November 30, 2015
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apartment 136
Washington, DC 20008
Tanya A. Royster, M.D.
Acting Director
D.C. Department of Behavioral Health
64 New York Avenue, NE
3rd Floor
Washington, DC 20002
Dear Dr. Royster:
I am a consumer of
mental health services provided by the D.C. Department of Behavioral
Health (DBH). I receive weekly out-patient psychotherapy from Alice E.
Stone, M.D., a third-year psychiatry resident working under the
supervision of Earl Baughman, M.D. (St. Elizabeths Hospital). I have
been a DBH consumer since mid-year 1996, 19 years. Supportive psychotherapy is inadequate for my needs. I believe I need psychodynamic
psychotherapy.
In wrongful termination litigation from the year 1993 I made an admission against interest that I require intensive psychodynamic psychotherapy, preferably with a psychoanalytically-trained therapist like Stanley R. Palombo, M.D. The District Government did not dispute my admission. See Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights, D.C.C.A no. 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998), record on appeal at 499-500 (enclosed).
Increasingly
I view my situation as precarious, desperate and futile. The failure of DBH to provide adequate
treatment for me is a terrible strain.
The District Government admits that my case is extremely serious. See Letter dated July 30, 2015 from Gary
Freedman to Barbara J. Bazron (enclosed).
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
Friday, November 27, 2015
Monday, November 23, 2015
Letter to DC DBH
November 23, 2015
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apartment 136
Washington, DC 20008
Tanya A. Royster, M.D.
Acting Director
D.C. Department of Behavioral Health64 New York Avenue, NE
3rd Floor
Washington, DC 20002
Dear Dr. Royster:
I am a consumer of mental health services provided by the D.C. Department of Behavioral Health (DBH). I receive weekly out-patient psychotherapy from Alice E. Stone, M.D., a third-year psychiatry resident working under the supervision of Earl Baughman, M.D. (St. Elizabeths Hospital). I have been a DBH consumer since mid-year 1996, 19 years. I do not derive benefit from supportive psychotherapy. I believe I need psychodynamic psychotherapy. Is there something that DBH could do to help me obtain psychodynamic psychotherapy?
I enclose for your information a psychological profile that details my personality problems as I see them.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apartment 136
Washington, DC 20008
Tanya A. Royster, M.D.
Acting Director
D.C. Department of Behavioral Health64 New York Avenue, NE
3rd Floor
Washington, DC 20002
Dear Dr. Royster:
I am a consumer of mental health services provided by the D.C. Department of Behavioral Health (DBH). I receive weekly out-patient psychotherapy from Alice E. Stone, M.D., a third-year psychiatry resident working under the supervision of Earl Baughman, M.D. (St. Elizabeths Hospital). I have been a DBH consumer since mid-year 1996, 19 years. I do not derive benefit from supportive psychotherapy. I believe I need psychodynamic psychotherapy. Is there something that DBH could do to help me obtain psychodynamic psychotherapy?
I enclose for your information a psychological profile that details my personality problems as I see them.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
Tuesday, November 10, 2015
Letter to the Attorney General of the United States
November 10, 2015
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apt. 136
Washington, DC 20008
The Honorable Karl A. Racine
Office of the Attorney General
Government of the District of Columbia
Judiciary Square
441 4th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001
Phone: (202) 727-3400
Fax: (202) 347-8922
RE: Current Psychiatric Treatment
Dear Mr. Racine:
This will advise the Office of Attorney General that on the afternoon of November 9, 2015 I had a psychiatric consultation with Alice E. Stone, M.D., a psychiatry resident affiliated with St. Elizabeths Hospital working under the supervision of Earl Baughman, M.D. There is evidence that said psychiatric consultation, whose cost is billed to DC Medicaid and Medicare, was medically questionable or fraudulent.
I receive weekly psychotherapy provided by the D.C. Department of Behavioral Health consistent with a determination made by the D.C. Department of Human Rights that effective October 29, 1991, my former employer, the D.C. law firm of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld had genuine and credible reasons to conclude that I required counseling for a paranoid "disorder" that might be associated with a risk of violent conduct. See Initial Determination, D.C. Department of Human Rights (DOHR), Freedman v. Akin Gump Hauer & Feld, Docket No.: 92-087-P(N) (June 30, 1993) ("Respondent also consulted mental health professionals who advised that Complainant did in fact need counseling and may exhibit violent behavior"); See also, DOHR Final Determination (September 24, 1993) ("That concern coupled with the advice of mental health professionals that Complainant needed counseling and that according to one professional could engage in violent behavior, was sufficient grounds for Respondent’s action to terminate Complainant.").
I was administered psychological testing by The George Washington University Medical Center Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Science in 1994 and in 1996. The testing failed to disclose that I suffer from any diagnosable mental illness. I achieved a perfect score on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (6 errors) in 1996, which virtually rules out schizophrenia and delusional disorder. See Ibanez-Casas, I. "Deficits in Executive and Memory Processes in Delusional Disorder: A Case-Controlled Study." PLoS One, 2013 Jul 2;8(7):e67341.
I have been diagnosed with psychotic mental illness -- Paranoid (Delusional) Disorder (consistent with the prior findings of DOHR) -- and receive monthly disability benefits paid by the U.S. Social Security Administration therefor. There is evidence that the only reason I qualify for disability benefits is that I believe I have been the victim of a longstanding criminal conspiracy carried out by attorney managers of the D.C. law firm of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, my former employer. There is evidence that St. Elizabeths Hospital is billing D.C. Medicaid and Medicare for the treatment of nonexistent mental illness. But see, Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C.C.A 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998) (Akin Gump had genuine and credible reasons to determine that I suffered from mental illness that rendered me unemployable and a direct threat in the workplace).
In fact, Akin Gump's disability determination was based on a medically worthless psychiatric opinion, offered by a psychiatrist who did not examine me personally and who did not obtain my written consent for the opinion. See American Psychiatric Association (APA) Goldwater Rule, Section 7.3 of the APA's ethics principles. As of the filing of the complaint in the Superior Court proceedings (cited above), in October 1995, and at all times thereafter, it was unlawful under the laws of the District of Columbia for a psychiatrist to offer a professional psychiatric opinion about an individual without benefit of personal examination per APA Section 7.3. The D.C. Code in its latest revision makes it unlawful for a physician to "[fail] to conform to standards of acceptable conduct and prevailing practice within a health profession." See D.C. Code 2-3305.14(26). This provision was added to the District of Columbia Health Occupations Revision Act by D.C. Law 10-247, enacted on March 23, 1995. The Court of Appeals in Freedman v. DHR expressly found that the professional psychiatric opinion offered by the psychiatrist to the employer amounted to the diagnosis of a "disorder." See No. 96-CV-961 at 4. Under current District law the actions of my former employer, Akin Gump in soliciting an illegal act by a psychiatrist might be deemed prosecutable as conspiracy and solicitation.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
cc: U.S. Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apt. 136
Washington, DC 20008
The Honorable Karl A. Racine
Office of the Attorney General
Government of the District of Columbia
Judiciary Square
441 4th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001
Phone: (202) 727-3400
Fax: (202) 347-8922
RE: Current Psychiatric Treatment
Dear Mr. Racine:
This will advise the Office of Attorney General that on the afternoon of November 9, 2015 I had a psychiatric consultation with Alice E. Stone, M.D., a psychiatry resident affiliated with St. Elizabeths Hospital working under the supervision of Earl Baughman, M.D. There is evidence that said psychiatric consultation, whose cost is billed to DC Medicaid and Medicare, was medically questionable or fraudulent.
I receive weekly psychotherapy provided by the D.C. Department of Behavioral Health consistent with a determination made by the D.C. Department of Human Rights that effective October 29, 1991, my former employer, the D.C. law firm of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld had genuine and credible reasons to conclude that I required counseling for a paranoid "disorder" that might be associated with a risk of violent conduct. See Initial Determination, D.C. Department of Human Rights (DOHR), Freedman v. Akin Gump Hauer & Feld, Docket No.: 92-087-P(N) (June 30, 1993) ("Respondent also consulted mental health professionals who advised that Complainant did in fact need counseling and may exhibit violent behavior"); See also, DOHR Final Determination (September 24, 1993) ("That concern coupled with the advice of mental health professionals that Complainant needed counseling and that according to one professional could engage in violent behavior, was sufficient grounds for Respondent’s action to terminate Complainant.").
I was administered psychological testing by The George Washington University Medical Center Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Science in 1994 and in 1996. The testing failed to disclose that I suffer from any diagnosable mental illness. I achieved a perfect score on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (6 errors) in 1996, which virtually rules out schizophrenia and delusional disorder. See Ibanez-Casas, I. "Deficits in Executive and Memory Processes in Delusional Disorder: A Case-Controlled Study." PLoS One, 2013 Jul 2;8(7):e67341.
I have been diagnosed with psychotic mental illness -- Paranoid (Delusional) Disorder (consistent with the prior findings of DOHR) -- and receive monthly disability benefits paid by the U.S. Social Security Administration therefor. There is evidence that the only reason I qualify for disability benefits is that I believe I have been the victim of a longstanding criminal conspiracy carried out by attorney managers of the D.C. law firm of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, my former employer. There is evidence that St. Elizabeths Hospital is billing D.C. Medicaid and Medicare for the treatment of nonexistent mental illness. But see, Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C.C.A 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998) (Akin Gump had genuine and credible reasons to determine that I suffered from mental illness that rendered me unemployable and a direct threat in the workplace).
In fact, Akin Gump's disability determination was based on a medically worthless psychiatric opinion, offered by a psychiatrist who did not examine me personally and who did not obtain my written consent for the opinion. See American Psychiatric Association (APA) Goldwater Rule, Section 7.3 of the APA's ethics principles. As of the filing of the complaint in the Superior Court proceedings (cited above), in October 1995, and at all times thereafter, it was unlawful under the laws of the District of Columbia for a psychiatrist to offer a professional psychiatric opinion about an individual without benefit of personal examination per APA Section 7.3. The D.C. Code in its latest revision makes it unlawful for a physician to "[fail] to conform to standards of acceptable conduct and prevailing practice within a health profession." See D.C. Code 2-3305.14(26). This provision was added to the District of Columbia Health Occupations Revision Act by D.C. Law 10-247, enacted on March 23, 1995. The Court of Appeals in Freedman v. DHR expressly found that the professional psychiatric opinion offered by the psychiatrist to the employer amounted to the diagnosis of a "disorder." See No. 96-CV-961 at 4. Under current District law the actions of my former employer, Akin Gump in soliciting an illegal act by a psychiatrist might be deemed prosecutable as conspiracy and solicitation.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
cc: U.S. Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch
Friday, November 06, 2015
Letter to DC Attorney General
November 6, 2015
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apt. 136
Washington, DC 20008
The Honorable Karl A. Racine
Office of the Attorney General
Government of the District of Columbia
Judiciary Square
441 4th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001
Phone: (202) 727-3400
Fax: (202) 347-8922
RE: Current Psychiatric Treatment
Dear Mr. Racine:
This will advise the Office of Attorney General that I am currently in weekly out-patient psychotherapy with Alice E. Stone, M.D., a psychiatry resident affiliated with St. Elizabeths Hospital working under the supervision of Earl Baughman, M.D.
I was administered psychological testing by The George Washington University Medical Center Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Science in 1994 and in 1996. The testing failed to disclose that I suffer from any diagnosable mental illness. I achieved a perfect score on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (6 errors) in 1996, which virtually rules out schizophrenia and delusional disorder. See Ibanez-Casas, I. "Deficits in Executive and Memory Processes in Delusional Disorder: A Case-Controlled Study." PLoS One, 2013 Jul 2;8(7):e67341.
I have been diagnosed with psychotic mental illness -- Paranoid (Delusional) Disorder -- and receive monthly disability benefits paid by the U.S. Social Security Administration therefor. The cost of psychiatric treatment is reimbursed by Medicare. There is evidence that the only reason I qualify for disability benefits is that I believe I have been the victim of a longstanding criminal conspiracy carried out by attorney managers of the D.C. law firm of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, my former employer. There is evidence that St. Elizabeths Hospital is billing Medicare for the treatment of nonexistent mental illness. But see, Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C.C.A 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998) (Akin Gump had genuine and credible reasons to determine that I suffered from mental illness that rendered me unemployable and a direct threat in the workplace).
In fact, Akin Gump's disability determination was based on a medically worthless psychiatric opinion, offered by a psychiatrist who did not examine me personally and who did not obtain my written consent for the opinion. See American Psychiatric Association (APA) Goldwater Rule, Section 7.3 of the APA's ethics principles. As of the filing of the complaint in the Superior Court proceedings (cited above), in October 1995, and at all times thereafter, it was unlawful under the laws of the District of Columbia for a psychiatrist to offer a professional psychiatric opinion about an individual without benefit of personal examination per APA Section 7.3. The D.C. Code in its latest revision makes it unlawful for a physician to "[fail] to conform to standards of acceptable conduct and prevailing practice within a health profession." See D.C. Code 2-3305.14(26). This provision was added to the District of Columbia Health Occupations Revision Act by D.C. Law 10-247, enacted on March 23, 1995. The Court of Appeals in Freedman v. DHR expressly found that the professional psychiatric opinion offered by the psychiatrist to the employer amounted to the diagnosis of a "disorder." See No. 96-CV-961 at 4. Under current District law the actions of my former employer, Akin Gump in soliciting an illegal act by a psychiatrist might be deemed prosecutable as conspiracy and solicitation.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
cc: U.S. Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apt. 136
Washington, DC 20008
The Honorable Karl A. Racine
Office of the Attorney General
Government of the District of Columbia
Judiciary Square
441 4th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001
Phone: (202) 727-3400
Fax: (202) 347-8922
RE: Current Psychiatric Treatment
Dear Mr. Racine:
This will advise the Office of Attorney General that I am currently in weekly out-patient psychotherapy with Alice E. Stone, M.D., a psychiatry resident affiliated with St. Elizabeths Hospital working under the supervision of Earl Baughman, M.D.
I was administered psychological testing by The George Washington University Medical Center Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Science in 1994 and in 1996. The testing failed to disclose that I suffer from any diagnosable mental illness. I achieved a perfect score on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (6 errors) in 1996, which virtually rules out schizophrenia and delusional disorder. See Ibanez-Casas, I. "Deficits in Executive and Memory Processes in Delusional Disorder: A Case-Controlled Study." PLoS One, 2013 Jul 2;8(7):e67341.
I have been diagnosed with psychotic mental illness -- Paranoid (Delusional) Disorder -- and receive monthly disability benefits paid by the U.S. Social Security Administration therefor. The cost of psychiatric treatment is reimbursed by Medicare. There is evidence that the only reason I qualify for disability benefits is that I believe I have been the victim of a longstanding criminal conspiracy carried out by attorney managers of the D.C. law firm of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, my former employer. There is evidence that St. Elizabeths Hospital is billing Medicare for the treatment of nonexistent mental illness. But see, Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C.C.A 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998) (Akin Gump had genuine and credible reasons to determine that I suffered from mental illness that rendered me unemployable and a direct threat in the workplace).
In fact, Akin Gump's disability determination was based on a medically worthless psychiatric opinion, offered by a psychiatrist who did not examine me personally and who did not obtain my written consent for the opinion. See American Psychiatric Association (APA) Goldwater Rule, Section 7.3 of the APA's ethics principles. As of the filing of the complaint in the Superior Court proceedings (cited above), in October 1995, and at all times thereafter, it was unlawful under the laws of the District of Columbia for a psychiatrist to offer a professional psychiatric opinion about an individual without benefit of personal examination per APA Section 7.3. The D.C. Code in its latest revision makes it unlawful for a physician to "[fail] to conform to standards of acceptable conduct and prevailing practice within a health profession." See D.C. Code 2-3305.14(26). This provision was added to the District of Columbia Health Occupations Revision Act by D.C. Law 10-247, enacted on March 23, 1995. The Court of Appeals in Freedman v. DHR expressly found that the professional psychiatric opinion offered by the psychiatrist to the employer amounted to the diagnosis of a "disorder." See No. 96-CV-961 at 4. Under current District law the actions of my former employer, Akin Gump in soliciting an illegal act by a psychiatrist might be deemed prosecutable as conspiracy and solicitation.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
cc: U.S. Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch
Wednesday, November 04, 2015
Letter to the Attorney General of the United States
November 4, 2015
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apartment 136
Washington, DC 20008
The Honorable Loretta E. Lynch
Attorney General of the United States
Office of the Attorney General
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20530-0001
RE:
Felony Fraud Certification
Dear
Attorney General Lynch:
There
is evidence that I committed a felony against the Government of the United
States on November 3, 2015. There is
evidence that I have been engaged, since the year 1991, in a scheme to defraud
the federal government in up to a half million dollars in government benefits
(U.S. Social Security Disability and Medicare benefits). My claim for disability, filed in April 1993,
was based in substantial part on sworn statements executed by my former
employer, the law firm of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld (Dennis M. Race,
Esq. and Laurence J. Hoffman, Esq.) .
There is persuasive evidence that said sworn statements, alleging that I
had been determined by the employer, in consultation with a psychiatrist, to
suffer from severe mental illness and that I posed a direct threat in the
workplace (thereby rendering me unfit for employment), were false, perjured or medically
worthless since the assessing psychiatrist did not examine me in person or
obtain my written consent for a psychiatric opinion. See American Psychiatric Association (APA) Goldwater
Rule, Section 7.3 of the APA's
ethics principles.
I want to thank the U.S. Department of Justice for
allowing me to collect a monthly disability check since the effective date of
my disability (October 29, 1991). The
forbearance of the Justice Department has allowed me to pursue my writing
ambitions. Enclosed are two novels that
I have written during the term of my disability. My psychiatrists have concluded that I am an
individual of average intellect who suffers from severe (psychotic) mental
illness. See opinions of Napoleon
Cuenco, M.D.; Dimitrios Georgopoulos, M.D.; and Albert H. Taub, M.D.
(enclosed). Despite my obvious intellectual
and severe psychological limitations I have made an attempt to make good use of
the largesse of the federal government.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
Wednesday, July 29, 2015
Letter to D.C. Department of Behavioral Health
July 30, 2015
I am a consumer of mental health services provided by the Department of Behavioral Health. I had been in weekly out-patient psychotherapy at 35 K Street with Mohammed Shreiba, M.D., a psychiatry resident working under the supervision of Earl Baughman, M.D. (St. Elizabeths Hospital).
My therapy with Dr. Shreiba ended on June 18, 2015 with the completion of Dr. Shreiba's residency training program. I was told that I would be transferred to another resident named Elise Stone, M.D. Dr. Stone has not yet contacted me.
Let me apprise you of the seriousness of my case.
In September 1992 I was diagnosed with bi-polar disorder, a psychotic mental illness, by Napoleon Cuenco, M.D.
In February 1996 I was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, a psychotic mental illness, by Dimitrios Georgopoulos, M.D.
In February 1999 I was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, a psychotic mental illness, by Albert H. Taub, M.D.
In March 2004 I was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, a psychotic mental illness, by Israella Bash, Ph.D.
In October 1991 my former employer terminated my employment after determining, in consultation with a psychiatrist, that I suffered from severe mental illness and that I was potentially violent. I have been disabled and unemployed since that time. You may review this disability determination with Dennis M. Race, Esq. at the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld (Akin Gump) at (202) 887-4028. The D.C. Office of Attorney General affirmed that Akin Gump's disability determination was genuine and credible.
The D.C. Office of the Attorney General determined that in August 1989 my Akin Gump coworkers formed genuine and credible fears that I might become armed and extremely dangerous. The D.C. Attorney General determined that my coworkers formed genuine and credible fears that I might carry out an armed, mass homicidal assault on the firm's premises.
My former direct supervisor at Akin Gump determined in October 1991 that I might carry out a mass homicidal assault on the firm's premises and had the firm take protective measures against such an assault.
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apartment 136
Washington, DC 20008
Barbara
J. Bazron, Ph.D.
Director
D.C.
Department of Behavioral Health
64 New York Avenue, NE
64 New York Avenue, NE
3rd Floor
Washington, DC 20002
Phone: (202) 673-7440
Phone: (202) 673-7440
I am a consumer of mental health services provided by the Department of Behavioral Health. I had been in weekly out-patient psychotherapy at 35 K Street with Mohammed Shreiba, M.D., a psychiatry resident working under the supervision of Earl Baughman, M.D. (St. Elizabeths Hospital).
My therapy with Dr. Shreiba ended on June 18, 2015 with the completion of Dr. Shreiba's residency training program. I was told that I would be transferred to another resident named Elise Stone, M.D. Dr. Stone has not yet contacted me.
Let me apprise you of the seriousness of my case.
In September 1992 I was diagnosed with bi-polar disorder, a psychotic mental illness, by Napoleon Cuenco, M.D.
In February 1996 I was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, a psychotic mental illness, by Dimitrios Georgopoulos, M.D.
In February 1999 I was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, a psychotic mental illness, by Albert H. Taub, M.D.
In March 2004 I was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, a psychotic mental illness, by Israella Bash, Ph.D.
In October 1991 my former employer terminated my employment after determining, in consultation with a psychiatrist, that I suffered from severe mental illness and that I was potentially violent. I have been disabled and unemployed since that time. You may review this disability determination with Dennis M. Race, Esq. at the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld (Akin Gump) at (202) 887-4028. The D.C. Office of Attorney General affirmed that Akin Gump's disability determination was genuine and credible.
The D.C. Office of the Attorney General determined that in August 1989 my Akin Gump coworkers formed genuine and credible fears that I might become armed and extremely dangerous. The D.C. Attorney General determined that my coworkers formed genuine and credible fears that I might carry out an armed, mass homicidal assault on the firm's premises.
My former direct supervisor at Akin Gump determined in October 1991 that I might carry out a mass homicidal assault on the firm's premises and had the firm take protective measures against such an assault.
In
August 1998 the U.S. Capitol Police (Stevan J. Horan, S.A.) advised me that the
federal government had placed my name on national registry of potentially
violent offenders.
In October 2004 the Metropolitan Police of the District of Columbia dispatched 10 police officers and 4 FBI agents to my residence because of fears that I might become armed and extremely dangerous. The MPDC escorted me to D.C. General for an emergency forensic psychiatric examination.
I urge the D.C. Department of Behavioral Health to assign me to out-patient psychotherapy at 35 K Street at the earliest possible time.
In October 2004 the Metropolitan Police of the District of Columbia dispatched 10 police officers and 4 FBI agents to my residence because of fears that I might become armed and extremely dangerous. The MPDC escorted me to D.C. General for an emergency forensic psychiatric examination.
I urge the D.C. Department of Behavioral Health to assign me to out-patient psychotherapy at 35 K Street at the earliest possible time.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
cc:
Karl A. Racine, D.C. Attorney General
Sunday, June 28, 2015
Another Letter to Loretta
June 29, 2015
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apartment 136
Washington, DC 20008
The Honroable Karl A. Racine
Attorney General of the District of Columbia
Government of the District of Columbia
One Judiciary Square
441 Fourth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001
RE: Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights, D.C.C.A. no. 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998)
Dear Mr. Racine:
Enclosed are several additional documents, all part of the record on appeal in the above-referenced matter, that highlight peculiarities in my job termination by the law firm of Akin, Gump, Starauss, Hauer & Feld: a job termination that formed the basis of a determination by the U.S. Social Security Administration that I became disabled and eligible for government benefits effective October 29, 1991, the date of termination.
Please keep the following chronology in mind:
October 29, 1991: I was terminated by senior counsel Dennis M. Race, Esq. at a meeting in Race's office attended by my direct supervisor (Chris Robertson) and the personnel administrator (Laurel Digweed).
February 4, 1992: The D.C. Department of Human Rights issued an unlawful termination complaint pursuant to the D.C. Human Rights Act
May 22, 1992: The employer (Akin Gump) filed with DHR its Response to Interrogatories and Document Request stating, “When terminated, [Claimant] was told that his actual work product was not a problem.”
September 1992: I filed two letters with DHR detailing the events of the job termination without knowledge of the employer's Response.
December 23, 1992: I received from DHR (via USPS registered mail) at my residence a copy of the employer's Response.
The following documents show that the termination meeting on October 29, 1991 featured a considerable amount of game playing by an Akin Gump senior attorney manager (Dennis M. Race, Esq.), game playing that is not entirely consistent with a good faith termination.
1. Letter from Gary Freedman to DHR dated September 25, 1992 in which I admitted that Race told me that my personnel file contained written statements detailing various infractions and instances of misconduct I had engaged in during my tenure. Race deliberately lied about said statements. Upon receipt of Akin Gump's Response on December 23, 1992 I learned that my personnel file contained no such written statements [R. 132].
2. Akin Gump Response dated May 22, 1992 states: "During his tenure, Claimant was not given a formal written reprimand. However, Respondent's concern about his inability to interact with co-workiers and volatile behavior were addressed by his immediate supervisor, Chrstine Robertson (caucasian/female) during several conferences with Claimant [R. 132]. In fact, my personnel record (Performance Evaluations or other documents) contains no contemporaneous memorial of any such conferences. The only memorial of such "conferences" is a retaliatory memo dated October 25, 1991 [R. 369-70], written by my supervisor (Robertson) the day after I complained about her. See Jeppsen v. Wunnicke, 611 F. Supp. 78, 82 (D.C. Alaska 1985) (a harassment complaint will more likely than not yield diametrically opposed statements from the complaining employee and the alleged offending supervisor and coworkers). Note that said memo states that my work performance was "exemplary" [R. 369].
3. Letter from Gary Freedman to DHR dated September 17, 1992, a highly defensive communication in which I defend the quality of my work performance and am utterly silent as to any oral statements by Race at the termination meeting about my mental stability or volatile behavior with coworkers [R. 527-532]. It is a fundamental principle of human behavior that people become defensive about things they have been accused of and remain silent as to things they were never accused of. Clearly, said letter is persuasive circumstantial evidence that I was told by Race that the main reason for my termination was poor work performance: that the employer was silent as to psychological or emotional reasons for the termination and silent as to volatile behavior.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
cc: U.S. Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apartment 136
Washington, DC 20008
The Honroable Karl A. Racine
Attorney General of the District of Columbia
Government of the District of Columbia
One Judiciary Square
441 Fourth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001
RE: Freedman v. D.C. Dept. Human Rights, D.C.C.A. no. 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998)
Dear Mr. Racine:
Enclosed are several additional documents, all part of the record on appeal in the above-referenced matter, that highlight peculiarities in my job termination by the law firm of Akin, Gump, Starauss, Hauer & Feld: a job termination that formed the basis of a determination by the U.S. Social Security Administration that I became disabled and eligible for government benefits effective October 29, 1991, the date of termination.
Please keep the following chronology in mind:
October 29, 1991: I was terminated by senior counsel Dennis M. Race, Esq. at a meeting in Race's office attended by my direct supervisor (Chris Robertson) and the personnel administrator (Laurel Digweed).
February 4, 1992: The D.C. Department of Human Rights issued an unlawful termination complaint pursuant to the D.C. Human Rights Act
May 22, 1992: The employer (Akin Gump) filed with DHR its Response to Interrogatories and Document Request stating, “When terminated, [Claimant] was told that his actual work product was not a problem.”
September 1992: I filed two letters with DHR detailing the events of the job termination without knowledge of the employer's Response.
December 23, 1992: I received from DHR (via USPS registered mail) at my residence a copy of the employer's Response.
The following documents show that the termination meeting on October 29, 1991 featured a considerable amount of game playing by an Akin Gump senior attorney manager (Dennis M. Race, Esq.), game playing that is not entirely consistent with a good faith termination.
1. Letter from Gary Freedman to DHR dated September 25, 1992 in which I admitted that Race told me that my personnel file contained written statements detailing various infractions and instances of misconduct I had engaged in during my tenure. Race deliberately lied about said statements. Upon receipt of Akin Gump's Response on December 23, 1992 I learned that my personnel file contained no such written statements [R. 132].
2. Akin Gump Response dated May 22, 1992 states: "During his tenure, Claimant was not given a formal written reprimand. However, Respondent's concern about his inability to interact with co-workiers and volatile behavior were addressed by his immediate supervisor, Chrstine Robertson (caucasian/female) during several conferences with Claimant [R. 132]. In fact, my personnel record (Performance Evaluations or other documents) contains no contemporaneous memorial of any such conferences. The only memorial of such "conferences" is a retaliatory memo dated October 25, 1991 [R. 369-70], written by my supervisor (Robertson) the day after I complained about her. See Jeppsen v. Wunnicke, 611 F. Supp. 78, 82 (D.C. Alaska 1985) (a harassment complaint will more likely than not yield diametrically opposed statements from the complaining employee and the alleged offending supervisor and coworkers). Note that said memo states that my work performance was "exemplary" [R. 369].
3. Letter from Gary Freedman to DHR dated September 17, 1992, a highly defensive communication in which I defend the quality of my work performance and am utterly silent as to any oral statements by Race at the termination meeting about my mental stability or volatile behavior with coworkers [R. 527-532]. It is a fundamental principle of human behavior that people become defensive about things they have been accused of and remain silent as to things they were never accused of. Clearly, said letter is persuasive circumstantial evidence that I was told by Race that the main reason for my termination was poor work performance: that the employer was silent as to psychological or emotional reasons for the termination and silent as to volatile behavior.
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
cc: U.S. Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch
Thursday, June 25, 2015
Letter to AG Lynch
June 22, 2015
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apt. 136
Washington, DC 20008
The Honorable Karl A. Racine
Attorney General of the District of Columbia
Government of the District of Columbia
One Judiciary Square
441 Fourth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001
RE: Department of Behavioral Health – Possible Abuse of Services
Dear Mr. Racine:
I am a consumer of mental health services provided by the D.C. Department of Behavioral Health as well as a Social Security disability claimant. My out-patient psychotherapeutic treatment provided by Mohammed Shreiba, M.D. (K Street Clinic) ended on June 18, 2015 with the completion of Dr. Shreiba's residency training program under the supervision of Earl Baughman, M.D. (St. Elizabeths Hospital). My psychotherapy will resume sometime in July 2015 with Elise Stone, M.D. (K Street Clinic), a third year psychiatry resident under the supervision of Dr. Baughman.
I previously forwarded to your office my former employer's (Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld's) sworn Response to Particulars in Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights, D.C.C.A. no. 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998), an unlawful job termination matter in which the employer alleged that I was found to be unemployable in late October 1991 on the grounds that I suffered from a psychiatric “disorder” that rendered me a direct threat in the workplace. Said pleadings were a material factor in the Social Security Administration's determination in August 1993 that I became unemployable and eligible for disability benefits effective October 29, 1991, the date of termination.
This letter provides my denial of allegations made by Akin Gump in said sworn Response to Particulars. The veracity of my denial is supported by the fact that the following statements constitute admissions adverse to my Social Security disability claim. Please recall that at the time I applied for Social Security disability benefits on April 20, 1993 I advised the agency that I believed that I was employable and that I believed that my job termination was wrongful, malicious and discriminatory. The following statement is consistent with my long-held view that the employer's termination was wrongful and that its defense of the termination was pretextual and based on false statements.
STATEMENT OF D.C. DEPARTMENT OF BEHAVIORAL HEALTH CONSUMER DENYING EMPLOYER'S ALLEGATIONS REGARDING WORK HISTORY AND EMPLOYABILITY AS OF OCTOBER 29, 1991
1. “Claimant, Gary Freedman, was initially employed by Respondent law firm, Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. [June 13, 1988] as a temporary employee for a specific project (See Attachment B). Later [August 1, 1989] Claimant was employed as a full-time legal assistant (“paralegal”) to manage massive amounts of documents for a major client (See Attachment C). Shortly thereafter [on March 9, 1989], the client filed for bankruptcy protection and eventually the legal work diminished.”
FALSE
The major client on which I was assigned, Eastern Airlines, filed for bankruptcy protection on March 9, 1989. See Salpukas, A. "Eastern Requests Bankrupt Status to Cut Strike Loss," The New York Times, March 10, 1989. The employer admits (Response to Particulars at Paragraph 1) that I was hired as a full-time employee with benefits five months later on August 1, 1989, when, according to the employer “the legal work diminished.”
2. “In an attempt to find comparable work for the Claimant, a decision was made to transfer him to the Litigation Support Department.”
FALSE
I was not "transferred" to the Litigation Support Department. In unrelated litigation, the employer acknowledged that a move from the paralegal program to the litigation support group constituted a demotion. See McNeil v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, D.C.D.C. no. 93-0477 (1993) at note 2. The employer concealed the fact that I was demoted and not simply transferred. Why did the employer actively conceal the fact that said transfer constituted a demotion?
3. “Although Claimant stated that he felt he was continually
harassed by fellow workers, his contentions lacked substance.”
CONTRARY TO LAW
Appellant’s complaint of harassment to the employer concerned very subtle harassment. While an unsophisticated, nonlegal employer might plausibly deem an employee’s complaint based on such harassment unbelievable, it is far less convincing that knowledgeable attorney managers of a major law firm, cf. U.S. v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245 (1991) (Akin Gump’s “very able counsel” are presumed to know the law), would credibly find appellant’s harassment complaint “baseless as proof of sexual or religious harassment” [Rec. 138]. In fact, a complaint based on subtle harassment is legally cognizable. At least one court (in a foreign jurisdiction), noting that “sexual harassment based on the creation of an offensive, hostile and intimidating environment . . . can take many forms and is often very subtle,” has permitted expert testimony to illuminate for the finder of fact the nature of plaintiff’s work environment and the sexual connotations of seemingly trivial events. Eide v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 397 N.W.2d 532, 538 (Mich. App. 1986).
4. "[Claimant’s allegation that] a female co-worker stood by him swinging her hips so as to provoke him [was baseless as proof of sexual harassment.]"
FALSE
The D.C. Department of Human Rights specifically found that a complete description of the incident includes the following facts:
Finding of Fact “4(i) On the afternoon of October 2, 1991 Complainant met with legal assistant Katherine Harkness in her private office on the fifth floor to review some work with Complainant had been doing under her direction. Complainant was seated in front of her desk. Ms. Harkness was in back of her desk, but leaning over it, supporting her torso with her elbows. As she was reviewing the work she proceeded in a continuous motion to gyrate her hips and rub her pelvic region against the desk in a sexually suggestive manner while simultaneously expressing her work-related comments in the form of double entendres. This lasted for about two to four minutes.”
I reviewed this incident with EEOC investigator Franklin C. Jones (Washington, D.C.) in November 1991. Mr. Jones said that said incident was prima facie evidence of harassment.
5. “Claimant also mentioned several phrases which he felt were anti-Semitic: one employee referring to a July bill with emphasis as if to mean “Jew-lie” and thereafter was heard singing “liar, liar, pants on fire”; the group’s mascot was a pig . . . which symbolized pork; and once a back employee was heard to use a Yiddish term [thereby indicating the insubstantial nature of his claim that his coworkers had an anti-Semitic animus].”
FALSE
In unrelated litigation the employer admitted that the litigation support group, where I worked, was tainted with anti-Semitic invective. See McNeil v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, D.C.D.C. no. 93-0477 (1993) (on one occasion an employee in the litigation support group called another employee a “Jewish bitch”).
6. “When asked whether these or any of the incidents he mentioned had a direct impact on him or his employment with Respondent, Claimant answered that they did not.”
CONTRARY TO LAW
In the case of harassment based on a hostile work environment, the material issue is not the severity or effect of individual incidents of harassment, but the pervasiveness of the harassment and the cumulative effect of hostile and intimidating behaviors. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
“[A discrimination] analysis cannot carve the work environment into a series of discrete incidents and measure the harm adhering in each episode. Rather a holistic perspective is necessary, keeping in mind that each successive episode has its predecessors, that the impact of the separate incidents may accumulate, and that the work environment created thereby may exceed the sum of the individual episodes. ‘A play cannot be understood on the basis of some of its scenes but only on its entire performance, and similarly, a discrimination analysis must concentrate not on individual incidents but on the overall scenario.’ Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1484. It follows naturally from this proposition that the environment viewed as a whole may satisfy the legal definition of an abusive working environment although no single episode crosses the Title VII threshold.” Robinson at 1524.
7. “Claimant was uncomfortable communicating with his peers.”
FALSE
The employer admitted that I had supervisory skills and that during a six-month period in 1989 I inspired my coworkers.
“Gary recently trained and supervised five temporary coders who were brought in to expedite the coding of some 200,000 pages of document production. In doing so, he inspired the group who were always eager to work and adopted Gary’s own sense of commitment to the case.” [Ability to work with others:] Above average. Constance Brown, November 6, 1989 [R. 219-222].
The performance evaluation dated May 1991, six months before termination, described me as "a team player." I had been assigned to the litigation support office suite on April 8, 1991. Said evaluation also states: "Gary has recently moved down to the terrace level and has truly become a part of the Lit Support team after being isolated on the ninth floor [sic] [I worked in a large group office on the ninth floor from October 1989 to April 1991]. He is both communicative and personable and has made the adjustment well. [AREAS NEEDING IMPROVEMENT]: None!" [R. 155-160].
8. “During the investigation of his concerns, it was also brought out that his behavior had been disruptive, with occasional violent outbursts, and frightening to co-workers.”
FALSE
There is no contemporaneous documentation to support this allegation. My personnel file contains no record of such behavior and includes no record of reprimands, either oral or written. My performance evaluations rated my ability to work with others at least average or above-average.
9. “Because of the emotional and psychological nature of Mr. Freedman’s complaints and those lodged against him, Messrs. Lassman and Race also sought professional guidance from two outside consultants: (1) a representation from the Employee Assistance Program [EAP]; and (2) a practicing psychiatrist.”
CONTRARY TO LAW
Appellant’s complaint of harassment to the employer concerned very subtle harassment. While an unsophisticated, nonlegal employer might plausibly deem an employee’s complaint based on such harassment unbelievable, it is far less convincing that knowledgeable attorney managers of a major law firm, cf. U.S. v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245 (1991) (Akin Gump’s “very able counsel” are presumed to know the law), would credibly find appellant’s harassment complaint “baseless as proof of sexual or religious harassment” [Rec. 138]. In fact, a complaint based on subtle harassment is legally cognizable. At least one court (in a foreign jurisdiction), noting that “sexual harassment based on the creation of an offensive, hostile and intimidating environment . . . can take many forms and is often very subtle,” has permitted expert testimony to illuminate for the finder of fact the nature of plaintiff’s work environment and the sexual connotations of seemingly trivial events. Eide v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 397 N.W.2d 532, 538 (Mich. App. 1986).
4. "[Claimant’s allegation that] a female co-worker stood by him swinging her hips so as to provoke him [was baseless as proof of sexual harassment.]"
FALSE
The D.C. Department of Human Rights specifically found that a complete description of the incident includes the following facts:
Finding of Fact “4(i) On the afternoon of October 2, 1991 Complainant met with legal assistant Katherine Harkness in her private office on the fifth floor to review some work with Complainant had been doing under her direction. Complainant was seated in front of her desk. Ms. Harkness was in back of her desk, but leaning over it, supporting her torso with her elbows. As she was reviewing the work she proceeded in a continuous motion to gyrate her hips and rub her pelvic region against the desk in a sexually suggestive manner while simultaneously expressing her work-related comments in the form of double entendres. This lasted for about two to four minutes.”
I reviewed this incident with EEOC investigator Franklin C. Jones (Washington, D.C.) in November 1991. Mr. Jones said that said incident was prima facie evidence of harassment.
5. “Claimant also mentioned several phrases which he felt were anti-Semitic: one employee referring to a July bill with emphasis as if to mean “Jew-lie” and thereafter was heard singing “liar, liar, pants on fire”; the group’s mascot was a pig . . . which symbolized pork; and once a back employee was heard to use a Yiddish term [thereby indicating the insubstantial nature of his claim that his coworkers had an anti-Semitic animus].”
FALSE
In unrelated litigation the employer admitted that the litigation support group, where I worked, was tainted with anti-Semitic invective. See McNeil v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, D.C.D.C. no. 93-0477 (1993) (on one occasion an employee in the litigation support group called another employee a “Jewish bitch”).
6. “When asked whether these or any of the incidents he mentioned had a direct impact on him or his employment with Respondent, Claimant answered that they did not.”
CONTRARY TO LAW
In the case of harassment based on a hostile work environment, the material issue is not the severity or effect of individual incidents of harassment, but the pervasiveness of the harassment and the cumulative effect of hostile and intimidating behaviors. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
“[A discrimination] analysis cannot carve the work environment into a series of discrete incidents and measure the harm adhering in each episode. Rather a holistic perspective is necessary, keeping in mind that each successive episode has its predecessors, that the impact of the separate incidents may accumulate, and that the work environment created thereby may exceed the sum of the individual episodes. ‘A play cannot be understood on the basis of some of its scenes but only on its entire performance, and similarly, a discrimination analysis must concentrate not on individual incidents but on the overall scenario.’ Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1484. It follows naturally from this proposition that the environment viewed as a whole may satisfy the legal definition of an abusive working environment although no single episode crosses the Title VII threshold.” Robinson at 1524.
7. “Claimant was uncomfortable communicating with his peers.”
FALSE
The employer admitted that I had supervisory skills and that during a six-month period in 1989 I inspired my coworkers.
“Gary recently trained and supervised five temporary coders who were brought in to expedite the coding of some 200,000 pages of document production. In doing so, he inspired the group who were always eager to work and adopted Gary’s own sense of commitment to the case.” [Ability to work with others:] Above average. Constance Brown, November 6, 1989 [R. 219-222].
The performance evaluation dated May 1991, six months before termination, described me as "a team player." I had been assigned to the litigation support office suite on April 8, 1991. Said evaluation also states: "Gary has recently moved down to the terrace level and has truly become a part of the Lit Support team after being isolated on the ninth floor [sic] [I worked in a large group office on the ninth floor from October 1989 to April 1991]. He is both communicative and personable and has made the adjustment well. [AREAS NEEDING IMPROVEMENT]: None!" [R. 155-160].
8. “During the investigation of his concerns, it was also brought out that his behavior had been disruptive, with occasional violent outbursts, and frightening to co-workers.”
FALSE
There is no contemporaneous documentation to support this allegation. My personnel file contains no record of such behavior and includes no record of reprimands, either oral or written. My performance evaluations rated my ability to work with others at least average or above-average.
9. “Because of the emotional and psychological nature of Mr. Freedman’s complaints and those lodged against him, Messrs. Lassman and Race also sought professional guidance from two outside consultants: (1) a representation from the Employee Assistance Program [EAP]; and (2) a practicing psychiatrist.”
UNSUPPORTED
The psychiatrist, Gertrude R. Ticho, M.D. (deceased) later denied speaking with anyone at Akin Gump and specifically denied ever having spoken to Dennis M. Race, Esq. The EAP later disclosed that it had no record of any contacts with Akin Gump and termed the employer’s allegation as sounding “fabricated” since it violated the EAP’s established business practice.
EMPLOYER’S TORTIOUS CONDUCT
Under the American Psychiatric Association’s so-called Goldwater Rule a psychiatrist may not offer a professional opinion to a third party about someone she has not seen in private consultation and without the individual’s written consent. The employer’s attorney managers either knew or should have known about this provision. Cf. U.S. v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245 (1991) (Akin Gump’s “very able counsel” are presumed to know the law). The firm’s pleadings attributing mental illness to me on the basis of an unethical psychiatric opinion constitutes defamation. See Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324 (1969).
10. “He . . . could not function in a group setting (he could not work with or in close proximity to other legal assistants or litigation support personnel).”
FALSE
During the period March 1989 through October 1989 I shared office space with two legal assistants. I did not complain about this arrangement. On August 1, 1989 I was granted full-time status with benefits.
During the period October 1989 to April 1991 I shared a large office space with numerous other legal assistants. I did not complain about this arrangement.
During the period April 1991 to October 1991 I worked in the litigation support office suite adjacent to another legal assistant named Robert E. Dillon, Esq., now a practicing attorney in Philadelphia, PA (telephone: 215-568-5116). I requested private office space on one occasion only, October 23-24, 1991. During this time period (April-October 1991) two employees in litigation support (Lutheria Harrison and Sherry Ann Patrick) requested and were granted a change in office assignment. See McNeil v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, D.C.D.C. Civil no. 93-0477 (1993) at note 2. Moreover, the employer admitted in unrelated litigation that the litigation support office suite was rife with unprofessional behavior, including insubordination, abuse of telephone privileges and anti-Semitic invective. See McNeil v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, D.C.D.C. no. 93-0477 (1993) (on one occasion a litigation support employee called a coworker a "Jewish bitch") [R. 57-61]
11. “When terminated, he was told that his actual work product was not a problem.”
FALSE
This is a deliberate lie. At the termination meeting I was told that my work was subpar and that my work performance was an issue in the termination decision.
The record on appeal [R. 453-454] contains a document I wrote, date-stamped September 25, 1992, that memorializes my telephone contacts with the employer's attorney managers immediately after the termination, and which includes the following recital:
“October 30, 1991 — Around 9:00 AM I telephoned Dennis Race at the office and asked him if the firm would object to a claim for unemployment insurance. Mr. Race said that the firm would not object, as long as I didn’t put down anything that embarrassed the firm. Noting that the previous day, Mr. Race had said that one of the reasons for my termination was that I ignored people’s corrections, I directed Mr. Race’s attention to my job evaluation dated November 1989 that expressly stated that I “catered to individual needs.” Mr. Race asked me if J.D. Neary had written that; I said, no, Constance Brown. Mr. Race politely explained that the problems with my work arose after that job evaluation had been written, which apparently in Mr. Race’s mind, made that job evaluation irrelevant. The telephone call was cordial. I was somewhat agitated since I hadn’t slept the night before. ”
12. "During his transition from a legal assistant position (paralegal) to his work with the litigation support department [March 1990], Claimant had several discussions with his direct supervisor about problems with interacting with co-workers and occasional outbursts."
FALSE
My personnel records do not support the allegation that I had any contemporaneous difficulties with coworkers or outbursts. My performance evaluations were above average or outstanding. D.C. Department of Human Rights Finding of Fact no. 2. My ability to work with others was consistently rated at least average or above average.
The contemporaneous performance evaluation dated May 1990 (covering the previous six-month period) states:
Gary has picked up the basics of on-line coding with very minimal instructions. With additional experience, he should adapt better to the software techniques. Always mindful of quality control, which aids in more efficient data entry. Relentless, thriving on huge volume while maintaining a good end product. Totally independent, self-sustaining and committed to his work. Extremely solid and aiming to please. I trust Gary’s ability to meet whatever the demand with little guidance. Gary is receptive no matter what the task and takes every assignment seriously. Even at times when material has to be redone because of GPE’s. Great pressure buffer. I can be at ease knowing Gary will prevail. Gary seems to find those small mistakes which are not obvious to the average eye. Well-tuned, good analytical eye for detail. He can turn any combination of words into a statement. [AREAS IN WHICH MOST CAPABLE]: His dedication to consistency and detail, eager attitude and independent nature. [AREAS OF SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT]: Working directly with the computer. [AREAS NEEDING IMPROVEMENT]: Adapting to the software environment, being aware of its characteristics and sensitivities and distinguishing those traits which are unique to each base. Of course, with time, this atmosphere will be more evident. [ABILITY TO WORK WITH OTHERS:] Average. [R. 311-314]
13. “Until the filing of this Charge [on February 4, 1992], the subject of Claimant’s sexual orientation was never brought up by Claimant or anyone involved directly or indirectly with Claimant’s employment. While Claimant raised concerns about sexual and religious harassment, he never stated that it was based on his sexual orientation — nor was it ever interpreted as such by anyone involved in this matter.”
FALSE
This is a deliberate lie. The D.C. Department of Human Rights specifically found that the subject of my sexual orientation came up at a meeting with the employer on October 23, 1991, days before the termination on October 29, 1991. See D.C. Department of Human Rights Finding of Fact no. 7. The D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed this agency finding of fact. The employer willfully lied about its knowledge about my membership in a protected class, which is definitive proof of pretext. Cf. Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 68 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Pretext . . . means a lie, specifically a phony reason for some action."); cf. Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1124 (7th Cir. 1994) ("If the only reason an employer offers for firing an employee is a lie, the inference that the real reason was a forbidden one . . . may rationally be drawn.") quoting Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 401 (7th Cir. 1990).
The psychiatrist, Gertrude R. Ticho, M.D. (deceased) later denied speaking with anyone at Akin Gump and specifically denied ever having spoken to Dennis M. Race, Esq. The EAP later disclosed that it had no record of any contacts with Akin Gump and termed the employer’s allegation as sounding “fabricated” since it violated the EAP’s established business practice.
EMPLOYER’S TORTIOUS CONDUCT
Under the American Psychiatric Association’s so-called Goldwater Rule a psychiatrist may not offer a professional opinion to a third party about someone she has not seen in private consultation and without the individual’s written consent. The employer’s attorney managers either knew or should have known about this provision. Cf. U.S. v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245 (1991) (Akin Gump’s “very able counsel” are presumed to know the law). The firm’s pleadings attributing mental illness to me on the basis of an unethical psychiatric opinion constitutes defamation. See Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324 (1969).
10. “He . . . could not function in a group setting (he could not work with or in close proximity to other legal assistants or litigation support personnel).”
FALSE
During the period March 1989 through October 1989 I shared office space with two legal assistants. I did not complain about this arrangement. On August 1, 1989 I was granted full-time status with benefits.
During the period October 1989 to April 1991 I shared a large office space with numerous other legal assistants. I did not complain about this arrangement.
During the period April 1991 to October 1991 I worked in the litigation support office suite adjacent to another legal assistant named Robert E. Dillon, Esq., now a practicing attorney in Philadelphia, PA (telephone: 215-568-5116). I requested private office space on one occasion only, October 23-24, 1991. During this time period (April-October 1991) two employees in litigation support (Lutheria Harrison and Sherry Ann Patrick) requested and were granted a change in office assignment. See McNeil v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, D.C.D.C. Civil no. 93-0477 (1993) at note 2. Moreover, the employer admitted in unrelated litigation that the litigation support office suite was rife with unprofessional behavior, including insubordination, abuse of telephone privileges and anti-Semitic invective. See McNeil v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, D.C.D.C. no. 93-0477 (1993) (on one occasion a litigation support employee called a coworker a "Jewish bitch") [R. 57-61]
11. “When terminated, he was told that his actual work product was not a problem.”
FALSE
This is a deliberate lie. At the termination meeting I was told that my work was subpar and that my work performance was an issue in the termination decision.
The record on appeal [R. 453-454] contains a document I wrote, date-stamped September 25, 1992, that memorializes my telephone contacts with the employer's attorney managers immediately after the termination, and which includes the following recital:
“October 30, 1991 — Around 9:00 AM I telephoned Dennis Race at the office and asked him if the firm would object to a claim for unemployment insurance. Mr. Race said that the firm would not object, as long as I didn’t put down anything that embarrassed the firm. Noting that the previous day, Mr. Race had said that one of the reasons for my termination was that I ignored people’s corrections, I directed Mr. Race’s attention to my job evaluation dated November 1989 that expressly stated that I “catered to individual needs.” Mr. Race asked me if J.D. Neary had written that; I said, no, Constance Brown. Mr. Race politely explained that the problems with my work arose after that job evaluation had been written, which apparently in Mr. Race’s mind, made that job evaluation irrelevant. The telephone call was cordial. I was somewhat agitated since I hadn’t slept the night before. ”
12. "During his transition from a legal assistant position (paralegal) to his work with the litigation support department [March 1990], Claimant had several discussions with his direct supervisor about problems with interacting with co-workers and occasional outbursts."
FALSE
My personnel records do not support the allegation that I had any contemporaneous difficulties with coworkers or outbursts. My performance evaluations were above average or outstanding. D.C. Department of Human Rights Finding of Fact no. 2. My ability to work with others was consistently rated at least average or above average.
The contemporaneous performance evaluation dated May 1990 (covering the previous six-month period) states:
Gary has picked up the basics of on-line coding with very minimal instructions. With additional experience, he should adapt better to the software techniques. Always mindful of quality control, which aids in more efficient data entry. Relentless, thriving on huge volume while maintaining a good end product. Totally independent, self-sustaining and committed to his work. Extremely solid and aiming to please. I trust Gary’s ability to meet whatever the demand with little guidance. Gary is receptive no matter what the task and takes every assignment seriously. Even at times when material has to be redone because of GPE’s. Great pressure buffer. I can be at ease knowing Gary will prevail. Gary seems to find those small mistakes which are not obvious to the average eye. Well-tuned, good analytical eye for detail. He can turn any combination of words into a statement. [AREAS IN WHICH MOST CAPABLE]: His dedication to consistency and detail, eager attitude and independent nature. [AREAS OF SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT]: Working directly with the computer. [AREAS NEEDING IMPROVEMENT]: Adapting to the software environment, being aware of its characteristics and sensitivities and distinguishing those traits which are unique to each base. Of course, with time, this atmosphere will be more evident. [ABILITY TO WORK WITH OTHERS:] Average. [R. 311-314]
13. “Until the filing of this Charge [on February 4, 1992], the subject of Claimant’s sexual orientation was never brought up by Claimant or anyone involved directly or indirectly with Claimant’s employment. While Claimant raised concerns about sexual and religious harassment, he never stated that it was based on his sexual orientation — nor was it ever interpreted as such by anyone involved in this matter.”
FALSE
This is a deliberate lie. The D.C. Department of Human Rights specifically found that the subject of my sexual orientation came up at a meeting with the employer on October 23, 1991, days before the termination on October 29, 1991. See D.C. Department of Human Rights Finding of Fact no. 7. The D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed this agency finding of fact. The employer willfully lied about its knowledge about my membership in a protected class, which is definitive proof of pretext. Cf. Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 68 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Pretext . . . means a lie, specifically a phony reason for some action."); cf. Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1124 (7th Cir. 1994) ("If the only reason an employer offers for firing an employee is a lie, the inference that the real reason was a forbidden one . . . may rationally be drawn.") quoting Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 401 (7th Cir. 1990).
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
cc: U.S. Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch
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