June 22, 2015
3801 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Apt. 136
Washington, DC 20008
The Honorable Karl A. Racine
Attorney General of the District of Columbia
Government of the District of Columbia
One Judiciary Square
441 Fourth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001
RE: Department of
Behavioral Health – Possible Abuse of Services
Dear Mr. Racine:
I am a consumer of mental health services provided by the D.C. Department of
Behavioral Health as well as a Social Security disability claimant. My
out-patient psychotherapeutic treatment provided by Mohammed Shreiba, M.D. (K
Street Clinic) ended on June 18, 2015 with the completion of Dr. Shreiba's residency
training program under the supervision of Earl Baughman, M.D. (St. Elizabeths
Hospital). My psychotherapy will resume sometime in July 2015 with Elise
Stone, M.D. (K Street Clinic), a third year psychiatry resident under the
supervision of Dr. Baughman.
I previously forwarded to your office my former employer's (Akin, Gump,
Strauss, Hauer & Feld's) sworn Response to Particulars in Freedman v. D.C. Department of Human Rights,
D.C.C.A. no. 96-CV-961 (Sept. 1, 1998), an unlawful job termination matter in
which the employer alleged that I was found to be unemployable in late October
1991 on the grounds that I suffered from a psychiatric “disorder” that rendered
me a direct threat in the workplace. Said pleadings were a material
factor in the Social Security Administration's determination in August 1993
that I became unemployable and eligible for disability benefits effective
October 29, 1991, the date of termination.
This letter provides my denial of allegations made by Akin Gump in said sworn
Response to Particulars. The veracity of my denial is supported by the
fact that the following statements constitute admissions adverse to my Social
Security disability claim. Please recall that at the time I applied for
Social Security disability benefits on April 20, 1993 I advised the agency that
I believed that I was employable and that I believed that my job termination
was wrongful, malicious and discriminatory. The following statement is
consistent with my long-held view that the employer's termination was wrongful
and that its defense of the termination was pretextual and based on false
statements.
STATEMENT OF D.C. DEPARTMENT OF BEHAVIORAL HEALTH CONSUMER DENYING
EMPLOYER'S ALLEGATIONS REGARDING WORK HISTORY AND EMPLOYABILITY AS OF OCTOBER
29, 1991
1. “Claimant, Gary Freedman, was initially employed
by Respondent law firm, Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. [June 13, 1988] as
a temporary employee for a specific project (See Attachment B). Later [August
1, 1989] Claimant was employed as a full-time legal assistant (“paralegal”) to
manage massive amounts of documents for a major client (See Attachment C).
Shortly thereafter [on March 9, 1989], the client filed for bankruptcy
protection and eventually the legal work diminished.”
FALSE
The major client on which I was assigned, Eastern Airlines, filed for
bankruptcy protection on March 9, 1989. See Salpukas, A. "Eastern
Requests Bankrupt Status to Cut Strike Loss," The New York Times, March
10, 1989. The employer admits (Response to Particulars at
Paragraph 1) that I was hired as a full-time employee with benefits five months
later on August 1, 1989, when, according to the employer “the legal work
diminished.”
2. “In an attempt to find comparable work for the Claimant, a decision was made
to transfer him to the Litigation Support Department.”
FALSE
I was not "transferred" to the Litigation Support Department. In
unrelated litigation, the employer acknowledged that a move from the paralegal
program to the litigation support group constituted a demotion. See McNeil v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer &
Feld, D.C.D.C. no. 93-0477 (1993) at note 2. The employer concealed
the fact that I was demoted and not simply transferred. Why did the
employer actively conceal the fact that said transfer constituted a demotion?
3. “Although Claimant stated that he felt he was continually
harassed by fellow workers, his contentions lacked substance.”
CONTRARY TO LAW
Appellant’s complaint of harassment to the employer concerned very subtle
harassment. While an unsophisticated, nonlegal employer might plausibly deem an
employee’s complaint based on such harassment unbelievable, it is far less
convincing that knowledgeable attorney managers of a major law firm, cf. U.S. v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245 (1991)
(Akin Gump’s “very able counsel” are presumed to know the law), would credibly
find appellant’s harassment complaint “baseless as proof of sexual or religious
harassment” [Rec. 138]. In fact, a complaint based on subtle harassment is
legally cognizable. At least one court (in a foreign jurisdiction), noting that
“sexual harassment based on the creation of an offensive, hostile and
intimidating environment . . . can take many forms and is often very subtle,”
has permitted expert testimony to illuminate for the finder of fact the nature
of plaintiff’s work environment and the sexual connotations of seemingly
trivial events. Eide v. Kelsey-Hayes Co.,
397 N.W.2d 532, 538 (Mich. App. 1986).
4. "[Claimant’s allegation that] a female co-worker stood by him swinging
her hips so as to provoke him [was baseless as proof of sexual
harassment.]"
FALSE
The D.C. Department of Human Rights specifically found that a complete
description of the incident includes the following facts:
Finding of Fact “4(i) On the afternoon of October 2, 1991 Complainant met with
legal assistant Katherine Harkness in her private office on the fifth floor to
review some work with Complainant had been doing under her direction.
Complainant was seated in front of her desk. Ms. Harkness was in back of her
desk, but leaning over it, supporting her torso with her elbows. As she was
reviewing the work she proceeded in a continuous motion to gyrate her hips and
rub her pelvic region against the desk in a sexually suggestive manner while
simultaneously expressing her work-related comments in the form of double
entendres. This lasted for about two to four minutes.”
I reviewed this incident with EEOC investigator Franklin C. Jones (Washington,
D.C.) in November 1991. Mr. Jones said that said incident was prima facie evidence of harassment.
5. “Claimant also mentioned several phrases which he felt were anti-Semitic:
one employee referring to a July bill with emphasis as if to mean “Jew-lie” and
thereafter was heard singing “liar, liar, pants on fire”; the group’s mascot
was a pig . . . which symbolized pork; and once a back employee was heard to
use a Yiddish term [thereby indicating the insubstantial nature of his claim
that his coworkers had an anti-Semitic animus].”
FALSE
In unrelated litigation the employer admitted that the litigation support
group, where I worked, was tainted with anti-Semitic invective. See McNeil v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer
& Feld, D.C.D.C. no. 93-0477 (1993) (on one occasion an employee in the
litigation support group called another employee a “Jewish bitch”).
6. “When asked whether these or any of the incidents he mentioned had a direct
impact on him or his employment with Respondent, Claimant answered that they
did not.”
CONTRARY TO LAW
In the case of harassment based on a hostile work environment, the material
issue is not the severity or effect of individual incidents of harassment, but
the pervasiveness of the harassment and the cumulative effect of hostile and
intimidating behaviors. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,
760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
“[A discrimination] analysis cannot carve the work environment into a series of
discrete incidents and measure the harm adhering in each episode. Rather a
holistic perspective is necessary, keeping in mind that each successive episode
has its predecessors, that the impact of the separate incidents may accumulate,
and that the work environment created thereby may exceed the sum of the
individual episodes. ‘A play cannot be understood on the basis of some of its
scenes but only on its entire performance, and similarly, a discrimination
analysis must concentrate not on individual incidents but on the overall
scenario.’ Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1484.
It follows naturally from this proposition that the environment viewed as a
whole may satisfy the legal definition of an abusive working environment
although no single episode crosses the Title VII threshold.” Robinson at 1524.
7. “Claimant was uncomfortable communicating with his peers.”
FALSE
The employer admitted that I had supervisory skills and that during a six-month
period in 1989 I inspired my coworkers.
“Gary recently trained and supervised five temporary coders who were brought in
to expedite the coding of some 200,000 pages of document production. In doing
so, he inspired the group who were always eager to work and adopted Gary’s own
sense of commitment to the case.” [Ability to work with others:] Above
average. Constance Brown, November 6, 1989 [R. 219-222].
The performance evaluation dated May 1991, six months
before termination, described me as "a team player." I had been
assigned to the litigation support office suite on April 8, 1991. Said
evaluation also states: "Gary has recently moved down to the
terrace level and has truly become a part of the Lit Support team after being
isolated on the ninth floor [sic] [I worked in a large group office on the
ninth floor from October 1989 to April 1991]. He is both communicative
and personable and has made the adjustment well. [AREAS NEEDING IMPROVEMENT]:
None!" [R. 155-160].
8. “During the investigation of his concerns, it was also brought out that his
behavior had been disruptive, with occasional violent outbursts, and
frightening to co-workers.”
FALSE
There is no contemporaneous documentation to support this allegation. My
personnel file contains no record of such behavior and includes no record of
reprimands, either oral or written. My performance evaluations rated my
ability to work with others at least average or above-average.
9. “Because of the emotional and psychological nature of Mr. Freedman’s
complaints and those lodged against him, Messrs. Lassman and Race also sought
professional guidance from two outside consultants: (1) a representation from
the Employee Assistance Program [EAP]; and (2) a practicing psychiatrist.”
UNSUPPORTED
The psychiatrist, Gertrude R. Ticho, M.D. (deceased) later denied speaking with
anyone at Akin Gump and specifically denied ever having spoken to Dennis M.
Race, Esq. The EAP later disclosed that it had no record of any contacts with
Akin Gump and termed the employer’s allegation as sounding “fabricated” since
it violated the EAP’s established business practice.
EMPLOYER’S TORTIOUS CONDUCT
Under the American Psychiatric Association’s so-called Goldwater Rule a
psychiatrist may not offer a professional opinion to a third party about
someone she has not seen in private consultation and without the individual’s
written consent. The employer’s attorney managers either knew or should have
known about this provision. Cf. U.S. v.
Moore, 931 F.2d 245 (1991) (Akin Gump’s “very able counsel” are presumed to
know the law). The firm’s pleadings attributing mental illness to me on the
basis of an unethical psychiatric opinion constitutes defamation. See Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d
324 (1969).
10. “He . . . could not function in a group setting (he could not work with or
in close proximity to other legal assistants or litigation support personnel).”
FALSE
During the period March 1989 through October 1989 I shared office space with
two legal assistants. I did not complain about this arrangement. On August 1, 1989 I was granted full-time
status with benefits.
During the period October 1989 to April 1991 I shared a large office space with
numerous other legal assistants. I did not complain about this arrangement.
During the period April 1991 to October 1991 I worked in the litigation support
office suite adjacent to another legal assistant named Robert E. Dillon, Esq.,
now a practicing attorney in Philadelphia, PA (telephone: 215-568-5116).
I requested private office space on one occasion only, October 23-24, 1991.
During this time period (April-October 1991) two employees in litigation
support (Lutheria Harrison and Sherry Ann Patrick) requested and were granted a
change in office assignment. See
McNeil v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, D.C.D.C. Civil no. 93-0477
(1993) at note 2. Moreover, the employer admitted in unrelated litigation
that the litigation support office suite was rife with unprofessional behavior,
including insubordination, abuse of telephone privileges and anti-Semitic
invective. See McNeil v. Akin, Gump,
Strauss, Hauer & Feld, D.C.D.C. no. 93-0477 (1993) (on one occasion a
litigation support employee called a coworker a "Jewish bitch") [R.
57-61]
11. “When terminated, he was told that his actual work product was not a
problem.”
FALSE
This is a deliberate lie. At the termination meeting I was told that my
work was subpar and that my work performance was an issue in the termination
decision.
The record on appeal [R. 453-454] contains a document I wrote, date-stamped
September 25, 1992, that memorializes my telephone contacts with the employer's
attorney managers immediately after the termination, and which includes the
following recital:
“October 30, 1991 — Around 9:00 AM I telephoned Dennis Race at the office and
asked him if the firm would object to a claim for unemployment insurance. Mr.
Race said that the firm would not object, as long as I didn’t put down anything
that embarrassed the firm. Noting that the previous day, Mr. Race had said that
one of the reasons for my termination was that I ignored people’s corrections,
I directed Mr. Race’s attention to my job evaluation dated November 1989 that
expressly stated that I “catered to individual needs.” Mr. Race asked me if
J.D. Neary had written that; I said, no, Constance Brown. Mr. Race politely
explained that the problems with my work arose after that job evaluation had
been written, which apparently in Mr. Race’s mind, made that job evaluation
irrelevant. The telephone call was cordial. I was somewhat agitated since I
hadn’t slept the night before. ”
12. "During his transition from a legal assistant position (paralegal) to
his work with the litigation support department [March 1990], Claimant had
several discussions with his direct supervisor about problems with interacting
with co-workers and occasional outbursts."
FALSE
My personnel records do not support the allegation that I had any
contemporaneous difficulties with coworkers or outbursts. My performance
evaluations were above average or outstanding. D.C. Department of Human Rights
Finding of Fact no. 2. My ability to work with others was consistently
rated at least average or above average.
The contemporaneous performance evaluation dated May 1990 (covering the
previous six-month period) states:
Gary has picked up the basics of on-line coding with very minimal instructions.
With additional experience, he should adapt better to the software techniques.
Always mindful of quality control, which aids in more efficient data entry.
Relentless, thriving on huge volume while maintaining a good end product.
Totally independent, self-sustaining and committed to his work. Extremely solid
and aiming to please. I trust Gary’s ability to meet whatever the demand with
little guidance. Gary is receptive no matter what the task and takes every
assignment seriously. Even at times when material has to be redone because of
GPE’s. Great pressure buffer. I can be at ease knowing Gary will prevail. Gary
seems to find those small mistakes which are not obvious to the average eye.
Well-tuned, good analytical eye for detail. He can turn any combination of
words into a statement. [AREAS IN WHICH MOST CAPABLE]: His dedication to
consistency and detail, eager attitude and independent nature. [AREAS OF SIGNIFICANT
IMPROVEMENT]: Working directly with the computer. [AREAS NEEDING IMPROVEMENT]:
Adapting to the software environment, being aware of its characteristics and
sensitivities and distinguishing those traits which are unique to each base. Of
course, with time, this atmosphere will be more evident. [ABILITY TO WORK WITH
OTHERS:] Average. [R. 311-314]
13. “Until the filing of this Charge [on February 4, 1992], the subject of
Claimant’s sexual orientation was never brought up by Claimant or anyone
involved directly or indirectly with Claimant’s employment. While Claimant
raised concerns about sexual and religious harassment, he never stated that it
was based on his sexual orientation — nor was it ever interpreted as such by anyone
involved in this matter.”
FALSE
This is a deliberate lie. The D.C. Department of Human Rights specifically
found that the subject of my sexual orientation came up at a meeting with the
employer on October 23, 1991, days before the termination on October 29, 1991. See D.C.
Department of Human Rights Finding of Fact no. 7. The D.C. Court
of Appeals affirmed this agency finding of fact. The employer willfully
lied about its knowledge about my membership in a protected class, which is
definitive proof of pretext. Cf. Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 68 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Pretext . . . means
a lie, specifically a phony reason for some action."); cf. Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
13 F.3d 1120, 1124 (7th Cir. 1994) ("If the only reason an employer offers
for firing an employee is a lie, the inference that the real reason was a
forbidden one . . . may rationally be drawn.") quoting Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 401
(7th Cir. 1990).
Sincerely,
Gary Freedman
cc: U.S. Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch
