committed during my tenure at the firm coupled with the firm's reasonable fear that my future conduct might expose the firm to tort liability, see record on appeal at 148 (possibly including tort damages for wrongful death, cf. record on appeal at 41), justified the firm's decision to terminate my employment.
The District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel expressly affirmed to the D.C. Superior Court and to the Court of Appeals in pleadings filed in the above-referenced proceedings, relying on legally-irrelevant "after-acquired" evidence, see McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S.Ct. 879, 885 (1995), that my coworkers had formed genuine fears (i.e., not motivated by discriminatory animus) that I might have been armed and dangerous and poised to carry out a homicidal assault on the firm's premises. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia Department of Human Rights and Minority Business Development at 9, Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Court of Appeals No. 96-CV-961 (citing record on appeal at 276). The District implicitly asserted that my coworkers' concerns about my potential for armed violence were relevant to the employer's decision to terminate my employment.
I stand by the "Statement of Gary Freedman to the Office of U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Regarding Intent to Commit Crime of Violence as Determined by the Law Firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld," ("Statement to the U.S. Attorney") dated April 24, 1995, and made under penalty of criminal sanctions (D.C. Code 22-2514).
I want to advise, however, that representations made by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (M. Justin Draycott, Esq.) to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals at oral argument in December 1997 that I "admitted" in pleadings that I filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights that my "coworkers" were genuinely "afraid" of me (specifically with regard to my potential for armed violence or homicide) conflict with the prior Statement to the U.S. Attorney, and that said conflict may give rise to the appearance that the exculpatory representations that I made in the Statement to the U.S. Attorney were misleading, knowingly false, or perjurious.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals has affirmed, see D.C. No. 96-CV-961 at 3 n. 1, that the Department of Human Rights had legally-valid concerns that a document I submitted to the agency (which purports to have been written by the psychiatrist consulted by Akin Gump) may have been inauthentic (i.e., forged or fabricated), see record on appeal at 8. Presumably, according to the agency, I submitted the possibly inauthentic document in order to deny forensic psychiatric evidence filed by Akin Gump with the agency: forensic psychiatric evidence that related to my mental health (specifically relating to a psychiatric "disorder" that my employer had attributed to me, see D.C. No. 96-CV-961 at 4) and stability (specifically relating to my potential for violence). But see Namerdy v. Generalcar, 217 A.2d 109, 111-112 (D.C. 1966) (circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that a letter is written on the author's letterhead, is sufficient for authentication).
For your additional information I forward a document submission that I made to the Federal Protective Service (Jerry McGill, S.A.) under cover letter dated Sept. 8, 1997 under penalty of a criminal investigation.
Robert Chapman, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, is familiar with this matter. The telephone number of the U.S. Attorney's Office in Washington is (202) 514-7566.
I am confident that defamatory statements about me that may raise substantial concerns about my mental stability and fitness to practice law, even acts of defamation committed by the law partners of a close friend of the President of the United States (Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Esq.) and acts of defamation committed by the current chief White House counsel to President Clinton (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.), will in no way impair my chances for fair consideration for employment by your firm.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
Mr. Abrams:
I thought that the legal analysis of the O.J. Simpson trial by your son, for NBC, was some of the most insightful and thoughtful analysis on television.
My name wouldn't happen to ring a bell for your son, would it?
Mr. Abrams son, Dan Abrams, is an American television host, legal commentator, and web entrepreneur. He is the Chief Legal Analyst for NBC News, and formerly served as General Manager of MSNBC and as an anchor for that network. He is currently the publisher of Mediaite, a media news website, and the CEO of Abrams Research, a media-focused expert network. Dan Abrams reported on the O.J. Simpson case for NBC News in the 1990s (see the close of the letter, below).
In 1999 I sent Floyd Abrams a job application. I wonder if he made any telephone calls about me.
January 6, 1999
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW #136
Washington, DC 20008-4530
Floyd Abrams, Esq.
Cahill Gordon & Reindel
New York, NY 10005-1702
Dear Mr. Abrams:
I am an attorney licensed to practice in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and qualify for consideration for a position as associate with the firm of Cahill Gordon & Reindel. Preliminary to forwarding a copy of my resume to Cahill Gordon I believe I have a legal duty to advise the firm of the following facts regarding concerns about my potential for armed violence or homicide, intent to purchase firearms to commit a felony, and the illegal transport of a deadly weapon: concerns placed in controversy and affirmed, by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.), as relating to genuine fears about my criminal intent.
The Government of the District of Columbia has affirmed that my former employer, the Washington, DC office of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld ("Akin Gump") terminated my employment in October 1991 on the basis of genuine concerns about my mental health and stability, including the potential for violence. The employer's termination decision was made following an ex parte consultation with a psychiatrist who did not examine me personally. Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Superior Court no. MPA 95-14 (final order, June 10, 1996), affirmed by the D.C. Court of Appeals (Terry, Reid, and King, associate judges), No. 96-CV-961 (Memorandum Opinion and Judgment filed Sept. 1, 1998).
As of the filing of the complaint in the Superior Court proceedings, in October 1995, and at all times thereafter, it was unlawful under the laws of the District of Columbia for a psychiatrist to offer a professional psychiatric opinion about an individual without benefit of personal examination as is strongly recommended by the American Psychiatric Association's Principles of Medical Ethics. The D.C. Code in its latest revision makes it unlawful for a physician to "[fail] to conform to standards of acceptable conduct and prevailing practice within a health profession." See D.C. Code 2-3305.14(26). This provision was added to the District of Columbia Health Occupations Revision Act by D.C. Law 10-247, enacted on March 23, 1995. The Court of Appeals expressly found that the professional psychiatric opinion offered by the psychiatrist to the employer amounted to the diagnosis of a "disorder." See No. 96-CV-961 at 4.
The District of Columbia Superior Court as well as the Court of Appeals did not find that the action of my Akin Gump supervisor in stating to employees that she feared that I might have had plans to kill her, and the action of the supervisor in arranging to have her office secured against such a homicidal assault, see record on appeal at 41, was invidiously motivated. The supervisor (Robertson) is designated by the employer as one of the three decisionmakers who terminated my employment, see record on appeal at 167, which termination decision was based in part on the above-referenced psychiatric evidence that tended to show that I posed a risk of violence. Robertson's termination decision was made in consultation with Dennis M. Race, Esq., a senior Akin Gump partner, see record on appeal at 138 and 167.
Mr. Race has expressly affirmed, under penalty of D.C. Code 1-2529 (D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977: false documents or testimony), that (unspecified) acts of "violence," see record on appeal at 140, that I committed during my tenure at the firm coupled with the firm's reasonable fear that my future conduct might expose the firm to tort liability, see record on appeal at 148 (possibly including tort damages for wrongful death, cf. record on appeal at 41), justified the firm's decision to terminate my employment.
The District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel expressly affirmed to the D.C. Superior Court and to the Court of Appeals in pleadings filed in the above-referenced proceedings, relying on legally-irrelevant "after-acquired" evidence, see McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S.Ct. 879, 885 (1995), that my coworkers had formed genuine fears (i.e., not motivated by discriminatory animus) that I might have been armed and dangerous and poised to carry out a homicidal assault on the firm's premises. See Brief of Appellee District of Columbia Department of Human Rights and Minority Business Development at 9, Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C. Court of Appeals No. 96-CV-961 (citing record on appeal at 276). The District implicitly asserted that my coworkers' concerns about my potential for armed violence were relevant to the employer's decision to terminate my employment.
I stand by the "Statement of Gary Freedman to the Office of U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Regarding Intent to Commit Crime of Violence as Determined by the Law Firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld," ("Statement to the U.S. Attorney") dated April 24, 1995, and made under penalty of criminal sanctions (D.C. Code 22-2514).
I want to advise, however, that representations made by the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel (M. Justin Draycott, Esq.) to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals at oral argument in December 1997 that I "admitted" in pleadings that I filed with the D.C. Department of Human Rights that my "coworkers" were genuinely "afraid" of me (specifically with regard to my potential for armed violence or homicide) conflict with the prior Statement to the U.S. Attorney, and that said conflict may give rise to the appearance that the exculpatory representations that I made in the Statement to the U.S. Attorney were misleading, knowingly false, or perjurious.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals has affirmed, see D.C. No. 96-CV-961 at 3 n. 1, that the Department of Human Rights had legally-valid concerns that a document I submitted to the agency (which purports to have been written by the psychiatrist consulted by Akin Gump) may have been inauthentic (i.e., forged or fabricated), see record on appeal at 8. Presumably, according to the agency, I submitted the possibly inauthentic document in order to deny forensic psychiatric evidence filed by Akin Gump with the agency: forensic psychiatric evidence that related to my mental health (specifically relating to a psychiatric "disorder" that my employer had attributed to me, see D.C. No. 96-CV-961 at 4) and stability (specifically relating to my potential for violence). But see Namerdy v. Generalcar, 217 A.2d 109, 111-112 (D.C. 1966) (circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that a letter is written on the author's letterhead, is sufficient for authentication).
For your additional information I forward a document submission that I made to the Federal Protective Service (Jerry McGill, S.A.) under cover letter dated Sept. 8, 1997 under penalty of a criminal investigation.
Robert Chapman, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, is familiar with this matter. The telephone number of the U.S. Attorney's Office in Washington is (202) 514-7566.
I am confident that defamatory statements about me that may raise substantial concerns about my mental stability and fitness to practice law, even acts of defamation committed by the law partners of a close friend of the President of the United States (Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Esq.) and acts of defamation committed by the current chief White House counsel to President Clinton (Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.), will in no way impair my chances for fair consideration for employment by your firm.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
Mr. Abrams:
I thought that the legal analysis of the O.J. Simpson trial by your son, for NBC, was some of the most insightful and thoughtful analysis on television.
My name wouldn't happen to ring a bell for your son, would it?
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